Iranian Politics
The Revolution of 1979 brought about a fundamental change in Iranian attitudes toward politics. Under the monarchy the political culture had been elitist in the sense that all major governmental decisions were made by the Shah and his ministers. Most of the population acquiesced in this approach to politics. The fusion of traditional Shia Islamic ideals with political values during the Revolution resulted in the emergence of a populist political culture. The principal characteristics of this political culture are pervasive feelings that the government is obligated to ensure social justice and that every citizen should participate in politics. These feelings are acknowledged by the political leadership, which constantly expresses its concern for the welfare of the mostazafin (disinherited) and persistently praises the people's work in a host of political and religious associations.
The transformation of the political culture owed much to the charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini. He was determined not simply to overthrow the monarchy, but also to replace it with a new society that derived its values from Islam. Khomeini believed that the long-term success of such an ideal Islamic government was dependent on the commitment and involvement of the masses. He envisaged the clergy as responsible for providing religious guidance, based on their expertise in Islamic law, to the people as they worked to create a new society in which religion and politics were fused. Khomeini's reputation for piety, learning, and personal integrity, as well as his forceful personality, were important factors in the mobilization of thousands of committed followers to carry out the desecularization of the country's political institutions.
Mass political involvement was both an objective and a characteristic of post-revolutionary Iran. Political participation, however, was not through political parties, but through religious institutions. The mosque became the single most important popular political institution. Participation in weekly congregational prayers, at which a political sermon was always delivered, was considered both a religious and a civic duty. For political aspirants, attendance at the weekly prayers was mandatory. Numerous religiopolitical associations are centered on the mosques. These organizations undertook a wide variety of activities, such as distributing ration coupons, investigating the religious credentials of aspirants for local offices, conducting classes in subjects ranging from the study of Arabic to superpower imperialism, and setting up teams to monitor shop prices and personal behavior. These organizations tended to be voluntary associations whose members devote several hours per week to their activities. Although most of these voluntary associations were for men, several were specifically for women.
Religious, rather than secular, organizations thus have the most important political roles. Factories, schools, and offices also had Islamic associations that undertook functions similar to those of the mosque voluntary associations. Although many secular groups exist, the majority of such associations as industrial and professional unions, university clubs, and mercantile organizations had acquired religious overtones. These private organizations generally had religious advisers who provided guidance to members on prayer ritual, Islamic law, and Shia history. Associations that tried to avoid mixing religion with business were often suspected of being anti-Islamic and risked having their articles of incorporation revoked.
The Iranians who accepted the dominant role of religion referred to themselves as hezbollahis. They tend to be fervent both in their profession of religious belief and in their loyalty to the Islamic Republic. Self-identified hezbollahis often joinned the numerous mosque-related voluntary associations, the Pasdaran, and the personal staffs of the leading ayatollahs. Given their strong commitment to the regime, it was inevitable that hezbollahis would resent those whom they perceived as critical of the government. By 1987, however, it was still not possible, owing to the lack of field research in Iran from the time of the Revolution, to estimate what percent of the adult population considered themselves true hezbollahis, what percent was generally indifferent and simply acquiesced to regime policies, or what percent strongly disapproved of the government.
As of 1987, Iran was divided into twenty-four provinces (ostans). Each province was subdivided into several counties (shahrestans). Shahrestans numbered 195, each of which was centered on the largest town within its boundaries. Most shahrestans took their names from those towns that served as county seats. All of the shahrestans consisted of two or more districts, or bakhshs. The 498 bakhshs were further subdivided into rural subdistricts (dehestans). Each dehestan consisted of several villages dispersed over an average area of 1,600 square kilometers.
The pre-revolutionary provincial administrative structure was still employed in 1987. Thus, each province was headed by a governor general (ostandar), who was appointed by the minister of interior. Each county was headed by a governor (farmandar), also appointed by the minister of interior. Local officials, such as the chiefs of districts (bakhshdars), rural subdistricts (dehyars), and villages (kadkhudas), were appointed by the provincial governors general and county governors. These local officials served as representatives of the central government.
Prior to the Revolution, the governor general was the most powerful person in each province. After 1979, however, the clerical imam jomehs, or prayer leaders, have exercised effective political power at the provincial level. The imam jomeh was the designated representative of the faqih in each county. Until 1987 each imam jomeh was appointed from among the senior clergy of the county. In June 1987, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini approved guidelines for the election of imam jomehs. The imam jomehs have tended to work closely with the komitehs (revolutionary committees) and the Pasdaran, and in most counties these organizations are subordinate to the imam jomehs.
As of 2007 Iran was divided into 30 provinces. The provinces are subdivided into counties (321 in 2007), districts, and villages. Each province was still administered by a governor general appointed by the central government. The governor general, in consultation with the Ministry of Interior, then appointed the governor of each county in the province and, in consultation with the latter, the chief of each district. At the local level, directly elected city and village councils have exerted substantial authority since the first local elections in 1999.
Suffrage was universal at age 16. Direct elections every four years choose the Majlis, president, and local councils. Because these elections are not held simultaneously, Iranians generally vote in a national election every year. Each of the 290 seats of the Majlis nominally represents constituencies of about 200,000, but distribution favors urban areas. The city of Tehran, for example, has 30 at-large constituencies. Candidates for office at any level may simply declare themselves by filing a registration form and paying a nominal fee. The Ministry of Interior and the Central Oversight Committee of the Guardians Council vet candidates for the presidency, parliament, and Assembly of Experts. Local boards supervise elections at the lowest governmental levels. Important qualifications for candidacy are a history of participating in the 1978–79 Revolution and a reputation for being a devout Muslim and observer of Islamic law. Post-secondary education also is relevant for national office. Candidates for the Assembly of Experts must be senior Islamic clergymen. The Guardians Council has used its vetting capacity to disqualify a high percentage of reformist candidates.
