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Further Reading

Defense Policy

The first "root and branch" review of Britain's defence policy for 10 years was announced by the government on 04 July 2009. 'The government is beginning a process that will enable a Strategic Defence Review early in the next parliament,' the ministry said in a statement. The next election must be held by June 2010, with the parliament being formed shortly afterwards. Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth said he wanted to "ensure the armed forces are fit for the challenges of tomorrow". He promised a Green Paper in early 2010 setting out initial thoughts followed by a more substantive Strategic Defence Review after the next general election. He said the first stages of the review would cover the "strategic context" for defence, including the lessons learned from recent operations and the "changing character of conflict".

The Tories, who could be in power by that time, indicated that a Conservative government could use the green paper to inform its thinking when it carried out its own promised SDR. Shadow defence secretary Liam Fox said the review should have been held at least two years ago. "This announcement represents the last gasp of a dying Government under a Prime Minister who has never given the armed forces the priority they deserve." Defence emerged as a key area for possible cuts by the Conservatives. David Cameron had not been able to commit fully to an updated Trident nuclear deterrent and refused to say whether two planned new aircraft carriers would still be built if he took power.

In recognition of the 'new strategic realities' of the post-Cold War era, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) structured Britain's armed forces on an 'expeditionary' basis to meet the demands of modern, complex emergencies instead of the traditional NATO European role. This was very much in line with the policy of the 1920s, in which the apparent absence of an immediate great power threat, codified in the Ten Year Rule, led Britain to a strategy of colonial administration based on the deterrent effect of rapid worldwide force projection. In the 1920s, with no need to plan for a major global or European conflict for ten years, the armed forces concentrated on imperial policing roles. In 1998, expounded within this expeditionary theme was the key issue of 'Jointery' and the recognition in a 'Joint Vision Statement' that 'the traditional distinction between ground, sea and air theatres of operations is rapidly being replaced by a single battlespace, embracing all 3 environments'.

Announcing the conclusions of the Strategic Defence Review to the House of Commons today Defence Secretary George Robertson said on 02 July 1998: "The Strategic Defence Review has delivered on this Government s promise to provide strong defence for the future. This radical review will modernise and re-shape our Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century, and give them the firm foundation which they need to plan for the long term.... We will transform the way in which the Armed Forces do business. New tri-service organisations will take the best from each of the Services and maximise their collective punch. We shall be taking major initiatives to ensure that we recruit the best people from all walks of life, that we get the best from them, and that they benefit from the best of modern employers.

In an historic agreement between the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff, a joint RN/RAF fixed wing force, "Joint Force 2000", will operate from both land and our aircraft carriers. This will initially bring together the Sea Harrier FA2 and RAF Harrier GR7 into joint operating packages, but in future the RN and RAF both plan to operate a single, common aircraft from land and sea - the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft.

Strategic lift to allow a rapid response capability will be enhanced by acquiring 4 more RORO container ships (probably through a PFI deal), giving us 6 in total. This will allow us to deploy the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, including their heavy armour and protection, at very short notice.

The emphasis will move from large scale open-ocean warfare to force projection and littoral operations in conjunction with the other two Services, with a premium on versatility and deployability. To that end, the government planned to procure two large aircraft carriers, capable of operating up to 50 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters from all three services at one time (compared with a maximum of 24 aircraft now), which will give a new, potent and flexible maritime capability to project power. The government decided to strengthen support to the brigade-sized amphibious force (5,000 troops), by acquiring an additional 4 RoRo container ships to add to the existing two (Sea Chieftain and Sea Crusader). This is in addition to the new helicopter carrier (HMS Ocean), the two replacement Landing Platforms Dock (Albion and Bulwark) and two replacement Landing Ships Logistic. These were offset by small reductions in the size of our attack submarine (12 to 10), surface escort (35 to 32) and mine countermeasure forces (18 to 22 instead of 25).

The SDR restructured the front line to provide six, not five deployable armoured or mechanised brigades to help reduce overstretch, provide greater flexibility and, together with the formation of the JRRF, the ability to undertake two brigade size operations (one of which could be sustained indefinitely) simultaneously at short notice.