Luftwaffe - Air Force
Fliegerkorps (air corps)
|
Jagdkorps
|
The Nazi seizure of power had a profound effect on German aviation. Hitler's heir-apparent, Hermann Goering, was appointed to the newly created position of Air Minister and assumed control of the covert air force, which immediately began a period of rapid expansion. As his deputy, Goering selected Erhard Milch, director of Lufhansa. Milch began immediately to increase the production of training aircraft. While Goering occupied himself with political matters, Milch did most of the planning work for the new air force. According to Milch's calculations, a period of 8 to 10 years would be necessary to build up an adequate nucleus for the new service. Political considerations were later to require an acceleration of this program. With his well-known passion for uniforms and display, Goering was appointed a General der Infanterie in the ground forces pending the unveiling of the new German Air Force. The clauses of the Versailles Treaty that had disarmed Germany were publicly denounced by Hitler on 16 March 1935.
A subsequent law, of 21 May 1935, brought the Air Force into the open and established it as a separate service. The law of 21 May also set the period of training for conscripts at one year. The Nazis used air power as one of the main ways to extend their influence over Europe and Asia, and indeed, much of the world. The distinctions between civil and military aviation were blurred, as the Nazi swastika, painted on both combat and passenger aircraft, became a powerful symbol of Nazi aspirations. It was a common sight to see Lufthansa aircraft with the swastika emblazoned on their tail fins.
The Luftwaffe by March 1939 was a potent attack force, which would have 4,303 operational aircraft available by the outbreak of hostilities. These would include 1,180 bombers, 336 dive bombers, 1,179 fighters, 552 transports, 721 observation planes, 240 naval aircraft, and 95 miscellaneous airplanes.
Goering's headquarters was known as the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL), or High Command of the Air Force. The four major subordinate air commands were designated as Luftflotten (air forces), and controlled both tactical and administrative units. This arrangement contrasted sharply with that of the Army, which had separate channels of command for its tactical and administrative components. Tactical air units were dispersed about Germany in eight air divisions. The administrative commands, 10 in number, were known as Luftgaue, similar to the Army's Wehrkreise, and provided the tactical air units with logistical support.
The organization of each air force was arranged to meet the particular needs of its respective mission. As a consequence, organization varied from one air force to the other. In general, each of the four air forces contained all types of aircraft in service, e. g. fighters, bombers', transports, and reconnaissance planes. The First Air Force had its headquarters in Berlin and responsibility for northern and eastern Germany. Braunschweig was the headquarters of the Second Air Force, dispersed over northwestern Germany. The Third Air Force, responsible for southwestern and southern Germany, was located in Munich. Vienna was headquarters for the Fourth Air Force, responsible for Austria and a portion of southeastern Germany. A separate tactical and administrative command of corps size was assigned to East Prussia and retained under OKL control.
The German Air Force in 1939 would experience no immediate problem insofar as personnel wras concerned. The Luftwaffe's training program had turned out a sufficient number of pilots and air crews to man an expanded wartime Air Force. For its part, German industry had provided the Luftwaffe with some of the most advanced operational aircraft of the day. The British and French Air Forces were larger, but a considerable number of their aircraft were obsolete or obsolescent. The Luftwaffe lacked airframe and engine replacements for sustained operations, however. Repair facilities, though well organized, were not nearly extensive enough for a major war effort.
Ultimately, however, it failed to deter France and Britain from declaring war in September 1939. Efficient and flexible within its limits, the Luftwaffe was the only one of the three services that made the immediate risks of a two-front war calculable. It promised quick victory in Poland and the simultaneous ability to hold off the air forces of the Western powers. Engaged in a total war, the Luftwaffe's fundamental problem was that it was not prepared to operate independently. Its aircraft and doctrine alike were tailored to support ground forces.
At the outset of World War II, the Luftwaffe was, undoubtedly, the world's supreme air force. It had the most advanced fighter and bomber aircraft and the best trained crews. Despite this, the Luftwaffe suffered severe losses during the course of the war. Its loss can be attributed to several factors, not the least of which was its inability to take advantage of, or maintain, the technological superiority enjoyed at the outset of hostilities. The technological superiority was not limited to aircraft fielded during the war but includes interesting technical innovations that arose during the war but not fielded by the Luftwaffe.
Equipment was not the only area in which quality suffered. As the war progressed, training for pilots was cut almost in half, primarily because of the need to have replacements for pilots lost in combat. The result was pilots significantly less skilled than earlier groups that entered combat. Poorly trained pilots, flying inferior equipment against a determined enemy on two fronts, was a sure recipe to create an even greater need for replacement pilots. In short, the German economy and industry could not keep up with the demands of a two-front, widely flung war and elected the desperation strategy of throwing everything it had into the fray, regardless of training or expertise. The result was the 1,000-year Reich lasted a mere 12 years.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
