Afghanistan Drug Control - Eradication
The drug eradication program has been run without adequate aid, aid workers, and Afghan government support to provide alternative income. In 2007, total effective eradication, including governor-led and AEF-led efforts, amounted to 19,047 hectares which is equal 10 percent of the total opium poppy cultivation. By 2008 was that many Afghans were dependent on growing opium, confronting the threat of eradication without adequate options. This has driven opium cultivation into Taliban-controlled areas in southern Afghanistan, effectively funding the insurgency. Corruption and violence continue to hinder the eradication process.
Several factors complicated the eradication process. First, corruption is believed to have hindered the eradication process with some eradication focal points using the opportunity to try to extract money from farmers in exchange for sparing their field. Equally challenging, some eradication focal points experienced violence directed toward themselves. In total, 16 security incidents resulting in 15 police fatalities and 31 injuries and 10 tractor burnings were reported during the 2007 eradication campaign. The security situation was particularly problematic in southern and western provinces.
The Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations have both expressed fears that Afghanistan is at risk of becoming a narco-state as organized criminal groups linked to drug trafficking gain power or are able to overwhelm government officials. There is little data available on the number of organized crime groups operating in Afghanistan and even less data regarding the extent to which these groups are involved in producing, trafficking or selling drugs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the processes of vertical integration and increasing organization may be occurring in Afghanistan. Vertical integration can be defined as the degree to which a criminal organisation (in this case, a trafficking group) owns its upstream suppliers and its downstream buyers. Networks of patronage-based organized crime groups operate on the basis of protection. However, it is worth noting that these groups do not resemble hierarchical organizations with a clearly defined leadership as seen with FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia for example.
There are several risk factors that magnify the threat of organized crime in Afghanistan including the lure of large profits available from the opium economy, the permissive environment created by a lack of effective government control, and in particular the lack of institutional transparency.
The large profits available from the Afghanistan opium economy provide a significant incentive for any group to organise and attempt to control part of it. It is estimated that the opium economy is worth $4 billion USD. Out of this amount, only a quarter is earned by farmers ($1 billion USD). Indeed, it is believed that a significant portion of the $3 billion USD that accrues ends up in the hands of warlords, organized criminal groups and insurgents.
The second risk factor is the permissive environment created by the lack of effective government control. The central government, even during the periods that it was in place, has rarely been able to exert effective control over the full scope of its territory and other power brokers have stepped in to fill in the vacuum. These power brokers have an interest in personal enrichment but also in maintaining their power base, which requires easy access to funds by controling parts of the opium economy.
The Paris Pact is an international partnership to combat traffic in and abuse of Afghan opiates. At the first Ministerial Conference on Drug Routes from Central Asia to Europe held in Paris in May 2003, more than 60 countries and international organizations agreed to join forces in order to limit the flow of opiates from Afghanistan to and through all countries along the smuggling routes. At the second Ministerial Conference on Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan held in Moscow in June 2006 partners reiterated the need for enhanced and coordinated counter narcotics action to reduce opiates trafficking, consumption and related health problems in the region. UNODC is leading the follow-up to these Ministerial Conferences through the Paris Pact Initiative, a project that facilitates periodical consultations at the expert and policy level and also aims to strengthen data collection and analytical capacities in and around Afghanistan. This project also provides partners with the use of a secure, automated internet-based tool for the coordination of technical assistance in the field of counter narcotics (ADAM - www.paris-pact.net). http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/regional/central-asia.html
