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Further Reading

Afghan Air Force (AAF)
Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC)

Most aircraft still remaining by 2001 were destroyed by coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. What was left of the Afghan Air Force was a few dozen pilots, most of whom had not flown since 1996, occupying a part of Bagram Air Base near Kabul. As part of the establishment of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in 2002, an Air Corps was subsequently established within the new Afghan National Army (ANA).

Afghanistan required an air force of a modest size. Few would dispute the need for a transport capability, but some fighting power was also required if the Afghan National Army was expected to operate independently of US air support. Therefore, at some point, surely before the year 2020, a political decision would have to be made to invest in the reconstitution of an Afghan Air Force with a fighting capability. In the shorter term, the existing ANAAC, which suffered from ageing and antiquated equipment, required immediate investment merely to establish an air lift capacity.

The ANAAC was in a very poor state as of late 2004. It lacked airworthy combat planes and possessed only a few attack helicopters. Airlift capabilities were very modest, with maybe 10 utility and attack helicopters and a few light transport planes at their disposal. Maintenance technicians were being trained, but no pilots. The Afghan National Army Air Corps relied on the vast pool of pilots who were trained during the communist period. More than 450 enlisted with the Afghan National Air Air Corps, but the majority of these serviceman had logged very few flying hours since 1990.

While the United States had said that it intended to rebuild the air force and various other states had made offers to donate equipment, no material aid had arrived by 2005. At that time essentially all air operations in Afghanistan were conducted by US and other allied aircraft.

In June 2010, President Hamid Karzai redesignated the Afghan National Army Air Corps as the Afghan Air Force (AAF). The name change did not make the AAF independent from the ANA, but the move affirmed Afghan intent to eventually return the air force to its former independent status. By 2011, the AAF's long-term development strategy envisioned an air force that could support the needs of the ANSF and the Afghan Government by 2016. It would be capable of Presidential airlift, air mobility, rotary and fixed-wing close air support, casualty evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance. The AAF also planned to be able to sustain its capacity through indigenous training institutions, including a complete education and training infrastructure. The air fleet would consist of a mix of Russian and Western airframes. Afghan airmen would operate in accordance with NATO procedures, and would be able to support the Afghan Government effectively by employing all of the instruments of COIN airpower. The United States viewed this plan as ambitious and said that it belied a continuing tension between aspirations and affordability.

During the final quarter of 2010, NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan (NATC-A) completed the initial stage of the AAF's Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI). The second stage was to run from February to April 2011. This effort had 3 purposes. First, the PAI established a true quantitative baseline for AAF personnel strength. Each AAF member provided personal data integral to identifying and calculating the AAF's total force and technical proficiency levels. Second, the PAI collected biometric data from each airman, allowing the Ministry of Interior (MoI) criminal investigation division to cross-reference the national databases to identify airmen with criminal histories. Finally, the PAI gathered electronic funds transfer (EFT) information from each airman. NATC-A then incorporates the EFT data and the remaining PAI information into the Afghan Personnel Information Management System (PIMS). Using this financial information, officials could identify and correct AAF pay irregularities and the "shadow" accounts sometimes used to collect these payments. In sum, the PAI supported efforts to build a transparent, professional, and sustainable AAF.

In January 2011, the AAF had 56 of its planned fleet of 146 aircraft, including 35 Mi-17 helicopters, 9 Mi-35 attack helicopters, 9 C-27 airlifters, and 3 An-32 airlifters. The AAF fleet reflected the Afghan Government's COIN airpower priorities. The Mi-17 was an effective rotary-wing airframe due to its durable structure and lift capacity at high altitude. The Mi-35 provided an indigenous, albeit limited, close air support capability for the ANSF. The C-27 was the AAF's first modern, all-weather-capable aircraft.

As of March 2011, in conjunction with the AAF, the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the US Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) planned and requested funding for a comprehensive aircraft acquisition and modernization plan. By 2016, the Mi-17 fleet will grow to 56. Discussions were under way to extend the service life of the Mi-35, which would allow the airframe to remain in the AAF inventory through 2016. A number of other key acquisitions were included in the planning. It was expected that the AAF's Antonov An-32 aircraft would be replaced by the 20 C-27A aircraft, a turboprop, fixed-wing airlifter. Nine C-27A's were on-hand by April 2011 and 11 were to be delivered by 2012. The AAF expected to procure 6 initial flight training rotary wing aircraft with expected delivery by October 2011. Procurement of up to 32 "Cessna-like" fixed-wing aircraft was also planned for initial flight and basic fixed-wing screening with expected delivery beginning in October 2011 and completion by FY13. A potential procurement of up to 20 aircraft for fixed-wing close air support was also to be investigated.

Assembling an experienced, professional AAF, including an instructor cadre that could provide pilot and technical training, was the focus of NTM-A/CSTC-A's "Airmen Build" line of operation. By the end of March 2011, AAF manning was expected to reach 4,728 Airmen, an increase of 630 airmen over the December 2010 strength. The Afghans and NTM-A/CSTC-A continued to research opportunities to bolster both the AAF NCO and Officer Corps in an effort to develop the force in both quantity and quality as it grows to the proposed 2011 end strength of 8,017 personnel (expected to be reached by March 2012). Attrition at the time stood near 1.4 percent per month, which was an acceptable level to maintain professional and technical skills. Factors limiting growth include education levels, English language requirements, and pilot training, which were factors that also limited the AAF's ability to produce personnel who were able to perform the technically advanced specialties required for aircraft maintenance and airfield support.

On 3 March 2011, the Presidential Airlift Squadron completed its first move of President Karzai by an all-Afghan crew. One air advisor remained in the formation to provide assistance, if required, but was not on the President's aircraft.