Littoral Combat Ship Program
As of mid-2001 the Office of Naval Research was considering construction of a Littoral Combat Ship with a displacement of 500 to 600 tons. The LCS would have a draft of about three meters, an operational range of 4,000 nautical miles, and a maximum speed of 50-60 knots. The cost per ship might be at least $90 million.
On 6 January 2002, Adm. Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, proposed buying 10 new ships and 210 new aircraft annually within six years. This would have taken an increase of $10 billion in procurement funds over the existing budget, which was to buy five ships and 88 planes. Clark also called for developing a fleet of new warships, including the small, fast and relatively cheap Littoral Combat Ship. The service's 2003 budget proposal would permit the purchase of just five ships, half the total the Navy needs just to sustain today's fleet of around 315. With the 30 to 60 littoral ships Clark advocated, the total force would reach between 345 and 375.
The Defense Planning Guidance in May 2002 directed the Navy to pursue a new class of small, stealthy "Littoral Combatant Ships" to support troops ashore and to conduct anti-mine, intelligence and reconnaissance operations. The Navy planned to build two "Flight Zero" LCS vessels to refine the new class' concept of operations. More detailed mission modules are to be developed for the Flight One LCS that was hoped would appear soon after 2007. The Navy wanted to buy eight of these ships through 2009, with the first in 2005.
Focused-Mission High Speed Ship Concept Studies [FMHSS]
The Navy went out with a recent Request for Proposal to obtain industry concepts for a High Speed Ship. The Navy would review the concepts for possible applicability to the Littoral Combat Ship. With this in mind, the contract was not for LCS, rather studies that would further refine the Navy's requirements and knowledge of technology options for the proposed Littoral Combat Ship and other future ship classes.
On 8 November 2002, six companies were each awarded a firm-fixed-price contract worth $500,000 for the performance of focused-mission ship concept studies intended to explore a range of approaches in an overall effort to define future ship requirements. These studies would further refine the Navy's requirements and knowledge of technology options for the proposed Littoral Combat Ship and other future ship classes. This was a part of the Naval services tranformation into the 21st Century and a part of the foundation for future warships. The focused-mission ship to be studied was envisioned to be a networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric threats in the littorals. Its primary missions would be prosecution of small boats, mine-countermeasures, and littoral anti-submarine warfare.
The companies, Bath Iron Works Corp, Bath, Maine, Gibbs & Cox, Inc, Arlington, Virginia, John J. McMullen Associates, Inc, Alexandria, Virginia, Lockheed Martin, Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems - Marine System, Baltimore, Maryland, Northrop Grumman - Ship Systems, Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Textron Systems, Marine & Land Operations, New Orleans, Louisiana, each performed a 90-day ship concept study to research innovative concepts for a focused-mission, high-speed ship. These contracts were awarded following a full and open competition, during which eighteen offers were received.
The General Dynamics team was led by Bath Iron Works, and included leading US and international defense contractors. Team members are The Boeing Company, Austal, USA, of Mobile, Alabama, British Aerospace Corporation (BAE), Maritime Applied Physics Corporation, CAE Marine Systems and five other General Dynamics business units. The team developed an integrated system that delivered significantly enhanced capabilities to naval, joint and coalition forces operating within the littorals. In defining system design characteristics, the team addressed FMHSS integration with FORCEnet, the information network into which the Navy planned integrate sensors, decision aids and weapons, as well as other joint and coalition information networks. The spectrum of technologies to be evaluated by the team would include all forms of remotely deployed and operated vehicles, distributed sensors, modular payloads, weapons, communications, command and control and automation systems as well as advanced propulsion technologies and hull construction materials.
The team had chosen to base its FMHSS hull design on advanced Trimaran hull form technology. Results of recent Office of Naval Research sponsored high-speed Trimaran studies completed by Bath Iron Works would be coupled with an existing Trimaran design available through Austal, USA, to create a highly automated ship capable of speeds in excess of 50 knots. This ship would have significantly lighter displacement than the Navy's FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class of frigates designed and built at Bath Iron Works and would be capable of extended independent operations with a crew of just 25-30. The advanced Trimaran design offers outstanding efficiency and performance in all sea conditions, endurance and reliability for sustained independent operations and a high degree of flexibility/adaptability to meet evolving military requirements through open architecture and modular configuration. The system was expected to enable advanced operational concepts such as those employing high speed, enhanced maneuver, distributed forces and reduced signatures as well as the ability to efficiently embark from a broad array of aircraft, amphibious, land and marine vehicles.
On 22 October 2002, the Northrop Grumman Corporation announced that it had signed a cooperative agreement with Kockums AB and its parent company, Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG (HDW), under which Kockums would join a team assembled by Northrop Grumman's Ship Systems sector to compete for the US Navy's Focused Mission Vessel Study. This study was expected to result in the development and construction of a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), one element of the DD(X) family of surface combatants planned for construction by the Navy during the next quarter century.
The cooperative agreement between Northrop Grumman, Kockums and HDW covers business opportunities for the design, development, construction and sale of Visby-class ships and/or derivative technology to the US government for the LCS and other US programs, and for sales to friendly international governments through the Foreign Military Sales program. Northrop Grumman plans to use the Visby as the baseline for development of Ship Systems' proposal for the Navy's LCS program. Combining the proven hull and composite technology developed by Kockums with Northrop Grumman's composite and overall ship integration experience would allow the Navy to rely upon a proven, full-service shipbuilder, with access to state-of-the-art fielded technology, for the LCS program.
In April 2003, at the US Navy League's Sea Air Space Exposition Team LCS, the Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems and John J. Mullen Associates Inc. partnership, unveiled their Littoral Combat Ship design based on Norway's Skjold class patrol boat. Raytheon was the prime contractor and was responsible for the systems architecture and ships systems integration. JJMA was heading up the naval engineering and ship design competencies. UMOE was working on the hull design and manufacturing processes. Goodrich heads up the composite design and fabrication and Atlantic Marine, Inc. was the shipyard.
Also at Sea Air Space Exposition 2003, Lockheed Martin LCS Team unveiled Sea Blade, an Advanced Semi-Planing Seaframe, for the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship program.
Textron Systems and EDO Combat Systems (also at the Navy League's Expo) submitted a ship design, the Hybrid Catamaran Air Cushion (HCAC), that uses Textron Marine & Lands considerable experience with air-supported craft, such as the LCAC. The ship design also had the ability to operate as a catamaran, in which mode it was able to sustain a cruise speed of 18-20 knots.
Preliminary Design
On 10 February 2003 the Navy announced that it would soon issue a formal request for proposals to build the LCS. The Navy said that it would award 3 contracts worth $10 million each, some time in July 2003, for a preliminary design concept. The US Navy plans included a first flight of two ships to be begin construction in 2005 and 2006 and for the follow-on flights to begin construction by 2008.
On 17 July 2003 the Navy announced that General Dynamics (including Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine, and Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems), Surface Systems, Washington, DC, and Raytheon Company, Integrated Defense Systems, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, were each being awarded a contract for the performance of Flight 0 littoral combat ship (LCS) preliminary design. Each contractor was to perform a seven-month preliminary design effort to refine its proposed littoral combat ship concept.
Total Program Objectives
In the Navy's FY06 plan, the 30-year force structure profile for 260 and 325 ships proposed building 63 and 82 LCS, respectively, covering the period from FY06 to FY36.
As of mid-2006 the Navy's current plans called for a total of 55 of the agile, high-speed LCS ships to be built for the Navy’s surface fleet. Each ship would be capable of carrying any one of the mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare or surface mission packages at a given time. In its shipbuilding plan delivered to Congress in February 2007, the Navy outlined plans to procure a total of 23 LCS between FY07 and FY11 at a cost of $6.8 billion and a total of 51 from FY07 to FY16 at an average cost of $270 million. By FY18, the Navy expected to reach a total of 55 LCS.
By early 2006 costs for the Littoral Combat Ship had increased by as much as 29 percent for the first ship and as much as 33 percent for follow-on ships that were intended to be procured in FY09 to FY11. Sea frame procurement costs in the service's FY07 budget had increased from those shown in the FY06 budget. The estimate for the first LCS increased from $212.5 million to $274.5 million, an increase of about 29 percent. The estimate for the second LCS increased from $256.5 million to $278.1 million, an increase of about 8 percent.
Flight 0 would consist of at least twelve or possibly thirteen ships, up from the initial plan of four. A Lockheed-Martin Industry Team and a General Dynamics Industry team would each initially build two ships with follow-on deliveries pending final acquisition strategy for the LCS program. The LCS working in concert with the rest of the fleet, was expected to bring substantially increased capability to the fleet in assuring access to the littorals ands in executing the Navy’s Strategy. While designed for three littoral focused missions: anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and surface warfare, its high speed, open combat system architecture, mission bay and large flight deck provide the capability to support a number of other emergent missions. Moreover, its reduced crew size, modular interchangeable focused mission payloads and revolutionary acquisition process lay the groundwork for the future of naval surface combatants.
International Cooperation Opportunity (ICO)
The International Cooperation Opportunities Group (ICOG) identified nine (9) areas/tasks of potential international cooperation in development and application of technology to Littoral Ships. Each of these tasks would have oversight from all participating Five Power Nations (France, Italy, Germany, UK and US), but would be led by a "Lead Nation" that would develop final Statements of Work (SOWs) and provide pertinent funds for a 1 to 1-1/2 year project. The Procurement Agencies of the Five Power Nations intend to award purchase orders/contracts to support these initiatives. The final SOWs would be based on the draft SOWs and inputs from expressions of interest. All SOWs would be combined into an "ICO" (International Cooperation Opportunity) that would be presented to the national Armaments Directors (NADS) for approval on 29 October 2003.
Work was planned to start in January 2004 and would continue for a period of 12-18 months. This scope of work was to constitute Phase I, which was explained in more detail below. Continuation into Phase II activities would be determined by Phase I outcomes. All 5 countries would participate in the oversight of all 9 tasks. A future selection would be made on which of the 9 initiatives would be further developed and become available for international support and use on any of the five nation's Littoral Ship Programs.
The ICOG-led projects (Phase I) ("Tasks of the ICO") were are broken into platform and mission modules as follows:
- 1. Platform Task, Future Propulsion and Power Generation Technologies and Fuel Cell System Implementation (Lead Nation: Germany)
- 2. Mission Module Task, Littoral Combat System Mission Module Concepts, Lead Nation: UK. 3. Mission Module Task, Integrated Antenna Systems (IAS) (Lead Nation: France)
- 4. Mission Module Task, Gun Modules and Extended Capability (Lead Nation: Italy)
- 5. Mission Module Task, Common Opto-Electric Laser Detection Systems (COLDS) (Lead Nation: Germany)
- 6. Mission Module Task, UAV Recovery Underway (Lead Nation: France)
- 7. Mission Module Task, Interfaces, Standards and Interoperability and Open Architecture (Lead Nation: US)
- 8. Mission Module Task, Rules, Regulations and Standards for Composite Materials and High Speed Structures (Lead Nation: US)
- 9. Mission Module Task, Damage Control vs. Manpower Requirements (Lead Nation: Italy)
The ICOG Project was initiated in 1996 by the United States, Italy, Germany, UK and France, with an initial goal for cooperation on common mission problems focused on coalition security needs to include:
- Extended air defense
- Combat identification
- Coordinated logistics and Interoperable communications
- Initiate concurrent governmental and industrial activities to match promising innovative technologies with upcoming national requirements
- Establish ICOs (international cooperation opportunities)
- Report results
- Hull and propulsion, signatures, offensive and defensive weapons systems, command & control components, communications and data link, networking and combat system integration
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
- Chemical-Biological/WMD Defense
- Training and Exercises
- Combat Identification
- Land Mine Countermeasures
- Sea Mine Countermeasures
- Air Refueling Technologies
- Interoperable Tactical Communications
With other task forces for:
2007 GAO Review
In March 2007 the Government Accountability Office reviewed 64 defense system programs, including the LCS. In the report it was noted that seven of the technologies under development were used in multiple applications or mission packages. Since these technologies were used on different platforms or environments, the program office chose to assess them in each setting separately, resulting in a total of 36 critical technologies, 22 of which were considered mature.
Delivery of the first mine warfare mission package would align with delivery of the first ship in June 2007. Of the 16 technologies used for mine warfare, only the Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep system (OASIS), remains immature. Tests to demonstrate this technology in a relevant environment were scheduled for the first quarter of FY07. Five other technologies were close to full maturity, while 10 others were fully mature.
The first antisubmarine and surface warfare packages would align with delivery of the second LCS in FY08. Of the 13 technologies dedicated to antisubmarine warfare, 3 remain in development, including the advanced deployable system and two subsystems for the antisubmarine variant of the remote mine-hunting vehicle. While the program expected to demonstrate the two subsystems in a relevant environment in late FY07, plans to mature advanced deployable system were unclear. An additional 4 technologies were near full maturity, while the remaining 6 were fully mature. Of the 7 technologies dedicated to surface warfare, the non-line-of-sight missile system was the only one not fully mature. It was expected to be demonstrated in a relevant environment in mid-FY07. Between the previous GAO and March 2007 report, the unmanned surface vehicle was removed from the surface warfare mission, although it was still to used in other missions.
The majority of ship-specific technologies were considered mature or close to full maturity. The Lockheed Martin design, the first to enter production, had 9 of 10 technologies mature or close to full maturity, only a system used to launch and retrieve small boats was not mature. The General Dynamics design currently had all of its technologies mature or close to full maturity. The program has reduced the number of critical technologies monitored to conform with DoD’s definition of a critical technology, a new or novel technology used to meet key requirements. Although not designated as critical, these technologies remained in the ships’ design.
According to the GAO, costs for constructing Flight 0 ships had grown due to development of a formal cost estimate, incorporation of lessons learned in construction of the first ships, and the congressionally mandated addition of requirements for force protection and survivability.
In reponse to the GAO report, the Navy stated that the LCS modular open system architecture strategy decouples core seaframe design and construction from the phased delivery of focused mission package payloads. A robust risk management process tracks technologies under development to ensure they are matured and fulfill program requirements according to planned deployment timelines. The Navy continued to apply all available management tools to optimize unit cost and schedule through the challenges of first of class construction.
2008 GAO Review
The GAO an assessment of selected weapons programs in March 2008, with entries for the baseline LCS program, as well as 3 of the modules. These modules were the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Countermeasures (MCM), and Surface Warfare variants (SuW).
In the report the Navy identified a total of 19 critical technologies across both LCS seaframe designs. Fifteen of these technologies were fully mature, and another 2 technologies were approaching maturity. Two other technologies, the overhead launch and retrieval system in the Lockheed Martin design and the aluminum structure in the General Dynamics design, remained immature.
The Navy identified the watercraft launch and recovery concept as a major risk to both LCS seaframe designs. This capability was essential to complete anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures missions planned for LCS. According to the Navy, industry watercraft launch and recovery designs were untested and unproven. To mitigate this risk, the Navy was conducting launch and recovery modeling and simulation, model basin testing, and experimentation. The Navy was encouraging the LCS seaframe industry teams to adopt similar approaches. Final integration of watercraft to each LCS seaframe design was not expected until the third quarter of FY09, after the Navy had accepted delivery of the first two LCS seaframes.
In addition, while the Navy had identified the aviation landing/retrieval system as a mature technology, it was concerned that this system could potentially not be qualified for use on the Lockheed Martin seaframe and could, in fact, result in damage to aircraft. The Navy had developed a system qualification and certification plan to mitigate this risk and intended to conduct pierside testing and training of the aviation landing/retrieval system in the first quarter of FY09.
In the GAO report the Navy was cited as expecting the first two LCS to exceed their combined budget of $472 million by over 100 percent and anticipated lead ship delivery would occur nearly 18 months later than initially planned. As a result of these challenges, the Navy canceled construction of the third and fourth LCS and deferred construction of additional seaframes. The Navy planned to use funds previously appropriated for construction of the fifth and sixth LCS seaframes to pay for cost growth on the remaining two ships under contract. The Navy continued to modify its acquisition strategy for LCS.
The delivery of the first ASW mission package was scheduled for February 2008. The critical technologies and design both continued to mature according to the GAO. The program office identified 12 technologies as critical for the package, 5 of which remained immature. A production representative, deployable package would not be delivered until FY11. The program tracked design drawings, a measure of design stability, for only those portions of mission systems that required alteration to deploy from LCS, as well as those for the containers in which mission systems were to be stored and transported. The design was not complete at the time of the critical design review. Neither the critical technologies nor the design of this package were expected to be fully mature until after they have been demonstrated as prototypes aboard the second LCS ship. The program office did not track critical process control data or use other production metrics.
The technologies that required further development at the time of the 2008 GAO report included sensors for submarine detection intended for use on unmanned platforms. If they failed to develop as expected, it could increase reliance on the manned MH-60R helicopter, which had reached full maturity, or the unmanned surface vehicle and its towed array sensor, both of which are nearing full maturity.
The first two ASW mission packages, expected to be delivered in FY08, would consist largely of prototypes or low-rate initial production items. According to the program office, these mission packages were not considered deployable and would be used only to demonstrate performance and concepts of operation from LCS seaframes. The mission systems delivered in these packages would eventually be upgraded to production representative, deployable systems. The first mission packages could also be delivered without some of the software needed for full functionality. The third mission package, expected for delivery in 2011, was expected to consist of fully mature, deployable, and production representative mission systems. According to program officials, the final number of anti-submarine warfare mission packages to be procured and the concepts of operation that guide their use were under review.
LCS mission modules program officials added to the GAO report that they defined production of a mission package as the support container procurement, assembly, checkout, and verification of readiness for issue of the mission module components that constitute an integrated package. They contended traditional manufacturing processes and metrics might not be applicable to the production of a mission package.
These officials also stated that the the first two ASW unmanned surface vehicles were designed and built under a contract to build a total of four. They planned to transition production responsibility to a program of record in FY09 for future mission packages.
The program office identified 11 technologies for use in the fully capable MCM package: four vehicles, five sensors for hunting and sweeping, and two weapons for neutralization. All technologies were mature or approaching maturity at the time of the GAO report. Five had previously been assessed by the GAO in a review of Airborne Mine Countermeasures, a capability dependent on successful integration of new systems with the MH-60S helicopter. Difficulty scheduling and conducting some system tests with the helicopter could affect plans to field MCM systems with the package according to the GAO. Tests identified technical challenges with a cable the helicopter uses to tow MCM systems. If the cable continued to malfunction in testing, fielding of airborne MCM systems could be delayed.
Although the MCM package had yet to be fully demonstrated aboard LCS, the Navy planned to make full-rate production decisions on several MCM systems. These systems were scheduled for tests that would assess their suitability and effectiveness, but the Navy planned to conduct these tests aboard other ships, not LCS. LCS featured a new automated launch, recovery, and handling system that was fully integrated with the seaframe. However, the Navy would not be able to test MCM systems with it until a seaframe was delivered in FY09. As a result, the Navy could not necessarily fully understand the suitability of new MCM systems to operate from LCS according to the GAO.
Although the Navy expected to deliver MCM packages in FY09 and FY10, they would continue to be configured with prototypes and low-rate initial production articles as they became available. The package would not be configured in production-representative form until the third package, expected for delivery in FY11, the same time the design was to be stable.
The Navy continued to refine concepts of operation for LCS and its mission packages. While initial packages were expected to meet the Navy's weight requirement, as of the 2008 GAO assessment they lacked some systems required for full mission capability. The fully configured package was expected to exceed its weight requirement by about 10 percent. The Navy was exploring ways to reduce weight while maintaining capability. If desired weight reductions were not achieved, the Navy could be forced to reduce MCM capability or accept a reduction in the ship's speed and endurance. This would affect earlier packages the Navy planned to backfit to be fully capable. Also, the crew members needed to operate the MCM package may exceed seaframe capacity. Navy mission planners and operators estimated 19 mission package and 23 aviation detachment crew would be needed per ship to complete planned missions, seven more than capacity.
Program officials responded to the MCM portion of the GAO assessment, noting that design stability would be achieved at completion of the Technical Data Package for the first production MCM package planned for delivery in FY11. Mission modules and systems were undergoing extensive testing in ways that do not require the ship. Surrogate platforms were being used to test some systems. Crew workload had been reassessed. The original estimate of 19 had been reduced to 15 mission package crew members, and the aviation detachment would increase from 20 to 23 to meet the mission requirement.
The program office identified four technologies for use in the SuW mission package. Of these the manned MH-60R helicopter, unmanned Vertical Take-off Autonomous Aerial Vehicle, and 30 mm gun system were considered fully mature, while the non-line-of-sight missile system remained immature. While the program office considers the 30 mm gun itself to be mature, its integration with LCS was not complete.
The Navy relied on the Army's Future Combat System for development of the missile system and would work with FCS to integrate it with LCS. As a result, the first SuW package, currently scheduled for delivery in June 2008, would not include the missile system. The first missile launcher would be delivered as a prototype without missiles in the second mission package in 2009, and missiles would be delivered with the fourth mission package in FY11. Should this technology fail to develop as anticipated, LCS would become more reliant on its guns for self-defense and upon the MH-60R for striking targets at greater distances.
The first two SuW mission packages were scheduled for delivery in FY08 and FY09. However, at the time of the GAO report in 2008, neither of these were complete or deployable. For example, the first package would contain only a prototype of the 30 mm gun system. The first SuW mission package delivery with all key systems present in production representative variants was not expected to occur until the fourth mission package in FY11. According to program officials, the quantities and concept of operations for the mission package were not yet finalized.
Program officials added to the GAO assessment that the delivery strategy for the SuW mission package included an incremental capability approach that delivered mature mission modules first, such as the 30mm gun module, followed by the delivery of the missile capability, after its technology maturity had been achieved. The Army was leading the development of the missile system and the Navy continued to work closely with the Army on its integration into LCS.
