Destroyer Introduction
Destroyers (DDs) and guided- missiles destroyers (DDGs) are multi-purpose ships that are useful in almost any kind of naval operation. They are fast ships with a variety of armament, but little or no armor. For protection, they depend on their speed and mobility. Their displacement varies from about 4,500 tons to 7,800 tons. The principal mission of destroyers is to operate offensively and defensively against submarines and surface ships and to take defensive action against air attacks. They also provide gunfire support for amphibious assaults and perform patrol, search, and rescue missions. The destroyer’s armament consists of 5-inch guns and a variety of antisubmarine weapons, such as torpedoes, antisubmarine rockets (ASROCs), and Terrier and Tartar missiles. Traditionally, destroyers have been named after officers and enlisted personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps and Secretaries of the Navy.
Torpedo Boat Destroyer
The destroyer had its origin in the late-19th century with the development of the first self-propelled torpedo. Navies quickly developed small fast torpedo boats designed to attack and sink larger battleships and cruisers. As a counter against torpedo boats, navies built a slightly larger ship, armed with torpedoes and heavier guns. These 900-ton ships were known as torpedo boat destroyers. World War I showed these ships suited to protecting larger ships against surface, submarine, and air attack. Also, they proved more effective offensively than torpedo boats, and assumed the attack role. By the end of World War I, they were simply known as "destroyers."
Two major events shaped the beginnings of the destroyer. The first was the advent of the torpedo boat. These swift, small craft were able to dash in close to larger ships, loose their torpedoes, and dash away. They proved their abilities with devastating effectiveness in the Chilean Civil War of 1894 and in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894.
In naval warfare the powers of destruction and protection held each other a close race. Whenever the penetration of the projectile has been increased, the armor plate has been thickened or hardened or both. The torpedo is the only weapon that stood unchallenged by the art of defence, and for this reason it was hard to overestimate its value.
Nothing so deadly had ever been introduced into warfare. It offered but two alternatives -- avoidance or destruction. In it powers were concentrated that did not admit of defence. The torpedo net, a steel netting arranged to be hung around a ship from spars, was probably more effective than any other defence that had been tried; but these nets were very difficult to handle, impede the speed of the ship, and were rendered vulnerable by a device attached to the torpedo, and known as a net cutter.
As with artillery directed against unprotected men, which must be silenced before it becomes ineffective, so it was with the torpedo boat, which must be put out of action before it is inoperative. There was no protection against a torpedo if it strikes its mark and expleKes. The most powerful battleship ever built may become its victim as readily as the lightest tug. When the torpedo boats of France became a menace to England, she quickly saw that she could not rely on nets, or any of the devices for defence that had been proposed.
There was but one means of protection and that was to hunt down and destroy the torpedo boats of the enemy. This meant that she at once directed all her energies to securing a vessel that could be relied upon to run down torpedo boats. She built a number of vessels designed to do this and these have become known as torpedo boat catchers. They all, however, proved utter failures, for as in nature so in naval architecture there are some inexorable laws. One of these is that within certain limits speed is not appreciably affected by size, and to secure greater speed the size of the vessel must either rise above or fall below these limits. To rise above makes the vessel so large as to be suitable only for a heavy battery, and to fall below brings it within the dimensions of a large sized torpedo boat.
Though this law was well known as a matter of theory, it took England six years to learn that she could not disregard it in practice, and during that time she stayed within the prohibited limits, producing the most ignominious failures, and the more marked her failures the more persistent were her efforts to attain speed without constructing a vessel either large enough or small enough to accomplish that purpose. None of the catchers ever proved capable of catching a torpedo boat. The fastest one only made twenty knots under the most favorable circumstances, two knots less than the speed made by one of the first twelve torpedo boats England built. In addition to lacking speed, the catchers were too large to be handled as quickly or easily as the torpedo boats. They were structurally weak and their seaworthiness was often questioned.
It looked as though England would never solve the problem of protection against torpedo boats. All the valuable time and the immense amount of money she had expended on the catchers had been wasted. Her failures had attracted the attention of the world and it was apparent she would only render herself ridiculous by pursuing further the theory of construction on which these boats had been built. So in 1893, much chagrined and discouraged by her failures, she commenced the construction of a vessel upon an entirely different plan. This time she fell below the prescribed limits which had stood in the way of former success, and produced a vessel which was a large-sized torpedo boat capable of & arrying a light battery. This craft was a marked success and exceeded in both speed and seaworthiness the most sanguine expectations.
It was the first of the class of vessels now known as torpedo boat destroyers, which entirely superseded the catchers and were adopted by the foremost maritime nations. Vessels of this character could be built of great strength and with a seaworthiness that admitted of their going anywhere, in any weather, and by the late 1890s they had attained a speed of 30 knots and even more.
By the mid-1890s, many of the world's navies recognized the need for a counter weapon, and so the torpedo boat destroyer, later just "destroyer," was born. The "torpedo boat" part of the name got dropped, but the purpose of the type has not changed. Destroyers are picket ships. They protect larger ships from threats. The job of the destroyer has expanded from torpedo boats, to submarines (the torpedo boat under water) to anti aircraft pickets.
The U.S. Navy first faced a destroyer in the Spanish-American War. Spanish Admiral Pascual Cervera sent two destroyers against a squadron of U.S. Navyships at Santiago Harbor on July 3, 1898. American cruisers quickly took aim on the destroyers, blowing one out of the water. An American armed yacht, USS Gloucester, moved in on the second destroyer and sank it. Our Navy, realizing that had these destroyers had better handling and thus could have inflicted serious damage, sent out orders to speed the American destroyer program, then in its infancy.
The first U.S. destroyer was USS Bainbridge (DD 1), launched on August 27, 1901, and placed in full commission on December 23, 1903. During World War I, Bainbridge served on patrol and convoy duty in the Atlantic. Bainbridge was the lead ship in her class of 16 ships. She had an overall length of 250 feet and displaced 420 tons. She had a crew of four officers and 69 enlisted personnel and was armed with two 3-inch guns, five 6-pounders, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes.
Great War Destroyers - Design
Turbine engines were economical only at high speed and only at approximately the speed at which they are designed to run. This introduces two problems into the design of turbine motive power for destroyers: — first, to harmonize the high speed which is necessary for the turbine rotor, with the lower shaft speed required for propeller efficiency ; and second to provide for reasonable economy both at the high speed for which destroyers are designed and the comparatively low speed at which they necessarily cruise under ordinary circumstances.
Various solutions were devised for these problems and widely differing arrangements were to be found in the destroyers in service in 1914. In recent destroyers of 35-knots designed maximum speed, a turbine speed of 2,500 RPM was converted by reduction gears to 450 turns of the propeller shaft. The problem of cruising efficiency is solved in some cases by the use of reduction gears and in others by the installation of special cruising turbines or reciprocating engines.
When a proper balance has been struck between maximum speed efficiency and cruising speed efficiency, it was found that the most economical speed at which a destroyer can cover a given distance was somewhere between 15 and 20 knots. Between these speeds, the fuel expended per mile varies but little, whereas at higher speeds it increases rapidly with the horse-power developed. Approximately twice as much fuel is required per hour at 25 knots as at 20 knots; and from 25 to 35 knots the consumption increased at an astonishing rate.
All destroyers of the United States Navy had four boilers, but it was only when making very high speed that more than two are required. A speed of 26 to 28 knots could be maintained with half boiler power, and some destroyers had reached thirty knots under two boilers. Speeds as high as 20 knots could be made with one boiler, but this was, of course, uneconomical as the boiler must be forced. Destroyers had made long cruises economically with only one boiler in use, at about fifteen knots. It was unwise to undertake harbor maneuvering under one boiler except under most favorable weather conditions, as the necessity to do considerable backing would probably draw all steam from the boiler, thus stopping the blowers and disabling the vessel. When engines were stopped and an ahead or astern signal is given, it was engineering practice to open throttles fairly wide in executing the signal, then to close them quickly to the pressure necessary for the speed demanded. Turbines of the thousand ton ships are direct connected, while those of the later type drive the shafts through reduction gears, and it was especially noticeable while warping to lines alongside docks that the newer type ships did not receive the quick "jolt" ahead or astern that was apparent with the older vessels immediately after ringing up an engine room signal. The propellers of the 1914 destroyer were larger than those of the older ships and they seem slower to "bite," but as soon as they took hold they are more effective so far as leverage is concerned.
The lightness of the ship, the large surface which she exposes to the wind, and the comparatively small draft, gave exceptional importance to the effect of wind, especially if this be on the beam. It was important to understand and keep constantly in mind the effect upon maneuvering which results from the limited backing power of turbine ships in general; the power available for backing being but little more than half of that for going ahead. This condition held for destroyers except that the power available for backing is ample and satisfactory when compared with the power that will ordinarily be used ahead in approaching a dock. However, if considerable headway is gathered the backing engines are slow to take charge: and if excess speed ahead is used in making a dock or in entering a slip, an error in judgment as to backing may have very disastrous consequences.
In maneuvering a destroyer alertness and sound judgment were required. It must be kept in mind that great power is available, (hat headway or sternway is very quickly gathered, that the hull of the destroyer is frail, and that in confined waters the effect of wind may be a very serious factor owing to the leeway and the poor manoeuvring qualities of the vessel. The tactical diameter of the destroyer with engines going ahead and rudder hard over is greater than that of the battleship.
The effect of screws of different types were more or less modified in destroyers by the great length of the vessel as compared with the leverage of the screws, the result being that under the most favorable conditions the maneuvering power due to the screws is less than with vessels of greater beam as compared with length. When one engine is turning ahead and the other astern, the ship being dead in the water, it would be found that the destroyer would swing very slowly, her bow moving to the side of the backing engine. If the conditions of wind were such as to assist the bow to swing no difficulty will be experienced in turning, but if the movement of the bow is opposed by any appreciable wind, the vessel will remain stationary and merely "tremble," or may fall off, meanwhile drifting bodily to leeward.
Great War Destroyers - Handling
No hard and fast rules could be laid down for the handling of destroyers any more than of battleships. It rarely happened that conditions are identical on any two occasions, even for the same vessel performing the same maneuver in the same place. A destroyer will make more leeway when her oil-tanks are light than when she is fully fuelled. The head will fall off rapidly in making a dock at low speed if the forward tanks are empty and the after tanks full; while if the reverse conditions exist, she may decide to lie broadside to the wind and drift bodily to leeward.
To pick up a buoy, approach on the weather side at slow speed and, if a boat is not in the water, lower a man to the buoy by means of a bowline from the forecastle. It was advisable to lower a boat to expedite the work of securing and to avoid possible injury to personnel. Little difficulty is usually found, by skillful use of engines and by taking advantage of wind, in keeping the ship in position long enough to enable the man on the buoy to make fast a line, after which the end of an anchor chain is led through the ring of the buoy and made fast on deck.
The facility with which destroyers could be handled when going astern, especially when backing into wind or current, may in some cases render it advisable to make landings or enter slips stern first. With gentle sternboard, motion of one screw astern will ordinarily push the stern away from the side of that screw and delicate control is often possible under these circumstances. A special case in which this method of handling is recommended is when running into port with following wind or current, when it is intended to pick up a mooring buoy. Rounding to under these circumstances will be a long and troublesome operation, especially if the channel be narrow; and under these conditions the bow may be run up to the buoy and held there indefinitely with stern to wind and tide by skillful backing of first one engine and then the other.
Destroyers were light craft with very powerful engines and there is an easily understandable fascination in handling them which frequently led to the taking of unnecessary chances. A good destroyer officer was one who used the powers at his command daringly when necessary, but who does not invite disaster by rashness. It happens from time to time that an engine will not follow tlie signal, through fault of either personnel or material; and if this happens when the commanding officer is charging into a landing at high speed, trusting to his backing power to stop in time, the result may be a smashed bow or some worse accident, resulting not from an effort to perform some important service, but merely from bravado.
The light scantling and high power of the destroyer made it especially important to exercise care in warping or springing around docks. If the fact be kept in mind that the horsepower of the latest type destroyer is equal to that of a 32,000-ton battleship, and that the hull is at the limit of lightness, it will at once be realized that the engines can only be worked against chocks, cleats, etc., with extreme care. This caution applied not only to the fittings of the vessel itself, but to the lines by which she is to be handled. The largest mooring line with which destroyers are at present equipped is a 5-inch manila, and this is none too strong. The foregoing should not be taken to mean that power cannot be employed while springing the vessel on a line, as it is often necessary to work the engines in opposite directions at considerable speed. What is meant is that great strain cannot be brought on the line by imparting motion to the vessel.
In formation underway, the standard distance between ships, bridge to bridge, is 300 yards; and it is safe even at high speeds to keep well within this distance, for collision can easily be avoided by quick use of rudder. However, with a following or quartering sea it is unwise to manoeuvre too close, for under these conditions the best helmsmen cannot steer a steady course and the bow as it yaws from side to side may strike the stern of the destroyer ahead before the rudder can become effective. When lying-to in a seaway, the destroyer will invariably work broadside on, into the trough, rolling heavily and drifting rapidly to leeward. If she is backed from this position, her stern will tend to point up; but the quantity of water shipped over the stern will prove very dangerous.
The destroyer's quick period made a short steep sea more trying than any other and if forced into heavy weather in partially-enclosed waters such as Long Island Sound she may pound more heavily and suffer more damage than under the same weather in the open sea, where the waves are longer and where the vessel will seem to slide over the crests.
During the Great War an escort of five destroyers had to abandon their 22-knot convoy, the Mauritania, between Liverpool and The Skerries, where short high seas were thrown up by the wind ahead; several destroyers sustained severe damage from collision and all returned safely. The Shaw, whose bow was completely severed at the forward end of the bridge by S. S. Aquitania, made port under her own engines, her forward oil tanks on fire. All American destroyers stood up splendidly so far as damage from seas was concerned and proved that they can operate in the worst weather.
At high speed, in depths of forty feet or less, the screws draw down the stern causing the vessel to drag and to be materially slowed. This drag is very perceptible and the speed of the vessel through the water cannot be increased above a certain point (about twenty knots) regardless of the speed of the screws. The stern will squat until the fantail deck is flush with the surface of the water, and the resultant wave will prove very destructive to harbor craft, and even to sea-walls and large shipping. So many complaints have been received and so many bills submitted to the government for parted lines and damaged property that present orders prohibit destroyers from using a speed greater than twelve knots in entering and leaving harbors. For this reason many units of the flotilla made it doctrine to use a standard maneuvering speed of eighteen knots. Channels are entered and left at two thirds speed, or twelve knots, and all speed signals except cones are thus eliminated in getting underway and coming to anchor. It was unsafe to pass operating dredges at more than six knots.
Most cruising was done at fairly high speeds so that a slight error in compass course, under weather conditions adverse to observation of sun or stars, will result in large error in the position by dead reckoning. Most destroyers are equipped with the Sperry two-wheel gyro compass, but little dependence can as yet be placed on the gyro in this type of vessel. Unquestionably the gyro compass will in time be developed and made suitable for destroyer work.
The motion is at times so excessive that it is difficult to use navigational instruments, and the navigator must learn to take sights while holding on to a stanchion or bridge rail to keep from being thrown from side to side, at the same time endeavoring to keep his sextant mirrors free from spray. He must become accustomed to "bringing down" stars under conditions of most violent rolling and learn to eliminate errors due to a rapidly changing dip, and to plot his positions with instruments that are constantly getting adrift.
To summarize: although it may justly be said that practically all methods of navigation are less reliable on Torpedo vessels than on larger craft, the navigator can with diligence and practice overcome these difficulties; and it has been demonstrated that destroyer navigation can be made to compare favorably with that of the largest vessel. Skillful navigating in destroyers is of the utmost importance because of the duty required of these vessels. In scouting work and in trailing the enemy, contact reports and other information sent out by the scout may be very misleading to the commander-in-chief unless based upon the most accurate navigation.
Great War Destroyers - Refueling at Sea
The method of fueling destroyers at sea was developed by the U. S. S. Maumee (fuel ship) and was employed with great success during the war and later during the trans-Atlantic sea-plane flight of 1919. By this method, oil was delivered through a four-inch hose at the rate of 25,000 gallons per hour, while the ships were steaming at speeds of four to thirteen knots, in a moderate sea, force of wind 3 to 4. It was estimated that vessels could be fueled in this manner during more than seventy-five per cent of all weather encountered.
In this maneuver rolling of the vessels will not interfere; but yawing is very dangerous, especially as the destroyer may be brought under the counter of the larger ship. The fuel ship therefore assumed such a course as to bring the sea forward of her off beam, preferably on the off bow. Her course and speed were signalled to the destroyer and both vessels were kept going ahead throughout the evolution. Various speeds were tried, but owing to the relatively high steerageway speed of the destroyer it was found that best results were obtained when the speeds of fuel ship and destroyer were regulated at about eight and seven knots respectively.
All gear was furnished by the fuel ship. A ten-inch manila spring was led from her bow chock and stopped along the rail, a 2-inch messenger being bent to this, fifty feet from the end, and stopped along to the end. The destroyer approached to leeward within about fifty feet of the Maumee's side and received the messenger by heaving line. This messenger was led through the after forecastle chock, taken to the capstan, and hove in, assisted by hand. Stops were cut as they came aboard and the ten-inch manila was given a turn around the base of the forward gun-mount and secured to bitts on the opposite side of the deck, a lashing on the bitts being necessary to prevent the hawser from jumping.
As soon as the destroyer signalled that the line was secured, the fuel ship hauled in the spring to take a strain and bring the smaller vessel to the relative position desired, and the destroyer regulated her speed at about one knot less than that of the Maumee. This spring, assisted by the force of the sea on the inboard bow, acted much as would a sea painter on a small boat, tending to keep the destroyer off; and with the 750 and 1,000 ton destroyers whose towing point was well aft on the forecastle, a slight in rudder was necessary to offset the effect of the sea on the bow. This sea-painter effect was not so pronounced in towing the modern type destroyer, whose bridge is farther forward.
A six-inch breast was now passed to bitts forward of the destroyer's forecastle gun and secured to bitts forward of the capstan. This line was subjected to considerable strain at times and when made fast was hove in on the fuel ship to reduce the distance between vessels to about forty feet. An afterbreast of six-inch manilla was passed to the destroyer's after deck-house and secured but tended. This line was not absolutely necessary to the manoeuvre but was employed as a safeguard against the delay that might be caused should a sudden lurch of the destroyer carry away the oil hose.
As soon as all lines were secured, the Maumee passed an oil hose to the destroyer by means of a wooden carrier suspended from a ahead amidships. The hose was led to the destroyer's tank and pumping was begun when the ready signal was received. Under unfavorable weather conditions, about forty minutes were required in passing lines and connecting up the hose; but in good weather the signal to begin pumping could be given within twenty minutes after the destroyer began going alongside.
While fueling, the destroyer received stores and provisions by means of an after boom; and by proper regulation of speed and delicate use of rudder, no difficulty was encountered after the lines were secured, and no damage sustained by either vessel. In very rough weather the destroyer was fueled while being towed astern, and oil was delivered to the older destroyers at the rate of fifteen thousand gallons per hour. With the newer type, however, considerable time was required in leading the hose while towing astern, as these vessels have no open tanks forward. The hose must either be coupled up to a deck fitting forward or led to an open tank abaft the after engine-room bulkhead.
The Great War
The opening of hostilities in World War I found the Navy strengthened with a new type destroyer design, much improved over Bainbridge's. In the early months of the war, the United States was neutral, although American lives were being lost as a result of German submarine warfare against British merchantmen. The U.S. protested when the German submarines began sinking American shipping bound for England. The protests, the sinkings, and the loss of lives continued until April 6, 1917, when the United States declared war on Germany.
Admiral William S. Sims, USN, persuaded the British to try the convoy system of shipping goods again. The British had tried the system before but, because they seemed to have little defense against the U-boat, decided that it wasn't worth the price. Now, with British supplies running dangerously low and American destroyers helping to combat the submarine menace, the convoy system was reinstated.
With American destroyers escorting convoys, the German's submarine toll was reduced: from 900,000 tons in April 1917 to one-third of that by November.
The first German submarine sunk by the U.S. Navy in World War I was the U-58. It was the only U-boat kill of the war by American destroyers. On November 17, 1917, destroyers USS Fanning (DD 37) and USS Nicholson (DD 52) were escorting an Atlantic convoy near the Hebrides. Suddenly, Fanning's lookouts sighted a periscope moving through the sea. Fanning swung about, raced toward the sub at top speed, and began attacking with depth charges. The U-boat partially surfaced. Then, Nicholson joined the fray, making a depth-charge pass of her own.
The explosions jammed the sub's diving gear and the U-boat plunged towards the bottom. At about 300 feet. the sub blew ballast and shot toward the surface. Fanning and Nicholson were waiting when the U-boat broke the surface and the destroyers began shelling. This was enough for the Germans who quickly surrendered. But, the U-boat's skipper ordered the seacocks opened, and as the destroyers were picking the surrendering Germans off the sub, it eased below the surface never to come up again. Only forty survivors were taken prisoner.
American destroyers in World War I made some lasting contributions to U.S. seapower. In their 250 battles with German submarines, the gallant little ships laid the groundwork for modern antisubmarine warfare. They had guarded the trans-Atlantic crossing of two million men without the loss of a single life or transport ship. And, by mounting 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, they had foreseen the day when ships would do battle with enemies in the sky.
By the end of the "war to end all wars," the U.S. had the largest destroyer fleet in the world, but, the Disarmament Treaty of 1922 caused more than 200 of these valiant ships to be decommissioned while 40 more were scrapped. Not one new destroyer was launched between 1921 and 1934.
What destroyers there were constituted the Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet. The Force was redesignated as Destroyer Squadron, Atlantic, on October 1, 1921; later to be redesignated again as Destroyer Squadron, Scouting Fleet, U.S. Fleet (December 8, 1922).
World War II
With the rise of Adolph Hitler in Germany in the early 1930s, authorizations began for the rebuilding of the American destroyer forces. Forty-five new DDs were authorized for the last half of the decade.
The destroyer during World War II continued in this role as an all-purpose ship ready to fight off attacks from the air, on the surface, or from below the sea. They could be called upon to give fire support to troops, deliver mail and people to other ships, rescue pilots who had been forced down at sea, and to serve as the distant early warning eyes of the fleet in hostile waters. [2] Destroyers did not have the glamour of a battleship or an aircraft carrier but without them the aircraft carrier and battleship would be helpless against enemy submarines. They were all-purpose ships whose support of general fleet operations was vital. No aircraft carrier or battleship ever proceeded into enemy waters without an escort of destroyers.
With the change in designations in the Fleet, the destroyers were established as Destroyer Squadron, Scouting Force, U.S. Fleet. From October 1, 1937, to July 3, 1940, units of this squadron were transferred continually to the Pacific Fleet. The outbreak of war in Europe reversed this trend.
On July 3, 1940, there were again enough destroyers in the Atlantic to establish a type command. This tycom was known as Destroyers, Atlantic Squadron, U.S. Fleet. When in November 1940, the Atlantic Squadron became the Patrol Force; the destroyer command was renamed Destroyers, Patrol Force, U.S. Fleet. On February 3, 1941, with the reorganization of the Navy and the dissolution of the Patrol Force; the U.S. Atlantic Fleet formed and Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet came into being.
When the war broke out in Europe on September 3, 1939, the United States again, as it had in World War I, tried to remain neutral. Once again, it was the German submarine threat that strained that neutrality.
On the morning of September 4, 1941, destroyer USS Greer (DD 145) was enroute from Newfoundland to Iceland when she picked up sonar contact with a German sub. A British patrol plane had warned Greer that the U-boat was lurking in her path earlier. The destroyer made and held contact uneventfully for nearly 3 1/2 hours, when suddenly, a torpedo was spotted heading for the ship. Greer turned sharply, avoiding the torpedo, and let loose a salvo of depth charges.Again, a sharp turn and another torpedo charged by the destroyer, which was followed by a salvo of depth charges from Greer. By late afternoon, Greer lost contact and after a three-hour search, she continued on to Iceland. Apparently, the sub had dropped the fight, but the attack prompted President Roosevelt to issue orders to "shoot on sight" any warships within "our defensive waters."
The destroyer USS Kearny (DD 432) was commissioned on Friday, September 13, 1940. Thirteen months later, Kearny, in company of destroyers Plunkett (DD 429) , Livermore (DD 431), and Decatur (DD 341), was dispatched on an emergency mission 350 miles south of Reyjavik, Iceland. A Canadian convoy was being attacked by German submarines. In the late afternoon of October 16, 1941, the four U.S. destroyers took up station as a screen around the Canadian merchantmen. The wolfpack which was followed by a salvo of torpedoes had temporarily withdrawn, shortly before midnight a merchantman suddenly went up in a ball of flame. The Germans had returned. Kearny and the other DDs rushed to the attack, but the U-boats broke off the engagement.
Minutes passed. Suddenly, two more merchant ships were ripped apart by German torpedoes, and the fight was on again. Near 2 a.m., Kearny had to cut her speed to avoid ramming a Canadian corvette. In the glow of the burning merchant ships, Kearny became a virtual sitting duck and one German submarine skipper took advantage of the situation, firing three torpedoes at the destroyer. Two missed, but the third tore a jagged hole in Kearny's starboard side, thus making her the first U.S. destroyer damaged in World War II. Kearny, which by the extent of the damage should have gone down, managed to limp into Iceland for repairs and continued fighting throughout the war.
Two weeks later, on October 31, 1941, a little more than a month before the United States entered the Second World War, USS Reuben James (DD 245) was escorting a convoy about 600 miles west of Ireland. With 44 merchantmen in the convoy, Reuben James, along with the destroyers Tarbell (DD 142), Benson (DD 421), Hilary P. Jones (DD 427) and Niblack (DD 424), was holding an average speed just under nine knots. It was 5:39 a.m. and Reuben James was 2,000 yards off the convoy's port flank. Without warning, a torpedo struck Reuben James, tearing her in two.
The bow section sank immediately and the stern went up in a tremendous explosion. Within minutes, there was nothing left of Reuben James. Only 45 of the 160 man crew survived, and Reuben James became the first destroyer casualty of World War II.
The war in the Atlantic saw the destroyer perform many varied tasks from hunting and destroying German submarines to rescuing downed airmen. These "greyhounds of the sea" were also on hand for the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Europe, using their guns to knock out shore batteries, to keep the skies clear of enemy aircraft, and to guard Allied landing craft.
The biggest operation destroyers participated in was Operation Overlord, the invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944. At Utah Beach, destroyers Fitch (DD 462), Corry (DD 463) and Hobson (DD 464) were the first ships of the invasion force to shell the shore. At Omaha Beach, destroyers Baldwin (DD 624), Carmick (DD 493), Doyle (DD 494), Emmons (DD 457), Frankford (DD 497), McCook (DD 496) and Thompson (DD 627) came in so close to the beach that their hulls rested on the bottom as their guns raked the enemy strongholds. It was the gunfire support of these and other ships that kept the German army from moving in reinforcements.
Cold War Era
Ships of the Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, also participated in the Korean War, the Cuban Crisis of October 1962, the Vietnam conflict and any time these "greyhounds of the sea" were needed.
The Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, continued from World War II to April 1, 1962, when it was combined with the Cruiser Force, Atlantic Fleet, forming the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, headquartered in Newport, R.I.
With the Navy-wide realignment of forces, the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic, shifted its headquarters to Norfolk, VA., on July 1, 1973, and was disestablished on December 31, 1974, to combine with the Amphibious Force, Atlantic and the Service Force, Atlantic, to form the Naval Surface Force, Atlantic Fleet on January 1, 1975.
Named for the Navy's most famous destroyer squadron combat commander and three-time Chief of Naval Operations, USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) is the most powerful surface combantant ever put to sea. Technological advances have improved the capability of this class of destroyer. Designed for survivability, DDG 51 incorporates all-steel construction and numerous damage control features.
Post-Cold War Era
DD 21 is the Navy's newest land-attack destroyer program. The DD 21 design concept will support joint-service requirements in littoral regions. Armed with an array of land-attack weapons, DD 21 will provide sustained, offensive, distributed, and precise firepower at long ranges in support of forces ashore. This program also includes the use and development of the electric drive systems.
