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Further Reading

CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford

Construction on the CVN-78 began on 11 August 2005, at Northrop Grumman Newport News' shipyards in Virginia with the beveling of a 15-ton metal plate. Advance construction was expected to take an estimated two years before construction could begin on the actual ship itself. The timeframe was expected to allow technicians and engineers the time needed to test and design the ship, and all the new technologies that were to eventually be put into the vessel.

Planned funding was required starting in FY09 to support the CVN 79 integrated design and construction schedule. Funding was required to efficiently and effectively complete design integration efforts, detailed design, and construction planning taking advantage of integrated product and process development to insert transformational technologies while reducing both construction costs and potential costly construction rework. Nuclear Propulsion Equipment GFE funding was required to fund a shipset of reactor plant components for CVN 79. The complexity, size and early shipyard need dates for reactor plant equipment made them among the longest lead items for CVN 79. Hull, Mechanical, & Electrical (HM&E) funding was required for government furnished engineering services support. Basic shipbuilder advance construction funding was required for both procurement of the longest lead non-reactor plant propulsion and electric plant contractor furnished equipment and advance construction efforts necessary to support an efficient CVN 79 construction schedule.

As of March 2007 the CVN-78 program expected to have 6 of 17 current critical technologies fully mature and another 7 approaching maturity by critical design review scheduled for May of that year. Program officials stated that the extended construction and design period allowed further time for development. Fallback technologies existed for 6 of 17 total critical technologies, but their use entailed drawbacks, such as decreased performance and/or an increase in manpower requirements. While the design process appeared on track, weight and stability issues have presented a challenge. In 2006 the Navy decided to delay awarding the contract for construction of the first two ships of the class by 1 year to meet other Navy priorities. The Navy expected to award the CVN 78 construction contract in January 2008.

Only 4 of CVN-78's 17 current critical technologies were fully mature as of a March 2007 Government Accountability Office report: the nuclear propulsion and electrical plant, a new desalination system, the Multi-Function Radar, and a high strength alloy steel. A plasma-arc waste destruction system and the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) were expected to be fully mature and 7 were expected to be approaching maturity prior to critical design review. A total of 9 were expected to be fully mature in time for construction contract award in 2008. The program reported 16 critical technologies at development start, with as many as 22 technologies in 2006. Since a 2006 GAO assessment, the Navy eliminated a technology and redefined another.

Programs other than CVN-21 were developing 6 of the critical technologies: the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), a missile, Multi-Function Radar, Volume Search Radar, an automated weapon information system, and a GPS-based landing system-known as JPALS. Progress in those programs could affect the CVN-21 schedule. Four of the technologies had mature alternate systems as backups. No backup is feasible for the radars without major ship redesign. While the Multi-function Radar demonstrated maturity through at-sea testing, the Volume Search Radar would not achieve maturity until 2014 after operational testing on the future destroyer. Program officials stated that they would most likely install AAG-even if it is not fully mature when a decision to use a backup must be made. CVN 78's optimal build sequence could be impacted, if AAG is not delivered on time.

EMALS was planned replace steam catapults and was expected to demonstrate maturity through land based testing. EMALS will not be tested at sea, but officials believe that this testing is the only alternative designed to approximate an aircraft carrier environment.

The Navy eliminated an integrated inventory system and intended to pursue materials aimed at reducing carrier weight. The materials were ultimately eliminated because the Navy believed that it could already achieve its goals for ship weight and stability. Only high-strength and toughness steel was expected to be used on CVN 78.

Four critical technologies would not be mature until after construction start in 2008. While a selfpropelled weapons loading device was not required until ship delivery in 2015, an armor protection system was needed for installation starting in 2009, the same year it is expected to demonstrate maturity. Risks associated with the 1,100-ton air conditioning plants were considered low since the components were available and used as of March 2007, but units of the requisite size had never been installed on a ship. Finally, the advanced weapons elevators were not expected to reach maturity until after shipboard system testing just prior to delivery.

A design review was planned for May 2007, but program officials stated that the design was regularly reviewed in the GAO report. According to program officials, the ship was meeting its design targets, in part because of a 1 year delay in the construction contract, which resulted in additional time to develop the design.

Meeting the ship's requirements for weight and stability was a challenge. EMALS and AAG have exceeded their allocated weight margins and weight must be compensated elsewhere on the ship. Additional degradation of its weight allowance could occur as the final designs for critical technologies become known.

The Navy concurred with the March 2007 GAO assessment, but emphasized that a lengthy construction period provided additional time to mature technologies. The Navy noted that technology readiness was closely managed through proven design processes, risk assessments, site visits, and contracting methods to ensure adequate maturity. Specific attention was given to requirements, legacy system availability, technology readiness, affordability, schedule, and return on investment. In addition, initial construction efforts aimed at validating new designs, tooling, and construction processes were already under way.

In the report the Navy also stressed that the decision to delay the program in 2006 had not been related to technology maturity, weight, or stability issues.

By a March 2008 GAO assessment, five of 15 current critical technologies were fully mature, including the nuclear propulsion and electric plant. Six technologies were expected to approach maturity, while four others would remain at lower maturity by construction contract award. Since 2007, the Navy had eliminated an armor protection system from CVN 78, but was evaluating use on follow-on ships, and the air conditioning plant and automated weapons information system were no longer considered developmental. Of CVN 21's technologies, the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), the advanced arresting gear, and the dual band radar (composed of the volume search and multifunction radars) present the greatest risk to the ship's cost and schedule. By January 2008, 76 percent of the design was complete. Challenges in technology development had the potential to lead to delays in maintaining the design schedule needed for construction.

EMALS would not be tested at sea, but a production model was scheduled to begin land-based testing in 2009. Difficulties developing the generator and meeting detailed Navy requirements had already led to a 15-month schedule delay. Problems manufacturing the generator delayed testing scheduled to begin by February 2008. The Navy was considering authorizing production of the generators prior to completing initial testing in order to ensure delivery to support CVN 78's construction schedule. As a consequence, production was to begin prior to demonstrating that the generators worked as intended. Timely delivery of EMALS remained at risk in 2008. Problems that occured in testing or production would likely prevent EMALS from being delivered to the shipyard to meet the construction schedule.

The dual band radar was being developed as part of the DDG 1000 program. In 2007 DoD reassessed the multifunction radar's readiness. Since modes critical to CVN 21 had not yet been tested, including electronic protection and air traffic control, the radar could not be considered fully mature. While the multifunction radar had been tested at sea, considerable testing remained for the volume search radar. Due to problems with a critical circuit technology, the volume search radar would not demonstrate the power output needed to meet requirements during upcoming testing. Full power output would not be tested on a complete system until the first production unit in 2010, and the radar would not be fully demonstrated until operational testing on DDG 1000 in 2013. Problems discovered during testing could affect installation on the carrier scheduled to begin in 2012.

The advanced arresting gear completed early verification tests that proved the system's concept and tested components. Integrated testing with simulated and live aircraft was scheduled to begin in 2009. Delays led the Navy to consolidate test events in order to maintain the shipyard delivery date, leaving little time to address any problems prior to production. Late delivery would require the shipbuilder to install the system after the flight deck has been laid, disrupting the optimal build sequence and increasing cost.

Other technologies would not be fully matured by construction contract award, but presented less risk to ship construction according to the GAO. The advanced weapons elevator could not be tested at sea until ship delivery, but was planned to complete full-scale testing in 2008. A shipboard replenishment system was a modification of current technology and full-scale testing concluded in 2008. The shipboard weapons loader was critical for achieving manpower reductions, but would be stored on the flight deck and not required until ship delivery. A GPS-based landing system (JPALS) was still in development, but the carrier would use a backup to land aircraft that were not JPALS-capable. A missile uplink would not be operationally tested until 2013, but CVN 78 could achieve its key performance parameters without this improvement.

The GAO reported that the Navy had generally concurred with their 2008 assessment that concurrent technology development, particularly regarding EMALS, the advanced arresting gear, and the dual-band radar system, presented the highest programmatic risk. They did, however, state that all critical technologies were being managed through established processes to mitigate cost, schedule, and development risk. Additionally, a lengthy construction period allowed technologies to mature and helped ensure technologies did not become obsolete by ship delivery. The Navy noted that the program had maintained key performance parameters through product modeling, which indicated design stability. Production risk was being mitigated by the advanced construction of structural units low in the ship. As of December 2007, 25 percent of the ship's units were under construction.