Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) Program
On 14 April 2010, speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee readiness and management support subcommittee, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. General Peter W. Chiarelli said "It will not be too long before we will be able to get everybody who can be out of the up-armored Humvee into the MRAP ATV." The general said the M-ATV offers Soldiers more protection than the up-armored Humvee. Third Army is now in the process of moving equipment such as M-ATVs out of Iraq as part of the drawdown, resetting that equipment, and sending what is needed to Afghanistan. This followed a sizeable reduction in funding for the HMMWV family that was included in a Department of Defense reprogramming request for Fiscal Year 2010 sent Congress in early April 2010.
On 13 November 2008, the US Government announced plans to acquire an MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). The M-ATV program was a spin-off of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program. The M-ATV would be a lighter, off-road, and more maneuverable vehicle that incorporated existing MRAP levels of protection. The M-ATV would require effectiveness in an off-road mission profile. The vehicle would include Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) protection (either integral or as a removable kit). The M-ATV would maximize both protection levels and off-road mobility and maneuverability attributes, and was required to balance the effects of size and weight while attempting to achieve the stated requirements. The M-ATV acquisition was being conducted under the authority of the Joint MRAP Vehicle Program. An NDI solution for the M-ATV was sought in response to a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS).
Offerors were required to be prepared to timely deliver 5 test vehicles. The government would purchase (expected at approximately 90 days after RFP release) the first 2 of the 5 representative test vehicles from each offeror that passed the proposal entrance criteria. Following vehicle test and evaluation, expected at approximately 120 days after RFP release, the government planned to award up to 5 IDIQ contracts. Offerors whose proposals and vehicles passed the entrance criteria would be offered an opportunity to provide a final proposal revision prior to the award. Awardees would be required to deliver the 3 additional test vehicles within 3 business days of contract award. At the completion of testing, the government planned to select from the IDIQ contractors a single M-ATV producer, but could, at its discretion, place production orders with multiple IDIQ producers.
There was a quantity range required from 372 to the most probable M-ATV production quantity of 2,080 up to a maximum of 10,000. The RFP would also require pricing for a range of monthly delivery rates from 100 to 1,000. These production quantity estimates were subject to availability of funding. The resulting IDIQ contract(s) would include associated initial spare parts and ancillary requirements. As soon as feasible, the government would post a draft acquisition summary with the anticipated schedule, and other documents for potential contractors. An RFP was planned to be issued before 1 December 2008.
On 5 December 2008, a pre-solicitation conference for the M-ATV program was held. During the conference the vehicle requirements were outlined. The M-ATV's survivability requirements were classified at that time. On 8 December 2008, a formal Request for Proposals was issued.
On 29 September 2009, it was reported that the first 2 M-ATVs had arrived in Afghanistan. These were part of a contract for over 4,000 vehicles in total for both the US Army and US Marine Corps. On 2 November 2009, it was reported that the US Army had begun training soldiers on the vehicles, of which 41 had arrived in Afghanistan. By that point, the US military had accepted 690 vehicles as part of a planned purchase of 6,500 vehicles.
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