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DOD'S Mobility Requirements: Value of Intratheater Lift Analysis Can Be Enhanced (Chapter Report, 01/30/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-53)

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis (ILA), focusing on
whether: (1) the analysis and recommendations in the study were
appropriately linked; (2) the study considered all options in meeting
the requirements for various lift assets; and (3) improvements could be
made to enhance the study's value as a decision-making tool.
GAO noted that: (1) the Intratheater Lift Analysis does not adequately
fulfill the congressional directive to determine lift requirements and
develop an integrated plan to meet them; (2) the study contains
recommendations that would cost billions of dollars to implement, but
the study's analysis generally did not support these recommendations;
(3) the disconnect between the analysis and recommendations is
especially evident in the information regarding tactical wheeled
vehicles and outsize airlift capability; (4) in addition, the study's
analysis did not incorporate several assets that can contribute
significantly to the intratheater lift mission; as a result, the study's
requirements and solutions may be overstated; (5) the analysis did not
consider: (a) commercial vehicles provided by host nation support; (b)
the use of the current and planned fleet of outsize-capable intertheater
airlifters such as the C-5 and C-17; and (c) the extent to which Army
watercraft could reduce the need for alternative sources of lift; (6)
furthermore, improvements could enhance the study's value to
decisionmakers; (7) these improvements include requirements stated as a
range rather than as absolute numbers and tradeoff assessments based on
the cost and capability of the various lift assets; (8) a range would
have better reflected the dynamic nature of intratheater requirements,
and system tradeoff assessments would have provided choices based on
cost and capability; and (9) the 1999 Mobility Requirements Study and
updated Intratheater Lift Analysis will afford DOD a good opportunity to
address these issues and provide Congress with a basis for acquisition
decisionmaking in future budget cycles.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-53
     TITLE:  DOD'S Mobility Requirements: Value of Intratheater Lift 
             Analysis Can Be Enhanced
      DATE:  01/30/98
   SUBJECT:  Strategic mobility forces
             Military airlift operations
             Military systems analysis
             Cost effectiveness analysis
             Military aircraft
             Logistics
             Military materiel
             Future budget projections
             Defense procurement
             Congressional/executive relations
IDENTIFIER:  Army Heavy Equipment Transporter System
             Army Palletized Load System
             C-5 Aircraft
             C-17 Aircraft
             C-130 Aircraft
             DOD Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
January 1998
DOD'S MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS -
VALUE OF INTRATHEATER LIFT
ANALYSES CAN BE ENHANCED
GAO/NSIAD-98-53
DOD's Mobility Requirements
(707262)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
  DOD - Department of Defense
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  HETS - Heavy Equipment Transporter System
  HNS - Host Nation Support
  ILA - Intratheater Lift Analysis
  LCU-2000 - Landing Craft, Utility-2000
  PLS - Palletized Load System
  SUMMITS - Scenario Unrestricted Mobility Model for Intratheater
     Simulation
  TACWAR - Tactical Warfare Model
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-277182
January 30, 1998
The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
As requested, we are providing you with the results of our review of
the Department of Defense's 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis.  We
reviewed the Department's analysis to determine whether (1) the
analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked,
(2) the study considered all options in meeting the requirements for
various lift assets, and (3) improvements could be made to enhance
the study's value as a decision-making tool. 
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
and the House National Security Committee; the Secretaries of
Defense, the Army, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget.  We will also make copies available to others
on request. 
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III. 
Louis J.  Rodrigues
Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm highlighted the need to
quickly deliver combat forces and their support to theaters of
operation other than Europe.  To ensure that a sufficient amount of
mobility assets would be available to support contingencies in the
post-Cold War environment, Congress directed the Department of
Defense (DOD) in fiscal year 1991 to assess both intertheater (from
one theater of operations to another) and intratheater (within the
same theater of operations) lift requirements and develop an
integrated plan to meet them.  In its 1992 Mobility Requirements
Study and 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update,
DOD addressed the intertheater portion of the directive.  According
to Joint Staff officials, the 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis
addressed the intratheater portion of the directive.  DOD is planning
to update this analysis as part of its 1999 Mobility Requirements
Study. 
Army officials told us that DOD plans to spend $1.7 billion through
fiscal year 2003 to implement the Army's tactical wheeled vehicle
acquisition plan, as recommended in the Intratheater Lift Analysis. 
If the airlift recommendations in the analysis were implemented as
well, another approximately $2.7 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars)
could be spent.  Because these recommendations are intended to serve
as a basis for proposed intratheater lift acquisitions, the Chairman
and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
requested that GAO report on the results of the 1996 Intratheater
Lift Analysis.  Specifically, GAO determined whether (1) the analysis
and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked, (2) the
study considered all options in meeting the requirements for various
lift assets, and (3) improvements could enhance the study's value as
a decision-making tool. 
   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Members of the defense community agree that intratheater lift
requirements are more difficult to establish than intertheater
requirements.  The type, amount, and timing of lift that will be
needed within the theater of operations depend on the theater
infrastructure and the course of the contingency, which can change
rapidly.  Five modes of intratheater transportation--airlift,
highway, rail, coastal waterways, and pipeline--present several
options for lift, all of which must be considered as the contingency
progresses.  For example, if outsize cargo--the largest items in the
Army's inventory such as the M1 battle tank--need to be delivered by
air, the availability of outsize-capable airlifters must be
considered.  The C-5 and the C-17 are the only airlifters capable of
transporting outsize cargo.  The Air Force plans to procure 120
C-17s.  The final 80 aircraft are being procured under a June 1996
multiyear contract.  The C-130, with a smaller payload capacity, is
the Air Force's primary intratheater airlifter. 
The 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis was led by the Joint Staff with
support from other DOD agencies, the military services, and theater
commands.  The study assessed lift requirements for a nearly
simultaneous Korea and Southwest Asia scenario.  It also determined
the mobility assets needed to move troops and equipment from the
airfields and seaports in the theaters of operation to destination
air bases, staging areas, and tactical assembly areas. 
   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The Intratheater Lift Analysis does not adequately fulfill the
congressional directive to determine lift requirements and develop an
integrated plan to meet them.  The study contains recommendations
that would cost billions of dollars to implement, but the study's
analysis generally did not support these recommendations.  The
disconnect between the analysis and recommendations is especially
evident in the information regarding tactical wheeled vehicles and
outsize airlift capability. 
In addition, the study's analysis did not incorporate several assets
that can contribute significantly to the intratheater lift mission;
as a result, the study's requirements and solutions may be
overstated.  The analysis did not consider (1) commercial vehicles
provided by host nation support; (2) the use of the current and
planned fleet of outsize-capable intertheater airlifters such as the
C-5 and C-17; and (3) the extent to which Army watercraft could
reduce the need for alternative sources of lift. 
Furthermore, improvements could enhance the study's value to
decisionmakers.  These improvements include requirements stated as a
range rather than as absolute numbers and tradeoff assessments based
on the cost and capability of the various lift assets.  A range would
have better reflected the dynamic nature of intratheater
requirements, and system tradeoff assessments would have provided
choices based on cost and capability. 
The 1999 Mobility Requirements Study and updated Intratheater Lift
Analysis will afford DOD a good opportunity to address these issues
and provide Congress with a basis for acquisition decision-making in
future budget cycles. 
   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
      INTRATHEATER LIFT ANALYSIS
      CONTAINS UNSUPPORTED
      RECOMMENDATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
The Secretary of Defense's 1997 Annual Report to the President and
the Congress cited the Intratheater Lift Analysis as a basis for
DOD's future force structure and investment decisions.  However, the
study does not adequately fulfill congressional direction to
determine intratheater lift requirements and establish an integrated
plan to meet those requirements.  The recommendations in the
Intratheater Lift Analysis support the Army's current procurement
plans but are not based on the requirements identified in the study. 
The disconnect occurred in some cases because of invalid assumptions,
but in other cases the cause for the disconnect is unclear. 
Assumptions about the mission of the Heavy Equipment Transporter
System, for example, did not reflect the way the Army plans to use
this asset.  As a result, the recommendation for the system's
acquisition supports the Army's planned acquisitions but is not
supported by the study.  The Intratheater Lift Analysis also
identified a requirement for
16 Palletized Load System companies but recommended that the Army
continue its planned procurement of 32 companies.  In addition, the
study recommended that excess Heavy Equipment Transporter Systems and
Palletized Load Systems, as well as host nation support, be used to
offset shortfalls in other categories of tactical wheeled vehicles. 
However, the study did not include a cost-effectiveness analysis that
assessed the relative cost and capabilities of using potential
excesses to offset shortages. 
The 442 C-130s currently in the fleet exceed the requirement
identified in the Intratheater Lift Analysis for the Korea and
Southwest Asia scenarios as well as other lift requirements generated
by theater commanders outside of these scenarios.  However, the study
recommended that additional C-17s beyond the planned procurement of
120 (a squadron of 14, according to DOD officials) should be used to
augment C-130 capability primarily by transporting outsize cargo. 
Although this recommendation is not currently a DOD acquisition
objective, it has been supported by the Defense Science Board and
theater commanders.  The cost to implement the recommendation could
be about $2.7 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars).  The study's
analysis, however, does not support the need to procure more than the
planned 120 C-17s.  The combat units relocated by the C-17 in the two
scenarios were considered apart from the rest of the battle, and the
time frames for delivery of the units were neither incorporated into
the overall mobility scheme nor directly related to a specified
intratheater lift requirement.  The Air Force has asserted that the
currently planned procurement of 120 C-17s, along with the current
C-130 fleet, will be sufficient to meet intratheater lift
requirements as they arise. 
      INTRATHEATER LIFT ANALYSIS
      DOES NOT CONSIDER ALL
      INTRATHEATER LIFT ASSETS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Commercial vehicles provided by host nation support were not
considered in the Intratheater Lift Analysis, although such support
is cited throughout the study as a potential offset to U.S.  mobility
force structure.  The theater commanders' current operation plans for
the Korea and Southwest Asia scenarios rely extensively on host
nation support to provide transportation of cargo, heavy tracked
vehicles, and fuel within the theater.  Host nation support was
instrumental in transporting heavy tracked vehicles and other cargo
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  Furthermore, the
1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, which
identified the intertheater requirements for the same war-fighting
scenario as the Intratheater Lift Analysis, assumed that commercial
cargo trucks, fuel tankers, and heavy equipment transporters would be
provided by the host nations.  Such support would limit the amount of
equipment that the United States would have to transport into the
theater.  The defense community is currently debating the appropriate
level of host nation support to offset U.S.  force structure, but
agreements have not been reached.  A study that considers U.S. 
intratheater requirements with and without host nation support
offsets, as opposed to only one scenario with no host nation support,
would provide decisionmakers with more flexibility as they consider
acquisition plans. 
The Intratheater Lift Analysis also did not consider the potential
contribution of the C-5 airlifter.  Air Mobility Command officials
said that the C-5, although an intertheater asset, would be a
candidate for intratheater lift of outsize cargo if destination
airfields can accommodate the aircraft.  The Command has surveyed 46
of the 67 airfields used in the Intratheater Lift Analysis to
determine whether they are accessible to the C-5.  The survey results
show that the C-5 can land on 34, or 74 percent, of the 46 airfields. 
This number would likely be higher during a contingency, when
airfields that have not yet been surveyed would be made available. 
The ability to rely on both the C-5 and the planned 120 C-17s to
deliver outsize cargo as needed could increase flexibility and
eliminate the need for additional large airlift capability dedicated
to an intratheater role. 
Finally, even though the Intratheater Lift Analysis modeled the
assets currently in the inventory, it did not consider that
additional watercraft could offset requirements for other lift
assets.  The Army's logistics support vessels and landing craft
transport personnel and cargo from large strategic sealift ships to
the shore and provide intratheater transport capability.  Army
watercraft were successfully used in Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm and could be a significant means of transporting tracked
vehicles, ammunition, and other cargo via coastal waterways in Korea
and Southwest Asia.  However, the study did not include any tradeoff
or cost-effectiveness analyses to identify the benefits of additional
watercraft.  A separate watercraft study, completed in November 1996,
found that theater commanders have not identified their intratheater
requirements for watercraft.  The role, capability, and requirements
for Army watercraft, and potential tradeoffs with ground
transportation assets, have not been determined. 
      USE OF RANGES AND
      COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
      COULD ENHANCE STUDY'S VALUE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
Because intratheater requirements are subject to change based on the
combat situation and theater infrastructure, requirements stated as
ranges, rather than as absolute numbers, would better reflect the
dynamic nature of intratheater lift.  DOD's 1988 Worldwide
Intratheater Mobility Study recommended that all future statements of
intratheater mobility requirements be expressed in ranges when
possible and that those requirements not expressed as ranges should
be understood to be approximations.  The Intratheater Lift Analysis,
however, stated requirements as absolute numbers, which lessens the
study's value as a management tool.  A range of requirements would
allow decisionmakers to consider different factors, such as the
effect of damage to airfields or seaports, weather, or various threat
scenarios, on the number and type of lift assets needed. 
The Intratheater Lift Analysis also failed to conduct a tradeoff
analysis among various lift assets based on cost-effectiveness,
thereby limiting the information available to those making investment
decisions within a sensitive budget environment.  For example, the
analysis identified excess Palletized Load Systems in the Army's
acquisition objectives for fiscal
year 2003 but recommended that the doctrine for the system be revised
to allow the system to carry cargo other than ammunition so that it
could alleviate shortfalls in 22.5-ton line haulers.  The ammunition
role was the sole mission on which the Palletized Load System
originally was determined to be cost-effective, and a new
cost-effectiveness analysis has not been done to justify the system's
expanded role.  A company of Palletized Load Systems costs about
$18.8 million (1996 dollars) compared with only $9.5 million (1996
dollars) for a company of 22.5-ton line haulers, according to an
analysis performed by the Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Requirements
Management Office.  According to Joint Staff officials, limited
tradeoff assessments were discussed in carrying out the Intratheater
Lift Analysis, but these assessments did not consider cost and were
not documented. 
   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct that the planned
1999 update of the Intratheater Lift Analysis
  -- link the study's recommendations to its analysis and include
     assumptions that consider current Army doctrine, if acquisition
     plans are to be based on the doctrine;
  -- consider host nation support as a means of accomplishing
     intratheater lift and ensure that host nation support
     assumptions are consistent with those in intertheater studies;
  -- include the potential contribution of the C-5 airlifter and
     planned fleet of 120 C-17s;
  -- reflect the role, capability, and requirements for Army
     watercraft in an intratheater role, including an analysis of the
     extent to which these assets can alleviate identified shortfalls
     in tactical wheeled vehicles;
  -- state intratheater requirements as ranges to reflect their
     dependence on the combat situation; and
  -- include cost-effectiveness analyses that examine tradeoffs among
     lift assets to reflect capability, cost, and requirements. 
   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with
GAO's report and agreed to take into account GAO's recommendations in
conducting its 1999 mobility study.  However, DOD did not agree with
GAO's finding that the recommendations of the Intratheater Lift
Analysis are not supported by the study's analysis.  DOD stated that
the study used computationally-derived data, along with additional
analysis and military judgment, to develop the study's
recommendations.  DOD cites service acquisition programs, input from
theater commanders, and substitution of one type of intratheater
asset for another as examples of the additional analysis considered
in developing the requirements and recommendations in the
Intratheater Lift Analysis.  DOD points to the study's recommendation
to use excess Heavy Equipment Transporter Systems in place of 34-ton
line haulers as being based on service acquisition programs and
theater commander input. 
The Intratheater Lift Analysis does not link its requirements to its
recommendations.  Rather, its recommendations merely support the
Army's acquisition plans with no explanation of the disconnect
between those plans and the study's requirements.  In discussing
GAO's draft report, agency officials acknowledged that the Joint
Staff had difficulty linking the Army's fiscal year 2003 acquisition
program to the Intratheater Lift Analysis requirements and that, for
this reason, the study's reliance on the acquisition program is not
clearly explained.  Furthermore, during GAO's review, Joint Staff
officials asserted that the decisions reached by the study's working
groups concerning, for example, tradeoff assessments and the airlift
tactical unit moves analysis, were not documented.  Without an
explicit link in the Intratheater Lift Analysis between the study's
requirements and recommendations, and without a means of reviewing
the factors or additional analyses that led to the final
recommendations in the study, GAO has no basis on which to concur
that a link exists.  Moreover, GAO questions the reliability and
independence of a DOD requirements study that bases its requirements
and recommendations on service acquisition programs without examining
the disconnects between those programs and the study's own findings. 
Concerning DOD's example, the number of Heavy Equipment Transporter
Systems identified as a requirement in the Intratheater Lift Analysis
is less than the number reflected in the study's recommendation. 
According to theater commanders' input to the study and GAO's
discussions with Army officials, the Heavy Equipment Transporter
System is not an effective or economical substitute for 34-ton line
haulers.  GAO agrees with DOD's statement that service acquisition
programs were used to support the study's recommendations for Heavy
Equipment Transporter Systems.  It is this fact that leads GAO to
conclude that the recommendations in the Intratheater Lift Analysis
were not based on the requirements identified by the study's
analysis, but rather were based on service acquisition programs that
had already been established. 
DOD's comments are addressed at the end of each chapter, and the
complete text of DOD's comments is in appendix II. 
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991,
Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine
intertheater (from one theater of operations to another) and
intratheater (within a theater of operations) mobility requirements
for the armed forces and develop an integrated plan to meet those
requirements.  DOD assessed its intertheater requirements in the 1992
Mobility Requirements Study.  This study was updated in 1995 based on
the results of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.  According to Joint Staff
officials, intratheater requirements were addressed in the July 1996
Intratheater Lift Analysis (ILA), which was DOD's first published
intratheater lift requirements study since the 1988 Worldwide
Intratheater Mobility Study.  The ILA was sponsored by the Joint
Staff, with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, military services, U.S. 
Central Command, U.S.  Forces Korea, U.S.  Pacific Command, and U.S. 
Transportation Command.  At the time of our review, the ILA had not
been submitted to Congress. 
Historically, DOD has focused on intertheater lift requirements
because intratheater lift requirements are more difficult to
establish.  The time-phased force deployment data process, which sets
out the mode and timing of transportation of each unit, typically
concentrates on the intertheater leg of the deployment.  Intratheater
lift requirements depend more on the combat situation and the theater
concept of operations, which may not be known until the start of
hostilities and are always subject to change.  Intertheater lift
transports troops, equipment, and supplies from U.S.  airfields and
seaports or prepositioned locations to the airfields and seaports in
the theater of operations.  The intratheater lift phase transports
the troops and equipment from these airfields and seaports to the
tactical assembly areas and foxholes in the theater. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates "fort-to-foxhole" deployment. 
   Figure 1.1:  Fort-to-Foxhole
   Deployment
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
The Secretary of Defense's 1997 Annual Report to the President and
the Congress states that the mobility objectives identified in the
updated 1995 Mobility Requirements Study and the 1996 ILA will guide
future force structure and investment decisions.  Officials from the
Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program
Analysis and Evaluation said that the ILA is the official DOD study
that the military services should use in developing their procurement
plans for intratheater lift assets.  The Army plans to spend about
$1.7 billion through fiscal year 2003 to implement the ILA's
recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles; if the airlift
recommendations were implemented as well, another approximately $2.7
billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) could be spent. 
According to Joint Staff officials, a new Mobility Requirements Study
is expected to be completed in 1999.  That study is expected to
incorporate the Quadrennial Defense Review scenarios and force
structure,\1 include an update to the ILA, and examine intertheater
and intratheater lift requirements simultaneously rather than
separately. 
--------------------
\1 In May 1997, DOD issued the Quadrennial Defense Review, its fourth
comprehensive review of the military since the end of the Cold War. 
This review, required by the Military Force Structure Review Act in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, examined
U.S.  defense needs from 1997 to 2015.  The Quadrennial Defense
Review continued to base force structure requirements on nearly
simultaneous scenarios in Korea and Southwest Asia, but it also noted
that the demand for smaller contingency operations is expected to
remain high over the next 15 to 20 years.  A limited mobility
analysis, focusing on intertheater lift requirements, was done for
the study. 
   MODES OF INTRATHEATER LIFT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Five alternate modes of transportation--airlift, highway, coastal
waterway, rail, and pipeline--present several options for
intratheater lift.  The availability of these options depends on the
combat situation and theater infrastructure.  For example, if the 176
bridges and 11 tunnels between Pusan and Seoul, South Korea are
damaged or destroyed or if the bridges cannot accommodate heavy
tracked vehicles, such as main battle tanks, alternative modes of
transportation must be arranged. 
Airlift enables immediate positioning and delivery of unit equipment
and sustainment, but it is costly and provides limited cargo
capacity.  The C-130 airlifter is the primary aircraft used for
intratheater lift.  Large intertheater airlifters, such as the C-17
and C-5, can also be used for intratheater lift if a larger payload
capacity or the transport of outsize cargo--the largest items in the
Army's inventory--is needed and airfields can accommodate the
aircraft. 
Tactical wheeled vehicles are key to (1) moving units to assembly
areas in the theater of operations in preparation for combat and (2)
sustaining forces with supplies essential for successful operations. 
The tactical wheeled vehicles included in the ILA were the Heavy
Equipment Transporter System (HETS), the Palletized Load System
(PLS), 5,000- and 7,500-gallon fuel tankers, and 22.5- and 34-ton
line haulers.  The Army's watercraft fleet consists of 245 craft that
transport cargo and combat vehicles from ship to shore or to
locations in the theater of operations via intracoastal waterways. 
The Logistics Support Vessel can accommodate
24 M1 main battle tanks and has the capacity to carry 2,000 tons. 
Rail, an important mode of transport in Korea, can alleviate some
highway transportation requirements, according to the ILA.  Appendix
I shows some intratheater lift assets. 
   ILA METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The war-fighting requirements on which the ILA was based were
established in the updated 1995 Mobility Requirements Study.  That
study, which formed the basis for DOD's current intertheater lift
program, developed a requirement that would accomplish, with moderate
risk, U.S.  objectives established by the Joint Staff's Tactical
Warfare model (TACWAR) for a nearly simultaneous Korea and Southwest
Asia scenario.\2 The study assessed intertheater lift requirements to
deliver combat and support forces to airfields and seaports in the
two theaters of operations.  The 1995 study, however, did not address
the intratheater lift requirements needed to transport the units to
their final destinations within the theaters. 
The ILA, through the Scenario Unrestricted Mobility Model for
Intratheater Simulation (SUMMITS), modeled the intratheater
lift--including airlift, tactical wheeled vehicles, Army watercraft,
and rail--needed to transport the troops and equipment from the
airfields and seaports and prepositioning sites in the theater to
destination air bases, staging areas, and tactical assembly areas.\3
SUMMITS considers required delivery date, payload, rate of movement,
loading and unloading times, and the available transportation assets
and network capabilities; examines every feasible path from origin to
destination; and selects the fastest path through the network,
subject to user-defined mode selection rules.  For example, the mode
selection rules direct that airlift, which is more expensive than
ground transportation, is to be used only if ground transportation
would be late and airlift would result in an improvement of at least
24 hours. 
--------------------
\2 Developed by the Joint Staff for a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization-Warsaw Pact conflict, TACWAR is a theater-level combat
model that examines the interaction of strategic and tactical forces
in a conventional and chemical environment.  TACWAR is a
deterministic model; that is, for a given set of input data, the
model provides an associated set of output results.  TACWAR has
recently been criticized by the National Defense Panel, appointed to
review the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Air Force Chief of
Staff for failing to account for the contributions of military
activity beyond force-on-force direct attack scenarios.  A new model,
planned to be fully operational by 2001, is expected to better
represent future warfare. 
\3 SUMMITS is an intratheater deployment simulation model that
quantifies the lift needed to deliver a specified force to its final
destination in the theater of operations and then to sustain that
force.  The model moves commodities, such as ammunition, bulk fuel,
unit equipment, and personnel through an interconnected network of
air routes, roads, pipeline, railroads, and coastal waterways. 
   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
Because its recommendations are intended to serve as the basis for
proposed DOD acquisitions, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services requested that we report on
the results of the 1996 ILA.  Specifically, we determined whether (1)
the analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately
linked, (2) the study considered all options in meeting the
requirements for various lift assets, and (3) improvements could
enhance the study's value as a decision-making tool.  To determine
whether the ILA's analysis and recommendations were appropriately
linked, we reviewed the ILA, its Catalogues of Data and Assumptions,
and other information supporting the study; theater command input to
the ILA; Army and Air Force doctrine and procurement plans for
tactical wheeled vehicles and airlifters; information on intratheater
mobility in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and Operation
Joint Endeavor; the 1997 and 1998 Air Mobility Master Plans; RAND's
1997 Documented Briefing, "Should C-17s Be Used To Carry In-Theater
Cargo During Major Deployments?"; and other relevant documents.  We
reviewed our prior reports on Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, PLS, HETS, and C-17.  We visited the tactical wheeled vehicles
training facility at Fort Eustis, Virginia.  We discussed the ILA's
assumptions, analysis, and recommendations with officials from the
following organizations: 
  -- Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.;
  -- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and
     Requirements, Washington, D.C.;
  -- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for Program
     Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.;
  -- U.S.  Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;
  -- U.S.  Forces Korea;
  -- U.S.  Pacific Command, Camp H.  M.  Smith, Hawaii;
  -- U.S.  Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;
  -- Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
  -- Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;
  -- Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;
  -- Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
  -- Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia;
  -- Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia;
  -- Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Requirements Management Office,
     Fort Eustis, Virginia; and
  -- Boeing Corporation (formerly McDonnell Douglas Corporation),
     Rosslyn, Virginia. 
To determine whether the ILA considered all options in meeting the
requirements for various lift assets, including host nation support,
the C-5, and Army watercraft, we reviewed the ILA and its supporting
Catalogues of Data and Assumptions; DOD's 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review; theater commands' operation plans for Southwest Asia and
Korea; DOD documents concerning host nation support in Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm; the DOD Inspector General's 1997
report on host nation support in Southwest Asia; the Air Mobility
Command's May 1997 Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report; Air
Force and contractor documents concerning C-5 operations and
capabilities; the Logistics Management Institute's November 1996
report, "Joint Logistics Over The Shore Causeway Systems and
Support;" the November 1996 Army Watercraft Master Plan; and other
documents.  We obtained information on the potential contribution of
these lift assets from officials at the Joint Staff; theater
commands; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for
Program Analysis and Evaluation; the U.S.  Transportation Command;
Army Headquarters; the Army Training and Doctrine Command; the Army
Combined Arms Support Command; the Air Combat Command; the Air
Mobility Command; and Lockheed Martin Corporation, Crystal City,
Virginia.  We also toured the Army watercraft docked at Fort Eustis. 
To determine whether improvements could enhance the study's value as
a decision-making tool, we reviewed the 1988 Worldwide Intratheater
Mobility Study, 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, 1995 Mobility
Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, and the 1996 Defense
Science Board Task Force Report on Strategic Mobility.  We also
reviewed the theater commands' input into the ILA, information on
tactical wheeled vehicle cost and capability from the Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management Office, and our prior reports
on the 1992 and 1995 Mobility Requirements Studies.  We obtained
additional information from the Joint Staff; the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy for Program Analysis and Evaluation;
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and
Requirements; Air Force Headquarters; Air Force Studies and Analyses
Agency; Air Combat Command; Air Mobility Command; Army Headquarters;
and Army Combined Arms Support Command. 
We did not assess the validity of the requirements or objectives
identified in the fiscal year 2003 Total Army Analysis and did not
independently verify the computer-generated data from the SUMMITS or
TACWAR models.  Our analysis focused on the decisions that were
justified based on the output of these models.  Our assessment of
whether the outputs were properly used did not require a
determination as to the accuracy of the models and the data they
produce.  We evaluated the links between the ILA's recommendations
and the requirements generated by the models. 
We performed our review between September 1996 and November 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
ILA RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT BASED
ON THE STUDY'S ANALYSIS
============================================================ Chapter 2
The ILA contains several recommendations that are not based on
requirements developed by the study's analysis.  In some cases, this
disconnect appears to be the result of invalid assumptions.  For
example, assumptions about how the Army would use HETS were not
consistent with Army doctrine.  In other cases, the cause of the
disconnect is unclear.  Further, the recommendations for tactical
wheeled vehicles supported the Army's planned acquisition objectives,
but the study's analysis would have resulted in a different
recommendation for most types of tactical wheeled vehicles (e.g., the
PLS and the 34-ton line hauler).  Finally, the ILA found that the
current C-130 fleet is more than sufficient to meet airlift
requirements but recommended that an additional squadron of C-17s,
beyond the planned procurement of 120 aircraft, should be used for
intratheater lift, particularly for outsize cargo.  This
recommendation is not supported by the analysis in the study. 
   TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLE
   RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT BASED
   ON THE STUDY'S REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
The tactical wheeled vehicle acquisition plan recommended by the ILA
does not reflect the requirements determined by the study's analysis. 
The ILA recommended that the Army continue with its tactical wheeled
vehicle acquisition objectives based on the biennial Total Army
Analysis for fiscal year 2003,\1 even though the ILA requirements
differed significantly from that analysis.  The ILA recommended that
shortfalls in some types of tactical wheeled vehicles be alleviated
either by host nation support or tradeoffs with other types of excess
vehicles.  However, because the ILA requirements differ significantly
from the Army's acquisition objectives, the excesses asserted in the
ILA may not actually exist.  Further, the ILA did not consider
tactical wheeled vehicle host nation support (the treatment of host
nation support is discussed in ch.  3) or include a
cost-effectiveness analysis of the tradeoffs among various types of
vehicles.  Table 2.1 shows the ILA requirements (number of companies)
and recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles.  Appendix I shows
the number of assets in each company. 
                               Table 2.1
                  ILA Requirements and Recommendations
               ILA
Asset          requirement\a  ILA recommendation\b
-------------  -------------  ----------------------------------------
HETS           4 companies    The ILA recommended supporting the
                              Army's doctrinal requirement of 18
                              companies and using HETS to offset a
                              shortfall in 34-ton line haulers. (The
                              study identified excess HETS
                              capability.)
5,000-gallon   12 companies   The ILA recommended 12 companies as the
fuel tanker                   absolute minimum. (The Army's
                              acquisition objective is 43 companies.)
7,500-gallon   41 companies   The ILA recommended 41 companies as the
fuel tanker                   absolute minimum. (The Army's
                              acquisition objective is 48 companies.)
PLS            16 companies   The ILA recommended that the Army's
                              acquisition objective of 32 companies be
                              continued and that the PLS doctrine be
                              changed so that the additional
                              capability could alleviate the 22.5-ton
                              line hauler shortfall.
22.5-ton line  54 companies   The ILA recommended continuing the
hauler                        Army's acquisition program of 33
                              companies but stated that 54 companies
                              should be the minimum. Additional PLS
                              capability could be used to alleviate
                              the shortfall.
34-ton line    87 companies   The ILA recommended 87 companies as an
hauler                        objective and that the Army's
                              acquisition objective of 49 companies be
                              continued. (These companies are already
                              on hand.) The study recommended using
                              HETS, 7,500-gallon fuel tanker tractors,
                              and host nation support to offset the
                              shortfall.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The ILA refers to the requirements as "workloads."
\b The Army acquisition objective is for fiscal year 2003. 
--------------------
\1 We did not assess the requirements or objectives of this
Army-generated analysis and thus cannot comment on their validity. 
      HETS ASSUMPTIONS ARE NOT
      CONSISTENT WITH ARMY
      DOCTRINE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
The ILA's recommendation for the procurement of HETS is not
consistent with the requirement identified in the study.  The ILA
requirement is for
4 HETS companies, but the recommendation supports the Army's plan to
buy 18 companies.  The ILA did not model the use of HETS according to
current Army doctrine and thus derived a much lower HETS requirement
than the Army's analysis.  The ILA Catalogue of Data and Assumptions
states that HETS were used to transport tracked vehicles only when
the vehicles' time to self-deploy would exceed the time required to
load them on a HETS, transport them, and unload them.  According to
Army officials, however, under current Army doctrine, battle tanks do
not self-deploy unless the distance to be traversed is 3 miles or
less.  This mission was added in 1991, before which time HETS only
evacuated tanks from the battlefield.  The Army's objective of 18
HETS companies reflects the Army's plan to procure enough HETS to
relocate a heavy brigade and its support in a single lift.  Another
reason for ILA's lower HETS requirement is that the study assumed a
steady, even flow of heavy equipment arrivals by sea, with no surges
as a result of weather or chance. 
      FUEL TANKER REQUIREMENTS ARE
      NOT ACCURATE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
The ILA identified a need for fewer 5,000-gallon fuel tankers than
the Army plans to procure, but it recommended that the Army's
acquisition program be continued.  The ILA acknowledges that its
5,000-gallon fuel tanker requirements are understated.  According to
Joint Staff and Army officials, one reason for the inaccuracy is that
the ILA did not factor in fuel requirements for the tankers or the
additional cargo line haulers that the analysis showed were needed to
meet requirements.  Another reason for the difference between the
Army and ILA estimates is that the TACWAR battle on which the ILA was
based was fought at a low-to-moderate intensity level.  If the level
of intensity had been higher, fuel requirements would have been
greater. 
      PLS RECOMMENDATION IS NOT
      SUPPORTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3
The ILA's recommendation to continue the Army's plan to procure 32
PLS companies is not based on the ILA's requirement of 16 companies. 
Rather than recommend a reduced number of PLS to reflect the
requirements, the ILA recommended that the Army continue toward its
acquisition objective and use the surplus PLS to help alleviate the
22.5-ton line hauler shortfalls.  However, on the basis of a cost and
operational effectiveness analysis, the cost-effectiveness of the PLS
was determined only for an ammunition role.  Further analysis has not
been done to determine the cost-effectiveness of the PLS in a
cargo-carrying role.  One PLS costs about $391,000 (1996 dollars)
compared with $158,000 (1996 dollars) for one 22.5-ton line hauler,
according to an analysis by the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements
Management Office.  Because alternative uses for the PLS have not
been assessed for cost-effectiveness, the ILA's recommendation for
the PLS is premature and not supported by analysis. 
      LINE HAULER RECOMMENDATIONS
      ARE NOT CONSISTENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.4
The ILA identifies a minimum requirement for 54 22.5-ton line hauler
companies but also supports the Army's acquisition objective of 33
companies.  The ILA states that excess PLS assets can help alleviate
this shortfall.  However, the PLS mission would have to be changed,
and a cost-effectiveness analysis for such a change has not been
done. 
The ILA also identified a large shortfall in the 34-ton line haulers,
but the Army believes enough of these assets are already in its
inventory and therefore does not plan to procure any more.  The ILA
recommends 87 of these companies as an objective but supports the
Army's plan not to procure any additional trucks, stating that
shortfalls can be offset with excess HETS assets, 7,500-gallon fuel
tanker tractors (the same tractor used with the 34-ton line hauler),
and host nation support.  None of these options, however, were
modeled. 
   RECOMMENDATION FOR ADDITIONAL
   AIRLIFT IS NOT SUPPORTED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The number of C-130s in the fleet exceeds the number that the ILA
identified as a requirement for the Korea and Southwest Asia
scenarios.\2 To determine the number of additional C-130s that would
be needed worldwide for contingencies unrelated to these scenarios,
the Joint Staff surveyed the theater commanders.  Even with their
additional requirement, the C-130 fleet still exceeds the number
needed for intratheater lift.  However, on the basis of analyses by
the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, the ILA recommended using
additional C-17s beyond the planned procurement of 120 (a squadron of
14, according to DOD officials) to augment the C-130s by providing
outsize cargo capability.  This recommendation has been supported by
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility (in a 1996
report) and by theater commanders.  The Air Force analyses, however,
do not support this recommendation because they only demonstrated
that the C-17 could move cargo more quickly than the C-130 under
certain circumstances.  No intratheater requirement was established
based on the C-17's contribution to meeting TACWAR timelines, and the
relative cost-effectiveness of the two aircraft was not taken into
account. 
The Air Force is not currently planning to acquire more than the
planned 120 C-17s so that a squadron could be dedicated to an
intratheater role.  An Air Force document shows that no C-17s are
allocated solely for intratheater lift but that the U.S. 
Transportation Command would continue to support the intratheater
lift needs of war-fighting commanders, as demonstrated in Operation
Joint Endeavor in Bosnia.  RAND's National Defense Research Institute
evaluated intratheater concepts of operations for the planned C-17
fleet of 120 aircraft.  In a 1997 Documented Briefing,\3 RAND
identified the advantages of using the C-17 in an intratheater role
and concluded that about one squadron of C-17s could be used
effectively in each of the two theaters of operation.  These C-17s
would be part of the planned procurement of 120 aircraft and would be
based in the theater, unavailable to fly intertheater missions.  RAND
acknowledged that deploying these C-17s as intratheater assets would
slow the flow of intertheater cargo, but stated that this effect
would be offset by the improved intratheater deliveries afforded by
the C-17.  DOD officials commented that, during the halting phase, a
delay in the strategic airlift flow may not be acceptable.  RAND also
determined that fewer C-17s would need to be dedicated to the theater
if some C-17s arriving in the theater were delayed to perform
intratheater missions and then re-entered the intertheater airlift
flow.  According to RAND, this concept could allow nondedicated C-17s
to fly most of the missions that would otherwise require
theater-assigned C-17s. 
--------------------
\2 As of fiscal year 1997, the Air Force had 442 C-130s in its fleet. 
This number does not include the additional aircraft used for
training and as backup for aircraft undergoing maintenance. 
\3 "Should C-17s Be Used To Carry In-Theater Cargo During Major
Deployments?" RAND, 1997. 
      FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
      POTENTIAL C-17 ROLE IS
      WARRANTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
In support of the ILA, the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency used
its own models, along with SUMMITS, to determine the number of C-130s
needed to meet TACWAR requirements after the addition of a squadron
of C-17s beyond the 120 planned aircraft.  The analysis found that
about 50 percent more cargo could be delivered with only two-thirds
as many sorties.  However, because the C-130 fleet was more than
sufficient to deliver the ILA workload, the faster deliveries
resulting from the addition of C-17s were not necessary to meet the
TACWAR battle requirements. 
The ILA also stated that, on the basis of its capability to deliver
bulk cargo,\4 every additional C-17 could replace three C-130s. 
However, the ratio of three C-130s to one C-17 does not take into
account either cost or the reduced flexibility that would be provided
to a theater commander who may need three C-130s for multiple
deliveries rather than one C-17 for a single delivery. 
Finally, dedicating a squadron of large airlifters, such as the C-17,
for intratheater use could be an inefficient use of the asset. 
Intratheater missions typically involve small loads.  In Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for example, the average C-130 load
was only 3.2 tons per sortie, although the C-130 can carry 17 tons. 
During the three peaks in the airlift operation--August and September
1990 and February 1991--the average C-130 load was 3.5 tons per
sortie, which is only 5 percent of the C-17's 65-ton cargo-carrying
capacity. 
The Air Force stated that more analysis is needed before a definitive
conclusion on the intratheater contribution of C-17s can be reached. 
The ILA notes that, due to SUMMITS' limited ability to model airlift,
C-17 and C-130 capability tradeoffs warrant further analysis.  The
Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency had planned to complete a more
detailed study of C-17 and C-130 capability in September 1996, but,
according to an Air Force official, that study has been delayed
indefinitely. 
--------------------
\4 Bulk, or palletized, cargo includes ammunition, supplies, and
food. 
      UNIT RELOCATION ANALYSIS
      USED QUESTIONABLE
      ASSUMPTIONS AND WAS NOT TIED
      TO THE TACWAR REQUIREMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2
The Air Force also performed an analysis of the advantages and
necessity of the C-17 in theater airlift operations by identifying
ways the C-17 could augment the C-130 in conducting specific unit
relocations in the theater.  This analysis was conducted outside of
the SUMMITS and TACWAR models because the TACWAR battle plan does not
relocate specific units once they have arrived at their target
destinations.  An ILA working group determined the units that should
be relocated to specific airfields based on how the move could
improve the theater commander's tactical advantage.  On the basis of
these discussions, the Air Force modeled 11 different unit moves,
including Patriot batteries, Multiple Launch Rocket System
battalions, and the 101st Air Assault Division. 
The Air Force analysis showed that, if a squadron of C-17s were
dedicated to the theater, the selected units could be delivered to
their destinations more rapidly than they could by the C-130. 
However, because the time frames in the analysis were not directly
related to a specified requirement in the TACWAR battle plan, the
benefit of the units' earlier availability was not measured.  For
example, even if the analysis showed that a Patriot battery could
reach its destination 3 days earlier on the C-17 than it would by
other means, the analysis did not assess the effect of this unit's
move on the rest of the battle.  In addition, the analysis did not
assess the ripple effect of earlier delivery of the selected units on
other units because the analysis was intended only to examine how the
C-17 could speed the arrival of the 11 selected units. 
Further, the C-17 unit relocation analysis assumed that the aircraft
could land on 18 planned fields.  However, according to the May 1997
Air Mobility Command Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report,\5
only 9 of the 18 airfields have been surveyed for airlift operation
suitability, and only 7 have been determined to be suitable for use
by the C-17.  The remaining two airfields have not been assessed for
C-17 operations. 
--------------------
\5 This report is updated quarterly and includes factors such as
airfield dimensions, obstructions, lights, and other potential
limitations to airlifter use. 
   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
The ILA does not adequately fulfill congressional direction to
develop intratheater lift requirements and establish an integrated
plan to meet them because the study's recommendations are not
supported by the analysis.  The ILA's tactical wheeled vehicle
recommendations, even though they support the Army's acquisition
objectives, are not consistent with the requirements identified in
the ILA.  In addition, some ILA assumptions are either not consistent
with Army doctrine or are invalid for other reasons.  These
discrepancies call into question the basis for the study's
recommendations.  Due to the inconsistencies between the ILA
requirements and the Army's acquisition objectives, for example,
excess HETS and fuel tanker tractor assets may not actually exist. 
In addition, the ILA's recommendation to use another squadron of
C-17s, beyond the planned procurement of 120 aircraft, for
intratheater lift is not based on sound analysis.  The ILA did not
establish a relationship between the use of the C-17 in a dedicated
intratheater role and the rest of the battle, so the effect of the
faster C-17 deliveries was not measured.  Furthermore, even though
the Air Force's analysis assumed that the C-17 would be able to use
all of the airfields identified by the ILA working group, there is no
guarantee that they would be accessible to the C-17.  The updated
ILA, planned as part of the 1999 Mobility Requirements Study, will
provide a good opportunity for DOD to reconsider the basis for
intratheater lift requirements and ensure that they are linked
appropriately to the study's analysis. 
   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999 ILA
update (1) link the study's recommendations to its analysis and (2)
include assumptions that consider current Army doctrine when
acquisition plans are based on the doctrine. 
   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
DOD concurred with our recommendations.  DOD noted that, although
study assumptions are generally based on military service doctrine,
DOD must be free to analyze changes to that doctrine in the interest
of enhancing joint capability.  However, DOD did not agree with our
finding that the ILA's recommendations are not supported by the
study's analysis.  DOD stated that the study used computationally
derived data, along with additional analysis and military judgment,
to develop its recommendations.  DOD cites service acquisition
programs, input from theater commanders, and substitution of one type
of intratheater asset for another as examples of the additional
analysis considered in developing the requirements and
recommendations in the ILA.  DOD points to the study's recommendation
to use excess HETS in place of 34-ton line haulers as being based on
service acquisition programs and theater commander input. 
The ILA does not link its requirements to its recommendations. 
Rather, its recommendations merely support the Army's acquisition
plans with no explanation of the disconnect between those plans and
the study's requirements.  In discussing our draft report, agency
officials acknowledged that the Joint Staff had difficulty linking
the Army's fiscal year 2003 acquisition program to the ILA
requirements and that, for this reason, the study's reliance on the
acquisition program is not clearly explained.  Furthermore, Joint
Staff officials told us during our review that the decisions reached
by ILA working groups concerning tradeoff assessments and the airlift
tactical unit moves analysis were not documented.  Without an
explicit link in the ILA between the study's requirements and
recommendations, and without a means of reviewing the factors or
additional analyses that led to the final recommendations in the
study, we have no basis on which to concur that a link exists. 
Moreover, we question the reliability and independence of a DOD
requirements study that bases its requirements and recommendations on
service acquisition programs without examining the disconnects
between those programs and the study's own findings. 
Concerning DOD's example, the number of HETS identified as a
requirement in the ILA is less than the number reflected in the
study's recommendation.  According to theater commanders' input to
the study and our discussions with Army officials, the HETS is not an
effective or economical substitute for 34-ton line haulers.  We agree
with DOD's statement that service acquisition programs were used to
support the study's recommendations for HETS.  It is this fact that
leads us to conclude that the recommendations in the ILA were not
based on the requirements identified by the study's analysis, but
rather were based on service acquisition programs that had already
been established. 
ILA DID NOT INCLUDE THE POTENTIAL
CONTRIBUTION OF SOME LIFT ASSETS
============================================================ Chapter 3
The ILA did not incorporate the potential contribution of several
lift assets that could assist in meeting intratheater lift
requirements.  Specifically, the ILA did not include (1) the
potential contribution of host nation-provided tactical wheeled
vehicles, (2) the ability of the C-5s currently in the inventory and
the planned fleet of 120 C-17s to meet outsize intratheater airlift
requirements as needed, and (3) the potential for Army watercraft to
supplant tactical wheeled vehicle requirements.  As a result, the
study's requirements and solutions may be overstated. 
   HOST NATION SUPPORT CAN
   SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
   INTRATHEATER LIFT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Host nation support (HNS) is the civil or military assistance
provided by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during
peacetime, crisis, or war based on agreements mutually concluded
between the nations.  In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
HNS included commercial cargo line haulers, fuel tankers, personnel
transporters, and HETS.  Of the 1,404 HETS used in the Persian Gulf
conflict, 333 were provided by Saudi Arabia.  DOD reported that
support from host and other nations during the conflict was critical
and that it gave the United States the flexibility to deploy
substantial amounts of combat power early in the contingency--when
the risks were the greatest--while reducing the amount of tactical
wheeled vehicles that needed to be deployed from the United States. 
The 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, based
on the same TACWAR battle as the ILA, assumed that HNS in Southwest
Asia and Korea would include commercial cargo line haulers, fuel
tankers, and HETS.  However, the potential HNS tactical wheeled
vehicle contribution to intratheater lift was not modeled in the ILA. 
Thus, ILA assumptions are inconsistent with the assumptions made in
the updated 1995 Mobility Requirements Study.  According to the ILA,
HNS was not modeled because of a lack of signed agreements with some
of the host nations.  In addition, theater commanders wanted the ILA
to model a worst case scenario without any HNS offsetting U.S.  force
structure.  The ILA, however, notes repeatedly that HNS has the
potential to reduce some of the reported lift shortfalls in several
categories of tactical wheeled vehicles.  HNS would also limit the
amount of equipment required to be moved into the theater.  Because
it did not reflect HNS, the ILA depicted the worst case scenario as
the only scenario for intratheater lift. 
The theater commanders' operation plans portray HNS as very
important, if not critical, to the successful outcome of wars in
Southwest Asia and Korea.  Even the lack of formal HNS agreements in
Southwest Asia does not limit the operation plans' expectations of
substantial HNS.  The Southwest Asia operation plans assume that HNS
will be available in either the amounts received during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm or in amounts negotiated and approved
bilaterally between the host nations and the United States.  The
plans note that outsourcing logistical requirements within the
theater of operations may completely preclude the need to deploy some
logistical assets or units from the United States.  The operation
plans for a war in Korea state that U.S.  Pacific Command forces can
expect to receive significant wartime HNS from the Republic of Korea. 
The United States negotiated a wartime HNS agreement with the
Republic of Korea in 1991.  Cargo transportation was one of the
components of this agreement, which also included medical, bulk fuel
transport, maintenance, engineering, and ammunition support. 
The key factors in making HNS successful are availability of the
right numbers of assets when and where they would be needed and the
commitment of host nation drivers and other equipment operators to
perform their assigned missions.  Members of the defense community,
including the military services, theater commanders, the Joint Staff,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are debating the extent
to which HNS should offset U.S.  force requirements.  This debate is
not likely to be resolved in the near future. 
   INTERTHEATER AIRLIFTERS CAN
   HELP MEET OUTSIZE INTRATHEATER
   REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
The current intertheater airlift fleet includes the C-5 and C-17,
which are capable of carrying outsize cargo.  The C-5 Galaxy is the
Air Mobility Command's largest intertheater airlifter, with the
capacity to carry 89 tons of cargo and 36 pallets, and the smaller
C-17 is capable of carrying 65 tons of cargo and 18 pallets. 
Although the C-5 and C-17 are intertheater lift assets, they can also
be used for intratheater lift if warranted, assuming that airfields
can accommodate them.  However, the ILA did not model the potential
contribution of the C-5 and considered the planned 120 C-17s as an
offset to the C-130 fleet only in Southwest Asia.  Use of the
existing airlift fleet for intratheater missions as needed could
increase flexibility and decrease the need to procure additional
outsize airlift capability.  Although the C-5 and C-17 are primarily
intertheater airlifters, the ability to divert them for intratheater
missions is recognized in Air Force operational documents. 
The Air Force has highlighted the C-17's ability to deliver outsize
cargo to small, austere airfields as a key factor in its dual role as
an intertheater and intratheater airlifter.  Small, austere airfields
usually have a short runway and are limited in one or a combination
of the following factors:  taxiway systems, ramp space, security,
materiel handling equipment, aircraft servicing, navigation aids,
weather observing sensors, and communications.  If delivering outsize
cargo to small, austere airfields is necessary, the C-17 would likely
be needed.  However, if the airfields could accommodate the C-5, it
could accomplish the mission.  For example, the C-5 can quickly
facilitate unit relocations.  A Patriot battalion requires only 9 C-5
sorties compared with 15 sorties for the C-17. 
Of the 67 airfields in the ILA, 46 have been surveyed by the Air
Mobility Command and are listed in its Airfield Suitability and
Restrictions Report.  Analysis of the 46 airfields common to the ILA
and the Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report showed that 34
airfields, or 74 percent, are suitable for all types of airlifters,
including the C-5.  In Korea, the C-5 can use 70 percent of the
airfields, and in Southwest Asia, the C-5 can use 77 percent of the
airfields.  Further, the number of airfields available to the C-5
would likely be higher during a contingency, since other airfields
that have not been surveyed would be available at that time. 
   POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF ARMY
   WATERCRAFT WAS NOT DETERMINED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
Due to their cargo capacity and demonstrated multiple mission
capability, Army watercraft could be used for intratheater
transportation and could reduce the need for reliance on rail,
tactical wheeled vehicles, and HNS.  However, the ILA did not
identify a requirement for Army watercraft and deferred a
recommendation on these assets pending a planned study by the
Logistics Management Institute.  That study, issued in November 1996
(4 months after the ILA), found uncertainty among planners at the
theater commands about the capability and availability of watercraft
for intratheater operations.  The Army has developed a long-range
fleet management plan that includes an acquisition strategy to
procure more watercraft, but the role and capability of watercraft to
help meet intratheater requirements have not been addressed at the
joint level. 
At the end of fiscal year 1997, the Army had 245 watercraft in its
fleet, according to an Army official.  Some of these watercraft, such
as the Logistics Support Vessel and the Landing Craft, Utility-2000
(LCU-2000), provide intratheater movement of equipment, cargo, and
combat vehicles and transport cargo from ship to shore.  The
Logistics Support Vessel can self-deploy anywhere in the world to
provide intratheater transport of large quantities of cargo, tracked
and wheeled vehicles, and equipment.  These vessels provided
intratheater transport during Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm.  The LCU-2000 can perform tactical resupply missions to remote
or underdeveloped coastlines and inland waterways.  During Operation
Uphold Democracy in Haiti, this vessel transported about 38,548 tons
of equipment and supplies to fishing villages that had small piers or
ramps. 
Army watercraft employment is phased to meet the theater commanders'
requirements to offload combat and support forces during major
regional contingencies.  During the first 3 weeks of a conflict, Army
watercraft operations would focus on port operations and offloading
combat and support equipment from prepositioned ships and large
strategic sealift ships.  After the first 3 weeks, watercraft would
continue port operations and begin to transition to sustainment
operations, which include establishing intracoastal main supply
routes and transporting equipment and cargo to forward areas in the
theater.  During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for
example, watercraft delivered main battle tanks, ammunition, and
other cargo to several locations on the Persian Gulf coast.  Thus,
although the port operations are the key mission for Army watercraft
during the first part of a contingency, watercraft can contribute
significantly to intratheater lift missions during later phases. 
In several cases, the ILA demonstrated how Army watercraft could be
used to offset reliance on rail, tactical wheeled vehicles, and HNS
by repositioning forces in the theater of operations and moving tanks
prepositioned on land to tactical assembly areas.  However, the ILA
did not recommend that these potential offsets be implemented, and
the contribution of watercraft to intratheater lift was not reflected
in the ILA's recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles as part of
a tradeoff analysis. 
The Logistics Management Institute study evaluated the role of
watercraft for logistics-over-the-shore and intracoastal main supply
route operations in the Korea and Southwest Asia scenarios.  The
study did not establish an intracoastal transportation requirement,
however, because of a lack of data from theater commanders regarding
the types and amounts of cargo and equipment that could be
transported on watercraft.  The study recommended that the Joint
Staff provide theater command planners the analytical tools to match
intratheater lift requirements with intracoastal transportation
capability. 
   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
Because several potentially significant contributions to intratheater
lift were not thoroughly considered in the study, the requirements in
the ILA may be overstated.  Given the experience of Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, the inclusion of HNS in the theater
commanders' operation plans, and the fact that the 1995 Mobility
Requirements Study update assumed HNS would be available, it is
unreasonable to exclude HNS from the analysis.  A more flexible
mobility study that reflected requirements with and without HNS would
better assist decisionmakers in determining the effects of HNS on
U.S.  mobility requirements.  U.S.  Central Command officials agree,
acknowledging that requirements stated with and without HNS would
have added flexibility to the ILA.  In addition, the C-5s and the
planned fleet of C-17s could be considered as needed if an outsize
intratheater airlift requirement is identified.  Use of these
airlifters would ensure that the potential contributions of DOD's
current assets are fully taken into account.  Finally, Army
watercraft has the potential to reduce reliance on tactical wheeled
vehicles and HNS, but a requirement for these assets that reflects
their intratheater role has yet to be defined.  The potential
contributions of tactical wheeled vehicle HNS, the current
outsize-capable airlift fleet, and Army watercraft to meeting
intratheater lift requirements warrant incorporation into the 1999
ILA update. 
   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999
updated ILA (1) consider HNS as a means of accomplishing intratheater
lift and ensure that HNS assumptions are consistent with those in
intertheater lift studies; (2) include the potential contribution of
the C-5 airlifter and planned fleet of 120 C-17s; and (3) reflect the
role, capability, and requirements for Army watercraft in an
intratheater role, including an analysis of the extent to which these
assets can alleviate identified shortfalls in tactical wheeled
vehicles. 
   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
DOD concurred with our recommendations and added that, as the
potential intratheater role of the C-17 and C-5 are investigated, an
analysis should be done to assess the impact on the warfight of
taking these assets out of the intertheater airlift flow.  We agree
that such an analysis would be an important part of future studies
that consider the use of these airlifters in an intratheater role. 
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE
STUDY'S VALUE AS A DECISION-MAKING
TOOL
============================================================ Chapter 4
Intratheater lift requirements depend on the course of the battle and
theater infrastructure and thus are difficult to quantify.  However,
because the ILA requirements and solutions were stated as absolute
numbers rather than ranges, the study does not reflect the dynamic
and often unpredictable nature of intratheater lift requirements.  In
addition, the ILA did not include a cost-effectiveness analysis to
assess tradeoffs between various lift alternatives.  Such an
assessment would provide decisionmakers with information needed to
make investment decisions in a sensitive budget environment. 
   LIFT REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT
   STATED AS RANGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
The 1995 updated Mobility Requirements Study determined lift
requirements through an iterative modeling process that examined
various war-fighting and mobility schemes.  However, the ILA did not
use an iterative modeling process to determine requirements, which
precluded the ILA from stating lift asset requirements and solutions
as ranges.  Rather, the ILA stated the requirements and solutions as
absolute numbers.  Given the dependence of intratheater lift
requirements on the course of the battle and the theater
infrastructure, requirements stated as ranges would provide a more
accurate depiction of the dynamic intratheater situation.  It would
also allow decisionmakers the flexibility to determine the type and
quantity of lift assets needed to meet requirements while accounting
for such factors as potential enemy actions to disrupt airfields and
seaports, chemical or biological warfare, weather, HNS, and various
threat scenarios. 
DOD's 1988 Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study noted that
intratheater mobility requirement statements are extremely dependent
on the theater concept of operations.  The study recommended that all
intratheater mobility requirements be expressed as ranges when
possible and that those requirements not expressed as ranges be
understood as approximations.  The 1996 Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility noted that the deployment
phase most subject to disruption by the adversary is the intratheater
movement of troops and equipment to their final destinations. 
DOD officials said that the ILA could not express requirements as
ranges because SUMMITS would have had to be rerun with a different
input requirement.  The officials told us that only one concept of
operations was available--the TACWAR battle established for the 1995
updated Mobility Requirements Study.  They stated that expressing the
ILA requirements as ranges could have required amending the TACWAR
battle timelines after the 1995 study had been completed and that
this option was not seriously considered.  The officials said,
however, that SUMMITS and TACWAR are capable of interacting and that
iterations can be modeled. 
   COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS IS
   NEEDED TO ASSESS TRADEOFFS
   BETWEEN LIFT ASSETS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
The 1995 updated Mobility Requirements Study, which is the basis for
DOD's procurement strategy for intertheater lift assets, included a
cost-effectiveness analysis that assessed tradeoffs between various
intertheater lift assets.  The study developed a set of options
consisting of possible additions to current airlift, sealift, and
afloat prepositioning programs.  Life-cycle cost estimates were
developed for each option, and cost was a factor in the analysis
leading to the final recommendations.  However, a cost-effectiveness
analysis that examined tradeoffs between the assets was not done to
support the ILA recommendations.  According to Joint Staff officials,
limited tradeoff assessments were discussed as part of the ILA, but
these assessments did not include cost and were not documented. 
The ILA states that the study's workloads for the 34- and 22.5-ton
line haulers can be met by other means, such as excess HETS or PLS. 
However, tradeoff assessments were not made to determine whether
these alternatives would be cost-effective uses of the HETS or PLS. 
The ILA identified a requirement for fewer HETS and PLS than the
Army's acquisition objectives for fiscal year 2003, but the study did
not recommend that the Army procure fewer of these expensive assets. 
As of January 1996, each HETS cost $414,000 compared with $118,000
for the 34-ton line hauler, according to the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
Requirements Management Office's Catalog of U.S.  Army Tactical
Wheeled Vehicles.  Army officials noted that the HETS would provide
excess capacity in a line-haul role.  In addition, even though a PLS
company can carry 17 percent more cargo, it costs almost twice as
much as the 22.5-ton line hauler.  A PLS company costs $18.8 million
(1996 dollars) compared with $9.5 million (1996 dollars) for a
company of 22.5-ton line haulers, according to an analysis performed
by the Requirements Management Office.  DOD officials noted, however,
that the PLS can self-load and unload containers, thereby requiring
fewer personnel than the 22.5-ton line hauler. 
In addition, a cost-effectiveness analysis was not conducted on the
ILA's proposed use of a squadron of 14 C-17s, beyond the planned
procurement of 120 aircraft, for intratheater lift.  Since the C-130
fleet is more than sufficient to meet requirements, according to the
ILA, and outsize airlift capability exists with the planned
procurement of C-17s and the current fleet of C-5s, it is important
for a recommendation to procure additional C-17s beyond the currently
planned 120 aircraft to be based on an analysis that includes
cost-effectiveness as a criterion.  In addition, a tradeoff
assessment has not been conducted to consider the extent to which
C-130s could be retired if additional C-17s were procured for
intratheater lift.\1
--------------------
\1 RAND's 1997 Documented Briefing noted that outsize cargo items
that require a C-17 for air transport could be delivered over roads
if their delivery dates allowed.  RAND noted that the lack of a
tradeoff assessment that considered alternative modes of
transportation was a limitation of its analysis. 
   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
The value of DOD's future lift studies as decision-making tools can
be strengthened if they state intratheater requirements and solutions
as ranges rather than as absolute numbers to reflect the uncertainty
associated with predicting lift requirements within the theater of
operations.  An iterative process resulting in requirements ranges
may have shown, for example, that allied forces would not lose key
objectives or incur additional casualties under a range of
intratheater delivery schemes that required fewer lift assets to
accomplish.  Since the planned 1999 Mobility Requirements Study and
ILA update are expected to be conducted simultaneously, concerns
about changing the TACWAR battle by establishing a requirements range
should be alleviated.  Furthermore, if future mobility studies are to
be the basis for the services' acquisition plans, it would be prudent
to determine the appropriate type and number of mobility assets to
procure based on a tradeoff analysis of the capability and
cost-effectiveness of different options.  Tradeoff assessments of the
lift alternatives considered in the study would provide
decisionmakers the flexibility to take into account competing
investment options within a constrained budget.  The 1999 updated ILA
will provide an opportunity to address these concerns so that
decisionmakers can have a more substantive basis on which to
determine DOD acquisition strategies. 
   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999
updated ILA
  -- determine intratheater requirements and solutions as ranges to
     reflect their dependence on the combat situation and
  -- include a cost-effectiveness assessment of the alternatives
     considered in the study that examines tradeoffs among the lift
     assets to reflect capability, cost, and requirements. 
   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
DOD concurred with our recommendation concerning requirements ranges. 
DOD stated that cost-effectiveness analysis would be accomplished if
appropriate and that DOD has in place an acquisition process that
considers cost-effectiveness when making programmatic decisions.  DOD
officials explained that detailed cost-effectiveness analyses would
significantly expand the time frame and cost of mobility studies. 
Our recommendation is directed at system tradeoff analyses that would
provide decisionmakers information on the relative costs and
capabilities of systems in light of identified requirements.  The ILA
made programmatic recommendations that included, to an extent,
tradeoffs among lift assets.  We believe that cost-effectiveness
should be a part of a requirements study that makes acquisition
recommendations. 
INTRATHEATER LIFT ASSETS
=========================================================== Appendix I
Airlifters, tactical wheeled vehicles, and watercraft are all used
for intratheater lift.  The following sections provide information
these assets. 
   AIRLIFTERS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
The C-130 Hercules is the Air Force's primary intratheater airlifter. 
It can carry 6 pallets and 17 tons of cargo and accommodate 90
passengers.  The C-17 Globemaster, being produced by the Boeing
Corporation, can carry 18 pallets and 65 tons of cargo and
accommodate 102 passengers.  The C-5 Galaxy can be loaded with 36
pallets and can carry 89 tons of cargo and 73 passengers.  Figures
I.1 through I.3 show the C-130, C-17, and C-5 airlifters,
respectively. 
   Figure I.1:  C-130 Hercules
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Lockheed Martin Corporation. 
   Figure I.2:  C-17 Globemaster
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Boeing Corporation (formerly McDonnell Douglas Corporation). 
   Figure I.3:  C-5 Galaxy
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Air Force. 
   TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
The primary mission of the Heavy Equipment Transporter System is to
(1) deliver main battle tanks to forward assembly areas fully fueled,
armed, and ready for combat and (2) evacuate tanks from the
battlefield.  The tank's crew rides in the cab of the system.  The
Palletized Load System consists of a truck, trailer, and removable
cargo beds.  It is used by artillery, ordnance, and transportation
units to move ammunition to and from transfer points.  The
7,500-gallon fuel tanker and the 34-ton line hauler use the same
tractor and transport fuel and cargo, respectively, from ports to
corps supply points, which are located farthest from the battle
front.  The 5,000-gallon fuel tanker and the 22.5-ton line hauler
also use the same tractor and operate primarily in the division and
brigade areas, which are closer to the battle front where roads are
generally less developed.  Table I.1 shows the number of tactical
wheeled vehicles per company. 
                               Table I.1
                Number of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles per
                                Company
System                                    Number per Company
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
Heavy Equipment Transporter System        96 trucks and 96 trailers
Palletized Load System                    48 trucks and 48 trailers
22.5-ton line hauler                      60 tractors and 120 trailers
34-ton line hauler                        60 tractors and 120 trailers
5,000-gallon fuel tanker                  60 tractors and 60 5,000-
                                          gallon tankers
7,500-gallon fuel tanker                  60 tractors and 60 7,500-
                                          gallon tankers
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Figures I.4 through I.6 show the Heavy Equipment Transporter System,
the Palletized Load System, and the 34-ton line hauler, respectively. 
   Figure I.4:  Heavy Equipment
   Transporter System
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
   Figure I.5:  Palletized Load
   System
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Army. 
   Figure I.6:  34-ton Line Hauler
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Army. 
      ARMY WATERCRAFT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1
The Logistics Support Vessel has the capacity to carry 2,000 tons and
accommodate 24 M1 main battle tanks or 25 20-foot containers (50 if
they are double-stacked).  Each Landing Craft, Utility-2000 has the
capacity to carry 350 tons and accommodate 5 M1 main battle tanks or
12 20-foot containers (24 if double-stacked).  Figures I.7 through
I.9 show the Logistics Support Vessel and the Landing Craft,
Utility-2000. 
   Figure I.7:  Logistics Support
   Vessel
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Army. 
   Figure I.8:  Logistics Support
   Vessel Unloading Trucks
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Army. 
   Figure I.9:  Landing Craft,
   Utility-2000
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Army. 
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp.  7 and 25. 
Now on pp.  7 and 31. 
Now on pp.  7 and 34. 
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
Thomas J.  Denomme
Michele Mackin
Jose A.  Ramos
   KANSAS CITY FIELD OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
Gregory J.  Symons
*** End of document. ***



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