U.S. Atlantic Command: Challenging Role in the Evolution of Joint
Military Capabilities (Chapter Report, 02/17/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-39).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on
Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to improve joint operations,
focusing on: (1) the U.S. Atlantic Command's (USACOM) actions to
establish itself as the joint force trainer, provider, and integrator of
most continental U.S.-based forces; (2) views on the value of the
Command's contributions to joint military capabilities; and (3) recent
expansion of the Command's responsibilities and its possible effects on
the command.
GAO noted that: (1) USACOM has advanced joint training by developing a
state-of-the-art joint task force commander training program and
simulation training center; (2) the Command has also progressed in
developing other elements of joint training, though not at the same
level of maturity or intensity; (3) however, USACOM has had to make
substantive changes in its approach to providing and integrating joint
forces; (4) its initial approach was to develop ready force packages
tailored to meet the geographic commands' spectrum of missions; (5) this
was rebuffed by the military services and the geographic commands, which
did not want or value USACOM's proactive role and by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (1993-97), who did not see the utility of such
force packages; (6) by late 1995, USACOM reverted to implementing a
force-providing process that provides the Command with a much more
limited role and ability to affect decisions and change; (7) the
Command's force integrator role was separated from force providing and
also redirected; (8) the establishment of performance goals and measures
would help USACOM assess and report on the results of its efforts to
improve joint military capabilities; (9) Congress anticipated that the
Government Performance and Results Act principles would be
institutionalized at all organizational levels in federal agencies; (10)
the Command's recently instituted strategic planning system does not
include performance measures that can be used to evaluate its impact on
the military capabilities of U.S. forces; (11) the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and USACOM believed the Command
was providing an important focus to the advancement of joint operations;
(12) the views of the geographic commands were generally more reserved,
with some benefitting more than others from USACOM's efforts; (13) the
Command's new authorities are likely to increase its role and
capabilities to provide training and joint war fighting support and
enhance its ability to influence decisions within the department; and
(14) although USACOM's roles are expanding and the number of functions
and DOD organizational elements the Command has relationships with is
significant, its roles and responsibilities are still largely not
spelled out in key DOD policy and guidance, including joint doctrine,
guidance, and other publications.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-39
TITLE: U.S. Atlantic Command: Challenging Role in the Evolution of
Joint Military Capabilities
DATE: 02/17/99
SUBJECT: Performance measures
Combat readiness
Defense operations
Interagency relations
Military training
Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER: JCS Joint Vision 2010
JCS Unified Command Plan
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
February 1999
U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND -
CHALLENGING ROLE IN THE EVOLUTION
OF JOINT MILITARY CAPABILITIES
GAO/NSIAD-99-39
U.S. Atlantic Command
(701114)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
CONUS - continental United States
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USACOM - U.S. Atlantic Command
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-278198
February 17, 1999
Congressional Committees
In 1993, the U.S. Atlantic Command was assigned the mission to
maximize America's military capability through joint training, force
integration, and deployment of ready U.S.-based forces to support the
geographic commands', its own, and domestic requirements. This
report discusses the Atlantic Command's actions to establish itself
as the joint force trainer, provider, and integrator of most
continental U.S.-based forces; views on the value of the Command's
contributions to joint military capabilities; and the recent
expansion of the Command's responsibilities and the possible effects
on the Command. We conducted this review under our basic legislative
responsibilities and are addressing this report to the committees of
jurisdiction because we believe it will useful to your committees
when they discuss joint operations with the Department of Defense.
This report contains recommendations that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command to adopt
performance goals and measures and that the Secretary fully
incorporate the Command's functional roles, authorities, and
responsibilities in appropriate Department of Defense directives and
publications.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Atlantic Command. Copies will also be made available to others
on request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact Marvin Casterline, Assistant Director, on (202)
512-9076. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix VIII.
Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable David K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
As the twenty-first century approaches, the United States faces the
critical challenge of ensuring that its military forces can meet a
full range of demands. Joint operations are key to meeting this
challenge, and the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) was designed to
play a major role in advancing the evolution of joint military
capabilities. In response to congressional interest in Department of
Defense (DOD) efforts to improve joint operations, GAO determined (1)
USACOM's actions to establish itself as the joint force trainer,
provider, and integrator of most continental U.S.-based forces; (2)
views on the value of the Command's contributions to joint military
capabilities; and (3) recent expansion of the Command's
responsibilities and its possible effects on the Command.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Until 1993, the lack of a joint headquarters to oversee the forces of
the four services based in the continental United States was long
considered a problem that the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried twice to
fix. The concept of a joint headquarters for U.S.-based forces
resurfaced again at the end of the Cold War. In making a
recommendation in 1993 to the Secretary of Defense for such a joint
headquarters, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-93),
General Colin Powell, said that such a command would bring greater
focus to joint training and operations among continental U.S.-based
forces. U.S.-based forces, he said, needed to be trained to operate
jointly as a way of life. Acting on the Chairman's recommendation,
the Secretary of Defense assigned USACOM this responsibility in
October 1993. Later, revisions to the Unified Command Plan\1
provided broad guidance on USACOM's new functional roles, and an
implementation plan, approved by the Secretary of Defense, provided
USACOM the basic concept of its mission, responsibilities, and
forces.
One of USACOM's principal missions is to maximize America's military
capability through joint training, force integration, and deployment
of ready U.S.-based forces to support geographic commands', its own,
and domestic requirements. Since USACOM was established, its mission
has received increased emphasis with the issuance of Joint Vision
2010--the military's long-range strategic vision--in July 1996.
Joint Vision 2010 serves as a conceptual template for how the armed
forces expect to channel resources to achieve new levels of
effectiveness in joint warfighting.
To accomplish its mission and conduct operations in its geographic
area of responsibility, USACOM has four service component commands:
the Navy's U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the Army's U.S. Forces Command, the
Air Force's Air Combat Command, and the Marine Corps' Marine Forces
Atlantic. Approximately 1.4 million armed forces personnel--or about
80 percent of the active and reserve forces based in the continental
United States--are assigned to these component commands. As of
fiscal year 1998, USACOM's headquarters included about 1,600 civilian
and military personnel, and the Command had an operations and
maintenance budget of about $100 million that was funded through the
Department of the Navy budget. The Command's size increased
significantly in October 1998, when five additional DOD activities
were transferred to USACOM.
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act,
P.L. 103-62) requires federal agencies to clearly define their
missions, set goals, link activities and resources to goals, prepare
annual performance plans, measure performance, and report on their
accomplishments. The Senate and House Reports on the Results Act
legislation anticipated that the act's principles would be
institutionalized and practiced at all organizational levels of the
federal government. USACOM has developed a new strategic planning
system to enhance the management of its major areas of focus, which
include joint force training, providing, and integrating.
--------------------
\1 The plan sets forth basic guidance to all unified commanders;
establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure;
delineates the general geographic area of responsibility for
geographic commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for
functional commanders.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
USACOM has advanced joint training by developing a state-of-the-art
joint task force commander training program and simulation training
center. The Command has also progressed in developing other elements
of joint training, though not at the same level of maturity or
intensity. However, USACOM has had to make substantive changes in
its approach to providing and integrating joint forces. Its initial
approach was to develop ready force packages tailored to meet the
geographic commands' spectrum of missions. This was rebuffed by the
military services and the geographic commands, which did not want or
value USACOM's proactive role and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (1993-97), who did not see the utility of such force
packages. By late 1995, USACOM reverted to implementing a
force-providing process that provides the Command with a much more
limited role and ability to affect decisions and change. The
Command's force integrator role was separated from force providing
and also redirected. The emphasis is now on improving the
interoperability\2 of existing systems, developing and evaluating
advanced technologies in support of joint operations, and advancing
the development of joint doctrine.
The establishment of performance goals and measures would help USACOM
assess and report on the results of its efforts to improve joint
military capabilities. Although it could be difficult to develop
such goals and measures and to assess the Command's performance, such
assessments could help USACOM better determine what it needs to do to
enhance its performance. The Congress anticipated that Results Act
principles, such as setting performance goals and measuring
performance, would be institutionalized at all organizational levels
in federal agencies. The Command's recently instituted strategic
planning system does not include performance measures that can be
used to evaluate its impact on the military capabilities of U.S.
forces.
Views of the value of USACOM's contributions varied widely within
DOD. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and
USACOM believed the Command was providing an important focus to the
advancement of joint operations. The Commander in Chief of USACOM
saw the Command's most important contributions as having been in
joint training and, most recently, force integration. The views of
the geographic commands were generally more reserved, with some
benefiting more than others from USACOM's efforts. While these
commands reported that USACOM had been a responsive and dependable
provider of trained forces, they also reported that they had received
little direct benefit from USACOM's efforts in training and
integration.
The Secretary of Defense recently expanded USACOM's charter. The
Command's new authorities are likely to increase its role and
capabilities to provide training and joint warfighting support and
enhance its ability to influence decisions within the Department.
USACOM's efforts to effect change can be expected to continue to
encounter opposition, particularly from the military departments.
The parochial or service-oriented priorities of the military services
can often conflict with USACOM's joint priorities.
Although USACOM's roles are expanding and the number of functions and
DOD organizational elements the Command has relationships with is
significant, its roles and responsibilities are still largely not
spelled out in key DOD policy and guidance, including joint doctrine,
guidance, and other publications. Making such change to policy and
guidance documents would help provide a common understanding of
USACOM's roles and responsibilities.
--------------------
\2 The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to
and accept services from other systems, units, or forces to enable
them to operate effectively together.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
PROGRESS AND REDIRECTION IN
EXECUTING FUNCTIONAL ROLES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
USACOM's actions to enhance joint training have generally been
consistent with those envisioned when the Command was established.
Its efforts have focused on developing a training program for joint
task force commanders and staff. This program has evolved into a
three-phased program that includes academics, planning drills, and
simulated joint exercises that emphasize command and control of
forces in an array of worldwide situations ranging from peacetime
operations to major conflicts. While not at the same level of
maturity or intensity, the Command has recently given more attention
to developing service interoperability training exercises and
providing mobile training teams to assist geographic commands in the
design and evaluation of joint training.
USACOM has redirected the approach and scope of its joint force
provider and integrator roles. "Adaptive joint force packaging" was
to be the foundation for implementing these roles. Under this
concept, USACOM was to assemble joint force packages tailored to
respond to the requirements of supported geographic commands from the
most capable and ready forces available. These force
packages--trained and organized around capabilities to meet specific
mission requirements--were to be proposed to the supported commands
and refined as necessary. The concept offered the opportunity to
explore and refine options for providing capabilities tailored to
mission requirements. USACOM largely abandoned this concept in 1995,
primarily because of resistance from other geographic commands who
did not want or value a significant role for USACOM in determining
how to meet mission requirements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff supported the position of the geographic commands.
In providing forces to supported commands, USACOM has become more
reactive than proactive. It has shifted from developing
products--preplanned joint groupings of forces to conduct specific
potential future missions--to overseeing a process that identifies,
selects, trains, and deploys forces, on an ad hoc basis, to meet the
near-term capability requirements of the geographic commands. A
major responsibility of the Command is to work with its service
components and the geographic commands to resolve operating and
personnel tempo issues related to assets that are in high demand.
This involves analyzing tempo data across its service components and
developing alternatives for meeting geographic commands' needs within
tempo guidelines. The assets include specialized aircraft, such as
surveillance and reconnaissance and electronic warfare planes; other
combat assets, such as the Patriot Missile System; and less prominent
support assets, such as military police and dog teams.
In its joint force integrator role, USACOM has redefined its efforts
as providing a process to improve interoperability and enhance joint
force capabilities through a blending of technology, systems, and
doctrine. This includes sponsoring a large number of technology
demonstration projects that have a multiservice emphasis to enhance
joint operational capabilities, searching for solutions to joint
interoperability problems among advanced battle systems, and
responding to joint doctrinal issues evolving from training,
operations, and other sources.
VALUE OF USACOM'S
CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOINT
MILITARY CAPABILITIES NOT
ASSESSED, AND VIEWS VARY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
USACOM has conducted several self-assessments of its performance.
These have largely been evaluations of progress toward accomplishing
tasks associated with its functional roles and other areas of major
focus--they provide little insight into the Command's contributions
to improved joint military capabilities. The most recent of these
evaluations, conducted in early 1998, assessed progress as being
satisfactory but also identified some specific areas, such as
determining training exercise requirements, where progress has not
been satisfactory.
USACOM recently developed a new strategic planning system and was
giving increased attention to the monitoring and accomplishment of
tasks designed to achieve established goals, objectives, and
subobjectives in major areas of focus at the Command, including joint
training, force providing, and integration. While USACOM officials
believed the actions being taken would ultimately improve joint
military capabilities, the new system's assessments and measures
could not be used to evaluate the difference the Command was making
in military capabilities. The Results Act principles call for
performance planning to include performance measures to help assess
whether goals and missions are being accomplished. Command officials
believed they needed more detailed guidance from DOD for implementing
the Results Act principles.
Views within DOD of the value of USACOM's contributions varied by
organization and functional role. In describing the Command's
contributions as a joint force trainer, USACOM and its service
components pointed primarily to its joint task force headquarters
training program, describing it as unique high-fidelity training.
The value of this training to other geographic commands has been
quite limited for several reasons. Participation requires a
significant investment of time and staff, as the training is lengthy
and much of it is conducted at USACOM's simulation facility in the
Norfolk, Virginia, area. The commands have also been concerned that
the scenarios used in the training might have limited applicability
in their areas of operational responsibility. The commands have
preferred to provide their own joint training for their assigned
forces, including their headquarters staff. While concentrating on
its joint task force commanders training program, USACOM has, until
recently, given little attention to its interoperability training
exercise program for which its service components are brought
together to train on joint tasks or capabilities considered essential
to accomplishing missions in a joint environment. It has relied on
its service components to plan and execute the training, and as a
result, the training has not always had the intended joint
operational emphasis.
As a major joint force provider, USACOM is valued by the Joint Staff,
the geographic commands it supports, and its service component
commands. USACOM and its service component commands see USACOM as an
"honest broker" that draws upon the range of forces and capabilities
available among the services, when necessary, to respond to the
mission requirements of the geographic commands. These commands also
saw benefit in having a single, unified command act as an arbitrator
among themselves and as their spokesman on issues with other DOD
organizations. The Joint Staff believed the Command had made
important improvements in the process, particularly valuing the
cross-service coordination that USACOM provides in identifying force
capabilities to meet the mission needs of the commands that request
forces. The Central and Southern Commands, which have very few
assigned forces, described USACOM and its service component commands
as a dependable and responsive force provider. Similarly, the
European Command, which has forces assigned, valued USACOM's support,
noting that the Command has ensured equitable tasking among
continental U.S.-based forces and has allowed the European Command to
concentrate on the operation at hand.
In force integration, USACOM believed the payoff of its investments
in advanced technology projects would be seen when the joint
capabilities developed are deployed. On a more near-term basis, the
Command was increasing its attention to interoperability problems in
select areas, such as theater missile defense and information
operations. It recently achieved a major success when DOD approved
joint requirements, developed by USACOM with the support of the other
geographic commands, for the theater ballistic missile defense
program. USACOM believed this was an indication of potential growth
in its influence in a requirements generation system and acquisition
process that has long been dominated by the military services. An
important next step is for the military services, which acquire the
weapon systems and equipment and manage much of the money used to fix
interoperability problems, to invest the resources required to make
the changes needed to improve interoperability. The services have
not always been willing to make such investments. The geographic
commands GAO visited were generally not keenly aware of USACOM's
integration efforts and therefore could not comment on the Command's
contributions.
COMMAND STILL BEING
ASSIMILATED AND ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES EXPANDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
The Unified Command Plan, which serves as the charter for USACOM and
the other unified commands, only broadly describes the roles and
responsibilities of the commands. USACOM's training role, however,
is identified and discussed in detail throughout the Chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staff's training and policy guidance, including the
Joint Training Manual and Joint Training Master Plan. In contrast,
USACOM's joint force provider and integrator roles have not been
incorporated in joint publications and guidance to provide a common
institutional understanding of the Command's functional roles. For
example, a key joint guidance document for planning and executing
military operations--the Joint Operational Planning and Execution
System--does not specifically discuss USACOM's role as a force
provider.
USACOM's size and responsibilities have been expanded considerably.
In October 1998, five activities controlled by the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, were transferred to USACOM in line with reform
initiatives to streamline DOD headquarters organizations. These
activities include the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, the Joint
Command and Control Warfare Center, the Joint Warfighting Center, the
Joint Battle Center, and the Joint Communications Support Element.
In October 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the 1999
realignment and restructuring of several additional activities
affecting USACOM. USACOM believed these added capabilities
strengthen the Command's abilities to provide joint training, force
integration, and joint experimentation, and support and to develop
and assess joint doctrine. The Commander in Chief of USACOM believed
the Command's ability to influence decisions on joint training,
doctrine, and operations was also enhanced.
The Secretary of Defense also assigned USACOM responsibility for
joint concept development and experimentation and the joint
deployment process, effective October 1998. With joint
experimentation, USACOM serves as the integrator of a range of joint
experiments intended to foster innovation and rapid fielding of new
joint operational concepts and capabilities. The Secretary of
Defense expected that this joint experimentation would facilitate the
development of new joint doctrine, improve joint training and
education, and enhance the consideration of joint requirements in the
weapons and material acquisition processes. A $30 million fiscal
year 1999 budget was approved by DOD for USACOM for joint
experimentation. As owner of the joint deployment process, USACOM is
responsible for improving the efficiency of force deployment
activities. USACOM officials believed this new role would also offer
opportunities to improve its efficiency as a force provider.
Additional resource requirements for this role were expected by the
Command to be minimal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
It is important that USACOM be able to evaluate its performance and
impact in maximizing joint military capabilities. Such assessments,
while very difficult to make, could help the Command better determine
what it needs to do to enhance its performance. GAO, therefore,
recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander in
Chief of USACOM to adopt performance goals and measures that will
enable the Command to assess its performance in accomplishing its
mission of maximizing joint military capabilities.
Additionally, as USACOM attempts to advance the evolution of joint
military capabilities and its role continues to expand, it is
important that the Command's roles and responsibilities be clearly
defined, understood, and supported throughout DOD. Only USACOM's
roles and responsibilities in joint training have been so defined in
DOD policy and guidance documents. Therefore, GAO recommends that
the Secretary of Defense fully incorporate USACOM's functional roles,
authorities, and responsibilities in appropriate DOD directives and
publications, including joint doctrine and guidance.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In written comments (see app. VII) on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with GAO's recommendations. In its comments, DOD provided
additional information on USACOM's efforts to establish performance
goals and objectives and DOD's efforts to incorporate USACOM's
functional roles, authorities, and responsibilities in appropriate
DOD directives and publications. This information has been
incorporated at appropriate places in the report.
Regarding GAO's recommendation to incorporate USACOM's functional
roles, authorities, and responsibilities in appropriate DOD
directives and publications, DOD said the 1999 Unified Command Plan,
which is currently under its cycle review process, will further
define USACOM's functional roles as they have evolved over the past 2
years. It also noted that key training documents have been, or are
being, updated. GAO believes that in addition to the Unified Command
Plan and joint training documents, the joint guidance for planning
and executing military operations--the Joint Operational Planning and
Execution System process--should discuss USACOM's role as the major
provider of forces.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Until 1993, most forces based in the United States were not assigned
to a single geographic command. Due to their location, these forces
had limited opportunities to train jointly with the overseas-based
forces they would joint in time of crisis or war. The lack of a
joint headquarters to oversee the forces of the four military
services based in the continental United States (CONUS) was long
considered a problem that the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried twice to
fix. The concept of a joint headquarters for U.S.-based forces
resurfaced again at the end of the Cold War and led to the
establishment of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) in 1993 as the
unified command for most forces based in CONUS.
A VISION FOR A NEW COMMAND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Eastern
European communist regimes in 1989, the Cold War was over and a new
world order began. Senior Department of Defense (DOD) leadership
began considering the implications of such changes on the Department.
They recognized that the end of the Cold War would result in reduced
defense budgets and forces, especially overseas-based forces, and
more nontraditional, regional operations such as peacekeeping and
other operations short of a major theater war. In developing a CONUS
power projection strategy, they looked at options for changing the
worldwide command structure, which included establishing an Americas
Command.
The initial concept for an Americas Command--a command that would
have geographic responsibility for all of North and South
America--was not widely accepted by DOD leadership. However, the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and other
senior military leaders during the early 1990s increased attention to
the need to place all CONUS-based forces under one joint command to
respond to worldwide contingencies. Factors influencing this concept
were the anticipation that the overall DOD force drawdown would
increase reliance on CONUS-based forces and that joint military
operations would become predominant. Chairman Powell believed such a
command was needed because CONUS-based forces remained
service-oriented. These forces needed to train to operate jointly as
a way of life and not just during an occasional exercise. The
concept of one command providing joint training to CONUS-based forces
and deploying integrated joint forces worldwide to meet contingency
operations was recommended by Chairman Powell in a 1993 report on
roles and missions to the Secretary of Defense.\1
The mission of this command would be to train and deploy CONUS-based
forces as a joint team, and the Chairman concluded that the U.S.
Atlantic Command was best suited to assume this mission.
--------------------
\1 Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United
States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993.
EXPANDING ATLANTIC COMMAND TO
BECOME THE JOINT FORCE
INTEGRATOR
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The Chairman's 1993 report on roles and missions led to an expansion
of the roles of the U.S. Atlantic Command. Most notably, the
Secretary of Defense, upon review of the Chairman's report, endorsed
the concept of one command overseeing the joint training,
integrating, and deploying of CONUS-based forces. With this lead,
but without formal guidance from the Joint Staff, USACOM leadership
began developing plans to expand the Command. As guidance and the
plan for implementing the Command's expanded roles developed, DOD's
military leadership surfaced many issues. Principal among these
issues was whether (1) all CONUS-based forces would come under the
Command, including those on the west coast; (2) the Commander in
Chief (Commander) of USACOM would remain the Commander of NATO's
Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic; and (3) the Command would retain a
geographic area of responsibility along with its functional
responsibilities as joint force integrator.
While these issues were settled early by the Secretary of Defense,
some issues were never fully resolved, including who would be
responsible for developing joint force packages for deployment
overseas in support of operations and numerous concerns about who
would have command authority over forces. This lack of consensus on
the expansion and implementation of USACOM was expressed in key
military commands' review comments and objections to USACOM's
implementation plan and formal changes to the Unified Command Plan.
Table 1.1 provides a chronology of key events that led to giving the
U.S. Atlantic Command the new responsibilities for training,
integrating, and providing CONUS-based forces for worldwide
operations.
Table 1.1
Events That Led to Expansion of the U.S.
Atlantic Command
Time frame Event
-------------- ------------------------------------------------------
1989
Fall Berlin Wall falls and Cold War ends.
1990
March Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposes Americas
Command in Unified Command Plan review.
1992
August Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposes a permanent,
CONUS-based command to respond to worldwide
contingencies.
1993
February Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommends
establishing the U.S. Atlantic Command in his Roles,
Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the
United States report.
March
Secretary of Defense endorses Chairman's
recommendation.
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Command, establishes
implementation working group for expanding the
April Command's roles.
Secretary of Defense directs service secretaries and
May/June unified commanders to implement the Chairman's
recommendation.
August Draft plan for implementing USACOM concept presented
to military services and unified commanders for
comment.
Final review of USACOM implementation plan by military
service, component, and unified commanders.
October Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requests Secretary of
Defense's approval of Unified Command Plan changes,
including expansion of USACOM's roles.
Secretary of Defense directs implementation of Unified
Command Plan revisions and approves USACOM
implementation plan, effective October 1, 1993.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: USACOM.
INITIAL CHARTER DOCUMENTS
PROVIDE DIRECTION FOR
ESTABLISHING THE COMMAND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
The USACOM implementation plan and revised Unified Command Plan, both
issued in October 1993, provided the initial approval and guidance
for expanding the responsibilities of the U.S. Atlantic Command.
The Unified Command Plan gave USACOM "additional responsibilities for
the joint training, preparation, and packaging of assigned
CONUS-based forces for worldwide employment" and assigned it four
service component commands. The implementation plan provided the
institutional framework and direction for establishing USACOM as the
"Joint Force Integrator" of the bulk of CONUS-based forces. As the
joint force integrator, USACOM was to maximize America's military
capability through joint training, force integration, and deployment
of ready CONUS-based forces to support geographic commanders, its
own, and domestic requirements. This mission statement, detailed in
the implementation plan, evolved into USACOM's functional roles as
joint force trainer, provider, and integrator.
The USACOM implementation plan was developed by a multiservice
working group for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved
by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman. The plan provided
USACOM the basic concept of its mission, responsibilities, and
forces. It further detailed the basic operational concept to be
implemented in six areas. Three of these areas of particular
relevance to USACOM's new functional roles were (1) the adaptive
joint force packaging concept; (2) joint force training and
interoperability concepts; and (3) USACOM joint doctrine and joint
tactics, techniques, and procedures.\2 The Command was given 12 to 24
months to complete the transition.
The Unified Command Plan is reviewed and updated not less than every
2 years. In 1997, USACOM's functional roles were revised in the plan
for the first time to include the following:
-- Conduct joint training of assigned forces and assigned Joint
Task Force\3 staffs, and support other unified commands as
required.
-- As joint force integrator, develop joint, combined, interagency
capabilities to improve interoperability and enhance joint
capabilities through technology, systems, and doctrine.
-- Provide trained and ready joint forces in response to the
capability requirements of supported geographic commands.
--------------------
\2 Joint doctrine is the fundamental principles that guide the
employment of forces from two or more services in coordinated action
toward a common objective. Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
are published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and detail the
actions and methods that implement joint doctrine and describe how
forces will be employed in joint operations.
\3 A joint task force comprises units and personnel from two or more
of the military services and is established on a geographical area or
functional basis when a mission has a specific limited objective and
does not require centralized control of logistics. It is dissolved
when its purpose has been achieved or when it is no longer required.
For example, USACOM established a joint task force in May 1994 to
provide humanitarian assistance to Haitians escaping by sea from
political strife.
OVERVIEW OF USACOM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
DOD has nine unified commands, each of which comprises forces from
two or more of the military departments and is assigned broad
continuing missions. These commands report to the Secretary of
Defense, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioning
as their spokesman. Four of the commands are geographic commands
that are primarily responsible for planning and conducting military
operations in assigned regions of the world, and four are functional
commands that support military operations. The ninth command,
USACOM, is unique in that it has both geographic and functional
missions. Figure 1.1 shows the organizational structure of the
unified commands.
Figure 1.1: Organizational
Structure of the Unified
Commands
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide (1997), Armed Forces Staff
College, Norfolk, Virginia.
In addition to its headquarters staff, USACOM has several subordinate
commands, such as U.S. Forces Azores, and its four service component
commands--the Air Force's Air Combat Command, the Army's Forces
Command, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet Command and the Marines Corps'
Marine Corps Forces Atlantic. Appendix I shows USACOM's
organizational structure. USACOM's service component commands
comprise approximately 1.4 million armed forces personnel, or about
80 percent of the active and reserve forces based in the CONUS, and
more than 65 percent of U.S. active and reserve forces worldwide.
Figure 1.2 shows the areas of the world and percentage of forces
assigned to the geographic commands.
Figure 1.2: Assignment of
Worldwide Areas and Forces by
Geographic Command
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: World areas in white have not been assigned to a geographic
command. By order of the Secretary of Defense, on October 1, 1999,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in
Central Asia will be added to the U.S. Central Command's area of
responsibility.
Source: Our analysis of DOD's data.
While USACOM's personnel levels gradually increased in its initial
years of expansion-- from about 1,600 in fiscal year 1994 to over
1,750 in fiscal
year 1997--its civilian and military personnel level dropped to about
1,600\4 in fiscal year 1998, primarily because part of USACOM's
geographic responsibilities were transferred to the U.S. Southern
Command.\5 During this period, USACOM's operations and maintenance
budget, which is provided for through the Department of the Navy,
grew from about $50 million to about $90 million. Most of the
increase was related to establishing the Joint Training, Analysis and
Simulation Center, which provides computer-assisted training to joint
force commanders, staff, and service components. The Command's size
increased significantly in October 1998, when five activities,
controlled by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their
approximately 1,100 personnel were transferred to USACOM. The
Secretary of Defense also assigned USACOM authority and
responsibility for DOD's joint concept development and
experimentation in 1998. An initial budget of $30 million for fiscal
year 1999 for these activities was approved by DOD. USACOM estimates
it will have 151 personnel assigned to these activities by October
2000.
--------------------
\4 Only 373 of these personnel were at USACOM headquarters. The
remaining personnel were in subordinate activities or commands such
as the Command's joint intelligence center (710), Joint Task Force-6
(180), Information Systems Support Group (120), and subunified
commands (100).
\5 USACOM's geographic area of responsibility covers the majority of
the Atlantic Ocean, excluding the waters around Central and South
America, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5
In response to congressional interest in DOD's efforts to improve
joint operations, we reviewed the assimilation of USACOM into DOD as
the major trainer, provider, and integrator of forces for worldwide
deployment. More specifically, we determined (1) USACOM's actions to
establish itself as the joint force trainer, provider, and integrator
of most continental U.S.-based forces; (2) views on the value of the
Command's contributions to joint military capabilities; and (3)
recent expansion of the Command's responsibilities and its possible
effect on the Command. We focused on USACOM's functional roles; we
did not examine the rationale for USACOM's geographic and NATO
responsibilities or the effect of these responsibilities on the
execution of USACOM's functional roles.
To accomplish our objectives, we met with officials and
representatives of USACOM and numerous other DOD components and
reviewed studies, reports, and other documents concerning the
Command's history and its activities as a joint trainer, provider,
and integrator. We performed our fieldwork from May 1997 to August
1998. A more detailed discussion of the scope and methodology of our
review, including organizations visited, officials interviewed, and
documents reviewed, is in appendix II.
Our review was performed in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
USACOM HAS HAD SUCCESSES AND MAJOR
REDIRECTION IN IMPLEMENTING ITS
FUNCTIONAL ROLES
============================================================ Chapter 2
In pursuing its joint force trainer role, USACOM has generally
followed its 1993 implementation plan, making notable progress in
developing a joint task force commander training program and
establishing a state-of-the-art simulation training center. The
joint force provider and integrator roles were redirected with the
decision, in late 1995, to deviate from the concept of adaptive joint
force packages, a major element of the implementation plan. For its
role as joint force provider, USACOM has adopted a process-oriented
approach that is less proactive in meeting force requirements for
worldwide deployments and is more acceptable to supported geographic
commanders. To carry out its integrator role, USACOM has adopted an
approach that advances joint capabilities and force interoperability
through a combination of technology, systems, and doctrine
initiatives.
SOME SUCCESSES ACHIEVED BY
USACOM AS JOINT FORCE TRAINER
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
USACOM planned to improve joint force training and interoperability
through six initiatives laid out in its implementation plan. The
initiatives were to (1) improve the exercise scheduling process, (2)
develop mobile training teams, (3) train joint task force commanders
and staffs, (4) schedule the use of service ranges and training
facilities for joint training and interoperability, (5) assist its
service components in unit-level training intended to ensure the
interoperability of forces and equipment, and (6) develop a joint and
combined (with allied forces) training program for U.S. forces in
support of nontraditional missions, such as peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance. USACOM has taken actions on the first two
initiatives and has responded to the third, fifth, and sixth
initiatives through its requirements-based joint training program.
While the fourth initiative was included in the Command's
implementation plan, USACOM subsequently recognized that it did not
have the authority to schedule training events at the service-owned
ranges and facilities.
ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPROVE
EXERCISE SCHEDULING AND TO
DEVELOP MOBILE TEAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially gave USACOM
executive agent authority (authority to act on his behalf) for joint
training, including the scheduling of all geographic commander
training exercises, USACOM's first initiative. In September 1996,
the Chairman removed this authority in part because of resistance
from the other geographic commands. By summer 1997, the Chairman,
through the Joint Training Policy, again authorized USACOM to resolve
scheduling conflicts for worldwide training. While USACOM maintains
information on all training that the services' forces are requested
to participate in, the information is not adequately automated to
enable the Command to efficiently fulfill the scheduling function.
The Command has defined the requirement for such information support
and is attempting to determine how that requirement will be met.
USACOM does provide mobile training teams to other commands for
training exercises. Generally, these teams cover the academic phase
of the exercises. The Command, for example, sent a training team to
Kuwait to help the Central Command prepare its joint task force for a
recent operation. It also has included training support, which may
include mobile training teams, for the other geographic commanders in
its long-range joint training schedule.
REQUIREMENTS-BASED JOINT
TRAINING PROGRAM ESTABLISHED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
To satisfy its third, fifth, and sixth initiatives, USACOM has
developed a joint training program that reflects the supported
geographic commanders' stated requirements. These are expressed as
joint tasks essential to accomplishing assigned or anticipated
missions (joint mission-essential tasks). The Command's training
program is derived from the six training categories identified in the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's joint training manual and are
described in appendix III. USACOM primarily provides component
interoperability and joint training and participates in and supports
multinational interoperability, joint and multinational, and
interagency and intergovernmental training. The Command's primary
focus has been on joint task force training under guidance provided
by the Secretary of Defense.
JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER
TRAINING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3
Joint training, conducted primarily at USACOM's Joint Training,
Analysis and Simulation Center, encompasses a series of
exercises--Unified Endeavor--that provide training for joint force
commanders and their staffs. The training focuses on operational and
strategic tasks and has evolved into a multiphased exercise. USACOM
uses state-of-the-art modeling and simulation technology and
different exercise modules that allows the exercise to be adapted to
meet the specific needs of the training participants. For example,
one module provides the academic phase of the training and another
module provides all phases of an exercise. Until recently, the
exercises generally included three phases, but USACOM added analysis
as a fourth phase.
-- Phase I includes a series of seminars covering a broad spectrum
of operational topics. Participants develop a common
understanding of joint issues.
-- Phase II presents a realistic scenario in which the joint task
force launches crisis action planning and formulates an
operations order.
-- Phase III implements the operations order through a
computer-simulated exercise that focuses on joint task force
procedures, decision-making, and the application of doctrine.
-- Phase IV, conducted after the exercise, identifies lessons
learned, joint after-action reviews, and the commander's
exercise report.
USACOM and others consider the Command's Joint Training, Analysis and
Simulation Center to be a world premier center of next-generation
computer modeling and simulation and a centerpiece for joint task
force training. The Center is equipped with secured communications
and video capabilities that enable commands around the world to
participate in its exercises. These capabilities allow USACOM to
conduct training without incurring the significant expenses normally
associated with large field training exercises and help reduce force
personnel and operating tempos. For example, before the Center was
created, a joint task force exercise would require approximately
45,000 personnel at sea or in the field. With the Center, only about
1,000 headquarters personnel are involved. As of December 1998,
USACOM had conducted seven Unified Endeavor exercises and planned to
provide varying levels of support to at least 17 exercises--Unified
Endeavor and otherwise--per year during fiscal
years 1999-2001. Figure 2.1 shows one of the Center's rooms used for
the Unified Endeavor exercises.
Figure 2.1: USACOM's Training
Center Provides
State-of-the-Art Equipment to
Facilitate Joint Task Force
Commander Training
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: TRW, Inc.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
We attended the Unified Endeavor 98-1 exercise to observe firsthand
the training provided in this joint environment. While smooth joint
operations evolved over the course of the exercise, service
representatives initially tended to view problems and pressure
situations from a service rather than a joint perspective. The
initial phase allowed the key officers and their support staff,
including foreign participants, to grasp the details of the scenario.
These details included the basic rules of engagement and discussions
of what had to be accomplished to plan the operation. In the
exercise's second phase, staff from the participating U.S. and
foreign military services came together to present their proposals
for deploying and employing their forces. As the exercise evolved,
service representatives came to appreciate the value and importance
of coordinating every aspect of their operations with the other
services and the joint task force commander. The third phase of the
exercise was a highly stressful environment. The joint task force
commander and his staff were presented with numerous unknowns and an
overwhelming amount of information. Coordination and understanding
among service elements became paramount to successfully resolving
these situations.
INTEROPERABILITY TRAINING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.4
For interoperability training, units from more than one of USACOM's
service components are brought together in field exercises to
practice their skills in a joint environment. USACOM sponsors three
recurring interoperability exercises in which the Command coordinates
the training opportunities for its component commands, provides
specific joint mission-essential tasks for incorporation into the
training, and approves the exercise's design. The goal of the
training is to ensure that U.S. military personnel and units are not
confronted with a joint warfighting task for the first time after
arrival in a geographic command's area of responsibility. For
example, USACOM sponsors a recurring combat aircraft flying
exercise--Quick Force--that is designed to train Air Force and
participating Navy and Marine Corps units in joint air operations
tailored to Southwest Asia. This exercise is devised to train
commanders and aircrews to plan, coordinate, and execute complex day
and night, long-range joint missions from widely dispersed operating
locations.
USACOM relies on its service component commands to plan and execute
interoperability training as part of existing service field
exercises. According to USACOM's chief for joint interoperability
training, the service component commanders are responsible for
evaluating the joint training proficiency demonstrated. The force
commander of the exercise is responsible for the accomplishment of
joint training objectives and for identifying any operational
deficiencies in doctrine, training, material, education, and
organization. USACOM provides monitors to evaluate exercise
objectives. Until recently, USACOM limited its attention to
interoperability training, as its primary focus was on its Unified
Endeavor training program. As this training has matured, USACOM
recently began to increase its attention on more fully developing and
planning the Command's interoperability training. The Command
recently developed, with concurrence from the other geographic
commanders, a list of joint interoperability tasks tied to the
services' mission-essential task lists. With the development and
acceptance of these joint interoperability tasks, Command officials
believe that their joint interoperability exercises will have a
better requirements base from which to plan and execute. Also,
USACOM is looking for ways to better tie these exercises to
computer-assisted modeling.
OTHER TRAINING SUPPORT
PROVIDED BY USACOM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.5
USACOM provides joint and multinational training support through its
coordination of U.S. participation in "partnership for peace"
exercises. The partnership for peace exercise program is a major
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiative directed at
increasing confidence and cooperative efforts among partner nations
to reinforce regional stability. The Command was recently designated
the lead activity in the partnership for peace simulation center
network.
USACOM also supports training that involves intergovernmental
agencies. Its involvement is primarily through support to NATO, as
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and to non-DOD agencies. For
example, USACOM has begun including representatives of other federal
agencies, such as the State Department and Drug Enforcement
Administration, in its Unified Endeavor exercises.
COMMAND ASSUMES MUCH MORE
LIMITED ROLE AS FORCE PROVIDER
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
USACOM has made substantive changes to its approach to providing
forces. Adaptive joint force packaging was to have been the
foundation for implementing its force provider role. When this
concept encountered strong opposition, USACOM adopted a
process-oriented approach that is much less controversial with
supported geographic commands and the military services. With over
65 percent of all U.S. forces assigned to it, USACOM is the major
source of forces for other geographic commands and for military
support and assistance to U.S. civil agencies. However, its
involvement in force deployment decisions varies from operation to
operation. The Command also helps its service components manage the
operating tempos of heavily used assets.
FORCE PACKAGE CONCEPT WAS
ADOPTED BUT REPLACED BY
PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACH
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
USACOM's implementation plan introduced the operational concept of
adaptive joint force packages as an approach for carrying out
USACOM's functional roles, particularly the provider and integrator
roles. Under this approach, USACOM would develop force packages for
operations less than a major regional war and complement, but not
affect, the deliberate planning process\1 used by geographic
commanders to plan for major regional wars. USACOM's development of
these force packages, using its CONUS-based forces, was conceived as
a way to fill the void created by reductions in forward-positioned
forces and in-theater force capabilities in the early 1990s. It was
designed to make the most efficient use of the full array of forces
and capabilities of the military services, exploring and refining
force package options to meet the geographic commanders' needs. The
approach, however, encountered much criticism and resistance,
particularly from other geographic commands and the military
services, which did not want or value a significant role for USACOM
in determining which forces to use in meeting mission requirements.
Because of this resistance and the unwillingness of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support USACOM in its broad
implementation of the force packaging concept, USACOM largely
abandoned it in 1995 and adopted a process-oriented approach.
Adaptive joint force packages and their demise are discussed in
appendix IV.
The major difference between the adaptive joint force packaging
concept and the process-oriented approach that replaced it is that
the new approach allows the supported geographic commander to
"package" the forces to suit his mission needs. In essence, USACOM
prepares the assets, which are put together as the supported
commander sees fit rather than having ready-to-go packages developed
by USACOM. The new approach retains aspects of the force packaging
concept. Most notably, geographic commanders are to present their
force requirements in terms of the capability needed, not in the
traditional terms of requests for specific units or forces. Forces
are to be selected by the supported commanders, in collaboration with
USACOM, from across the services to avoid over-tasking any particular
force. The process is shown in figure 2.2 and discussed in more
detail in appendix V.
Figure 2.2: USACOM's Process
for Providing Forces
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: USACOM.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\1 A DOD planning process conducted principally in peacetime for the
deployment and employment of apportioned (the distribution of limited
resources among competing requirements for planning purposes) forces
and resources in response to a hypothetical situation. The process
relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military
circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented.
USACOM IS THE MAJOR PROVIDER
OF FORCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2
USACOM, commanding nearly 68 percent of the combat forces assigned to
geographic commands, is the major provider of forces for worldwide
operations. The size of its assigned forces far exceeds the
requirements for operations within the Command's area of
responsibility, which is much less demanding than that of other
geographic commands. As a result, USACOM can provide forces to all
the geographic commands, and its forces participate in the majority
of military operations. The Command also provides military support
and assistance to civil authorities for domestic requirements, such
as hurricane relief and security at major U.S. events. During 1998,
USACOM supported over 25 major operations and many other smaller
operations worldwide. These ranged from peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance to evacuation of U.S. and allied nationals
from threatened locations. On average, USACOM reported that it had
over 30 ships, 400 aircraft, and 40,000 personnel deployed throughout
1998.
The Pacific, European, and Special Operations Commands also have
assigned forces, but they are unable to provide the same level of
force support to other commands as USACOM. The Pacific Command has
large Navy and Marine Corps forces but has limited Army and Air Force
capabilities. European Command officials said their Command rarely
provides forces to other commands because its forces are most often
responding to requirements in their own area of responsibility. The
Special Operations Command provides specialized forces to other
commands for unique operations. The Central and Southern Commands
have very few forces of their own and are dependent on force
providers such as USACOM to routinely furnish them with forces.
USACOM'S INVOLVEMENT IN
FORCE PROVIDER DECISIONS IS
LIMITED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.3
USACOM provides forces throughout the world for the entire range of
military operations, from war to operations other than war that may
or may not involve combat. Since the Gulf War in 1991, the U.S.
military has largely been involved in operations that focus on
promoting peace and deterring war, such as the U.S. military support
to the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and the enforcement of
U.N. sanctions against Iraq. The extent of USACOM's involvement in
force decisions varies from operation to operation. In decisions
regarding deployment of major combatant forces, the Command plays a
very limited role. The military services and USACOM's service
components collaborate on such decisions. Although USACOM's
interaction with geographic commands and service components may
influence force decisions, USACOM's Commander stated that when
specific forces are requested by a geographic commander, his Command
cannot say "no" if those forces are available.
USACOM is not directly involved in the other geographic commands'
deliberate planning--the process for preparing joint operation
plans--except when there is a shortfall in the forces needed to
implement the plan or the supported commander requests USACOM's
involvement. Every geographic command is to develop deliberate plans
during peacetime for possible contingencies within its area of
responsibility as directed by the national command authority and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a supporting commander,
USACOM and its service component commands examine the operation plans
of other commands to help identify shortfalls in providing forces as
needed to support the plans. USACOM's component commands work more
closely with the geographic commands and their service components to
develop the deployment data to sequence the movement of forces,
logistics, and transportation to implement the plan.
During crises, for which an approved operation plan may not exist,
the responsible geographic command either adjusts an existing plan or
develops a new one to respond to specific circumstances or taskings.
The time available for planning may be hours or days. The supported
commander may request inputs on force readiness and force
alternatives from USACOM and its component commands. A European
Command official said USACOM is seldom involved in his Command's
planning process for crisis operations because of the compressed
planning time before the operation commences.
USACOM has its greatest latitude in suggesting force options for
military operations other than war that do not involve combat
operations, such as nation assistance and overseas presence
operations, and for ongoing contingency operations. In these
situations, time is often not as critical and USACOM can work with
the supported command and component commands to develop possible
across-the-service force options.
ATTENTION GIVEN TO BALANCING
OPERATING AND PERSONNEL
TEMPOS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.4
A primary consideration in identifying and selecting forces for
deployment is the operating and personnel tempos of the forces, which
affect force readiness. As a force provider, USACOM headquarters
supports its service component commands in resolving tempo issues and
monitors the readiness of assigned forces and the impact of
deployments on major contingency and war plans. While tempo issues
are primarily a service responsibility, USACOM works with its service
component commands and the geographic commands to help balance force
tempos to maintain the readiness of its forces and desired
quality-of-life standards. This involves analyzing tempo data across
its service components and developing force alternatives for meeting
geographic commands' needs within tempo guidelines.
According to USACOM officials, the Command devotes much attention to
managing certain assets with unique mission capabilities that are
limited in number and continually in high demand among the geographic
commands to support most crises, contingencies, and long-term joint
task force operations in their regions. These
low-density/high-demand assets, such as the Airborne Warning and
Control Systems and E/A-6B electronic warfare aircraft and Patriot
missile batteries, are managed under the Chaiman of the Joint Staff's
Global Military Force Policy. This policy, which guides decisions on
the peacetime use of assets that are few in number but high in
demand, establishes prioritization guidelines for their use and
operating tempo thresholds that can be exceeded only with Secretary
of Defense approval. The policy, devised in 1996, is intended to
maintain required levels of unit training and optimal use of the
assets across all geographic commander missions, while discouraging
the overuse of selected assets.
USACOM is responsible for 16 of the 32 low-density/high-demand
assets\2 --weapon systems and personnel units--that are included in
the Global Military Force Policy. The Pacific and European Commands
have some of these 16 assets, but the bulk of them are assigned to
USACOM. These assets are largely Air Force aircraft. In this
support role, USACOM has initiated several actions to help implement
the policy, including bringing the services and geographic commands
together to resolve conflicts over the distribution of assets,
devising a monitoring report for the Joint Staff, and recommending to
the services assets that should be included in future policy
revisions. Appendix VI provides a list of the
low-density/high-demand assets currently assigned to USACOM.
The Global Military Force Policy does not capture all of the highly
tasked assets. For example, the policy does not include less
prominent assets such as dog teams, military security police, water
purification systems, intelligence personnel, and medical units.
There were similar concerns about the high operating tempos of these
assets, and USACOM has monitored them closely. Most of these assets,
or alternatives to them, were available across the services.
Therefore, USACOM has some flexibility in identifying alternative
force options to help balance unit tempos.
Another Joint Staff policy affecting USACOM as a force provider is
the Global Naval Force Presence Policy. This policy establishes
long-range planning guidance for the location and number of U.S.
naval forces--aircraft carriers and surface combatant and amphibious
ships--provided to geographic commands on a fair-share basis. Under
this scheduling policy, the Navy controls the operating and personnel
tempos for these heavily demanded naval assets, while it ensures that
geographic commands' requirements are met. USACOM has little
involvement in scheduling these assets. While this policy provides
little flexibility for creating deployment options in most
situations, it can be adjusted by the Secretary of Defense to meet
unexpected contingencies.
According to an action officer in USACOM's operations directorate,
one of USACOM's difficulties in monitoring tempos has been the lack
of joint tempo guidelines that could be applied across service units
and assets. Each service has different definitions of what
constitutes a deployment, dissimilar policies or guidance for the
length of time units or personnel should be deployed, and different
systems for tracking deployments. For example, the Army defined a
deployment as a movement during which a unit spends an overnight away
from its home station. Deployments to combat training centers were
not counted. In contrast, the Marine Corps defines a deployment as
any movement from the home station for 10 days or more, including a
deployment for training at its combat training center. As a result,
it is difficult to compare tempos among the services. An official in
USACOM's operations directorate said the services would have to
develop joint tempo guidelines because they have the responsibility
for managing the tempos of their people and assets. The official did
not anticipate a movement anytime soon to create such guidelines
because of the differences in the types of assets and in the
management and deployment of the assets. DOD, in responding to a
1998 GAO report on joint training, acknowledged that the services'
ability to measure overall deployment rates is still evolving.\3
--------------------
\2 All assets of the remaining 16 asset types are assigned to the
U.S. Special Operations Command. These special operations forces
asset types include Navy SEAL platoons, the Army's 75th Ranger
Regiment, and the Air Force's MH-60G helicopter.
\3 Joint Training: Observations on the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Exercise Program (GAO/NSIAD-98-189, July 10, 1998).
INTEGRATOR ROLE EVOLVES INTO A
PROCESS TO IMPROVE
INTEROPERABILITY AND JOINT
CAPABILITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
The integrator role has changed significantly since 1993 and is still
evolving. It was originally tied to adaptive joint force packaging.
But with that concept's demise, the Command's role became to
implement a process to improve interoperability and enhance joint
force capabilities through the blending of technology, systems, and
doctrine. The Command's force integration objectives are to (1)
identify and refine doctrinal issues affecting joint force
operations; (2) identify, develop, evaluate, and incorporate new and
emerging technologies to support joint operations; and (3) refine and
integrate existing systems to support joint operations. The
Command's emphasis since 1996 has been to sponsor advanced concept
technology demonstration projects that have a multiservice emphasis
and search for solutions to joint interoperability problems among
advanced battle systems. It has given limited attention to joint
doctrinal issues.
Establishing its integration role has not been easy for USACOM.
USACOM's Commander (1994-97) characterized the Command's integration
efforts as a "real struggle" and said the Joint Staff was not
supportive. The current USACOM Commander expressed similar comments,
citing the integration role as the most challenging yet promising
element of his Command's mission. He told us the Command stumbled at
times and overcame numerous false starts until its new integration
role emerged. He said that as USACOM's functional roles mature, the
Command may create more friction with the services and other
commands, many of which view USACOM as a competitor. Its efforts
were significantly enhanced with the October 1998 transfer to the
Command of five joint centers and activities previously controlled by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see
ch. 4).
ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
PROVIDE PRIMARY MEANS FOR
FULFILLING ROLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
USACOM's primary means to fulfill its integration role has been to
sponsor advanced concept technology demonstration projects. These
projects are designed to permit early and inexpensive evaluations of
mature advanced technologies to meet the needs of the warfighter.
The Command considered such projects to be the best way to achieve
integration by building new systems that are interoperable from the
beginning. The warfighter determines the military utility of the
project before a commitment is made to proceed with acquisition.
These projects also allow for the development and refinement of
operational concepts for using new capabilities.
As an advanced concept technology demonstration project sponsor,
USACOM provides an operations manager to lead an assessment to
determine the project's joint military utility and to fully
understand its joint operational capability. The Command also
provides the personnel for the projects and writes the joint doctrine
and concepts of operation to effectively employ these technologies.
USACOM only accepts projects that promote interoperability and move
the military toward new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.
Various demonstration managers, such as the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, fund the projects. At the
completion of our review, USACOM was sponsoring 12 of DOD's 41 active
advanced concept technology demonstrations. It completed work in
1996 on the Predator project,\4 a medium-altitude unmanned aerial
vehicle that the Air Force is to acquire. Table 2.1 identifies each
USACOM project and its funding through fiscal year 2003.
Table 2.1
USACOM's Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration Projects
(Dollars in millions)
Project Objective Funding
------------------ -------------------------------------------------- --------
High Altitude Provide near-real-time imagery to the warfighter $1,011
Endurance by using two complementary, performance-enhanced
Unmanned Aerial air vehicles (Global Hawk, Darkstar) and a ground
Vehicles control segment.
Joint Countermine Demonstrate the capability to conduct a "seamless" 556
transition of countermine operations from sea to
land.
Synthetic Theater Under exercise conditions, develop and preview 215
of War technology that provides effective and efficient
joint task force training.
Battlefield Disseminate and manage information for warfighter 114
Awareness and systems.
Data
Dissemination
Semi-Automated Develop tools to assist image analysts in 119
Image exploiting large volumes of image data from
Intelligence tactical image platforms.
Processing
Combat Demonstrate and assess the utility of air-to- 67
Identification surface and surface-to-surface technologies to
positively identify friendly, hostile, and
neutral platforms.
Navigation Warfare Demonstrate proof of concept for preventing 57
adversaries' use of precision satellite
navigation while protecting friendly access to
Global Positioning System.
Joint Logistics Develop joint decision support tools to achieve 52
seamless interoperability and control of the
logistic pipeline.
Advanced Joint Identify and enhance operational planning 28
Planning capabilities for the geographic commands.
Joint Modular Build and demonstrate a prototype causeway system 25
Lighter System to safely assemble and operate (in a loaded
condition) through high sea conditions.
Integrated Allow Joint Task Force commanders to better 17
Collection synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and
Management reconnaissance assets across national, theater,
and tactical levels of control.
Link-16/Variable Proof of concept for the exchange of information 3
Message Format between Link-16 and Variable Message Format
Ground networks.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: USACOM.
We issued a report in October 1998 on opportunities for DOD to
improve its advanced concept technology demonstration program,
including the process for selecting candidate projects and guidance
on entering technologies into the normal acquisition process, and the
risky practice of procuring prototypes beyond those needed for the
basic demonstration and before completing product and concept
demonstration.\5
--------------------
\4 The Predator is a fully autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicle with
technology that provides continuous day-and-night coverage with
optical, infrared, and radar sensors. In March 1996, the Predator
began flying operational reconnaissance and surveillance missions in
Bosnia. The advanced concept technology demonstration evaluation was
completed in September 1996 and transferred to the Air Force, which
began system production in August 1997.
\5 Defense Acquisitions: Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
Program Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-99-4, Oct. 15, 1998).
INTEROPERABILITY AND OTHER
USACOM INTEGRATION EFFORTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
In addition to its advanced concept technology demonstration
projects, USACOM has sought opportunities to advance the
interoperability\6 of systems already deployed or about to be
deployed that make a difference on the battlefield. Particularly
critical capabilities USACOM has identified for interoperability
enhancements include theater missile defense; command, control, and
communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and
combat identification (friend or foe). The military services have a
long history of interoperability problems during joint operations,
primarily because DOD has not given sufficient consideration to the
need for weapon systems to operate with other systems, including
exchanging information effectively during a joint operation. We
reported on such weaknesses in the acquisition of command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence systems in March 1998.\7
A critical question is who pays the costs associated with joint
requirements that USACOM identifies in service acquisition programs?
The services develop weapon system requirements, and the dollars pass
from the Secretary of Defense to the services to satisfy the
requirements. If USACOM believes modifications are needed to a
weapon system to enable it to operate in a joint environment, the
Command can elevate this interoperability issue to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council\8 for action. For example, the USACOM Commander recently
told the Chairman and the Council that the Air Force's unwillingness
to modify the Predator and the concept of operations to allow other
services to directly receive information from the unmanned aerial
vehicle would limit a joint commander's flexibility in using such
vehicles, hurt interoperability, and inhibit the development of joint
tactics. According to USACOM's Operations Manager for this area, the
Air Force needs to provide additional funding to make the Predator
truly joint but it wants to maintain operational control of the
system. As of November 1998, this interoperability concern had not
been resolved.
USACOM can also enhance force integration through its responsibility
as the trainer and readiness overseer of assigned reserve component
forces. This responsibility allows USACOM to influence the training
and readiness of these reserves and their budgets to achieve full
integration of the reserve and active forces when the assigned
reserves are mobilized.\9 This is important because of the increased
reliance on reserve component forces to carry out contingency
missions. The USACOM Commander (1993-97) described the Command's
oversight as a critical step in bringing the reserve forces into the
total joint force structure.
--------------------
\6 Enhance the ability of such units or forces to provide and accept
services with other systems, units, or forces and to use these
services to enable them to operate effectively together.
\7 Joint Military Operations: Weaknesses in DOD's Process for
Certifying C4I Systems' Interoperability (GAO/NSIAD-98-73, Mar. 13,
1998).
\8 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council, an instrument of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense,
supports the Chairman by assessing military requirements for defense
acquisition programs, assessing joint warfighting capabilities, and
assigning a joint priority among major weapons meeting valid
requirements.
\9 A reserve unit does not come under the command authority of USACOM
or another combatant command until it is mobilized or ordered to
active duty for purposes other than training.
VALUE OF USACOM'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO
JOINT MILITARY CAPABILITIES
============================================================ Chapter 3
USACOM and others believe that the Command has helped advance the
joint military capabilities of U.S. forces. While USACOM has
conducted several self-assessments of its functional roles, we found
that these assessments provided little insight into the overall value
of the Command's efforts to enhance joint capabilities. The Command
has established goals and objectives as a joint trainer, provider,
and integrator and is giving increased attention to monitoring and
accomplishing tasks designed to achieve these objectives and
ultimately enhance joint operational capabilities. Our discussions
with various elements of DOD found little consensus regarding the
value of USACOM's contributions in its functional roles but general
agreement that the Command is making important contributions that
should enhance U.S. military capabilities.
USACOM'S ASSESSMENTS PROVIDE
LITTLE INSIGHT ON VALUE OF
COMMAND'S CONTRIBUTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
USACOM has conducted three self-assessments of its functional roles.
These appraisals did not specifically evaluate the Command's
contribution to improving joint operational capabilities but
discussed progress of actions taken in its functional roles. The
first two appraisals covered USACOM's success in executing its plan
for implementing the functional roles, while the most recent
appraisal rated the Command's progress in each of its major focus
areas.\1
In quarterly reports to the Secretary of Defense and in testimony
before the Congress, USACOM has presented a positive picture of its
progress and indicated that the military has reached an unprecedented
level of jointness.
--------------------
\1 Major focus areas are the main areas, as defined by USACOM, where
the Command must focus its efforts to fulfill its vision and mission.
These areas now include joint force trainer, joint force provider,
and joint force integrator.
EARLY ASSESSMENTS REPORT
PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTING
FUNCTIONAL ROLES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
In a June 1994 interim report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, USACOM's Commander noted that the Command's first 6 months of
transition into its new functional roles had been eventful and that
the Command was progressing well in developing new methodologies to
meet the geographic commands' needs. He recognized that it would
take time and the help of the service components to refine all the
responsibilities relating to the new mission. He reported that
USACOM's vision and strategic plan had been validated and that the
Command was on course and anticipated making even greater progress in
the next 6 months.
USACOM performed a second assessment in spring 1996, in response to a
request from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a review
of the success of USACOM's implementation plan at the 2-year point.
The Command used Joint Vision 2010, the military's long-range
strategic vision, as the template for measuring its success, but the
document does not provide specific measures for gauging improvements
in operational capabilities. USACOM reported that, overall, it had
successfully implemented its key assigned responsibilities and
missions. It described its new functional responsibilities as
"interrelated," having a synergistic effect on the evolution of joint
operations. It reported that it had placed major emphasis on its
joint force trainer role and noted development of a three-tier
training model. The Command described its joint force provider role
as a five-step process, with adaptive joint force packaging no longer
a critical component. Seeing the continuing evolution of its force
provider role as a key factor in supporting Joint Vision 2010, USACOM
assessed the implementation plan task as accomplished. The Command
considered its joint force integrator role the least developed but
the most necessary in achieving coherent joint operations and
fulfilling Joint Vision 2010. Although the assessment covered only
the advanced concept technology demonstrations segment of its
integrator role, USACOM reported that it had also successfully
implemented this task.
MOST RECENT ASSESSMENT CITES
PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMMAND'S MAJOR FOCUS AREAS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
As requested by USACOM's Commander, USACOM staff assessed progress
and problems in the Command's major focus areas in early 1998. This
self-assessment covered the Command's directorate-level leadership
responsible for each major focus area. An official involved in this
assessment said statistical, quantifiable measures were not
documented to support the progress ratings; however, critical and
candid comments were made during the process. The assessments cited
"progress" or "satisfactory progress" in 38 of 42 rated areas, such
as command focus on joint training, advanced concept technology
demonstration project management, and monitoring of
low-density/high-demand asset tempos. Progress was judged
"unsatisfactory" in four areas: (1) exercise requirements
determination and worldwide scheduling process; (2) training and
readiness oversight for assigned forces; (3) reserve component
integration and training, and readiness oversight; and (4)
institutionalizing the force provider process. This assessment was
discussed within the Command and during reviews of major focus areas
and was updated to reflect changes in command responsibilities.
COMMAND REPORTS PROGRESS IN
ADVANCING JOINT OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3
USACOM, like other unified commands, uses several mechanisms to
report progress and issues to DOD leadership and the Congress. These
include periodic commanders-in-chief conferences, messages and
reports to or discussions with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and testimony before the Congress. Minutes were not kept of
the commanders-in-chief conferences, but we obtained Commander,
USACOM, quarterly reports, which are to focus on the Command's key
issues. Reports submitted to the Secretary of Defense between May
1995 and April 1998 painted a positive picture of USACOM's progress,
citing activities in areas such as joint training exercises, theater
missile defense, and advanced technology projects. The reports also
covered operational issues but included little discussion of the
Command's problems in implementing its functional roles. For
example, none of the reports discussed the wide opposition to
adaptive joint force packaging or USACOM's decision to change its
approach, even though the Secretary of Defense approved the
implementation plan for its functional roles, which included
development of adaptive joint force packages.
In congressional testimony in March 1997, the Commander of USACOM
(1995-97) discussed the Command's annual accomplishments, plans for
the future, and areas of concern. The Commander noted that U.S.
military operations had evolved from specialized joint operations to
a level approaching synergistic joint operations.\2 In 1998
testimony, the current USACOM Commander reported continued progress,
describing the military as having reached "an unprecedented level of
jointness." USACOM's ultimate goal is to advance joint warfighting to
a level it has defined as "coherent" joint operations with all battle
systems, communications systems, and information databases fully
interoperable and linked by common joint doctrine. Figure 3.1
depicts the evolution from specialized and synergistic joint
operations to coherent joint operations.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of Joint
Operations
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: USACOM.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\2 In specialized joint operations, such as those during Operation
Desert Storm in 1991, the military services operate somewhat
autonomously within distinct spheres to achieve a common objective.
In synergistic joint operations, such as those in Haiti in 1994,
service capabilities are integrated without a common doctrine across
all aspects of joint operations. The lack of a common doctrine
hampers full integration of service capabilities.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
ESTABLISHED, BUT ASSESSMENTS OF
COMMAND'S IMPACT NOT PLANNED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
At the conclusion of our review, USACOM was completing the
development of a new strategic planning system to enhance its
management of its major focus areas and facilitate strategic planning
within the USACOM staff. Goals, objectives, and subobjectives were
defined in each of its major focus areas, and an automated internal
process was being established to help the Command track actions being
taken in each area. The goals and objectives were designed to
support the Command's overall mission to maximize U.S. military
capability through joint training, force integration, and deployment
of ready forces in support of worldwide operations. Table 3.1
provides examples of goals, objectives, and subobjectives in the
joint force trainer, provider, and integrator major focus areas.
Table 3.1
Examples of Goals, Objectives, and
Subobjectives in USACOM Major Focus
Areas
Major focus area and
goal Objective Subobjective
---------------------- ---------------------- ----------------------
Joint force trainer Enhance fidelity and --Resolve schedule
Sustain and improve a rigor of joint task conflicts between
high quality joint force training to USACOM's joint task
task force training provide supported force training and
program to produce commands with flexible training provided by
trained joint high-quality training others.
commanders and that reduces staff --Design multiechelon
staff.\a tempos.\a exercises to meet the
multiple training
needs
of geographic
commands, joint task
forces, and USACOM's
service components.
Joint force provider Identify and select --Balance tempos
Provide combat-ready combat-ready forces.\b among
joint forces to meet service components
worldwide with Global Military
requirements.\b Force Policy and
geographic command
requirements.
--Develop a database
to track availability
of
deploying forces.
Joint force Monitor and assess --Develop concepts,
integrator USACOM joint influence doctrine,
Develop joint, integration and identify
combined, and initiatives that requirements at
interagency promote the geographic
capabilities to interoperability and command
improve enhance near-term level for providing
interoperability and joint military trained theater air
enhance current operations.\c and
operational missile defense
capabilities.\c forces
that are integrated
for joint operations.
--Develop fully
interoperable
technology to improve
target
identification and
combat effectiveness
of joint
forces and to reduce
fratricide.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a One of five trainer goals with one of four objectives supporting
this goal.
\b One of three force provider goals with one of three objectives
supporting this goal.
\c One of three integrator goals with one of three objectives
supporting this goal.
Source: USACOM.
The goals and the objectives and subobjectives necessary to achieve
the goals are established by officials in each major focus area. The
objectives and subobjectives are to be understandable, relevant,
attainable, and measurable. Progress in achieving the subobjectives
becomes the measures for the objective's success, and progress on
objectives is the measure of success in achieving a goal. The
relative importance of each objective and subobjective is reflected
in weights or values assigned to each and is used to measure
progress. Objective and subjective assessments of progress are to be
routinely made and reported. Command officials expect that in some
areas progress will not be easy to measure and will require
subjective judgments.
USACOM officials believed the Command's new planning system, which
became operational on October 20, 1998, meets many of the
expectations of the Government Performance and Results Act, which
requires agencies to set goals, measure performance, and report on
their accomplishments. The Command believed that actions it plans to
adopt in major focus areas would ultimately improve the military
capabilities of U.S. forces, the mission of the Command. The
officials, however, recognized that the planning system does not
include assessments or measures that can be used to evaluate the
Command's impact on military capabilities. Under the Results Act,
agencies' performance plans are to include performance goals and
measures to help assess whether the agency is successful in
accomplishing its general goals and missions. The Congress
anticipated that the Results Act principles would be
institutionalized and practiced at all organizational levels of the
federal government. Establishing such performance measures could be
difficult, but they could help USACOM determine what it needs to do
to improve its performance.
DOD has begun to implement the Results Act at all organizational
levels, and the Secretary of Defense tasked subordinate organizations
in 1998 to align their programs with DOD program goals established
under the act. Recognizing that the development of qualitative and
quantitative performance measures to assess mission accomplishment
has been slow, USACOM has provided training to its military officers
on performance objectives. USACOM officials said that while the
Command has begun to take steps to implement the principles of the
Act, they believed the Command needs additional implementation
guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
VIEWS REGARDING THE VALUE OF
USACOM'S CONTRIBUTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
In the absence of specific assessments of USACOM's impact on joint
operations, we asked representatives from the Joint Staff, USACOM and
its service component commands, and supported geographic commands for
their views on USACOM's value and contributions in advancing DOD's
joint military capabilities. Opinions varied by command and
functional role and ranged from USACOM having little or no impact to
being a great contributor and having a vital role. Generally
speaking, Joint Staff officials considered USACOM to be of great
value and performing an essential function while views among the
geographic commands were more reserved.
JOINT FORCE TRAINING VIEWED
AS POSITIVE BUT ONLY
RECENTLY USED BY SOME
COMMANDS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1
USACOM and its service components believed the Command's joint task
force headquarters training was among the best joint training
available. This training has allowed USACOM components' three-star
commanders and their senior staffs to be trained without fielding
thousands of troops and to concentrate on joint tasks considered
essential to accomplishing a mission anywhere in the world. The
Commander of USACOM cited this training as the best example of
USACOM's success in affecting joint operations. He told us that
USACOM has secured the funding it needs to do this training and has
developed what he described as a "world-class" joint training
program.
Representatives of the geographic commands we visited believed
USACOM's joint task force commander training has provided good joint
experience to CONUS-based forces. They believed this training has
enabled participants to perform more effectively as members of a
joint task force staff. While these commands spoke well of the
training, they have been slow to avail themselves of it and could not
attribute any improvement in joint tasks force operations to it. The
commands have not taken advantage of this training for several
reasons. First, other geographic commands considered providing
headquarters' staff joint task force commander training their
responsibility and were reluctant to turn to USACOM for assistance.
Second, USACOM's joint task force commander training is conducted at
the Command's Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center in
Suffolk, Virginia. Thus, geographic commands would have to make a
significant investment to deploy several hundred headquarters staff
for up to 18 days to complete the three phases of USACOM's training.
Third, the commands are not confident that the training at the Center
provides a true picture of the way they would conduct an operation.
That is, the scenarios USACOM uses may have limited application in
the other geographic commands' regional areas of operational
responsibility. The commands have, therefore, preferred to train
their own forces, with assistance from the Joint Warfighting Center.
Representatives from this Center have gone to the commands and
assisted them with their training at no cost to the command. In
October 1998, the Center was assigned to USACOM. USACOM officials
believed this would enhance the training support provided by the
Command to geographic commands (see ch. 4).
Indications are that the geographic commands are beginning to more
fully use USACOM as a training support organization. According to
the Commander of USACOM, the current generation of commanders of the
geographic commands have been more receptive of USACOM support than
their predecessors. Also, as USACOM adjusts its training to make it
more relevant to other geographic commanders, the commands are
requesting USACOM's support. In 1998, USACOM sent mobile training
teams to the U.S. Central Command in support of an operation in
Kuwait. The Command was also supporting the U.S. European Command
in one of its major training exercises. U.S. Southern Command has
requested support from USACOM for one of its major Caribbean joint
exercises and asked the Command to schedule the training exercise for
the next 3 years.
Regarding interoperability training, USACOM's component commands
believed the Command should be more involved in planning and
executing training exercises. Most of this training was existing
service exercises selected to be used as joint interoperability
training. Some service component officials believed that without
sufficient USACOM influence, the sponsoring services would be
inclined to make these exercises too service-specific or
self-serving. For example, the Navy's annual joint task force
exercise has basically been a preparation for a carrier battle group
to make its next deployment. The Air Force has participated, but Air
Combat Command officials told us they did not believe they gained
much joint training experience from the exercise. USACOM officials
recognize that the Command has not given interoperability training
the same level of emphasis as its joint task force training. They
believed, however, that components' use of the recently developed
universal joint interoperability tasks list in planning this training
would result in more joint orientation to the training.
USACOM ADDS VALUE AS JOINT
FORCE PROVIDER
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2
As the major joint force provider, USACOM was valued by the Joint
Staff, other geographic commands, and its service component commands.
The Joint Staff believed that USACOM, as a single joint command
assigned the majority of the four services' forces, has provided a
more efficient way of obtaining forces to meet the mission needs of
the other geographic commands. Prior to establishing USACOM, the
Joint Staff dealt individually with each of the services to obtain
the necessary forces. Now, the Joint Staff can go to USACOM, which
can coordinate with its service component commands to identify
available forces with the needed capabilities and recommend force
options. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1993-97) told us
that forces have never been provided as efficiently as USACOM has
done it and that forces were better trained and equipped when they
arrived where needed.
The geographic commands we visited that USACOM primarily supports
viewed the Command as a dependable and reliable force provider. The
U.S. Central Command stated that forces provided by USACOM have been
well trained and have met the Command's needs. The Command described
USACOM forces as having performed exceptionally well in Operation
Desert Thunder, in response to Iraq's denial of access to its
facilities to U.N. weapon inspectors in February 1998. The Command
also stated that USACOM could provide forces more tailored to
fighting in its area of responsibility than the U.S. European or
Pacific Commands because USACOM forces have routinely deployed for
exercises and missions in support of ongoing operations in their
area. Similarly, U.S. European Command officials said that USACOM
has been responsive to their Command's force needs and was doing a
good job as a force provider. The U.S. European Command also noted
that USACOM has ensured equitable tasking among CONUS-based forces
and has allowed the European Command to focus on the operation at
hand. The U.S. Southern Command, with few forces of its own,
believed that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Panama throughout
1999 would make the Southern Command more dependent on USACOM for
forces to support its exercise and operations requirements.
In discussing its contributions as a major provider of forces, USACOM
believed that it adds value by providing the Joint Staff with
informed force selection inputs based on all capable forces available
from across its service components. For example, the European
Command requested that an Air Force engineering unit build a bridge
in 1997. USACOM identified a Navy Seabees unit already deployed in
Spain as an option. The European Command agreed to use this unit.
USACOM believed that it has supported other geographic commands by
providing well-trained forces and alerting them of any potential
training needs when forces are deployed.
USACOM and its service component commands viewed the Command as an
"honest broker" that has drawn upon the capabilities of all the
services, as necessary, to meet the mission requirements of the
geographic commands. As pointed out by USACOM's Commander, while
USACOM has not been involved in all deployment decisions concerning
its assigned forces--such as the Navy's carrier battle groups or
large Army units--and was not in a position to deny an available
force to a supported command, the Command has served as a
clearinghouse for high-demand forces. For example:
-- USACOM had provided optometrists for its mobile training teams
deployed to Africa to train Africans for peacekeeping
activities. Optometrists were needed to diagnose eye problems
of African troops, who experienced difficulties seeing with
night optical equipment. The Forces Command was unable to
provide the needed personnel beyond the first deployment, so
USACOM tasked its Atlantic Fleet component to provide personnel
for the redeployment.
-- In May 1997, an aerostat (radar balloon) that provided coverage
in the Florida straits went down. USACOM tasked the Navy's
Atlantic Fleet to provide radar coverage every weekend with an
E-2C aircraft squadron. When the balloon was not replaced as
expected and the requirement continued, the Atlantic Fleet asked
for relief from USACOM. USACOM adjudicated resources with the
Air Combat Command so that the Air Forces's E-3 aircraft would
provide coverage for half of the time.
USACOM's service component commands also saw the benefit in having a
single unified command act as an arbitrator among themselves. USACOM
can arbitrate differences between two of its component commands that
can provide the same capability. It can provide rationale as to why
one should or should not be tasked to fill a particular requirement
and make a decision based on such things as prior tasking and
operating and personnel tempos. Its components also saw USACOM as
their representative on issues with DOD and other organizations. In
representing its components, for example, USACOM handled politically
sensitive arrangements over several months with a U.S. embassy,
through the State Department, to provide military support to a
foreign government for a counterdrug operation conducted between July
1997 and February 1998. USACOM's involvement allowed its Air Force
component, the Air Combat Command, to limit its involvement in the
arrangements and concentrate on sourcing the assets and arranging
logistics for the operation.
JOINT FORCE INTEGRATOR VALUE
MAY LIE IN LONGER-TERM
BENEFITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.3
The Commander of USACOM told us he considered joint force integration
to be the Command's most important functional role. He believed that
over the next 2 years the Command's integration efforts would gain
more recognition for enhancing joint operational capabilities than
its efforts in joint training. He said the Command was beginning to
gain access to critical "levers of progress," such as the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, which would enhance its influence.
He cited the Command's development--in collaboration with other
geographic commands--of a theater ballistic missile defense capstone
requirements document and its August 1998 approval by the Council as
a demonstration of the Command's growing influence and impact. This
document is to guide doctrine development and the acquisition
programs for this joint mission. While approval was a very
significant step for jointness, it raised important questions,
including who will pay for joint requirements in service acquisition
programs. The services have opposed USACOM's role and methodology in
developing joint requirements and did not believe they should be
responsible for funding costs associated with the joint requirements.
The USACOM Commander believed the Command has made considerable
progress in developing the process by which joint force integration
is accomplished. He cited the Command's advanced concept technology
demonstration projects that have a joint emphasis as one of its
primary means of enhancing force integration. He said, for example,
that the Command's high-altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle
project should soon provide aerial vehicles that give warfighters
near-real-time, all-weather tactical radar and optical imagery.
Views and knowledge about USACOM's integration role varied among the
geographic commands we visited. Few commands were knowledgeable of
USACOM's efforts at integration but perceived them to be closely
aligned with the Command's joint force trainer and provider
functions. While these commands were aware that USACOM had responded
to some specific opportunities (for example, theater ballistic
missile defense) in its integrator role, they described the Command's
involvement in refining joint doctrine and improving systems
interoperability as a responsibility shared among the commands. A
representative of the Joint Staff's Director for Operational Plans
and Interoperability told us USACOM's integrator role, as originally
defined, faded along with adaptive joint force packages. He believed
the Command's staff had worked hard to redefine this role and give it
a meaningful purpose and considered the Command as adding value and
performing a vital mission in its redefined role.
COMMAND STILL BEING ASSIMILATED
AND ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
EXPANDED
============================================================ Chapter 4
USACOM's evolving functional roles as joint force trainer, provider,
and integrator have not been fully embraced throughout DOD. Except
for USACOM's joint force trainer role, its functional roles and
responsibilities have not been fully incorporated into DOD joint
publications or fully accepted or understood by other commands and
the military services. USACOM's functional responsibilities are
expanding with the recent assignment of five additional joint staff
activities, a new joint experimentation role, and ownership of the
joint deployment process. USACOM's Commander believes these will
have a positive impact on its existing functional roles.
JOINT TRAINING ROLE HAS BEEN
INSTITUTIONALIZED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
Over time, the Joint Staff and USACOM have incorporated the Command's
joint force trainer role into joint publications. These documents
provide a common understanding among DOD organizations of USACOM's
role in the joint training of forces. USACOM's training role is
identified in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint training
policy and discussed in detail in the Chairman's joint training
manual and joint training master plan.
The Chairman's joint training master plan makes USACOM responsible
for the joint training of assigned CONUS-based forces, preparing them
to deploy worldwide and participate as members of a joint task force.
It also tasks the Command to train joint task forces not trained by
other geographic commands. As defined in the joint training manual,
USACOM develops the list of common operational joint tasks, with
assistance from the geographic commands, the Joint Warfighting
Center, and the Joint Staff. These common tasks, which are used by
USACOM to train CONUS-based forces, have been adopted by the Chairman
as a common standard for all joint training.
To further clarify its training role, USACOM issued a joint training
plan that defines its role, responsibilities, and programs for the
joint training of its assigned forces. This plan also discusses the
Command's support to the Chairman's joint training program and other
geographic commands' joint training. USACOM has also developed a
joint task force headquarters master training guide that has been
disseminated to all geographic commands and is used to develop
training guides.
OTHER FUNCTIONAL ROLES NOT YET
INSTITUTIONALIZED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
While USACOM's force provider and integrator roles are described in
broad terms in the Unified Command Plan, these roles have not been
incorporated into joint guidance and publications. This lack of
inclusion could hinder a common understanding about these roles and
what is expected from USACOM. For example, key joint guidance for
planning and executing military operations--the Joint Operational
Planning and Execution System--does not specifically discuss USACOM's
role as a force provider even though the Command has the
preponderance of U.S. forces. The lack of inclusion in joint
guidance and publications also may contribute to other DOD units'
resistance or lack of support and hinder sufficient discussion of
these roles in military academic education curriculums, which use
only approved doctrine and publications for class instruction.
Internally, USACOM's provider role is generally defined in the
Command's operations order and has recently been included as a major
focus area. However, USACOM has not issued a standard operating
procedure for its provider role. A standard operating procedure
contains instructions covering those features of operations that lend
themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without the loss
of effectiveness. Such instructions delineate for staffs and
organizations how they are to carry out their responsibilities. Not
having them has caused some difficulties and inefficiencies among the
force provider staff, particularly newly assigned staff. USACOM
officials stated that they plan to create a standard operating
procedure but that the effort is an enormous task and has not been
started.
USACOM's integrator role is defined in the Command's operations order
and included as a major focus area. The order notes that the
training and providing processes do much to achieve the role's stated
objective of enhanced joint capabilities but that effectively
incorporating new technologies occurs primarily through the
integration process. Steps in the integration process include
developing a concept for new systems, formulating organizational
structure, defining equipment requirements, establishing training,
and developing and educating leaders. The major focus area for the
integration role defines the role's three objectives and tasks within
each to enhance joint force operations.
USACOM'S ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN
FURTHER EXPANDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
The Secretary of Defense continued to expand USACOM's roles and
responsibilities in 1998, assigning the Command several activities,
the new role of joint experimentation, and ownership of the joint
deployment process. These changes significantly expand the Command's
size and responsibilities. Additional changes that will further
expand the Command's roles and responsibilities have been approved.
CHAIRMAN ACTIVITIES
TRANSFERRED TO USACOM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1
Effective October 1998, five activities, formerly controlled by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and about 1,100 of their
authorized personnel were transferred to USACOM. Table 4.1
identifies the activities and provides information on their location,
missions, and fiscal year 1999 budget request and authorized military
and civilian positions.
Table 4.1
Missions and Authorizations for Five
Activities Transferred to USACOM
Fiscal year 1999
budget request
and personnel
Activity Mission authorizations
------------------- ----------------------------------------- ----------------
Joint Warfare Provide Joint Staff and geographic $75 million
Analysis Center, commands with targeting options to carry 384 positions
Dahlgren, Virginia out U.S. national security and military
strategy during peacetime, crisis, and
war.
Joint Warfighting Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs $58.2 million
Center, 