NATIONAL GUARD FORCES
INTRODUCTION: An important issue that came to the forefront during the civil disturbance operation was that the DOD GARDEN PLOT plan does not contain sufficient guidance on procedures for the Army to execute a selective mobilization. Inherent in the lack of guidelines was the issue of federalization of the National Guard. The requirements of the defederalization process also caused confusion, to include the need for physicals, and the manner in which service was documented.
To eliminate confusion, statutory and administrative requirements, relating to federalization of the National Guard, need study. In addition, the GARDEN PLOT plan should be revised to specifically task military departments to develop supporting plans for selective mobilization. The Department of the Army revised plan will implement guidance for the Army, incorporating the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) under selective mobilization.
TOPIC: Federalization Status of the National Guard.
DISCUSSION: The federalization status of several California National Guard units was not known when JTF Los Angeles was activated by the FORSCOM commander. Neither the California Adjutant General nor FORSCOM could provide an accurate list of federalized National Guard units at the time the JTF was activated. As a result, the J1 spent a significant amount of time compiling this information, which was necessary to properly employ, supply, and administer the National Guard units.
LESSON(S): Parent commands must pay close attention to the exact federalization status of their units during mobilization. This will ensure a smooth transition to federal control under a JTF. Upon the activation of a JTF for civil disturbance operations, the J1 should inquire into the federalization status of the National Guard units assigned to the command.
TOPIC: Federalization from the Legal Standpoint.
DISCUSSION: From a legal standpoint, the National Guard was unprepared for federalization. On 1 May 1992, the President directed federalization of certain National Guard forces and the creation of a joint task force to assist in civil disturbance operations. While the National Guard forces responded quickly, from a legal perspective, they appeared to be generally unprepared for the transition to federal service. Many National Guard attorneys were unfamiliar with the benefits and problems associated with transitioning their force to federal service.
National Guard Judge Advocates must always be prepared for federalization. The Guard needs to develop standing operating procedures (SOPs) which allow a smooth transition, and they must understand the implications of federalization before it happens. Many of the more common issues (e.g., legal assistance issues, such as reemployment rights and Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act benefits) could be addressed in the GARDEN PLOT Operations Plan (OPLAN).
LESSON(S): Develop a legal SOP that outlines the mechanics and effects of federalizing the National Guard. Add an annex to the GARDEN PLOT OPLAN that highlights the key legal implications of federalizing the National Guard (e.g., legal assistance issues, military justice issues, and administrative law problems).
TOPIC: Military Justice and Federalization.
DISCUSSION: Federalization of the National Guard, especially for short-term civil disturbance operations, creates unique problems in the military justice system. Federalization of the National Guard may create a jurisdictional gap for prosecution of offenses. When a soldier is notified of activation under Title 32 and fails to report, the National Guard can handle the case using state judicial or nonjudicial. procedures. State procedures no longer apply when soldiers fail to report after federalization. The offenses must be disposed of using Title 10, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) procedures. However, a soldier cannot be considered ordered to active duty under Title 10 unless notified of the activation. A gap is created for offenses committed between the time of federalization and the time the soldier receives notification. In AWOL cases, that time would be lost for prosecution purposes.
Civil disturbance operations that conclude quickly present difficult time restraints for processing military justice actions. The command must act quickly either to resolve the issue or reassign the soldier to a regular Army unit for disposition before the individual is removed from federal status. Failure to act in a timely fashion may result in misconduct going unpunished.
The time constraint problem is compounded by the fact that many National Guard attorneys lack familiarity with Title 10 military justice procedures. If JTF-LA is any barometer for the future, planners should expect civil disturbance operations to be concluded quickly, and, as such, there may be insufficient time for a Title 10 learning curve.
Army Regulation (AR) 27-10, Military Justice, specifies that only trial defense attorneys can represent soldiers at special and general courts-martial. National Guard units, being state entities, do not have trial defense attorneys assigned. The trial defense attorney must, therefore, be provided from a regular Army installation.
LESSON(S): Each National Guard JAG unit should dedicate an attorney, preferably a trial counsel, to remain current in Title 10 procedures. Training for the dedicated "Title 10" attorney should include annual training (AT) with an active duty division SJA office.
TOPIC: Personnel Accountability Difficulties.
DISCUSSION: Personnel accountability broke down during Operation GARDEN PLOT and headcounts became both unreliable and difficult to verify. Some soldiers were originally deployed on state active duty (SAD) orders and were then federalized. Others were not federalized, but were retained longer than anticipated. Because both types of soldiers were used to augment Active Component units or were placed as subordinate units to JTF-LA, inaccurate manpower statuses for pay and personnel processing resulted. This was especially confusing during the defederalization process.
LESSON(S): The Title 32 soldier must be placed in a Title 10 status for tactical employment under Title 10 command. Exercise of precise personnel accountability is essential to properly complete administrative functions. Attention to the proper use of command and control, to include command emphasis on SOP, needs to drive requirements for accountability.
TOPIC: Personnel Service Support and Federalization.
DISCUSSION: The CAARNG used an extract of the unit payroll instead of the DA Form 1379, Record of Reserve Training. DA Form 1379 is used to account for, and record, active federal service. If the CAARNG had used this form as directed, documentation of federalized service and the preparation of DD Forms 214 would not have posed the problems which were encountered. By using DA Form 1379, strength accounting and preparation of the DD Form 214 is simpler and faster to complete upon defederalization.
The supporting installation was required to prepare almost 10,000 DD Form 214s and did not have the manpower nor the computer support necessary to perform the mission within a reasonable timeframe. The CAARNG provided two units on annual training (AT) to assist with the mission, and Sixth U.S. Army and DOD provided experienced soldiers to supervise the effort. There was not a good working program for the preparation of the DD Form 214. A completed DD Form 214 was required instead of the requested abbreviated form or use of the DD Form 220 (Active Duty Report). Preparation of the DD Form 214 is impractical for soldiers on active duty for less than 30 days.
A National Guard division activated without its Personnel Service Company (PSC) and Finance Company. While the division was federalized, routine personnel and finance support was lacking. Active duty PSCs and Finance & Accounting Offices (FAOs) are not staffed to perform services for an attached RC unit.
If the operation had extended for a longer period of time, administrative support by the supporting installation would have been reduced even further. The supporting installation could not handle the defederalization process with its assigned personnel. A division finance company assisted greatly during its AT with the preparation of the DD Form 214s. Division support units should be activated with the division and remain on active duty until all defederalization actions are completed.
Because of time constraints in federalizing and defederalizing the CAARNG, augmentation of the CAARNG staff (personnel, logistics, medical and finance) to support the operation was required. After federalization of the CAARNG, a critical need surfaced to augment the personnel, logistics, medical and finance personnel in performing those tasks required for defederalization. Several requests from the CAARNG and Sixth U.S. Army seeking approval to use Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) were submitted and disapproved by DA. Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) was authorized. TTAD is a cumbersome procedure which, had it been used, would have resulted in a much slower reaction time than that required to accomplish the mission. There is a need for Army policy to authorize the augmentation of the ARNG staff with ADSW assets when needed.
*The National Guard should use DA Form 1379, Record of Reserve Training, during future federalizations to account for, and record, active federal service. Army Regulations should be revised to use DD Form 220 or an abbreviated version of DD Form 214 to document active duty service of less than 30 days. For 31 days or more, DD Form 214 should be prepared.
*Always activate the PSC and finance company when a major portion of the division is activated.
*Authorize Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) during future ARNG federalizations and provide guidance to identify ADSW as the preferred method of augmentation.
TOPIC: Finance and Federalization.
DISCUSSION: There was confusion with the payroll after federalization. State mission 92-1056 activated an MP brigade to perform duty in support of the civil disturbance in the south central Los Angeles on 30 April 1992. While the brigade was deploying, the Sixth U.S. Army published orders which superceded its state orders.
SAD (Office of the Adjutant General (OTAG) Form 14) payroll was initiated for 30 April 1992 for an undetermined time. The state of California, Military Department, was undecided as to which payroll procedure to invoke. The problem was to identify the number of days the payroll would entail.
The brigade was federalized, not mobilized, which caused additional confusion within the chain of command during this effort. Once the brigade was federalized, the payroll activity changed from SAD to federal pay. Upon federalization, the State of California was trying to determine the number of SAD days to pay the soldiers.
Federal payroll was accomplished through the Unit Payroll Listing which placed all personnel on one listing, and the pay period was stipulated to be 2 May through 15 May 1992. The SAD payroll was delayed because of the State of California's inability to decide on the days to pay the personnel. Once the federal payroll was completed on 10 May 1992, the SAD system was reconstituted for designated units.
The SAD system was a major burden to the State Personnel Office because each office clerk was required to individually handle each payroll. Each of the payrolls included handling each OTAG Form 14 verifying the address, typing an address label, placing the label onto a State of California envelope, placing the SAD check into the envelope, and mailing the envelope to each home of record.
LESSON(S): Revamp the antiquated state payroll system. For events that cause the governor to activate units for state missions, the state payroll system should be integrated with the Joint Service Software payroll system at the U.S. Property and Finance Office USPFO). The state system should initiate a procedure to utilize a unit payroll listing and accomplish the payment of payroll with a Class A Agent.
TOPIC: Health Care for Federalized National Guard.
DISCUSSION: Poor communication to health-care providers regarding entitlements to defederalized soldiers caused some individuals and family members to be denied authorized entitlements. Although all soldiers were informed of their entitlements after defederalization, the information was not disseminated to the health-care providers. As a result, some soldiers and their families were not provided care when they attempted to receive treatment at some military hospitals and dental clinics.
Data on ARNG family members must be entered in the Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS) for eligibility to be established. Eligibility requires current data be maintained for immediate input into DEERS through an annual POM process, records update, or other means. The ARNG manually inputs data into DEERS.
LESSON(S): A DA policy of communication to military and commercial facilities as to the entitlements of defederalizing RC soldiers should be required to assure the proper treatment of activated RC soldiers and their families.
TOPIC: Medical Screening during Demobilization.
DISCUSSION: Effective medical screening procedures were developed to defederalize the California National Guard. U.S. Code 3502 requires that federalized National Guard soldiers must be medically screened before release from active duty. Because of the relatively brief period of federalization during Operation GARDEN PLOT, The Army Surgeon General authorized the use of a health status interview to streamline the screening process. Under the control of the JTF Surgeon, medical screening for defederalization was conducted in three phases. Phase I was an initial screening by qualified medics. If the patient reported no problems, he was immediately cleared for defederalization. Soldiers reporting medical problems would undergo a Phase II screening by a physician assistant or an Army nurse. In Phase III, those soldiers requiring immediate hospitalization were treated. Units from the 40th Infantry Division, 143rd Evacuation Hospital, and Long Beach Naval Hospital conducted the screenings. The Sixth U.S. Army's Surgeon Office supplied an advisory group to assist in the defederalization process. Over 11,000 National Guard personnel successfully completed the medical screening for defederalization. The requirement to medically screen National Guardsmen taxed the JTF's medical assets. As a result, the medical coverage for ongoing missions could have been jeopardized, had it not been for the medical screening procedures established by the JTF Surgeon.
LESSON(S): The CONUSA, in conjunction with the state Adjutant General, should assume responsibility for the medical screening process required for defederalization. The JTF's medical assets should be used solely to support the operational mission. The screening procedures used during Operation GARDEN PLOT should be used in the future.
TOPIC: Defederalization from the Legal Standpoint.
DISCUSSION: Rapid defederalization with less than a 48-hour notice, resulted in limited legal support for CAARNG troops at the out-processing station. Counseling on legal matters, such as the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act, the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Law, and personal property and disability claims, was limited. Prepared handouts for the troops (e.g., Sixth U.S. Army DESERT STORM Demobilization Handbook, DA PAM 600-2), were not distributed at home station to provide a quick legal briefing for soldiers.
LESSON(S): FORSCOM and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) should develop an emergency response deployment and demobilization handbook to provide soldiers with information on pay, medical, legal matters, and other benefits and entitlements for short deployments.
Standing Up JTF-LA
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