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Appendix: Compilation of Findings and Recommendations

Strengthening DoD Policies And Training To Prevent Radicalization Of Servicemembers To Violent Islamist Extremism

Finding:

DoD policies provided Hasan's superiors with sufficient authority to discipline or discharge him based on his conduct as witnessed by fellow servicemembers and his superiors. However, DoD lacked an institutional culture, through policies and training, sufficient to inform commanders and servicemembers on how to identify radicalization to violent Islamist extremism and to distinguish this ideology from the peaceful practice of Islam.

DoD avoided referencing violent Islamist extremism explicitly in the West/Clark inquiry into the Fort Hood attack or in the recommendations issued by DoD in response to the review. It will be more difficult for the military to develop effective approaches to countering violent Islamist extremism if the identity and nature of the enemy cannot be labeled accurately.

Recommendation:

DoD leadership should identify the enemy as violent Islamist extremism explicitly and directly in order to enable DoD to confront it effectively and efficiently. DoD should reform religious discrimination and other equal opportunity policies to distinguish violent Islamist extremism from legitimate, protected religious observance of Islam so that commanders will not be reluctant to deal with displays of violent Islamist extremism among servicemembers and in order to protect the thousands of Muslim- American servicemembers from unwarranted suspicion. Servicemembers should receive specific training concerning the ideology and behaviors associated with violent Islamist extremism — and how they differ from the peaceful practice of Islam. Finally, DoD should ensure that personnel evaluations are accurate with respect to any evidence of violent Islamist extremist behavior.

Strengthening The FBI To Prevent Domestic Terrorist Attacks

Finding:

There was a fundamental disjunction between the San Diego JTTF and the Washington JTTF concerning who was responsible for investigating [REDACTED] communications between Hasan and the Suspected Terrorist. That disjunction contributed to the Washington JTTF's failure to conduct an intensive investigation of Hasan, including interviews of his superiors and colleagues, based on all available information regarding Hasan's communications with the Suspected Terrorist. Neither the FBI's headquarters-based Counterterrorism Division nor the National JTTF was notified of or resolved the conflict between the field offices and thus were unable to take steps to resolve it. As a result, the FBI's inquiry into Hasan was terminated prematurely, The FBI lacks documents that articulate the division of labor and hierarchy of command-and-control authorities among the Counterterrorism Division, the National JTTF, the FBI's headquarters- based intelligence analysis unit called the Directorate of Intelligence, the field offices, and the JTTFs. The leadership of the Counterterrorism Division has also experienced significant turnover since 9/11. Thus, despite the FBI's progress in strengthening its headquarters and bringing field offices under a strategic framework, the Hasan case leads us to be concerned that the FBI remains divided among strong field offices and between the field offices and its headquarters.

Recommendation:

The FBI should ensure the appropriate balance between field office autonomy and headquarters central control in order to become the intelligence-driven organization it wants to be. Headquarters elements such as the Counterterrorism Division and the National JTTF should actively identify and resolve investigative disagreements and ensure that they conduct sufficient oversight of how field offices are aligning their activities with strategic priorities for intelligence collection and analysis. The FBI should articulate in writing the command-and-control hierarchy among its headquarters and field entities in order to ensure clear responsibility, authority, and accountability for national security activities.

Finding:

Despite the FBI's improvements in its analytic capability, intelligence analysts were not integrated sufficiently into the inquiry into Hasan. Such integration might have enabled the JTTF to: (I) gain a broader perspective on the significance of Hasan's communications with the Suspected Terrorist, [REDACTED], (2) orient the inquiry into Hasan to whether he was radicalizing rather than just whether he was engaged in overt terrorist activity, (3) analyze Hasan's communications more critically as to whether they were truly research, and (4) suggest what information to seek in order to determine whether Hasan was radicalizing to violent Islamist extremism or otherwise constituted a national security threat.

Recommendation:

We are concerned that analysts may not be sufficiently integrated into operations and may lack sufficient stature within the FBI vis-a-vis agents as necessary for an intelligence-driven organization. As the Hasan case shows, the FBI should ensure that analysts are integrated into operations and play a major role in driving operational decisionmaking. At a basic level, the FBI should ensure that — unlike in the Hasan case — agents consult with analysts routinely, and the FBI should ensure that agents who integrate analysts into their operational activities are rewarded and agents who do not are held accountable. For example, the FBI should accelerate its use of combined agent/analyst threat fusion centers. More generally, the FBI should ensure the dismantling of barriers to intelligence analysts assuming a prominent role in the organization and that analysts have sufficient leadership opportunities at all levels, including to supervise agents as appropriate. Finally, the FBI should ensure that analysts receive the technological and other support necessary to produce sophisticated analysis.

Finding:

The FBI did not update its tradecraft for purposes of its investigation of the Suspected Terrorist. The FBI could not easily link Hasan's initial communications with the Suspected Terrorist to his later communications, and the failure to do so was a factor in the government not intervening against Hasan before the attack, and the FBI should have identified and remedied its inability to link his communications together prior to the attack.

Recommendation:

The FBI should ensure that its internal processes are effective in identifying tradecraft that is outmoded as compared to evolving threats.

Finding:

The FBI's inquiry into Hasan was focused on whether Hasan was engaged

in overt terrorist activities. The inquiry did not pursue whether Hasan might be radicalizing to violent Islamist extremism, what information his radicalization and relationship with the Suspected Terrorist could contribute to the larger understanding of radicalization, and whether Hasan

might become a counterterrorism or counterintelligence threat in the future.

Recommendations:

The FBI should ensure that agents understand practically how being intelligence-driven should affect their investigative objectives and operational activities.

Finding:

JTTF personnel never cited any legal restrictions as the reason that Hasan's communications were not shared with DoD counterintelligence officials. Our investigation surfaced a policy dispute concerning whether detailees to JTTFs were representatives of their departments and thus served a major information-sharing function. As revealed in the Hasan case and reinforced by other evidence, detailees to JTTFs have often lacked adequate access to databases and training but paradoxically are relied upon to lead JTTF investigations. As a result, we are concerned that JTTFs may not be fulfilling their intended role as interagency information-sharing and operational coordination mechanisms.

Recommendation:

The FBI should ensure that JTTFs fulfill the broader role of being mechanisms for interagency information-sharing and operational coordination rather than being mere FBI investigative entities and sources of personnel augmentation. Detailees need training and access to databases so that they can be full-fledged members of the JTTFs. The FBI and departments sending detailees should agree upon and train them regarding the purpose of their detail. The FBI also should clarify the requirement that FBI supervisors approve the sharing of information by a detailee with his home agency by setting forth criteria for such approval, creating an appeals process, and evaluating the process periodically. Finally, the FBI should ensure that it facilitates other entities in playing critical investigative roles in countering terrorism and other national security threats, including by sharing appropriate information and having those entities lead investigations in order to use inherently limited government resources and expertise most efficiently and effectively.

Finding:

The FBI's internal training materials contemporaneous to the Hasan inquiry did not provide sufficient guidance concerning the ideology of violent Islamist extremism and intellectual indicators that evince that an individual is subscribing to that ideology.

Recommendation:

The FBI and other intelligence agencies should ensure that they have sufficient understanding of the ideology of violent Islamist extremism and that ideological indicators or warning signs have been developed for use by agents. Our Committee will review the training materials recently completed by NCTC and the FBI to ensure their adequacy.

A Comprehensive Approach To Countering The Threat Of Homegrown Terrorism

Finding:

The United States is confronted by a growing threat of homegrown terrorism but lacks sufficient capability to identify individuals in our country who are radicalizing to violent Islamist extremism, to deter such radicalization, and to disrupt terrorist plots when they arise.

Recommendation:

We request that the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council in coordination with state and local officials ensure a comprehensive approach to countering the threat of homegrown terrorism.

First, this effort would include leadership by the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Director of National Intelligence to ensure an integrated law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security approach domestically.

Second, we request that the federal government (1) carefully consider what types of counterradicalization activity could be effective, and by whom, across federal, state, and local governments and the private sector and then (2) develop a national approach to this challenge utilizing all relevant federal agencies including those not traditionally part of counterterrorism. That approach should be implemented into specific, coordinated, and measurable programs across the government. A system could then be developed to measure compliance with those plans, and regular reports of the success of those programs could be made to the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council.




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