Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Section 2-Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance
2.2. Ministry of Interior
MoI security forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the National Police (NP) and the Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE). In anticipation of the passage of the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) Reform Law, the MoI continues to prepare to absorb FPS personnel currently spread among other ministries. In January 2008, the Oil Protection Force (OPF) from the Ministry of Oil transferred nearly 32,000 contractors to MoI employment. The Sons of Iraq have transferred more than 17,000 personnel into full time employment within the ISF as of May 31, 2008. The IPS employs virtually all former Sons of Iraq that have integrated into security sector employment. The Coalition is working with the MoI to develop a transfer plan for the remaining U.S.CERP-funded temporary security contracts to the MoI.
Ministry of Interior Transition Issues
Ministry Capacity Development
Coalition advisors continue to report steady, but uneven, improvement in the MoI’s ability to perform key ministerial functions such as force management, personnel management, acquisition, training, logistics and sustainment and the development and implementation of plans and policies. Reducing corruption and improving professionalism continue to require close attention. So far, in 2008, the MoI Directorate of Internal Affairs has opened 2,329 cases against ministerial employees. The MoI has closed 2,523 cases during the first quarter of 2008. Upon adjudication of these cases, the ministry fired 377 employees and disciplined 297. From March 23 to April 17, 2008, Basrah operations resulted in 27 officers and 283 police officers being fired. Internal Affairs also arrested 57 individuals for terrorism and took an additional 76 people into custody. These developments demonstrate progress in the MoI’s willingness and capacity to address corruption and professionalism issues, but significant corruption issues remain a challenge.
Strategic planning continues to improve. The MoI published its first annual strategic plan in March 2008. Directorates internally track progress against stated objectives and regularly report to the Minister. The Director General of Planning has published an annual strategic planning calendar to guide development of the plan for 2009 and subsequent years. The Deputy Minister has instructed MoI directorates to begin their analysis of requirements for inclusion in the plan for the coming year. The MoI expects to complete its draft plan for 2009 by the end of July 2008 in order to shape the budgetary process.
During this period, the MoI made progress in defining a Basis of Issue plan for its three major elements—the IPS, NP, and DBE. This plan will allow the MoI to conduct the necessary fiscal programming and force generation activity for the ministry as a whole. The Baghdad IPS expansion plan is meeting goals for recruitment, hiring and equipping.
The final 2007 budget reconciliation showed improved MoI budget execution. The MoI spent over $2.8 billion of its 2007 budget, an 88% execution rate. In comparison to the 2006 budget, this represents more than a $1.0 billion increase in total expenditures and an 11% increase in expenditure rate. The 2008 budget, which the Council of Representatives (CoR) recently approved, includes separate accounts for the Baghdad Police College, the Higher Institute, the NP, the FPS, the DBE and the Patrol Police. A major improvement over previous budgets, these accounts will allow a more streamlined approval process for the use of funds by spending units and therefore, better rates of budget execution. The MoI 2008 budget request to the GoI was $7.8 billion, of which the Ministry of Finance (MoF) approved $3.8 billion. Even though this represents a 49% reduction of the submitted request, it represents a 21% increase over the 2007 MoI budget, and the MoI hopes to gain additional funding through a 2008 budget supplemental request.
The use of manual systems to report ministry expenditures remains a systemic problem for the MoI. In many cases, the MoI receives monthly reports well over two months late, adversely affecting timely decision making by senior leaders. Through the end of CY 2007, on-time expenditure reporting has averaged only 65%. To improve performance for 2008, the MoI is insisting upon electronic reporting from its spending units and is undertaking administrative measures to reinforce timely reporting. Additionally, the MoI’s nascent strategic planning structure will help sustain positive trends in budget execution. The MoI Finance Directorate, which has expressed interest in developing processes to conduct execution-year budget status reviews, will be a critical element within this new structure. This is a welcome indication of inter-ministerial cooperation. Such senior ministerial level emphasis will reinforce proper and timely budget execution.
The remaining FY 2008 ISFF request of $1.5 billion in the 2008 Global War on Terror Supplemental remains crucial for continued MoI force generation and ministry expansion. The MoI share of this total is $856 million. Funds are critical to the generation of new police and professionalizing the police forces.
E-ministry is an Iraqi-funded system that will link human resource and payroll actions in order to address most personnel accountability issues. E-ministry is in Phase I of a threephased fielding plan, and the MoI human resources (HR) directorate has begun populating the database. In December 2007, the MoI called for a complete stand-down of Eministry implementation until completion of off-site training in Amman, Jordan. Now that this training is complete, the MoI has reinvigorated the implementation process. The MoI designated the HR directorate as the major stakeholder and facilitator of the E-Ministry project. MoI HR is in the final stages of deploying the necessary assets in the form of personnel and equipment. Additionally, they are establishing processes and procedures for data storage with proper security protocols.
The MoI continues to receive large shipments from the 2006 U.S. FMS program. It also began to receive delivery of a large ammunition and weapons contract brokered independently with China. These deliveries demonstrate that the ministry is increasing its capability to execute Iraqi-funded procurement processes and procedures, rather than exclusively relying on ISFF and U.S. funding routes. Other signs of improved acquisition capacity include uniform contracts with Iraqi state factories for uniforms and progress toward the direct purchase of 1,373 new vehicles.
Logistics and Sustainment
The MoI uses a civilian model for logistics and therefore does not have organic logistics units, nor does the ministry track personnel by occupational specialty. Once hired, police receive additional training to assume administrative or logistical duties as required. The development of the National Police Sustainment Brigade is the notable exception. Scheduled for completion by the end of 2008, this brigade will have organic mobility and will be capable of accomplishing a wide range of logistical missions including line haul transportation, deployable maintenance, supply receipt storage and issue for NP divisions, combat health treatment and mobile fuel storage and distribution. Currently, the brigade consists of headquarters, medical, transportation, maintenance and logistics companies, with 865 personnel assigned of its planned end strength of 2,697; this is an increase of 317 since March 5, 2008. The major equipment requirements for this unit are included on a planned FMS case.
Organic MoI maintenance capability cannot yet fully sustain the level of maintenance required to keep vehicle operational readiness rates at or above 85%. In order to develop a pool of trained MoI mechanics, ISFF-funded maintenance programs continue to include mechanic training as part of their schedule. In preparing to take on its share of the 8,500 refurbished HMMWVs bought with ISFF, the MoI realized that it was going to be unable to train all its own mechanics to maintain an expanded vehicle fleet. The MoD and MoI are currently drafting a Memorandum of Agreement that will facilitate MoD support of MoI HMMWV integration with both mobile maintenance teams and train-the-trainer packages. The Iraqi Army Service and Support Institute began training MoI HMMWV mechanics in April 2008.
Training and Development
Sixteen of the 17 MoI training institutions throughout Iraq are under full control of the MoI. The other, Camp Dublin, is in the process of transition to Iraqi control.29 The Iraqi instructor cadre at the Baghdad Police College handles all basic officer and enlisted recruit training and continues to accept an increasing proportion of the specialized and advanced course load. MNSTC-I advisors and International Police Advisors (IPAs) continue to assist by providing advice, overwatch and quality control at all of these training institutions. Overcoming the MoI training backlog continues to present significant challenges. In 2006-2007, deteriorating security conditions necessitated rapid MoI growth, to which the MoI responded by approving a truncated 80- hour training course that provided police officers with the basic skills needed to operate. However, this course falls short of the full training requirement to be an effective police officer. As a result, the MoI wants all police officers trained in this truncated course to complete the full 400-hour course as the security situation and training capacity allows.
The MoI training base is currently capable of training 79,850 enlisted police and 3,462 officers per year, using a total student capacity of 24,810 at any given time. With the MoI Training Base expansion plan through mid- 2009, seat capacity will increase to enable yearly throughput of 117,100 enlisted and 5,472 officers.
The jointly funded MoI training-base expansion plan includes building 12 new training centers and the expansion of eight existing training centers.30These include new officer colleges in Mosul, Irbil and Basrah, new provincial training centers in Muthanna and Maysan Provinces and the expansion of facilities at the Baghdad Police College, Mosul Provincial Training Center and Habbaniyah. All training centers will eventually share a common curriculum to standardize training. In several cases, regional levels of violence have hampered planned expansion efforts. In conjunction with the MoI, the Coalition is exploring temporary training facility options to hasten reduction of the training backlog.
The MoI continues to maximize officer generation by recalling select former Iraqi Army and Police officers into the force. These recalled personnel become officers after completing a three-week Officer Transition Integration Program (OTIP).
The MoI continues to show progress in training Internal Affairs and Inspector General (IG) personnel. In 2007, the MoI trained 344 Internal Affairs and 140 Inspector General personnel across five training courses that address basic internal affairs, interview and interrogations, anti-corruption, first-line supervisor and internal affairs advanced course. The 250 IG recruits currently in IPS training will subsequently receive IG training and graduate in late-May 2008. Internal Affairs completed the training of four Tier 3 level instructors on April 20, 2008, qualifying them to teach basic Internal Affairs classes. These instructors will receive additional training that will qualify them to be able to teach the advanced level classes. Internal Affairs work continues to be a particularly dangerous specialty. In the first quarter of 2008, criminals killed four Internal Affairs officers and wounded another seven.
In support of developing accountability procedures, the Coalition has developed standard accountability procedures for the distribution and issue of all ISFF and FMS equipment to both the MoI and MoD. The procedures apply to all personnel, units, organizations and agencies entrusted with the accountability, physical security or distribution of weapons and equipment.
Embedded Advisory Support
There are 251 Police Transition Teams (PTTs) assigned to the Iraqi Police, covering police commands from local police stations up through the district and provincial level headquarters. There are 27 border transition teams, enough to cover about two-thirds of the DBE units at the battalion level and above. There are 40 NP TTs covering over 80% of the NP units at the battalion level and above. As of April 22, 2008, the MoI-TT has 92 of 120 required advisors—Coalition military, a Department of State (DoS) Foreign Service Officer and contracted personnel—assigned to the various directorates in the ministry. Each transition team includes IPAs hired under a DoD-funded, DoS-managed contract. IPAs provide civilian law enforcement expertise in criminal investigation and police station management. PTTs travel to stations to mentor the Iraqi Police.
Approximately 17% of the required number of transition teams for MoI forces are not yet established. One reason for this gap is a paucity of Military Police units with which PTTs can base. Larger stations, and those in high-threat areas, are the highest priority because there are not enough IPA or military assets to allow for full coverage of all provincial and local headquarters and stations. Almost all senior MoI police commands have transition teams.
Ministry of Interior Forces
Operational Planning and Execution
The recent Basrah operations tested the MoI Operations Directorate operational, planning and execution capabilities. The Operations Directorate realized early that the flow of timely and accurate information to support the deployment of MoI forces would be critical to success. In addition to the Minister himself, the directorate sent three liaison officers to Basrah, along with the Director General of the Operations Directorate. Although reporting was initially intermittent, an improved system slowly emerged. The directorate intends to capture lessons learned and refine procedures. A positive sign of cooperation occurred in March 2008, when the Iraqi Air Force provided emergency re-supply to IPS forces in Mosul with its C-130 fleet.
During this reporting period, the National Command Center (NCC) did not fully integrate with the Prime Minister’s National Operations Center (PM NOC), or with the MoD’s Joint Operations Center (JOC). This lack of integration demonstrated command and control shortcomings and the need to codify the national level security architecture. Working alongside their Iraqi counterparts, the Coalition and NATO are in the process of implementing a series of exercises to develop Iraqi individual and collective capabilities within and between the NCC, PM NOC and JOC.h4>Iraqi Police Service
As of May 1, 2008, the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) consists of 291,497 patrol, station and traffic personnel. The IPS mission remains unchanged: to enforce the rule of law, safeguard the public and provide local security. IPS leaders continue to confront serious and significant challenges—militia and criminal intimidation and influence, wear and tear of equipment, attrition, poor maintenance and theft of equipment. The IPS continues to require equipment support, which underscores the continuing need to build MoI materiel acquisition capacity.
An area of significant development has been the Company Special Weapons and Tactics (CSWAT) unit capabilities. Previously called ISWAT, there are currently 30 such units throughout Iraq’s provinces. They fulfill a para-military role in support of Iraqi police forces. The Coalition has agreed to fund the equipping of 18 of these units, and the MoI is responsible for equipping the remainder. A standardized program of instruction is also under development to ensure uniformity of training across the force.
The National Police (NP) has increased assigned strength to 90% of authorization from 70%. Officer staffing is still significantly short, but it has improved as 239 additional officers have joined the NP in the first four months of 2008, bringing the total to 551 officers since June 2007. Despite this progress, the NP can fill only 42% of its officer requirements. Increasing the percentage of officers in the NP remains a focus area for 2008. The NP is also continuing its efforts to achieve, through both recruiting and assignments, better ethnosectarian balance within the force so that force demographics reflect the Iraqi population.
The Coalition continues to support the MoI’s four-phased NP Transformation Program intended to address the previously high degree of sectarian behavior in the NP. A second battalion completed the seven-week Phase III Italian Carabinieri-led training in mid- February, graduating 422 candidates. A third battalion graduated 420 candidates April 21, 2008, and the fourth battalion began training on May 4, 2008. Iraq’s National Chief of Police noted that the first Carabinieri-trained NP battalion has excelled in its operations throughout Baghdad and performed well in the recent Basrah operations. Future rotations will continue through spring 2009. The MoI bases most NP forces in Baghdad where they support the Baghdad Operations Command. Despite this fact, the NP has conducted more than 15 operational deployments outside of Baghdad, most recently in Basrah. The increased effectiveness and deployability marks the beginning of a transition of the NP from a static, Baghdad-centric force to a rapid response force for the GoI. Phase IV of the NP transformation will see further development of the regionalization of NP units and deployments in more areas outside Baghdad. Over time, the NP will establish permanent bases in select provinces. The Prime Minister has directed formation and basing of a third NP division in Salah ad Din Province. The Al Askarian Brigade is the first of three brigades in this new division, and it is already generated and operating. Force generation for the second and third brigades has yet to begin.
Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry
The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) supports two key missions: Ports of Entry (PoE) policing to ensure the smooth transition of legal goods and persons and interdicting illegal traffic—including smuggling and movement of terrorists and foreign fighters— within and between PoEs. The DBE has five regional commands, each responsible for PoE control, border overwatch and patrolling within its area. The border police force structure consists of 12 brigades and 44 battalions spread across the five DBE regions. Based on the recently passed 2008 Iraqi Budget, the proposed DBE 2008 budget is approximately $407.5 million.
The PoE Directorate is improving its management of the 17 land PoEs, seven airports and five seaports. Of the 17 land PoEs, ten are open, three are partially open, and the Directorate considers four closed.31 Phase II of the PoE Enhancement Plan, which directs improvements at Zurbatiyah, Muntheria, Shalamsha and Al Sheeb, is underway and will be complete in August 2008. These improvements are part of a larger effort to disrupt the cross-border flow of foreign terrorists and facilitators and to provide the Iraqi border forces with an improved capability to enhance border and PoE security. A suicide bomber attacked PoE Rabea’a on March 14, 2008. The blast destroyed the immigration building that housed biometric processing capability. The DBE closed the PoE for approximately two weeks and re-opened after installation of a temporary facility. The construction of a replacement facility is underway.
The new Director General (DG) brought stability to the directorate by implementing his new three-year plan that includes constructing and staffing GoI-funded border forts and annexes to establish a line-of-sight perimeter around Iraq. The envisioned end-state will feature 684 border forts and annexes with a line-of-sight of five to six kilometers, as well as an increase in DBE authorized strength from 38,000 to 46,000 personnel. Units continue to suffer from officer and NCO shortages, inadequate fuel supplies, lack of maintenance capability, poor logistical support, poor maintenance of facilities and equipment shortages. Additionally, on occasion, local recruits have become complicit with smuggling efforts. This was the case in the Basrah area and is one of the issues that led the MoI to appoint a new Basrah region DBE commander. The DBE transition team and the MoI transition team are working with the MoI DBE to overcome these issues.
Facilities Protection Services
The current authorization for the Facilities Protection Services (FPS) is 19,108 personnel. If the GoI consolidates other elements of the FPS that are currently under other ministries under the MoI, the authorization will gradually increase to over 108,000 personnel. The current version of the FPS Reform Law still awaits CoR approval. The FPS has responded to a number of questions from the Council of Ministers. These questions dealt with two sets of relationships: one between the FPS and the ministry that owns the facility, and the other between the FPS and the various air, land and seaports throughout the country. Otherwise, there has been no movement on this legislation. The CoR intends for the FPS Reform Law to provide authority to consolidate all FPS under the MoI, enhancing unity of effort, command and control and common standards.
A joint MoI, FPS and Coalition steering group meets weekly to discuss consolidation actions and issues while working groups address issues in the functional areas of HR, training, finance, logistics, communications and information technology. Coalition forces have assisted the MoI and FPS in developing a training plan to increase training capacity from 320 students per month to over 1,000 students per month (two classes of 500 students per class each month). The first class under this program began on February 10, 2008, and graduated on April 29, 2008. The second class began on April 28, 2008.
A Prime Minister directive transferred the Ministry of Oil Protection Force (OPF) to the MoI in January 2008. Rather than becoming a part of the MoI FPS, the OPF falls under the MoI IP Affairs and Security Forces. This force of nearly 32,000 personnel is responsible for protecting oil infrastructure including oil wells, pipelines and refineries. The Coalition is working with the OPF to ensure that the transition is completed and that the OPF is a professional force contributing to the security of Iraq.
National Information and Investigation Agency
The National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA) is the lead intelligence apparatus of the MoI with the mission to conduct criminal intelligence analysis and investigations and to enable intelligencesupported police operations across Iraq. The organization consists of a National Headquarters, 15 provincial bureaus, six regional bureaus, 56 district offices and 13 PoEs offices. At the end of March 2008, the NIIA had 5,600 of 7,000 authorized personnel on hand.
During February and March 2008, the NIIA made significant strides in their intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination processes in support of targeting, resulting in a 40% and 47% monthly capture rate, respectively. The NIIA has implemented an aggressive training program. All new employees now attend a 30- day Basic Training course. In addition, the NIIA is taking advantage of other training venues including the MoD Taji Military Intelligence Academy, the Baghdad Police College and various Coalition-provided training to include training given by the FBI, NATO and ITT. Overall, NIIA effectiveness remains hampered by the lack of an independent intelligence budget, weak command-and-control systems and a primitive training base. Several key infrastructure projects vital to building capacity remain on track. The installation of the Iraqi Intelligence Network (I2N) throughout the Agency will be complete by the end of 2008. As of March 2008, the construction of the new Headquarters and Baghdad Bureau complex is 37% complete with an estimated completion date of June 30, 2008.
To combat militia infiltration, foreign intelligence penetration and corruption, the NIIA is developing a Personnel Assurance Program that includes personnel vetting programs, polygraph examination capabilities, a security classification system and a physical access control program. The NIIA scheduled polygraph examiner training for four NIIA investigators to begin in June 2008. These ongoing initiatives will translate into operational improvements in NIIA’s intelligence and law enforcement capabilities in 2008.
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