Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Section 2-Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance
2.2 Ministry of Interior
The MoI forces consist of the IPS, the NP, the Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE), and other, smaller forces. Recently the MoI assumed responsibility for the Facilities Protection Service (FPS). This transition will take place in phases and will run into 2008. The MoI has hired a significant number of police beyond those trained by MNSTC-I, mainly as a result of pressure from provincial and local governments that want additional police in their jurisdictions. MoI data indicate that there are about 298,100 police, National Police, Border Enforcement, and Forensics personnel on the payroll and a total of 297,000 authorized positions. Approximately 36,000 ministry staff employees are also on the payroll. Previous attrition rates for MoI forces were estimated at 20%, but closer analysis indicates that current attrition is closer to 17% for the IPS, 15% for the NP, and 6% for Border Enforcement forces.
Ministry Transition Issues
Ministerial Capacity Development
Coalition advisors continue to report marginal improvement in the MoI’s ability to perform key ministry functions such as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, and communications. The MoI continues to have particular difficulty in budget programming and execution, processing and commitment of funds, and executing direct contracts in general. The MoI does not yet have accurate personnel accountability and reporting procedures. MNSTC-I continues to assist the MoI in developing the capability to account for how many of the more than 330,000 employees on the Ministry’s payroll are present for duty on a given day. For example the MoI has trained on and is adding data to E-Ministry, an MoIfunded web-based database system that will significantly enhance quick access to accurate human resources, financial, payroll, and logistic information. The heightened sensitivity of personal information in the environment of severe intimidation and threats to which MoI employees are subject will, however, likely hamper implementation of the system. Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian and militia influence continue to constrain progress in developing MoI forces and gaining more popular support.
The MoI continues to struggle with internal corruption, but the Ministry has made continued efforts this quarter to confront this problem. Key to these efforts is effective investigations when allegations appear to have some credibility. For example, from April 1, 2007, through June 30, 2007, MoI Internal Affairs opened 1,482 new misconduct and corruption-related investigations resulting in dismissal of 110 employees and referral of 20 to the Commission on Public Integrity for further investigation. Eighty-four are pending trial, and internal disciplinary action is pending against 90. Almost 1,500 cases are open and currently under investigation. As of June 30, 2007, 1,026 employees were dismissed since the beginning of the year due to Internal Affairs Directorate efforts. In addition, the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) project identified 535 false applications for the reporting period of April 1, 2007 through June 30, 2007. Of these 535 cases, the most serious convictions identified by individual fingerprint comparisons to criminal court records included 48 murderers, 94 burglars, and two rapists. The MoI Inspector General initiated a program to inspect and assess the conditions of short-term detention facilities using checklists based on international standards. Along with support from Multi-National Forces-Iraq’s Task Force-134, 1st/sup> Division NPTT and the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team’s (CPATT) MoI Transition Team (MoI-TT), MoI inspectors assigned to the Human Rights Directorate conducted five facility inspections. The results of these inspections were formalized and forwarded to the MoI for appropriate action. Deficient areas identified during the visits include overcrowding, lack of adequate medical care, and a lack of legal due process.
Embedded Advisory Support
In order to achieve its goals within the MoI, MNSTC-I has embedded the MoI-TT with deputy ministers and their subordinates throughout the Ministry to assist in building capacity. The MoI-TT is comprised of approximately 50 military and civilian contractor advisors divided into six teams, each assigned to a directorate in the MoI. These advisors work with their Iraqi partners on a daily basis, enabling them to provide monthly assessments of each directorate’s progress and a formal quarterly readiness assessment. The MoI-TT, in conjunction with other Coalition partners, has conducted training both in Iraq and in other countries across a number of areas. MoI procurement staff received training in Jordan to improve procurement practices. The High Institute (based at the Baghdad Police College) has produced a detailed plan to improve facilities, teaching standards, and programs and will likely receive substantial funding in 2008. In addition, foundations have been laid for future legal education programs designed by MoI lawyers, and work is being done to prepare for the enactment of the MoI’s internal disciplinary system by yearend.
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) also fields 238 Police Transition Teams (PTTs) that assist in the development of the IPS at the field level. Ten of these teams advise at the provincial police headquarters level, 63 at the district level, and 165 at the police station level. Each team has approximately 12 to 15 members, two to four of whom are civilian International Police Advisors (IPA) hired as contractors by the Department of State and funded by the Department of Defense’s Iraq Security Forces Fund.15 The remaining personnel are from the military, many of whom are Military Police. IPAs provide civilian law enforcement expertise in technical aspects of criminal investigation and police station management. PTTs travel to stations to mentor the Iraqi police and conduct joint patrols to promote community policing activities. On a nationwide basis, PTTs are assigned between 1 to 10 stations each and can conduct between one to four visits or patrols at stations daily. Current funding levels for the IPA program and availability of military assets do not allow for full coverage of the more than 1,100 provincial and local police headquarters and stations in Iraq. Security concerns at over half of these sites prevent safe transit and visits.
Based on feedback from the PTTs, in December 2006 the MoI-TT coached the MoI to initiate an MoI-led Iraqi Police Reform Program called “Quicklook” to review all aspects of performance and effectiveness of Baghdad police stations. The MoI successfully inspected all but three of the 47 police stations within Baghdad. Building on this program, the MoI initiated its own series of inspections. As a result of the April 2007 Provincial Directors of Police conference, the Minister of Interior directed that senior officers from the Police Affairs Agency conduct inspections throughout all of the Iraqi provinces. The Minister specified that the focus of the provincial inspections would be on personnel and equipment issues.
In the MoI-TT Operations Directorate, the Command and Control focus was further refined. Additional internal procedural documents for the Provincial Joint Coordination Centers have been completed and are being reviewed by senior MoI officials, and exercises are being planned to develop linkages to the Iraqi National Command Center (NCC). Construction of the tips call center adjacent to the NCC is proceeding on schedule.
Logistics and Sustainment
MNSTC-I is focused on assisting the MoI to improve key logistic shortfalls, particularly in equipment maintenance. For example, the MoI is developing policies, plans, and processes for acquisition, distribution, and maintenance of vehicles. The MoI has begun to centrally purchase vehicles and repair parts using self-generated and FMS contracts. Shortfalls of adequate fuel continue to hinder mission performance. All life-support contracts were transferred to the MoI, except for those used by the Baghdad Police College, training centers in Numaniyah, Habbaniyah, and Camp Dublin in Baghdad, which are expected to transition to the MoI by November 1, 2007. Smallscale life-support contracts have been reestablished at the Basrah, Al Kut, and Sulaymaniyah Joint Training Centers to support the NP Replenishment Plan. Efforts to improve equipment accountability at the MoI are continuing. Transition teams in the field receive equipment from Coalitioncontracted warehouses and issue the equipment directly to the IPS, at which point it becomes Government of Iraq property. This transfer is tracked using forms containing signatures and thumbprints. To obtain equipment, subordinate elements submit a standard memorandum requesting the items. Transfers are documented and tracked. After the equipment is issued to the field, MoI-TT mentors the MoI forces in conducting weekly and monthly inventories and the submission of status reports. MoITT continues to work with MNC-I to improve reporting procedures and mechanisms.
The MoI and CPATT are working to replenish all NP units with personnel and key equipment items in support of FAQ. MNSTC-I is supporting the Prime Minister’s initiative to build a multicomponent (Iraqi Army and National Police) division-sized force to protect the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. Generation of additional NP by the end of 2007 is required to replace combat losses and to support the Prime Minister’s Initiative. The NP replenishment goal for 2007 is approximately 14,000. MoI-TT is also assisting the MoI with consolidating the Facilities Protection Services (FPS). Phase III operations of FAQ will require an estimated 12,000 new Iraqi Police Services personnel for Baghdad over the next six months. This initiative is part of the Baghdad Security Plan and is estimated to produce a police officer to civilian ratio of 1:133. This plan brings the ratio of Iraqi police to civilians in Baghdad to that of New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago.
Iraqi Police Service
The IPS constitutes the majority of MoI forces assigned throughout Iraq’s 18 provinces and is comprised of patrol, station, traffic, and forensic specialists. The IPS’s mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide local security. There are 229,300 authorized IPS positions in the MoI. Due to local hiring initiatives, police ranks have swelled in those areas where the population has turned against extremists. This has contributed to previous overhiring at the provincial level, which has resulted in a total police force of 232,000 based on payroll data. There are no reliable data on how many of these are the approximately 135,000 police who have received basic recruit and transition reintegration training from the Coalition. Estimates of the percentage of total trained by the Coalition that are still on the force range from 40% to 70%. Estimated attrition is 17% annually. For Baghdad and the nine key cities, 100% of U.S.-funded authorized vehicles and weapons have been delivered to the police.16 Overall, the IPS has been issued approximately 93% of authorized U.S.-funded critical equipment and is expected to receive 100% by yearend. The MoI has been procuring equipment on its own for the police who have been hired in excess of the agreed Objective Civil Security Force levels.
Due to combat loss, theft, attrition, poor maintenance, and heavy use of equipment that in many cases was issued three or four years ago, a significant portion of the equipment may no longer be serviceable or in MoI inventories. These demands, as well as growth of police authorization levels, will require continual equipment support for personal protection and other equipment items. Militia infiltration of local police remains a significant problem in select areas. Because IPS members tend to be based in their home areas, the extent of militia intimidation among the police in a particular area is often a function of general militia influence in that area. Some security forces also remain prone to intimidation by, or collusion with, criminal gangs.
The National Police (NP) is a bridging force between the local police and the Iraqi Army and, unlike the local police, is under the direct command and control of the MoI. This enables projection of national-level police capabilities across the provinces. The MoI has 24,400 NP on the payroll and 25,700 authorized positions. It is unknown how many of the 26,300 NP and Police Commandos (the NP’s predecessor organization that was founded in 2004) who have received initial training and equipping from MNSTC-I are still in the force. Current attrition is estimated at 15% annually. As of July 2007, the 27 National Police Battalions have an average presentfor- duty strength of 60%. The NP continue to make only minor gains in capability because their high operations tempo diverts them from training on a wide range of skills or from conducting company-level or higher training events, staff development, collective training, or unit regeneration. Moreover, the NP faces budget, logistics, maintenance, and medical care shortfalls that exacerbate officer shortages, militia influence, and disciplinary issues that hinder the overall mission.
Forty National Police Transitional Teams are embedded at the division, brigade, and battalion levels. Until October 2006, the NP were trained and served primarily in a paramilitary role and had received little traditional police training. Sunnis view the mostly Shi’a NP with distrust because of its involvement in extrajudicial abuses. Iraqi and Coalition leaders continue to work with the NP to address these problems and to improve its capabilities and public image. Since October 2006, the National Police Commander has relieved commanders of both divisions, all nine brigades and 17 of 27 battalions, comprising the majority of the NP leadership at these levels. Still, sectarianism remains a significant problem within the NP.
An adequate National Police “life cycle” rotation would significantly contribute to developing a trusted and professional organization. MNSTC-I, in coordination with the MoI, is developing such a program. National Police Cohort Training at Numaniyah NP Academy, commonly known as “re-blueing,” is a four-phased NP transformation program and an opportunity for NP units to conduct limited retraining and regeneration. Phase I is complete while Phase II is ongoing; over a four-week period, policing skills training, tactical training, human rights training and limited collective training is conducted. As of mid- August 2007, seven of nine NP brigades have completed Phase II of “re-blueing” at Numaniyah. Some operational commanders indicate that re-vetted and re-trained brigades are performing better than they had previously performed. The UN-funded, NATO-approved Italian Carabinieri Mobile Training Team is part of Phase III of the program and is preparing to begin training the NP in October 2007. Eight NP battalions per brigade will attend courses focused on criminal investigation, crowd control, weapons handling, dignitary protection, intelligence operations and physical fitness. Phase IV, which has not yet begun, involves deployed training on contingencies such as security for pilgrimages, natural disasters and national emergencies.
National Information and Investigation Agency
The National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA) is the lead intelligence apparatus of the MoI. NIIA intelligence officers assist NP and regular police in performing their criminal investigative duties. NIIA capabilities are currently assessed as minimal in most areas such as investigations, analysis, and surveillance but continue to make modest albeit slow improvement. Since the last report, weapons and body armor issuance has remained at 95% of authorized levels while vehicle issuance has increased to 75% of authorized levels. The current security environment and the infiltration of Shi’a militia groups within the MoI continue to be the main impediment to effective, nonsectarian operations. Furthermore, lack of trust among agencies impedes the exchange of criminal intelligence and collaborative intelligence products.
Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry
The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the Directorate of Ports of Entry (PoE) collectively are responsible for controlling and protecting Iraq's borders. The DBE is organized into five regions, with 12 brigades totaling 44 battalions; MNSTC-I equips 38 of the battalions. 37,700 border enforcement personnel are currently on the payroll and 38,000 positions are authorized by the MoI. The Coalition has trained and equipped about 28,000 border enforcement personnel; it is unknown how many of these are currently on the payroll. These forces staff 420 border and annex forts, of which the U.S. Government has built and equipped 258. The PoE Directorate operates 13 of 17 land PoEs into Iraq. Four land PoEs were closed as part of the increased security measures implemented in February 2007. Currently, 29 Coalition Border Transition Teams (BTTs) support border and port operations. A new State Department contract provides 64 Border Support Advisors (BSAs) as subject matter experts on port and border operations and customs and immigration procedures to coach, mentor and train senior MoI border enforcement and PoE personnel. Each border police headquarters, from the national level to brigade level, will have a minimum of two BSAs assigned. Two BSAs will be assigned to each training academy and two to three at each PoE. These civilian contractors will enhance the operations provided by the BTTs and Department of Homeland Security Border Support Teams, intensifying current efforts to accelerate the DBE’s ability to assume full operational sustainment and stability of Iraq borders and PoEs. To improve capability and establish better border control, the DBE is planning to increase the end strength of border forces.
Facilities Protection Service
The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) was originally established in 2003 by CPA Order 27 to protect infrastructure and facilities controlled by the various government ministries and independent directorates. To assert MoI authority over the FPS, the Iraqi government decided in 2006 that the FPS will be consolidated under the MoI, except for the protective forces within the Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Energy, and Supreme Judicial Council. This effort includes standardization of pay, equipment, training, and logistics of approximately 120,000 FPS personnel. Although the MoI began to take over training and vetting of FPS personnel, the Ministry of Finance has not yet centralized funding with the MoI, and the budgets for non-MoI FPS, including salaries, were not transferred to the MoI. The FPS is not part of the Coalition’s programmed train-and-equip requirements. Metrics such as numbers of personnel or equipping status are not included in the overall data. Currently, the MoI FPS is developing Tables of Organization and Equipment to include the non-MoI FPS forces. The MoI FPS has begun to consolidate some of the other FPS units while awaiting the passage of the new FPS Law. The first consolidation was the Ministry of Health (MoH) FPS located in the Medical City Complex (MCC) on July 7, 2007, when responsibility for security at the MCC was transferred to the MoI FPS. The MCC was initially secured by the Iraqi Army and cleared of MoH FPS personnel suspected of insurgent and militia affiliation. With the approval of the Prime Minister and leadership of the Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) Baghdad Command, the MoI FPS then deployed a 400- person force as a part of Operation Black Crescent to begin protecting the MCC. The first 920 of 1,200 Ministry of Health FPS personnel to be retrained have graduated from the MoI’s Baghdad Police College FPS training facility and have been posted at various hospitals around Baghdad. A second operation in early August 2007 successfully replaced the FPS at the Ministry of Culture with newly raised and trained FPS personnel.
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