USAID/Nigeria/Democracy and Governance
Civil Society Annual Program Statement, 2002-2003
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USAID/NIGERIA DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
AMENDMENDMENT NUMBER 2 The purpose of this amendment is to: A). Provide a list of attending organizations, addresses and points of contact. B). Highlight the events, as well as questions and responses posed at the pre proposal conference held December 12, 2001 in Washington, D.C. - Incorporate changes to Figure 2 “Strategic Objective:
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN GOVERNANCE SUSTAINED ” of the Annual
Program Statement (APS).
A). LIST OF ATTENDING ORGANIZATIONS 1. Johns Hopkins University
2. CEDPA
3. IFES
4. International Human Rights Law Group
5. CLUSA/UCBA
6. Value-Added, LLC
7. ARD, Incorporated
8. Casals & Associates
9. NDI
B. Discussions, questions and responses: The pre proposal conference was held with representatives from USAID
officials and representatives from interested organizations listed above.
The information provided below is intended to be descriptive and provide
insight to the events of the pre proposal conference. It is not intended
to be a verbatim transcript of the discussion, questions or responses;
nor is it intended to represent the exact sequence of events.
Courier address for USAID/Ghana:
Diplomatic pouch address for USAID/Ghana (takes minimum of two weeks for
delivery):
Two copies of the technical proposal are to be mailed to the Technical
Evaluation Committee
Courier address for USAID/Nigeria:
Diplomatic Pouch address for Nigeria (takes minimum two weeks for delivery):
USAID/Nigeria
b. Modification to the Democracy and Governance results framework (Figure 2, Section III): As a result of the end of the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) program, the following changes have been made to the democracy and governance results framework: I.R. 1.3, “Potentially Destabilizing Forces Mitigated” is deleted, along
with its sub-results
New indicators from Mission’s Performance Monitoring Plan (Section
VI):
I.R. 1.3 : “Increased Participation by Civil Society in Public Deliberations, Oversight of Government, and Conflict Management” Percent of CSOs assisted by USAID that report that the overall outcome of their organizations’ advocacy efforts at the national, state or local level has been positive. Percent of USAID-supported conflict management networks and forums that result in proactive management of peace processes. Sub-IR 1.3.1: “Technical and Organizational Capacity of CSOs to Address Priority Transition Issues Expanded” Number of CSOs that report meeting at least 80% of selected technical/organizational capacity improvements. (to be further defined with project implementer). Number of conflict management networks and forums established. Sub-IR 1.3.2: “Women play an increased role in civil society participation and oversight of government.” No specific indicators, but it is expected that the indicators above will be disaggregated by gender (i.e., by groups predominantly made up of women and/or dealing with predominantly women’s issues). Modification of Section III, A. Second sentence of first paragraph should be modified to read: “As a result, USAID/Nigeria’s program was transformed from a relatively small health and women’s democratic decision-making program, to a fast-paced elections program that assisted both elections administration and domestic poll monitoring efforts, and then to a full-fledged development assistance program…” III. Questions and Responses a. Questions received in advance of meeting: 1. It is currently unknown if the local government elections will be held next year. How will this affect the APS? Can proposals be revised once the status of elections is officially announced? Response: The calendar for local government elections will likely remain disputed for some time. Clearly, this may affect the order in which certain activities might be implemented, or the timing of activities. It is suggested that proposals describe the general approaches to be used for the elections (and any other related) element of the program, and briefly describe how emphasis or timing might be changed to respond to different possible scenarios for the elections. An indication of any expected significant effect on budget should also be given. Since the calendar will likely not be known even by the submission deadline, USAID will evaluate all proposals based on how they respond to the elections calendar as it stands at the date of this amendment. It is assumed that the quality of proposed technical approaches will not change substantially if the electoral calendar were to be revised further. After the selection is completed, the successful applicant will have the opportunity to change proposed work plans and other related material in response to changes in the electoral calendar. This is in keeping with the statement in the APS that program approaches will have to remain flexible throughout the program period, to respond to changing circumstances, what other donors are doing, etc. 2. Please clarify the information provided about the allocation of effort and funds for conflict management/peace-building activities. Section IX of the APS indicates that conflict management/peace-building should be 30% of the program effort, which is approximately $1.65 million. This section also notes that $1.4 million in the first year is earmarked for conflict-related activities. Is it correct to assume that during year two, only $250,000 will be spent on these activities? Response: The percentages given in the APS are meant to be indicators of relative order of precedence for the various activities. It is not expected that they will be adhered to exactly noting that priorities are subject to shift over the course of the program. Regarding the $1.4 million earmarked for conflict. This amount is planned to be released in the first year, but may be spent over the two years of the program (it is anticipated that 50% will be spent in the first year). Therefore, more than $250,000 may be spent in the second year of the program on conflict activities, if the second-year spending includes part of the $1.4 million. It is important to note is that the $1.4 million are for sole purpose of conflict-related activities, regardless of the timing. This is a separate source of funding that shall not be exchanged with other funds, even on a short-term basis. It is expected that the first allocation of funds into this cooperative agreement will total approximately $3.9 million: $1.4 million in conflict funds, and $2.5 million in funds that can be used for other purposes. Proposals should not plan expenditures beyond this level from the time of award until September 2002, when it is expected that FY 2002 funds will be available.
Please note that this is a general plan and all information is subject
to change.
3. Please confirm that
the 25% cost-sharing which is encouraged in Section IX Information on Award,
Funding and Cost-Sharing Requirements” is a suggestion and not a requirement.
To what extend will the amount of the cost-sharing offered count in the
allocation of points for the cost proposal?
b. Questions from the pre-bid conference:
1. It is assumed that USAID wants proposals responding to the whole
APS package and not on 1 piece.
2. Is it up to bidder to designate key personnel? Response: Yes, entities identify their key personnel positions. However if during the review process, there are positions that USAID believes to be key that are not identified, this would be a point of negotiation and an area of concern. 3. MSIs were mentioned in the APS. Will you expand on this subject? Response: The U.S. Government in general, USAID and USAID’S Mission to Nigeria are interested in increasing the role of MSIs to one that is more substantive in U.S. Government programs and projects. The specific definition of an MSI was provided in Amendment 1 of the APS. 4. Does the definition of “Minority Institutions” refer to US-based institutions? Response: The classification is based on U.S. laws, regulations and standards. There is no indication that the governments of other countries implement the U.S. statutory and regulatory guidelines for institutional classification. As with the U.S. Small Business Administration’s guidelines being applicable to U.S. firms, similar adherence would apply to U.S. based NGOs. 5. Section V.B.1 refers to the fact that other donors are likely to be active in the area of elections support and highlights the need for flexibility in USAID’s program in order to complement other donors. What has USAID/Nigeria been hearing from other donors about their plans and how might this affect USAID’s program? Response: USAID is not in a position to speak for other donors. What is known at this time is that all donors are shaping their election assistance strategies. USAID will continue to coordinate with Nigeria’s principal donors during its planning process. The Annual Program Statement identifies a number of potential means for supporting civil society work regarding the elections. The proposals will be evaluated as described in the selection criteria for their technical strengths and appropriateness in context with the Nigerian donor situation. Some donor initiatives are being developed, such as a UN Elections Assistance Division program to work with domestic civil society poll monitoring groups. USAID has not made a commitment concerning this project. It is important to note in this regard that the APS describes a civil society assistance strategy that focuses on elections. Therefore, any aspect of support for civil society’s participation in the electoral process should be seen as part of an overall civil society assistance strategy. 6. The section on the background of USAID/Nigeria’s civil society work doesn’t include 1998-99 with regards to election monitoring. NDI worked with USAID on a 1 million dollar project during this time. NDI proposes including this information in amendment. If this APS deals with election monitoring, it should include as relevant background.
Response: The corporate history is not longer in the mission concerning
this project. No one currently in mission was there during the 1998
to 1999 timeframe. This explains the possible oversight. Will
take under consideration & consult.
7. Could the list of attendees & other people that asked questions be attached to amendment to be issued with addresses and telephone numbers? Interested organizations? Response: A list names of organizations in attendance will be attended. The additional information requested for release is possible and will be considered. Notation to all in attendance: All questions & comments will be issued in an amendment. We anticipate latter part of this week, early next week to be available on USAID’s web site. Should there be a discrepancy between the oral communication during the pre proposal conference and the amendment issued, the amendment shall prevail. The Regional Contracting Officer will be out of the office through 11
January 2002. The point of contact during her absence is Mr. Thomas
Yeboah. He may be reached at: tyeboah@usaid.gov.
AMENDMENT NUMBER 1
1) Section X Application Format, D.5. the third line is modified to reflect a change in the application due date as follows: Applications are due on January 28, 2002. 2) Add to Section VIII. Evaluation Criteria, A.2. Technical Approach Does the proposal provide for a substantive technical role for Minority Serving Institutions? Definition of a Minority Serving Institution (MSI) - - those institutions of higher education in the U.S. which either historically or currently have ethnic minority student enrollments of more than twenty-five percent (25%). U.S. Federal agencies by Executive Orders have been mandated to increase opportunities for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs) and Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs) to participate in the and benefit from program and activities in Federal Government Agencies. For additional information on this subject, please refer to the USAID web site or the Minority On-Line Information System (MOLIS) web site (http://www.sciencewise.com/molis)
I. Introduction/OverviewThe purpose of this Annual Program Statement (APS) is to solicit proposals for a cooperative agreement with USAID/Nigeria to implement a newly-redefined civil society assistance program under the Mission’s Democracy and Governance (DG) Strategic Objective. This APS describes USAID’s current civil society assistance strategy, changes to that strategy, expected results, illustrative activities, and the process and criteria for evaluating applications. Subject to the availability of funds, it is anticipated that $5.5 million will be available for this program over a 24-month period. Under the DG Strategic Objective “Transition to Democratic Civilian Governance Sustained”, the cooperative agreement will implement activities to achieve the Intermediate Result “Increased knowledgeable participation by civil society in public deliberations and oversight of government.”A. Objectives of New Program USAID/Nigeria seeks to achieve two main goals with this Annual Program Statement. First, there is a need for more focus and coordination in USAID’s civil society assistance program. USAID’s current civil society program consists of a combination of programs carried over from the previous strategy that emphasized women’s participation in basic community-level governance, and new programs occasioned by the 1999 political transition which give more attention to civil society involvement in higher-level advocacy and oversight processes. The civil society program is currently implemented by four independent organizations, each with differing institutional priorities and programming strengths. USAID requires an overall coordination mechanism to promote integrated programs and strategies for achieving results, as well as increased focus on strategic priorities. Second, USAID/Nigeria seeks greater emphasis on building the capacity of local organizations under the new program. As the new political environment takes shape, Nigerian civil society needs to improve its ability to participate more effectively in both Nigeria’s governance and international donors’ programs. It is expected that the new program will put more emphasis on these concerns through grant making, institutional development, and more extensive partnerships with Nigerian organizations. B. Current Priority Issues Through a series of consultations with civil society organizations (CSOs), USAID has identified four key transition issues, which will constitute the initial focus of the new program:
C. Definition of Civil Society For the purposes of this document, “civil society” is defined as any non-state, non-government group, network, or organization whose primary purpose is to contribute to the promotion of principles and practices of good governance and to improve the lives of the people they represent. These are multi-faceted and multi-layered groups organized around community, functional and sector concerns; they do not include political parties for the purposes of this document. Civil society groups critical to sustaining Nigeria’s transition to civilian, democratic governance have been identified as human rights groups, conflict management groups, civic and political education groups, anti-corruption groups, constitutional reform groups, organized labor groups, women’s organizations, youth groups, student organizations, business and professional associations, and religious groups, among others. Key roles for civil society in sustaining the transition have been identified as educating the public on civil rights and responsibilities; advocating on transition and reform issues; mobilizing citizens for political, socio-economic and legal reforms; supporting women’s participation in leadership and governance; and managing conflict. Examples of activities civil society organizations may conduct include advocacy campaigns, training, conflict mediation, civic education, election observation, participation in public hearings, development of community-industry-government partnerships for development, or town hall meetings, among others. D. Definition of Capacity Building Capacity building will include developing CSOs’ organizational capacity, as well as their technical skills. Organizational capacity includes areas such as enhancing internal management of CSOs for improved accountability, transparency and sustainability, and technical skills such as project/proposal development, program management and performance evaluation. Technical capacity refers to skills covering the substantive work of CSOs, including areas such as research, policy development, monitoring governance, advocacy and lobbying, establishing and sustaining networks/coalitions, conflict management/peace building skills, and leadership capacity. E. Increased Women’s Participation
F. Expectations USAID/Nigeria’s transition strategy has been extended through December 2003. The results achieved during this transition period will provide a basis for a longer-term (2004-2009) sustainable development program. Given the relatively short transition period, it is critical that the proposed program be results-oriented, build on previous USAID programming where possible, and focus on a limited number of issues key to sustaining the current political transition. It is also important that the program builds linkages with USAID activities in legislative strengthening, political party development, election administration, rule of law, and activities funded under USAID/Nigeria’s other strategic objectives. Finally, since there is great interest in supporting CSOs among many donors in Nigeria, the proposed program must be well coordinated with other international development organizations' activities. II. Assumptions and ParametersAssumptions and parameters that USAID/Nigeria has made for the cooperative agreement to be funded under this APS are as follows:
(1) Performance monitoring plan; and, (2) Providing technical direction to facilitate coordination with other USAID/Nigeria program as well as those of other donors;
III. BackgroundA. USAID/Nigeria Program StrategyIn 1999, Nigeria moved from a military dictatorship that devastated the economic, social, and political capital of the country to a civilian-led government ushered into power through elections that were seriously flawed, but nonetheless were considered to represent the will of the Nigerian people. As a result, USAID/Nigeria’s program was transformed from a relatively small health and women’s democratic decision-making program, to a fast-paced elections program, and then to a full-fledged development assistance program, the goal of which is to “Assist Nigeria’s transition to economic, social and political stability.” To achieve this goal, the Mission supports four strategic objectives and one special objective. (Figure 1) 
Full-text description
B. USAID/Nigeria Democracy and Governance Objective Operating under the strategic objective, “Transition to democratic, civilian government sustained,” USAID/Nigeria’s DG program is structured around four intermediate results: improving the responsiveness and accountability of government institutions; establishing the foundation for a free and fair electoral system; mitigating potentially destabilizing forces; and increasing knowledgeable participation of civil society in public deliberations and oversight of government. USAID/Nigeria’s programs under these results are designed such that the work of its implementing partners is coordinated around priority transition issues. This approach enhances USAID’s support to Nigeria’s transition by linking achievements in increased civil society demand for good governance with those of greater responsiveness of target government institutions. In this way, the civil society program contributes to accomplishing the other intermediate results, building the capacity of Nigeria’s political system to develop policies on key transition issues that enjoy popular legitimacy. (Figure 2) A very important component of USAID’s transitional strategy has been that of assuaging pressures on the nascent democratic structures (through conflict management and peace building), until they are fully able to not only withstand, but also effectively manage threats to the transition. The Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) has so far managed this component of USAID’s work. OTI has now closed operations in Nigeria, and USAID’s civil society program will continue implementing its conflict management activities. The Intermediate Result (IR) 1.3 and its Sub- Results in the results framework in figure 2 may be reviewed, as these areas were the specific responsibility of OTI. 
Full-text description Figure 2
IV. USAID/Nigeria’s Current Civil Society ProgramA. OverviewThe means by which USAID/Nigeria’s program has achieved the result of “Increased knowledgeable participation of civil society in public deliberations and oversight of government” has evolved substantially in response to the changing conditions presented by Nigeria’s democratic transition. Over the last two years, USAID/Nigeria has sought to empower civil society to effectively demand good governance and responsive stewardship from public officials, as well as to enhance popular participation in political processes, policy deliberations and advocacy for reform. Through its four implementing partners, USAID has provided technical and financial assistance to over 60 CSOs widely spread across the country. The program began as a “scattering of seeds” in the period before the political transition and has increasingly attempted to target key transition issues and promote linkages with other democracy and governance activities. B. Program Highlights
1. Increased respect for women’s human rights, increased political participation of women:
Through USAID’s support, effective legislative advocacy coalitions are being formed and sustained.
The achievements above notwithstanding, the scope of USAID/Nigeria’s civil society program has been broad, and the diversity of implementing partners and program focus areas has made effective integration difficult and has dissipated results. In expectation of procuring a new civil society program implementation mechanism, the USAID/Nigeria Democracy and Governance Team undertook a process of consultations with Nigerian civil society organizations, other donors and current implementors to identify program needs and priority focus areas. Also, an assessment was conducted of OTI’s conflict programs in Nigeria to help USAID make a determination as to what aspects of its work need to be continued. The report of that assessment was also reviewed as part of the civil society review consultations. (see annex) The issues addressed by the different forums included a review of civil society’s priorities in helping sustain the new democracy and an analysis of successes, strengths, weaknesses and constraints in work to date. Finally, potential means by which donors could support civil society in achieving priority goals were examined. During these consultations, a remarkable consensus emerged around key issues for sustaining the democratic transition. This action agenda included electoral reform, constitutional and legal reform, civic education and popular participation, poverty alleviation and youth employment, conflict mitigation, transparency and accountability, and gender reform. The transition issues for civil society support under this cooperative agreement were derived from this action agenda. Final selection was based on consideration of the Democracy and Governance team’s objectives, the program’s comparative advantages, and the activities of other donors. In addition, it was agreed that the technical and organizational capacity of Nigerian civil society organizations needed to be strengthened in order for these organizations to effectively advance their agendas. CSOs also recognized that they have a generally poor record of effective coalition building that limits their impact. At the same time, it was made clear that donor efforts do not always promote these goals. Problems identified included small grant amounts leading to limited, stop-and-start programming; lack of support for CSOs’ institutional development; and poor partnerships between international and local organizations, resulting in local CSOs viewing many international groups as competitors rather than sources of assistance. E. APS Direction Implementation of this APS will assist USAID/Nigeria to focus its efforts to achieve the Intermediate Result “Increased knowledgeable participation of civil society in public deliberations and oversight of government”. The following four areas are deemed critical to sustaining Nigeria’s democratic transition and shall constitute the initial focus of the program:
In order to effectively promote sustainable civil society action on the issues above, the program strategy will heavily emphasize the following cross-cutting elements:
V. Expected Results for this Cooperative AgreementThe cooperative agreement will provide grants and technical assistance for programs in the identified areas using the strategies highlighted to achieve the Intermediate Result “Increased knowledgeable participation of civil society in public deliberations and oversight of government.”USAID/Nigeria expects the grantee to build on relevant USAID civil society activities in each area. For each of the following outcomes, guidelines on expected results and illustrative activities are given below to provide technical context to the applicant. However, these are not to be considered exhaustive. USAID/Nigeria expects the applicant to provide a discussion of the technical approach and its own illustrative activities for achieving these results. USAID/Nigeria urges applicants to be forward thinking and innovative. USAID/Nigeria expects significant portions of the program to be implemented
through grants to Nigerian civil society organizations. Such grants
may be made to national, regional, and/or local organizations in Nigeria.
They may support partnerships between Nigerian and international groups
for joint implementation to achieve the expected results, or may fund individual
civil society activities designed to produce these results. It is
expected that a combination of partnerships and more limited-scope grant
making will be used in addition to capacity building activities.
Applicants may also want to consider how rapid response capabilities might
be built into some or all aspects of the program.
USAID/Nigeria anticipates a great deal of donor support targeted at the 2002 and 2003 elections. For this reason, programming in this area will need to be extremely flexible. Although the proposal should reflect knowledge of what other donors are supporting, USAID will collaborate with the grantee to ensure USAID-funded activities are coordinated with those of other donors. For the purposes of this solicitation, electoral processes include those of political parties and candidates in preparing for and participating in elections, as well as election administration, voter education and other related activities. Civil society activities in this area will seek to contribute to increasing the transparency of electoral processes and increasing knowledgeable participation by civil societies and the public in these processes. This will be done through participation of civil society in public deliberations on the electoral framework, oversight by civil society of all aspects of the electoral process, as well as civic/voter education and mobilization for participation. Activities in this area may include, but would not be limited to, the following:
Conflict management activities will be designed to increase civil society’s role in preventing, managing and mitigating the impact of conflict in Nigeria. Currently, three types of conflict have been identified as priorities for USAID intervention: election-related conflict, ethnic/religious conflict (particularly in Kano, Kaduna, and Lagos), and conflict in the Niger Delta. Though Nigeria frequently experiences conflict outside of electoral cycles and issues, it is expected that elections will be a significant catalyst for conflict during the period of this cooperative agreement. Priorities for intervention should be determined based on the degree to which a given conflict threatens Nigeria’s transition to civilian, democratic governance, and the feasibility of achieving impact. Considerations for determining the degree to which a conflict threatens Nigeria’s transition would include factors such as the following:
Activities will be designed to produce some or all of the following results: 1) increased participation of civil society in developing transparency and accountability policies, legislation, and regulations; 2) increased effectiveness of civil society oversight of public institutions; 3) increased legal protection of (and advocacy for) citizen's rights; and 4) enhanced media coverage of transparency and accountability issues. Activities might include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
It should also be noted that this element is not intended to lead to
a full-scale media-strengthening program. Any proposed media programming
should be directly and substantively tied to the objective of reducing
corruption and increasing government responsiveness.
Civil society’s participation in the debate on constitutional reform should be promoted. Activities may include:
1. Improved Organizational and Management Capacity of Civil Society Organizations USAID/Nigeria expects the grantee to improve the capacity of at least a subset of the civil society organizations it assists to engage in substantive implementation partnerships in which there is shared responsibility for achieving program results. Activities should enhance, in a sustainable fashion, organizational capacity and grant worthiness, among other items. This may include, but would not be limited to, activities such as the following:
2. Improved Technical Capacity of Civil Society Organizations to Participate in Public Deliberation and Oversight of Government USAID/Nigeria expects the grantee to improve the technical capacity of civil society organizations to participate in public deliberations. This may entail, but would not be limited to, activities such as the following:
Increasing women’s participation may include, but would not be limited to, the following:
VI. Performance Monitoring PlanThe grantee will be required to develop and implement a performance monitoring plan (PMP) that will measure and monitor progress towards achieving program results under USAID’s democracy and governance results framework. The PMP shall be developed in accordance with USAID’s Automated Directives Systems (ADS) on performance monitoring (available at http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads/, with reference to the entire 200 series).VII. Application Process USAID/Nigeria anticipates awarding one cooperative agreement from proposal applications submitted in response to this APS. USAID/Nigeria reserves the right to fund any or none of the applications submitted. Applications will be competitively reviewed. Applicants are requested to submit proposals for a 24-month program with accompanying budget for the period January 1, 2002, to December 31, 2003. (Note: It is expected that the actual dates of budget application will be adjusted to coincide with the award date.) VIII. Evaluation CriteriaShortly after the submission deadline, USAID/Nigeria will competitively review applications received in response to this APS according to the following criteria. The total points for the technical proposal is 90 points and the cost proposal is 10 points, for a combined total of 100 points.A. Technical Proposal (Total: 90 points) 1. Key Personnel (30 points) Do the proposed key personnel have the skills, experience, and expertise to effectively manage the proposed program? Do the proposed personnel have outstanding leadership and facilitation skills to work effectively with Nigerian partners? Have proposed personnel worked effectively on similar programs in Nigeria or other developing countries? 2. Technical Approach (25 points)
3. Management Capability and Organizational Effectiveness (15 points)
4. Nigerian Partnerships and Capacity Building (10 points)
5. Monitoring and Evaluating Results (10 points)
What is the cost-effectiveness of the proposed approach and its ability to effect a wide base of beneficiaries? Are the budget estimates realistic for proposed activities? Has the applicant considered collaboration opportunities which bring additional resources (cash or in-kind) to complement USAID/Nigeria resources? IX. Information on Award, Funding and Cost-Sharing RequirementsA. Award and FundingUSAID/Nigeria anticipates awarding one (1) Cooperative Agreement.
The total amount of funds available for activities awarded under the Annual
Program Statement is anticipated to be $5.5 million over a period of approximately
24 months, subject to availability of funds. For illustrative purposes,
the table below provides a breakdown, as a percentage of the total budget,
of the overall distribution of resources among the four priority areas.
(Note: $1.4 million in the first year is earmarked for conflict-related
activities and must be spent only on conflict activities and related program
support costs.)
X. Application FormatA. General information1. Applicants are encouraged to propose innovative programs designed to reach the desired results. Included in the program design should be an aggressive but realistic schedule of performance milestones as steps toward reaching proposed results. 2. Applications will be evaluated based upon both the level of achievement proposed and the realism of the plan for reaching that level of achievement. Once selected, the grantee’s performance will be evaluated against the standards proposed by the grantee and accepted by USAID/Nigeria. 3. The applicants should present their proposals in two parts: 1) an original and two (2) copies of the technical application (Program Description) which describes the technical approach and specific interventions/activities proposed to achieve the expected outcomes as outlined in Section V of this request; and 2) one (1) original and two copies of the cost proposal (Financial Plan/Business Management Application). 4. The length of the Technical Application shall not exceed 40 single-spaced typed pages (excluding annexes and executive summary). Past performance references, performance monitoring plan, organizational capability and personnel resumes are excluded from the 40-page limit. 5. Unnecessarily elaborate brochures or other presentations beyond those sufficient to present a complete and effective application are not desired and may be construed as an indication of the prospective recipient’s lack of cost consciousness. Elaborate artwork, expensive paper and bindings and expensive visual and other presentation aids are neither necessary nor desired. B. Technical Application The technical application is an extremely important item considered in determining the successful application and in issuing an award. The technical application must be specific, complete and presented in a concise manner. The technical application should contain all of the elements as they pertain to the proposed program, respecting the 40-page limit referenced above. 1. Proposed Approach and General Strategy: The application must include a clear description of the conceptual approach and general strategy (i.e. methodology and techniques) being proposed for the program implementation. This should include clearly-stated rationales for strategic choices. 2. Results, Achievement Indicators, Timeline: The determination of successful performance will be based upon the achievement of the proposed results and not merely the generation of activities. This process is expected to be dynamic and performance will be monitored on an on-going basis. The application will be evaluated based upon the level of achievement proposed and the realism of the plan for reaching that level of achievement. Recipient performance will be evaluated against the standards proposed by the applicant and accepted by USAID/Nigeria; therefore, well-documented realism in the statement of program objectives is essential. 3. Implementation Plan: The application must provide an illustrative work plan for achieving program objectives. The applicant is encouraged to propose innovative implementation mechanisms to reach desired results and an aggressive but realistic schedule of performance milestones as steps towards reaching those results. The implementation plan should be linked with the results timeline mentioned above. 4. Performance Monitoring Plan: In the proposal, the applicant should articulate the results for which it will be held accountable in each of the priority areas under the Intermediate Result 1.4 as per the Strategic Objective 1 (SO1). The intermediate result indicators and targets will be defined during the development of the performance monitoring plan in collaboration with USAID and key development partners. In the proposal, the grantee should clearly articulate expected results and identify illustrative indicators. To the extent possible, the proposal should give some indication of the scope and/or magnitude of change in the indicators on an annual basis. This target setting should reflect the proposed budget allocated to specific activities leading to the results identified. 5. Organizational Capability: The application must provide evidence of the organization’s technical resources, expertise and capabilities for addressing problems and issues related to expected outcomes for the civil society program. The application should clearly identify the lead organization and indicate pertinent experience and representative accomplishments in developing and implementing similar programs. Care should be taken to establish the relevance of past experience to this program and the basis for reliance upon that experience as an indicator of success for the proposed program. At a minimum, the following should be addressed: (a) Brief description of organizational history/expertise;
Should a consortium make the application, it must provide a description of the proposed management structure for the consortium. The description must detail which organization would be responsible for coordinating the consortium and ultimately responsible for program results, what roles each organization would play, and which organizations would be working toward which results. 6. Personnel: The application must specify the composition and organizational structure of the program team (including home office support) and describe the role of each proposed staff member and the amount of time the staff member will be devoted to the program. The application must also indicate the names and positions and provide full resumes of key managerial and technical personnel to be assigned to the proposed program. 7. Mobilization Plan: The application must provide specific information related to the speed with which full start-up can be achieved in each of the priority areas. 8. Cost-Share Contribution: It is USAID policy that the principle of cost sharing in an important element of the USAID-recipient relationship. Further, it demonstrates the organization’s commitment to the program. In order to enhance the success of this program, the applicant is highly encouraged to propose cost sharing at a 25% level. Cost-share includes contributions, both cash and in-kind, which are necessary and reasonable to achieve program objectives and which are verifiable from the recipient’s records. The technical application should indicate the level of cost-share in terms of percentage of program amount and the breakdown and explanation of type of cost share anticipated (e.g. volunteer services, in-kind, cash, un-recovered indirect costs). The application should indicate other donor funding available to complement this cooperative agreement. 9. Past Performance References: Applicants shall provide a list of all U.S. Government- and/or privately-funded contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, etc. awarded to your organization within the last three fiscal years involving programs similar to the program being proposed in your application. The following information should be included for each award listed: (a) Name of awarding organization/agency;
10. Sub-agreements and Partnerships: Applicants shall indicate the extent to which they intend to utilize sub-awardee(s), the method of identifying and selecting the sub-awardee(s) and the tasks/functions the sub-awardee(s) will perform. If an existing relationship exists with the proposed sub-awardee(s), the applicant shall describe the nature of the relationship. The application must specify the technical resources, capabilities and expertise of proposed sub-awardee(s). C. Financial Plan/Business Management Application The financial plan/business management application shall be in a separate package from the technical application and has no page limitation. The financial plan/business management application should contain all of the elements specified below, as they pertain to the proposed program: 1. Application Standard Forms: Complete and submit the following
required forms (mark "N/A" for sections on the forms that are not applicable):
The forms may be downloaded from USAID's web site:
2. Financial Plan (budget): The financial plan should be fully supported by adequate cost data to establish the reasonableness of proposed program costs. At a minimum, the financial plan shall contain the following: (a) a summary budget page with total costs by each cost category; (b) annual budgets defined by major program activities; and (c) detailed budget notes and supporting justification of all proposed budget line items. The total estimated amount for each major program activity must be supported by detailed cost line items, such as personnel salaries and wages, fringe benefits, consultants, allowances, travel and transportation, per diem, training, equipment, sub-contracts/sub-agreements, other direct costs and indirect costs. In addition, the following should be taken into consideration when developing
the financial plan:
3. Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA): Provide a copy of the most recent indirect cost rate agreement negotiated with your organization's cognizant U.S. Government agency. D. Other Relevant Information 1. Pre-Proposal Conference: USAID/Nigeria will hold a pre-proposal conference to provide additional information and address technical and contractual questions relating to this solicitation. The pre-proposal conference will be held on December 12, 2001 from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. at the following venue: 1325 G Street, N.W.(Nile Conference Room)
Contact person for meeting venue information only:
2. Questions to be addressed at the pre-proposal conference shall be submitted in writing to the Contracting Officer (not the venue information contact person above) not later than the close of business, November 28, 2001. Submit questions to: Courier: Mail: USAID/Ghana USAID/Ghana
Telephone number: 233-21-228-440
Receipt of questions via facsimile or courier is preferred but not mandatory. 2. Certificates, Assurances and Other Information: If the application
is approved technically for award, the following certifications, assurances
and other information, as appropriate, will be sent to the applicant organization
for completion and signature by an authorized official of the organization:
3. Administration of Resultant Award(s): Awards to U.S. organizations will be administered in accordance with 22 CFR 226, OMB Circulars and USAID Standard Provisions for U.S. Non-governmental Recipients. Awards to non-U.S. organizations will be administered in accordance with the USAID Standard Provisions for Non-U.S. Non-governmental Recipients. 4. APS Outcome: USAID/Nigeria reserves the right to fund any or none of the applications submitted in response to this Annual Program Statement and will not pay for costs incurred in the preparation and submission of an application. 5. Point of Contact: All questions related to this Annual Program Statement should be made in writing and addressed to: Rachel Ballen, Regional Contracting Officer, FAX: 233-21-231937 or e-mail rballen@USAID.gov Applications are due on January 18, 2002. Applications shall be submitted to the following addresses: The original technical proposal (no copies necessary) and the original cost proposal (plus two copies) are to be submitted to the Regional Contracting Officer at the following address: Courier: Mail:
Two copies and of the technical proposal are to be mailed to the Technical Evaluation Committee at the following address: Courier: Mail: USAID/Nigeria USAID/Nigeria
Please Note: Due to the recent security issues occurring in the
U.S. and its embassies, security for the receipt of mail via the "pouch
system" is currently very slow. Please consider that under normal
circumstances, mail receipt time is approximately two weeks; therefore,
"pouch" mail is not recommended. Also, if an entity determines that
submission via courier services will be used, it is imperative that the
RCO (or CTO/ATO) be advised when a package will arrive, the courier's tracking
number provided and the courier identified prior to delivery.
List of Annexes/web sites 1. Future Directions for USAID Support to Conflict Mitigation in Nigeria {A Conflict Assessment Report Prepared by Associates in Rural Development (ARD)} [Attached] 2. OTI Nigeria Field Reports <http:www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/country/nigeria> 3. “Supporting A New Path To Democracy, Prosperity and Leadership” (USAID/Nigeria
Country Program Strategy) <http:www.usaid.gov/country/nigeria>
ATTACHMENT
Future Directions for USAID Support to Conflict Mitigation in Nigeria
July 12, 2001 By Wendy Marshall, USAID/Global/DG Center, Democracy Specialist
Submitted to: USAID/Nigeria and USAID/OTI/Nigeria
Submitted by: ARD, Inc.
Task Order No.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS iii GLOSSARY v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii
I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT IN NIGERIA 4
III. POLICY ENVIRONMENT 9
IV. GENERAL APPROACH TO CONFLICT MITIGATION 13
V. FINDINGS/LESSONS LEARNED 15
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 28
VII. PLAN OF ACTION 36
APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE A-1 APPENDIX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY B-1 APPENDIX C: PERSONS INTERVIEWED C-1 APPENDIX D: METHODOLOGY D-1 APPENDIX E: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON KEY AREAS E-1
IV. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
V. GLOSSARY Afenifere: Yoruba ethnic leaders who play a powerful role in slating political candidates for the Alliance for Democracy (AD) party. Area Boys: Social miscreants often available for rioting. Bakassi Boys: Vigilante youth group active in Nigeria’s Southeastern geopolitical zone. Conflict: Conditions and dynamics in which two or more parties are in a situation in which the goals of one or both parties are incompatible because existing structures, processes, or relationships result in the basic human needs (both material and nonmaterial) of one or both parties not being met. Since basic human needs are considered to be nonnegotiable, the resolution of conflicts generally requires approaches that go beyond mere bargaining or negotiations, to include changes in those structures, processes, and relationships. Conflict Mitigation: Intervention in cases in which violent conflict has occurred and amelioration of the immediate results of violent conflict. Conflict Management: Solving problems or settling disputes and/or establishing mechanisms to solve problems or settle disputes. Conflict Resolution: Addressing the underlying sources of conflicts, rather than the immediate surface issues, so that conflicts do not persist or recur. Conflict Transformation: Approaching the resolution of conflicts as opportunities to change the relationships between the parties, as well as to change the parties themselves, in positive ways. Some authors use the term to denote not only changes in relationships and individuals, but also changes in the social, political, or economic structures in which conflicts are embedded. Conflict Prevention: Efforts to prevent violent conflicts by addressing their underlying structural and relational sources, as well as by establishing mechanisms to address conflicts in constructive ways. Dagaci: Head of an urban district within the Kano indigenous Hausa–Fulani system of governance. Dispute: Conditions and dynamics in which two or more parties are in a situation in which the interest-based goals of one or both parties are incompatible. Since interests are considered negotiable, disputes can be resolved through bargaining and negotiation that lead to compromise (in which each party wins something and loses something) or through problem-solving approaches that lead to collaboration (or win–win solutions). Hausa–Fulani: Major Nigerian ethnic complex combining two ethnic groups, the sedentary Hausa and the transhumant, pastoral Fulani (Fulbe). Although large numbers of Fulani remain pastoralists in northern areas of Nigeria, many have settled there as farmers or city dwellers. Fulani descended from Uthman Dan Fodio, the Fulani Muslim conqueror who organized the early nineteenth century jihad to replace lax Muslim or pagan Hausa leaders with practicing Muslims, remain important in indigenous governance structures in much of Nigeria’s northern region. Hisba: Muslim volunteers who organize patrols to enforce application of shari’a provisions. Igbo: Major Nigerian ethnic group based in the Southeast region. Jihad: Islamic religious war destined to extend the Muslim faith to conquered areas. Magajin Gari: In the Katsina Emirate, title of the individual (emir’s eldest son) who currently administers the city of Katsina. Naira: Nigerian currency unit. Rate as of May 2001, $1 US = 120 Naira. Peacekeeping: Third-party military intervention to stop violence but not to go beyond the cessation of violence and enforcement of peace. The most common types of actors in such situations are multinational peacekeeping forces. Peacemaking: Interventions by official governmental actors to draw up formal agreements between parties, such as peace accords. The most common types of actors are high-level international or third-party diplomats. Peacebuilding: The broad range of interventions that aim to address the psychological, relational, and structural aspects of conflict, including social, political, and economic injustice and underdevelopment. The most common types of actors are representatives of unofficial, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as religious or civil society leaders. Sarki: Hausa term for chief or emir (e.g., Sarkin Kano, Emir of Kano). Shari’a: Muslim legal code that governs both civil relations and criminal
matters. Currently applied in some (northern) Nigerian states.
VI. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Nigeria, like many other countries, confronts a number of internal conflicts. Since independence in 1960 it has survived a civil war. It has also survived a series of military regimes that have exacerbated many conflicts by treating them as illegitimate dissent. Rather than working with people and groups to transform the structures, issues, and relationships that underlie those conflicts, most Nigerian military leaders sought instead to suppress the symptoms, particularly when conflicts turned violent. A. A. Background on Conflict in Nigeria The upshot of the policy of suppression became clear when Nigeria returned again at the very end of the twentieth century to civilian rule and launched its Third Republic. Conflicts that had festered under the preceding military regimes, becoming more venomous and difficult to process with the passage of time, burst into the open shortly after the accession of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to the Nigerian presidency on May 29, 1999. The array of conflicts is bewildering; the intensity of the violence often stunning. In the short space of two years since a democratically elected civilian administration took power, armed confrontations have erupted throughout the country over such issues as: Religion;
Some of these conflicts occur along ethnic lines and therefore have a potential to spread to other areas, whereas other sorts of conflicts are more localized and less threatening to the broader Nigerian political system. Thousands of people have died in violent interactions tied to incompatible visions of religion within the context of a state whose constitution is ambiguous as to whether the state is to be secular, and in battles between ethnic groups over control of markets and other income-generating enterprises such as slaughterhouses. Many of these outbreaks have given rise to the phenomenon designated here as ricochet riots, in which members of the ethnic group considered to have suffered the most casualties in the first round of violent conflict evens the score by attacking members of the other ethnic group elsewhere in the country. Typically those attacked have emigrated and settled in areas where the first-round “losers” are both indigenes and dominant, leaving the settlers critically exposed to attack in the second round. These tit-for-tat assaults heighten tensions as people of both groups find it prudent to plan for third and subsequent rounds. B. B. Incentives to Promote Conflict The principled and the unscrupulous alike can profit from violence. For some religious leaders, martyrdom of some followers strengthens faith and commitment among others. Some politicians identify themselves with programs of religious groups (e.g., by legislating application as state law of the criminal sections of the Islamic shari’a legal code, 95% of which concerns personal and civil conduct rather than criminal behavior). Members of ethnic groups, both leaders and followers, seek advantage by driving out competitors from other ethnic groups from their home areas. This kind of nativist reaction to outsiders, phrased in terms of indigene–settler opposition, reflects popular perceptions that the Nigerian economy is shrinking, and that most people can hope only for meaningless crumbs from the federal cake. C. C. Mitigating and Transforming Conflicts Despite this litany of woes, much can be done to mitigate conflict in Nigeria. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has, since the fall of 1999, enabled many, many Nigerians to demonstrate that they fervently seek peace. OTI, with a two-year mandate to support Nigeria’s transition from military to civilian democratic rule, has progressively focused its efforts on aiding and abetting Nigeria peacemakers at all levels in the society. Nigerians, for their part, have proven repeatedly that they will invest energy and long hours in acquiring the skills and techniques of peacebuilding, and will spend countless days trying to apply those skills through individual interventions and peace and reconciliation committees in efforts to prevent or halt violence. Once the violence has stopped, many peacemakers in Nigeria continue to work with former antagonists to restructure the relationships, structures, and processes that gave rise to violent conflict in the first place. Their efforts have borne fruit in a sufficiently wide variety of places and situations in the country (see Boer, 2000: Appendix B) to suggest that further support for conflict resolution in Nigeria will pay important dividends, not only in reducing violent confrontations, but in gradually transforming conflicts and building relationships of peace and trust that form the indispensable foundation for economic development. D. D. Conflict Intervention: A General Approach OTI has worked to promote the sustainability of the Conflict Resolution Stakeholders’ Network (CRESNET), a professional association of Nigerians dedicated to promoting peace and conflict resolution (CR) in their country. Together, OTI staff and CRESNET members have pursued a general, four-part strategy to intervene in community conflicts: 1. Sensitizing and training of stakeholders in specific conflicts;
In this tested approach, peacemakers first intervene in conflicts to help stakeholders realize that they can pursue alternatives to violence and confrontation. Peacemakers also help stakeholders acquire skills so that antagonistic stakeholders can begin talking seriously with each other about issues that cause conflict because the issues involve divergent or contradictory basic needs of the stakeholders. Through brainstorming sessions, peacemakers then support discussions that lead to agreements among stakeholders on how they can move beyond the current conflict. Finally, mechanisms must be created to monitor whether all parties comply with their agreements and to report findings regularly and in a highly transparent manner. E. E. USAID/Nigeria: Recommended Strategy for Conflict Mitigation Nigeria is a huge country with a population well in excess of 100 million. USAID is working with a two-year programming timeframe (FY2002–2003) for the next phase of support to CR in Nigeria. Three other criteria likewise constrain the choice of CR activities. The first is formulated by reference to the Mission’s Strategic Objective 1: Sustain Transition to Democratic Civilian Governance. Conflict mitigation interventions should focus on conflicts that threaten that transition. Second, conflicts that can damage the national economy sufficiently to undermine the transition should also be targeted. Finally, conflicts that are prone to generate ricochet riots should be targeted. These criteria suggest that the Mission should narrow its CR focus to a small subset of the total number of conflicts currently affecting Nigeria and Nigerians. The choice should be driven by the intensity of the threat to the transition, as well as by the need to select a manageable number of conflicts on which to work. This suggests that Mission support for conflict mitigation activities should incorporate a geographic focus. Many conflicts, although dangerous to the lives and property of immediate stakeholders, are localized and do not particularly threaten the transition to democratic civilian governance. Included here are disputes over land, renewable resources, environmental issues, youth battles over sundry issues, labor–management strife, and police-related violence. The remaining major types of conflict—religious, economic, and political struggles, as well as issues surrounding the allocation of oil wealth among various jurisdictions within the country—all pose, in decreasing order of severity, potential threats to the transition to democratic civilian governance. Recent religious strife over incorporating criminal sections of the shari’a code into state legislation (11 of 19 northern states have now taken this step, although not all have passed implementing rules and regulations) culminated in armed clashes in Kaduna City during February and again during May 2000. These battles left more than 2,000 Muslims and Christians dead. But the political leaders of Kaduna State have taken vigorous action to prevent repetition of these conflicts. They have established a peace and reconciliation committee, they have taken steps to limit the application of shari’a provisions to those areas of Kaduna State where Muslims constitute substantial majorities, and they have begun to work on some of the underlying economic problems that lead many youth from rural areas of the state to migrate to urban centers. Frequently those young people cannot find work and so can be easily mobilized for small amounts of money to participate in confrontations over religious issues. Kaduna State thus offers a significant positive example of conflict mitigation, the support and expansion to which USAID should commit itself. Two other states have a strong potential for violence and for generating ricochet riots: Lagos and Kano. Particularly in the country’s two largest cities, Lagos and Kano, violence formulated along ethnic lines has flared over both religious and economic issues. These pit the largely Muslim Hausa–Fulani indigenes of the north against the southern Yoruba and Igbo. The Yoruba, divided equally between Islam and Christianity, are indigenes of the Southwest, including Lagos State. The Igbo, largely Christian, are indigenes of the Southeast. The potential for ricochet riots is extremely strong because major Hausa–Fulani settler communities exist in Lagos as elsewhere throughout the South, and these are mirrored by large concentrations of Yoruba and Igbo settlers established in the sabon gari (Hausa: new town) sections of most northern cities. Electoral violence has to date been concentrated predominately in the South South and Southwest. Further analysis of historical patterns of such violence and areas where political competition in the upcoming elections is expected to be particularly intense could provide additional clues to predicting priority intervention locations. F. F. Mechanisms for Intervention USAID should engage an implementing partner to work over the next two years on the following three areas: 1. Capacity building
VII. I. INTRODUCTION Nigeria, with a population of 120 million, vast natural resources, and highly developed human resources, could provide the key to a peaceful and prosperous future for at least West Africa and, probably, for much of the rest of the African continent. Corrupt and arbitrary governance in Nigeria can and has imposed serious inconveniences on its neighbors. On the other hand, Nigerian success in consolidating effective systems of democratic governance can inspire and enable success elsewhere. Achievements in democratic civilian governance in Nigeria would demonstrate that Africans can indeed deal with their challenging political and economic problems. Were Nigeria to get its house in order, it could generate enormous economic energy that would create a magnet and a market for the rest of West Africa. If its leadership recaptures its former status, the country can take the region forward on a number of fronts, not least of all peacekeeping. Finally, its successes would generate lessons that, appropriately adapted to changed contexts, could be usefully shared with its neighbors. Indeed, it is not unrealistic to suppose that Nigeria could potentially exert the kind of impact on the rest of Africa that democratic success in the Iberian peninsula had subsequently in Latin America. The fledgling Nigerian Third Republic, however, faces many challenges. Perhaps the most explosive and destructive of these is the ethnic and religious conflict that has torn at Nigeria since the first two coups and ensuing pogroms of 1966. These were followed by electoral disputes that wrenched its first two attempts at democracy, ending both of those efforts before they had had a chance to take root and grow into established systems of civilian governance. Destructive ethnic and religious conflicts have continued throughout the 1990s and into the first decade of the new century, occasioning the loss of thousands of lives and destroying much property of people who already experience grinding poverty. These conflicts must be carefully distinguished from the myriad disputes found in Nigeria as in all human societies. The box at right indicates how these terms are used in this assessment of conflict in Nigeria. The diverse groups of Nigeria generally co-exist peacefully in mixed ethnic neighborhoods throughout the country’s urban areas. Nonetheless, members of different ethnic groups often look with suspicion on one another. They remember the violence of the past, and remain sensitive to slights, insults, and “unfair” advantages. They frequently interpret the actions of members of other groups as efforts to assert (or reassert) domination over them. Each group has its own history of perceived slights, injuries, and disadvantages experienced at the hands of other groups. Each group has militants to mobilize those most ready to engage in intergroup violence, and each group has hurt members of the others. If these cycles of violence cannot be stopped, the next elections will predictably escalate the conflict, as each major group seeks to protect itself from the others by acquiring political power. Smaller groups will inevitably suffer in these conflicts. In this circumstance, Nigeria could easily slip back into another round of authoritarian governance, with all the nasty consequences that military regimes have triggered over much of the last two decades. This could indeed provoke general violence, perhaps state collapse and dismemberment reminiscent of Yugoslavia’s. This outcome must be prevented. Against this backdrop of recent Nigerian history follow several observations. Conflicts per se do not cause concern in Nigeria, but atrophying of the means to manage them does. A society of 120 million people cannot function without generating disputes. Humans—whether as individuals or organized in families, groups, firms, or governments at various levels—often differ in their perspectives on the myriad issues that span the gamut from minor problems of daily life to fundamental questions such as the country’s constitutional structure. From these differences of perspective flow, inevitably, discussions and arguments. Some escalate into disputes. All this is perfectly normal and prosaic in a democracy where people enjoy freedom to express opinions and where entrepreneurs, both public and private, enjoy freedom to pursue opportunities. In these very typical circumstances, disputes typically signal unresolved problems. They also highlight areas of opportunity to restructure institutional arrangements, the distribution of resources, and even values, in ways that consider the interests of all active and passive stakeholders in a problem. Furthermore, systems of governance that can successfully craft, negotiate, or mediate solutions to problems typically grow in power and authority and in their ability to process new rounds of disputes successfully: practice makes perfect. At present, Nigeria cannot successfully manage disputes––a key test of an effective system of governance. Twenty years of military misrule underlie this failure. The soldiers in power for all but four years, from 1975 to 1999, viewed disputes as evidence of defiance and resistance to their will in a command and control system (Osaghae, 1998: 21). That system concentrated power at the apex of a hierarchy, and the ruling soldiers did not view disputes as opportunities to craft more productive solutions to collective problems. With the advent of Nigeria’s Third Republic on May 29, 1999, elementary democratic freedoms once again replaced military repression. But that shift of power from military to civilian leaders did not automatically revive dispute resolution capacities in the country. Indeed, in the relaxation of controls a broad range of disputes surfaced that military leaders had, for the previous 15 years, actively repressed. These disputes threatened, in many areas of the country, to overwhelm dispute resolution capabilities. Often, disputes not only threatened to, but did in fact, exceed resolution capacities, erupting in lethal conflicts with extensive loss of life and property. These events have shaken public confidence in the capacity of Nigeria’s new democratic system of governance to ensure the minimum conditions of security necessary for a peaceful existence and for development. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) stepped into this breach in September 1999. Among other activities OTI took on, its support for Nigerians already engaged in the struggle to improve conflict resolution (CR) capacities throughout the country has emerged as a key investment for Nigeria. OTI/Nigeria spent the bulk of its FY2000 grants budget on conflict management ($1,803,812 distributed in 52 separate grants to 43 grantees; OTI/Nigeria, 2000: 1, Table 1). OTI is now rapidly approaching the end of its two-year mandate, and will have withdrawn from Nigeria by the end of FY2001. Few doubt the need for USAID/Nigeria to continue to support the work begun by OTI/Nigeria. Support for conflict management and for creation of a network of Nigeria conflict management specialists has clearly produced tangible and important results in peace keeping (OTI/Nigeria, 2000: 4–12; Boer, 2000: Annexes 2 |