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SAND2000-0184 Unlimited Release Printed January 2000
Conceptual Monitoring Options for a Southern Lebanon Withdrawal Agreement
Charles W. Spain International Assessments Program Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA
94551 Lawrence C. Trost Arms Control Studies Department Michael G. Vannoni Advanced Concepts Department Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque, NM
87185-1371 Abstract Southern Lebanon is a key factor in a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. Israel has had a presence in southern Lebanon since 1976 and occupied a self-described “security zone” there in 1985. The purpose of this study is to outline options for
cooperation in southern Lebanon that address the security goals of the players
and may help facilitate a withdrawal agreement. Three scenarios were developed
to address the security goals of the participants, each requiring increasing
levels of cooperation. These
scenarios and options for cooperative monitoring are described in this report.
Acronyms GPS Global Positioning System IDF Israeli Defense Forces ILMG Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps JMG Joint Monitoring Group LAF Lebanese Armed Forces MoD Ministry of Defense OP Observation Post PLO Palestine Liberation Organization SLA South Lebanon Army UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UGS Unattended Ground Sensors UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
Contents Executive Summary................................................................................................................................................................
7
Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................
9
Background............................................................................................................................................................................
10
The Historical Context of the Israeli Presence
in Southern Lebanon.......................................................
10
Key Players and Their Goals.......................................................................................................................................
15
Israel: Secure Its Border...................................................................................................................................................
15
The South Lebanon Army:
Just Fade Away..............................................................................................................
16
Lebanon: Regain Its Sovereignty...................................................................................................................................
16
Syria: Protect Its Flank....................................................................................................................................................
16
Iran: Strengthen the Shia................................................................................................................................................
18
Hizballah: Liberate Lebanon..........................................................................................................................................
19
Current Monitoring Efforts......................................................................................................................................
21
United Nations......................................................................................................................................................................
21
Multilateral........................................................................................................................................................................
23
Recent Israeli Proposals for Withdrawal.....................................................................................................
24
If Withdrawal Comes…...................................................................................................................................................
25
Cooperative Monitoring Options............................................................................................................................
26
Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................................
26
Possible Monitoring Options...........................................................................................................................................
26
A Low Cooperation Regime..............................................................................................................................................
27
Features of the Low Cooperation Regime.......................................................................................................................
28
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Low
Cooperation Regime..............................................................................
30
A Medium Cooperation Regime.......................................................................................................................................
30
Features of the Medium Cooperation Regime................................................................................................................
30
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Medium
Cooperation Regime.......................................................................
31
A High Cooperation Regime..............................................................................................................................................
31
Features of the High Cooperation Regime......................................................................................................................
31
Advantages and Disadvantages of the High
Cooperation Regime............................................................................
32
Comparison of the Three Regimes..................................................................................................................................
33
National Means....................................................................................................................................................................
33
The Role of UN Peacekeepers..........................................................................................................................................
33
Summary and Conclusions...........................................................................................................................................
34
Appendix A: Relevant United Nations
Resolutions......................................................................................
35
Appendix B: Text of April 26, 1996 Cease-fire
Understanding..................................................................
37
Figures
Figure 1. Map of
Lebanon..................................................................................................................................................
11
Figure 2.
Israeli Security Zone in Southern Lebanon.....................................................................................
13
Figure 3.
IDF Casualties in Lebanon, 1990-1998........................................................................................................
15
Figure 4.
UNIFIL, IDF/SLA, and LAF Positions and Zones of Control.........................................................
22
Figure 5.
Representative Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS).....................................................................
28
Figure 6.
Pioneer UAV............................................................................................................................................................
32
Tables Table 1. Functional
Components of the Three Cooperative Monitoring Regimes.......................
33
Southern Lebanon is a key factor in any comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. Israel has maintained a political and military presence in southern Lebanon since 1976 and occupied a self-described “security zone” since 1985. The United Nations Security Council issued Resolution (UNSCR) 425 in March 1978 calling for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon and for United Nations peacekeepers to restore peace and security there. Israel largely ignored UNSCR 425 until April 1998 when the Israeli inner cabinet unanimously acknowledged the resolution. Israeli officials described two options for action: 1) a withdrawal based on bilateral negotiations with Lebanon, and 2) a unilateral withdrawal with the implied right to reenter Lebanon if deteriorating security conditions require it. At the time of writing (spring 1999), it is not clear how the Israelis will proceed. The ultimate resolution of these issues requires major decisions about national security by Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Each of the key players involved in southern Lebanon has specific goals that will affect their security decisions: Israel seeks a secure northern border. Members of Israel’s allied South Lebanon Army seek a way to withdraw without retribution. Lebanon seeks to regain sovereignty in the southern part of the country. Syria wants to protect its western flank and maintain political influence in Lebanon. Iran wants to strengthen its influence with Lebanon’s Shia population. Hizballah seeks to force the Israeli army out of Lebanon. The purpose of this study is to outline options for cooperation in southern Lebanon that address the security goals of the players and may help facilitate an agreement. The study is not prescriptive and assumes that a political arrangement for Israeli withdrawal has been reached. Cooperation may take a number of forms. Israel has an interest in a stable Lebanese government in control of southern Lebanon. In some circumstances, Israeli security could benefit from Lebanese armed forces with capabilities enhanced through equipment upgrades and technical training. Direct Israeli support for these enhancements could provide the basis for cooperative monitoring of southern Lebanon by Israel and Lebanon. Cooperative monitoring is the collection (often by the use of sensors), analyzing, and sharing of information among parties to an agreement. Three cooperative monitoring scenarios were developed to address the security goals of the participants, each requiring increasing levels of cooperation. Some options for cooperative monitoring identified in the three scenarios are LOW COOPERATION · Joint military patrols along border. · Enhanced border-crossing points between Israel and Lebanon. · Means of notification of military activities and border incidents. · Enhanced monitoring ability for Lebanese military. MEDIUM COOPERATION (in addition to or in place of those in LOW) · Border monitoring sensors that report to Israeli and Lebanese military commands. · Procedures for coordinated operations. · Enhanced Lebanese interior checkpoints. · Introduction of a multinational supervisory organization. · A shared border communications network. HIGH COOPERATION (in addition or in place of those in MEDIUM) · A multinational monitoring organization with operational responsibilities. · A monitoring and coordination center, staffed by parties to an agreement. · A real-time reporting network for the monitoring center · Enhanced border monitoring sensors including unmanned aerial vehicles On April 1,
1998, the Israeli inner cabinet*
unanimously accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 425,
which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.
The cabinet’s acceptance came 20 years after the Security Council
adopted UNSCR 425 and renewed domestic and international debate over the Israeli
government’s Lebanon policy. The future status of the Israeli military presence in Lebanon
was an issue in Israel’s May 1999 election.
Prime Minister Ehud Barak has indicated he would like to withdraw Israeli
troops from southern Lebanon although he has not yet described a plan to do so.
At the time of writing (spring 1999), Israel Defense Forces (IDF) remain
engaged in a guerrilla war with various armed factions in southern Lebanon. Any eventual Israeli decision for withdrawal is inextricably
linked to larger regional issues, particularly relations with Syria and the
dormant Middle East Peace Process. In light of
the Israeli acceptance of UNSCR 425, an examination of the potential roles
cooperative monitoring could play in building confidence or implementing an
agreement among the parties in southern Lebanon is timely.
Cooperative monitoring is the collecting (usually through the use of
sensor technology), analyzing, and complete sharing of information among parties
to an agreement. The issues that
surround the Lebanon imbroglio are complex, and an effective cooperative
monitoring regime must account for the myriad interests there.
This paper will describe the history of the conflict, the players and
issues present on the contemporary Lebanon-Israel border and then discuss
potential cooperative monitoring activities within this context.
These measures might help support a future withdrawal agreement and
improve confidence that the respective security interests were being addressed. Israel’s
security dilemma in southern Lebanon began shortly after the Six-Day War of June
1967. In 1968, guerrillas of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began to use southern Lebanon as a base
for occasional attacks on Israeli border towns and military facilities (see
Figure 1 for a map of Lebanon). In
September 1970, the government of the Kingdom of Jordan, alarmed at the PLO’s
rising influence and power in its country, began a military campaign to expel
the PLO from Jordan. In 1971, the
PLO headquarters and its paramilitary organization relocated to Lebanon.
From their new bases in southern Lebanon, the PLO escalated its military
campaign of attacks, cross-border shelling, and infiltration against Israel.
The government of Lebanon steadily lost functional control of the area
the PLO occupied in the South. In
1975, the civil war began in Lebanon and, over time, reduced the government’s
effective control to a small area around Beirut.
The Lebanese military splintered along religious lines and ceased to have
any power in the South. By the late
1970s, Israel-Lebanon border was a battleground with recurrent conflict between
the Israeli army and the PLO. The Historical Context of the Israeli Presence in Southern LebanonIn
the summer of 1976, the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon began with Defense
Minister Shimon Peres’ announcement of the "Good Fence" program.
This allowed local Lebanese to cross into Israel for work, medical
treatment, and travel. In addition, the policy gave Israel access to both Lebanese
collaborators and southern Lebanon in its battle with the Palestinian forces
there. Israel allied itself with
Major Sa’ad Haddad, a Greek Catholic Lebanese army officer who had been sent
south by Beirut in 1976 to help organize the defense against Palestinian and
leftist forces. Haddad later
ignored orders and remained in the South after the collapse of the Lebanese
army. He formed his own militia
army, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), and became Israel’s proxy in its campaign
against the PLO.[i] During the
next six years Israel and the SLA battled the Palestinian forces in southern
Lebanon. Israel launched two major
military offensives. Operation
Litani, begun in March 1978, displaced the PLO along the border, created
200,000 civilian refugees, and caused the United Nations Security Council to
approve Resolution 425 (UNSCR 425) calling for the withdrawal of Israeli and
immediate deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (see Appendix A).
Israel withdrew its forces by June 1978 but turned its positions over to
the SLA, not the United Nation Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[ii]
Infiltration and cross-border attacks by rockets, although reduced in
frequency, continued. In June 1982, Israel launched Operation
Peace for Galilee to rid Lebanon of the PLO. By late 1982, the PLO headquarters and its remaining military
forces evacuated Lebanon and relocated to Tunisia. Israeli forces pulled back from their positions in central
Lebanon and around Beirut but remained in southern Lebanon along with the SLA.
This
extended occupation initiated Israel’s current conflict with the Shia Moslem
Lebanese who have historically lived in southern Lebanon.
Lebanon’s
southern Shia population is the poorest and largest community in the country[iii]
and has been historically underrepresented in the government.
Many Shia have been attracted to groups promising a change in the status
quo.[iv]
The movement of the PLO to southern
Lebanon in 1971 largely displaced the central government.
Over time, the Shia felt they were under foreign occupation.
Consequently, when Israel invaded in 1982, the Shia initially welcomed
the Israelis. In 1983 Shia
attitudes towards Israel began to change when they realized that the Israelis
were not going to withdraw. The
Shia concluded that they had exchanged one foreign occupation for another.
The IDF viewed the shift in Shia support as challenging their authority.
Several violent confrontations occurred between the IDF and the Shia. In
November 1983, a guerilla war began between the Shia militias and the IDF.
The goal of the militias was, and still is, to force a complete Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanon. By 1984, the Shia were launching frequent attacks against the
IDF. In response, Israel withdrew
the bulk of its forces in Lebanon between January and June 1985 but created a
"security zone" averaging 10 km wide along the Israel-Lebanon border
patrolled by an IDF garrison along with the SLA.[v]
The areas controlled by the IDF and SLA are shown in Figure 2.
Shia militias continued their fight against the SLA and IDF in Lebanon
throughout the rest of the 1980s and early 1990s and used the area to launch
attacks on Israel’s northern settlements and as an infiltration route to
conduct terrorist operations inside Israel.
Figure 2. Israeli Security Zone in Southern Lebanon By
the early 1990s the Hizballah militia had become the primary Shia guerrilla
force fighting to oust the Israelis. IDF
casualties sharply increased in 1992 as Hizballah improved both its weapons and
military organization. The Shia
militias received money, training, and arms from Syria (to pressure Israel) and
Iran (to support Islamic revolution). In
response, Tel Aviv launched its third major offensive in southern Lebanon, Operation
Accountability, on 25 July 1993. The
goal was to cripple the military capability of Hizballah and apply pressure on
Syria to disarm Hizballah. By
the end of July 1993 American mediation efforts had stopped the fighting and led
to an unwritten "understanding" under which Hizballah forces would
stop launching rockets into Israel. U.S.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher brokered the understanding with
"…Israel, Syria and Lebanon and through indirect contacts with
Iran."[vi]
Israeli officials declared victory saying their offensive resulted in the
Hizballah pledge not to fire on northern Israel.
Hizballah publicly vowed to continue its fight against the Israeli
occupation of Lebanon, which the "understandings" did not prohibit,
but said it would stop its rocket attacks"…as long as Israeli forces
[did] not fire on Lebanese civilians."[vii] Although
conflict in the security zone continued, shelling of northern Israel ceased.
The unwritten understandings of 1993 collapsed on April 11, 1996 with the
beginning of Israel’s fourth military offensive into Lebanon, Operation
Grapes of Wrath. The offensive
was in retaliation for a surge of Hizballah attacks against Israeli troops and
northern Israel. Tel Aviv targeted Lebanese infrastructure in Beirut, such as
electrical supply stations, to put a new form of pressure on the Lebanese and
Syrian governments to restrain Hizballah. On
April 18, Israeli artillery shells landed inside the UN military compound in
Qana killing approximately 100 civilian refugees and injuring another 100.
Allegations were made that the shelling was deliberate. Whatever
the cause of the Qana tragedy, Israeli public support for the operation
evaporated and the Clinton Administration began to apply significant pressure on
Israel to implement a cease-fire. Secretary
Christopher negotiated an end to the fighting and the so-called “April 26,
1996 Understanding,” between Israel and the government of Lebanon.
The agreement protects civilians by prohibiting attacks on civilian
targets or from civilian areas (see Appendix B).
The April 26 Understanding added a new feature in an attempt to stabilize
conditions in southern Lebanon: the
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG).
The ILMG is an independent monitoring group composed of representatives
from Israel, Lebanon, Syria, France, and the United States with the goal of
assessing the application of the April 26 Understanding. Conditions
in southern Lebanon are largely unchanged at the time of writing.
Shia
militias attack IDF/SLA positions and attempt to infiltrate into Israel. The
political and military context for the conflict in southern Lebanon is among the
most complex in the Middle East. As
the previous discussion illustrates, activities there impact the interests of
state and non-state actors, primarily Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and
Hizballah. Each sees southern
Lebanon’s future in terms of its respective goals.
Understanding the players and their goals is central to application of
cooperative monitoring. Israel: Secure Its BorderSince the
late 1970s, Israel’s stated goal has been to secure its northern border
against military, guerrilla, and terrorist attack.
Israel’s efforts originally were focused on the threat posed by the
PLO. After being forced out of
Jordan, the PLO established bases throughout Lebanon and used the South to
launch repeated attacks against Israel’s northern towns. The government of Israel established the self-declared
“security zone” to provide an armed buffer zone between PLO forces and
Israel. Israel’s
costly success in driving the PLO from Lebanon and establishing its buffer zone
ironically produced a new threat: the
Shia resistance. Just as the PLO
before them, but with less local resentment, the militias used the South to
launch attacks against Israeli forces, northern towns, and as an infiltration
route to conduct terrorist operations inside Israel. Israel’s
response to the Shia militias was similar to that against the PLO.
IDF forces used the “security zone” as a buffer between the armed
groups and Israel and as a base for operations against them.
Today, Israel maintains about 1,500 soldiers in Lebanon.
Guerrilla groups attack almost daily and inflict casualties on the IDF
(see Figure 3).
(Casualty
data from Israel Defense Forces, Spokesperson’s Office, Information Branch
from the Internet) Figure 3. IDF Casualties in Lebanon, 1990-1998 The South Lebanon Army: Just Fade AwayThe SLA has
fought beside the IDF from the very beginning as Israel’s Lebanese proxy.
The group has been funded by Israel and does not have clearly defined
political goals. It is difficult to
imagine the group’s continued existence after an IDF pullback.
The rank and file of the 2,200-man SLA (about 55 percent Muslim and 45
percent Christian) probably would not have much difficulty returning to their
villages and civilian life. The
senior leadership, however, could face severe reprisals.
The Lebanese government in late 1996 sentenced current SLA Commander
Antoine Lahd to death in absentia for
his collaboration with Israel. SLA
senior leadership likely would flee to Israel or other countries outside the
region to escape Lebanese retribution. Some
of these officers, including Lahd, reportedly have already acquired foreign
passports.[viii] Lebanon: Regain Its SovereigntySince
the end of the civil war in 1990, the internationally recognized government in
Beirut has remained a peripheral player in the conflict due to its subordinate
relationship with Syria. Syria
strongly influences Lebanon’s foreign policy decisions, given the power of
30,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon remained after the civil war. The 60,000-man Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) collapsed during
the civil war and has lately focused on rebuilding itself.
The LAF is not deployed throughout the country.
The government in Beirut has said that once the Israelis withdraw, the
LAF will deploy south. Lebanon has
largely placed its goal of regaining its sovereignty in the South in the hands
of the international community. Syria: Protect Its FlankSyria is a
key participant in southern Lebanon. Beginning
in 1970, Syria’s primary interest in Lebanon became one of protecting its
western flank, politically as well as a militarily.
When the PLO took up residence in Lebanon, Syrian President Asad became
“... intensely interested in every twist of Palestinian politics.”[ix]
Israel’s close relations with Lebanon’s Christian community and its
nascent war with the leftists and PLO there left Asad with the threat of either
a significant gain in Israeli influence, or a war on his border that could
eventually involve Syria. When civil
war erupted in 1975 among Lebanon’s Palestinian, Muslim and Christian camps,
security became Asad’s primary concern. If
Syria remained on the sidelines, the Christians might win and set up a separate
Christian state with Israel as protector. If
the Christians lost, Israel might intervene to protect its interests.
Asad attempted to negotiate with the warring factions to stave off a
Lebanese collapse but with the disintegration of the LAF into its religious
factions in March 1976; Asad saw no alternative to intervention.
During the night of May 31, 1976, Syrian regular army units crossed into
Lebanon”...to teach the Palestinians sense and to keep the Christians Arab.”[x]
Syria’ s intervention in Lebanon was no surprise to Israel.
As a result of American negotiation, Israel had agreed to a limited
incursion in an unwritten “red-line” agreement, which limited the number of
Syrian troops south of the Damascus-Beirut road and restricted air and naval
deployments. By late 1976,
Syria’s military intervention had ended the fighting.
In October, Asad attended a Saudi Arabian-sponsored peace summit, which
legitimized Syria’s presence in Lebanon.
Syrian forces in Lebanon became part of an “Arab Deterrent Force”
funded by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and supported by troops from other Arab
militaries. Syrian forces gained
control over all of Beirut by November, the militias fled, and the civil war was
declared over.[xi]
Despite his success in ending the fighting, Asad’s efforts to
keep the Israelis out of Lebanon failed. In
1983 Israel and Lebanon signed a joint security agreement that provided for an
Israeli withdrawal if the Syrians withdrew.
Syria rejected this offer. Fighting
among the various religious groups within Lebanon resumed in the mid-1980s again
drawing Syrian forces into the conflict. By
1988 the deep rifts between these groups resulted in a presidential secession
crisis in Lebanon. A leadership
vacuum and renewed fighting followed. With
the Lebanese economy in shambles and a breakdown in public services looming, 62
members of the Lebanese parliament -- evenly split between Christian and Muslim
--met in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia in late 1989.
The meeting produced the “Document of National Understanding,” more
commonly referred to as the Ta’if Accord.
The accord implicitly recognized the necessity of compromise while not
abandoning the ultimate goal of political unification under a “national”
government, superior to the religious groups.
The Ta’if Accord, accepted by the Lebanese legislature in 1990,
effectively ended the civil war. It
also formalized Lebanon’s “special relationship” with Syria and only
required Asad to redeploy his forces to the Bekaa Valley within two years.[xii]
Today, Syrian forces not only remain in the Bekaa Valley, but also in
Beirut and northern Lebanon.[xiii] Syria’s
presence in Lebanon has become inextricably linked to Asad’s agenda in the
stalled Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Syria’s
30,000 troops in Lebanon are the ultimate guarantor of Asad’s interests there
and were critical to the successful disarming of the various militias at the end
of the civil war. Asad allowed
Hizballah to retain its weapons, however, to support the guerrilla action
against the Israelis in the South. Syria
defined Hizballah operations as legitimate resistance to Israeli occupation.
Syrian support to Hizballah also includes serving as a resupply conduit
for Iranian assistance.[xiv] Syrian
support to the Hizballah guerrillas figures prominently in Asad’s strategic
posturing with Israel. President
Asad’s primary goal in any peace deal with Israel is a return to the June 4,
1967 border that returns the Golan Heights to Syrian control.
Asad apparently concluded that he could not retake this strategic plateau
lost to Israel in 1967 by force. Instead
he looked to the diplomatic arena for a solution.
However, with the collapse of MEPP negotiations with Israel in 1996, Asad
turned again to his “Hizballah card” to keep pressure on Israel and remind
it of the costs of not having a comprehensive peace agreement.
When Israel floated proposals in 1996 for resolving the security issues
with Lebanon bilaterally, Syria and Lebanon publicly restated the linkage
between the return of the Golan, quiet along the Lebanon border and
comprehensive peace with Israel. Asad
told reporters, “Syria and Lebanon first - at the same time, in the same
steps.”[xv]
Asad’s manipulation of Hizballah guerrilla activities in southern
Lebanon provides the only real leverage Syria enjoys over Israel. Iran: Strengthen the ShiaIran’s
interests in Lebanon have been closely linked to the plight of the Shia Muslims
there. A charismatic Iranian cleric
of Lebanese ancestry provided a political outlet for Shia fervor. Musa al-Sadr began a populist reform movement after his
return to Lebanon in 1959 and by 1975 had organized his own armed militia, Amal
(an acronym of Afwaq al Nuqawamah al Lubnanya, the “Units of the Lebanese
Resistance”). Musa al-Sadr said
Amal was distinct from other militias in Lebanon in that its men were
“...trained to go to the South and fight Israel.”[xvi]
Tehran’s efforts have been channeled through various Shia groups
(indirectly through Amal at first and directly through Hizballah more recently)
and intended to improve conditions for the Shia and to spread the Islamic
“revolution” started by Ayatollah Khomeini.[xvii] By the time
of Israel’s invasion of 1982, however, Amal had split into two factions.
One was secular in nature, rejected an “Islamic Republic of Lebanon,”
and sought political accommodation with Israel.
This group also was more beholden to Syria for support.
The other faction “...viewed Amal as the vanguard of revolutionary
struggle ... based on the model and ideals of the Iranian revolution”[xviii]
and won Iran’s favor. In June
1982 several senior members of Amal allied to the Iranian faction split and
started the Islamic Amal based in
Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley Iranian
support for the ideals of Islamic Amal was strengthened with the arrival in
mid-1982 of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Tehran sent a small contingent of IRGC to Lebanon ostensibly to fight
Israeli forces in the South but this role was “...blocked by Syria as well as
Khomeini himself for strategic reasons.”[xix]
The IRGC did play a critical role in the immediate survival of Islamic Amal,
however, and in its eventual merging with other radical Lebanese Shia movements
to create Hizballah in late 1982. Iranian goals
in Lebanon appear to be less revolutionary and more pragmatic today. Iran
appears willing to reap the additional political benefits of an Israeli
withdrawal and cease its armed struggle through its Hizballah proxy. Iranian Minister of Culture Ayatollah Mohajerani said as much
in April 1998, “If Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon within a security
framework to defined, secure borders, there will be no further need for
Hizballah oppositionist activities in southern Lebanon.”[xx] Hizballah: Liberate LebanonAfter quietly
organizing itself in the wake of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the
“Party of God” (hizballah in
Arabic), issued its manifesto in February 1985.
In it, Hizballah declared its pan-Islamic character, allegiance to
Khomeini’s Iran, and hatred of Israel and its patron, the United States.
The manifesto legitimized armed struggle:
“Freedom is not freely given or granted, but it is retrieved through
the exertion of souls and blood. We
can no longer be patient for we have been patient for tens of years.”[xxi]
Hizballah’s campaign has included hostage taking and the destruction of
the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut as well as its guerrilla war against Israel
in the South. Hizballah
became the Shia standard bearer in the fight against the IDF after Amal’s
power peaked in 1985. Hizballah
gained increasing popular support as Amal moved into the political mainstream.[xxii]
By the 1990s, Hizballah guerrillas were the primary force fighting Israel
in southern Lebanon earning them “recognition” during American mediation
efforts to end Israel’s “Operation Accountability.”
The April 26, 1996 Understandings went even further by implicitly
legitimizing Hizballah’s right to attack Israeli forces in Lebanon. Hizballah is
moderating its public image. With
Iranian support, Hizballah has established itself “as the country’s only
effective means of resistance, earning it some respect from across Lebanon’s
fractured political spectrum.”[xxiii]
Iran has sought to capitalize on that respect and has redirected some of
its support of Hizballah to establishing schools, hospitals and other social
services in Shia communities. Hizballah
has moved into the mainstream political life in Lebanon as a political party
with representatives in Parliament. Hizballah
has learned to adapt to the changing domestic and international political
climate as well, even though its ideology has not officially changed much since
its 1985 manifesto.[xxiv]
The deputy chief of Hizballah’s political bureau reportedly said,
“There’s a difference between ... ideological beliefs and ... political
stands.”[xxv]
Hizballah realizes its war with Israel serves a purpose for its patrons,
Syria and Iran. Once that purpose is no longer served, Hizballah understands
its role must change, much the same as Amal’s did before it.
As Hizballah
moves closer to the political mainstream, an unanswered question is whether
other factions will continue to launch attacks against Israel even if the IDF
withdraws. There are elements
within Hizballah that are more “radical” than others and may decide that
moderation is abandonment of the revolution.
It was just that kind of ideological rift in Amal that produced Hizballah
in 1982-83. Recent Israeli press
reports citing defense officials say that Hizballah is already in the midst of a
“violent split.” Hizballah’s
secretary-general Hasan Nasrallah heads the more moderate camp.
Subhi al-Tufayli, Hizballah’s first secretary-general and former Amal
member leads the other camp. The
report says that Tufayli is more extreme than Nasrallah and has been advocating
a more “confrontational policy.”[xxvi]
Tufayli launched a “Revolution of the Hungry” in July 1997 and led a
civil revolt in the Bekaa Valley demanding that the Lebanese government provide
more resources to the Shia living there, the poorest in the country.
Tufayli’s actions have forced him out of the Hizballah mainstream, and
he has been in hiding since February 1998.
What role Tufayli and his followers could play in Lebanon after an
Israeli withdrawal is uncertain. There have
been reports recently that suggest Amal is reasserting itself in the conflict in
the South, especially since Israel began discussing withdrawal publicly.
These reports say that Amal cannot afford to let Hizballah take all the
credit for an Israeli pullout. Recently,
a booby-trapped videocassette that had been given to a SLA official exploded and
killed one and wounded several others in Lebanon near the Israeli border.
This incident was attributed to Amal and cited as evidence of one of its
“more spectacular” attacks aimed at regaining attention for Amal.
Moreover, the group reportedly has stepped up its conventional attacks on
IDF and SLA forces in southern Lebanon, which now average about one a day.[xxvii] The United
Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring
Group (ILMG) both currently serve in a “monitoring” capacity in southern
Lebanon. United NationsThe United
Nations Security Council established UNIFIL in 1978 with Resolution 425.
UNIFIL was chartered to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore
international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in
regaining its effective authority in the area (see Appendix A).
The first contingent of UNIFIL troops arrived in Lebanon on March 23,
1978. Even though Israel withdrew
most of its troops by June 1978, it handed over its positions to its Lebanese
proxy, the SLA, not UNIFIL. Moreover,
Israel’s 1982 invasion - which UNIFIL was powerless to prevent - left the UN
force behind the IDF’s lines and limited its role to providing humanitarian
assistance and some protection to the local population.
Israel partially withdrew its forces in 1985 but maintained its
“security zone” along the border. Consequently,
UNIFIL has never fulfilled its mandate. It
has served as the UN’s “eyes and ears” in the area and tries to prevent
its area of operations from being used by armed Lebanese groups to attack
Israeli forces. Both armed Lebanese
groups and the IDF have attacked UNIFIL forces over the years.
Currently, the force consisted of about 4500 soldiers provided by Fiji,
Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, India, and Poland.[xxviii]
UNIFIL, IDF/SLA, and LAF positions are shown in Figure 4.
Figure
4. UNIFIL, IDF/SLA, and LAF
Positions and Zones of Contro
MultilateralThe United
States, France, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria established the Israel-Lebanon
Monitoring Group (ILMG) in July 1996 as part of the “understanding” that
ended Israel’s “Operation Grapes of Wrath.”
The ILMG is independent of the United Nations.
France and the U.S. jointly chair the ILMG, alternating as chair and
co-chair every five months. The
group serves as a forum for hearing complaints of violation of the April 26,
1996 Understanding, which forbids attacks on civilians or attacks launched from
civilian areas. The goal of the
agreement is to protect civilian life and property and prevent escalation in
tensions. The members meet at
facilities provided by UNIFIL at its headquarters in Naqura, Lebanon, where the
ILMG reviews complaints, reports to member governments, and issues a press
statement. Because the ILMG
operates on the principle of unanimity, its statements tend to be factual
accounts of the complaining party’s arguments without judgement. The ILMG
meets regularly to hear complaints of violation from Israel and Lebanon. After
more than three years, the April 26, 1996 Understanding appears to be holding.
Even though the ILMG has no enforcement power, it has helped to prevent
escalation that has proved so damaging in the past.
One example came after a recent Israeli attack on a senior Shia militia
official. With approval of the Israeli inner cabinet, the IDF launched
a helicopter attack that killed a top Amal militia official in southern Lebanon
on August 25, 1998. Immediately
following the attack, Hizballah rocketed towns in northern Israel wounding at
least 19 people.[xxix]
Initial press reports linked the rocket attacks to the Israeli
assassination. Subsequent reports,
however, said that the Hizballah attack was in response to Israeli shelling of
Lebanese villages during the same timeframe.[xxx]
Regardless of the reason for the rocket attack, in the past Israel did
not tolerate attacks on northern Israel and historically has responded with
military operations against Hizballah targets in Lebanon.
This time, the ILMG convened on August 31, 1998 to discuss the incident
and no escalation was reported. The
monitoring group has apparently forced the IDF to limit its operations to avoid
civilian casualties. An Israeli
artillery commander in Lebanon recently said that he has “... clear
instructions not to fire within 500 meters of any settlement,” and added,
“There are very few places where I can fire freely.”[xxxi]
At a minimum, the ILMG’s continued existence - the only forum where
Israeli, Lebanese, and Syrian government representatives meet - demonstrates
commitment of the parties to cooperate and keep this line of communication open.
Recent Israeli Proposals for Withdrawal Israel’s
April 1998 acceptance of UNSCR 425 prompted much discussion over when and how
the IDF might withdraw from Lebanon. At
the time, Israel publicly floated two approaches: ·
One, supported by Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, was based on
bilateral negotiations with Lebanon. An
IDF withdrawal was dependent on security guarantees to be made by the Lebanese
government in Beirut. Lebanese and
Syrian government officials responded that Resolution 425 could not be
negotiated and that Lebanon would not enter into any discussions over it.
Resolution 425 calls for Israel to immediately withdraw its forces and
does not provide for Lebanese security guarantees.
Moreover, Syria has no interest in allowing the Lebanese government to
negotiate with Israel bilaterally and insists that any discussion of IDF
withdrawal from Lebanon be tied to an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights
as part of comprehensive peace negotiations.[xxxii]
Further, Syria may be concerned that if an IDF pullback withdrawal occurs
there will be calls to remove its own forces from Lebanon. ·
Then Infrastructure Minister Ariel
Sharon - the former Defense Minister who launched Israel’s 1982 invasion of
Lebanon - championed the second idea that called for a unilateral, staged
pullout. Without explicit Lebanese
and Syrian security guarantees, a unilateral IDF withdrawal is fraught with
complications and is a non-starter, according to the views of some Israeli
analysts. A unilateral withdrawal
“... will not only result in perennial instability in the region, with
Israeli forces popping in and out of Lebanon each time there is a [rocket]
attack, but also in the mass slaughter of Israel’s [South Lebanon Army]
allies.”[xxxiii] For the
purposes of this paper, a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is assumed.
This study is based on conditions in early 1999 and is an assessment of
potential cooperative monitoring scenarios and does not try to predict the
likelihood or form of an IDF pullback. The
underlying assumption is that without a formal or informal political agreement
between Israel, Lebanon, and most likely Syria, there will be no withdrawal
scenario in which cooperative monitoring could be practical.
Moreover, all parties are assumed to have an interest in making the
agreement and any subsequent monitoring program work. Any formal or
informal agreement would probably include the following provisions: ·
Complete withdrawal of the IDF from
southern Lebanon ·
A cease-fire by Hizballah and
potentially the withdrawal of its units from southern Lebanon ·
Re-establishment of a Lebanese Army
presence in southern Lebanon ·
Disbanding of the South Lebanon Army ·
An understanding that Syria would not
move its military forces into areas vacated by the IDF Given the
mutual distrust of the participants, cooperative monitoring (possibly with third
party assistance) might be seen as a way to establish an environment that is
acceptable to all parties. In
addition, organized cooperation would act to build confidence between the
parties. Cooperative Monitoring Options IntroductionCooperative monitoring involves collecting, analy |
