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Military

Joint Simulation System

Concept of Operations

Version 1.0 (15 August 1997)

Comments or inquiries regarding this document may be addressed to:

Concepts Division

Joint Warfighting Center

Fenwick Rd., Bldg. 96

Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000

Attn: CDR Richard Myer, USN

Phone (757) 726-6419/6559 (DSN 680-xxxx)

Fax (757) 726-6433 (DSN 680-6433)

E-mail: myerr@jwfc.js.mil

Table of Contents

1. Scope *

A.4. JSIMS Training Objectives for Initial Development *

A.4.1. Scenario Task Conditions *

A.5. World Situation *

A.5.1. The Iranian and Gulf Crisis *

A.5.1.1. Background *

A.5.1.2. Sociological/Economic Factors *

A.5.1.3. Demographics of Resistance *

A.5.1.4. Regime Agenda - Retain Power *

A.5.1.5. Regional Military Action *

A.5.1.6. International Shipping Provocations *

A.6. Scenario Events *

A.6.1. Escalation - Stages One Through Four *

A.6.1.1. Stage One. *

A.6.1.2. Stage Two *

A.6.1.3. Stage Three *

A.6.1.4. Stage Four *

A.7. Operational Situation *

A.7.1. Background *

A.7.2. Theater Objectives *

A.7.3. Mission Statement *

A.7.4. Concept of Operations *

A.7.5. Command and Control *

A.7.6 Force Allocation *

A.8. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) *

A.8.1. Background *

A.8.2. Factors Affecting Mission Execution *

A.8.3. MOOTW Development Scenario Summary *

A.9. Academic Seminar Training Scenario *

A.10. Conclusion *

References: *

Sources: *

Annex B -- JSIMS Development Scenario Force Structure *

B.1. General *

Appendix (1) to Annex B: U.S. Forces *

B.A1.1. In Place Forces - Major Theater War - Persian Gulf *

Army Forces *

Air Forces *

Naval Forces *

Coast Guard Forces: *

B.A1.2. Allocated for Planning - Persian Gulf Region *

CINC/CENTCOM Staff: *

Army Forces: *

Air Forces: *

Navy Forces: *

Coast Guard Forces: *

Marine Corps Forces: *

Special Operations Forces (SOF): *

Appendix (2) to Annex B: Combined/Coalition Forces *

B.A2.1. SAUDI ARABIA *

B.A2.1.1. Saudi Land Forces *

B.A2.1.2. Saudi Air Forces: *

B.A2.1.3. Saudi Navy Forces: *

B.A2.2. KUWAIT *

B.A2.2.1. Kuwaiti Land Forces: *

B.A2.2.2. Kuwaiti Air Forces: *

B.A2.3. EGYPT: *

B.A2.3.1. Egyptian Land Forces: *

B.A2.3.2. Egyptian Air Forces: *

B.A2.4. GULF STATES (BAHRAIN, QATAR, UAE, OMAN) *

B.A2.4.1. Gulf States Land Forces: *

B.A2.4.2. Gulf States Air Forces: *

B.A2.4.3. Gulf States Navy: *

Appendix (3) to Annex B: Opposing Forces Order of Battle *

B.A3.1. IRAN *

B.A3.1.1. Land Forces: *

B.A3.1.2. Air Forces: *

B.A3.1.3. Navy Forces: *

B.A3.1.4. Iranian Missile Forces: *

A.4. JSIMS Training Objectives for Initial Development

As sequential versions of JSIMS are fielded after IOC, training objectives will be developed as described in chapter three. For this initial development, however, the following training objectives have been developed as a notional representation of what is required for an exercise training objective for the training audience.

Joint tasks (essential and supporting) are developed from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and once conditions (taken from the scenario) and standards (delineated by the exercise director, CINC or JTF commander) are added, this becomes a training objective for this particular exercise. The development scenario does not attempt to replicate the information normally derived from various reference CINC and component documents normally used in the development of training objectives. However, it demonstrates the linkages that occur during the exercise design process.

The initial JSIMS event will be conducted within the context of the scenario as described in this Annex, for which it is appropriate to use training objectives as listed below. Each of these training tasks refers to common conditions which are listed later in this section. Some of these training tasks will not pertain to all of the training audience, rather a specific component, board, cell, center, or section of the staff.

References on how to perform each of these tasks are listed in the UJTL and are from current joint and service publications. In applying the UJTL to the requirements-based joint training process, a number of basic terms apply which are shown in figure A.3.

Term

Definition

Mission

The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor.

Essential

Absolutely necessary; indispensable; critical.

Task

A discrete event or action, not specific to a single unit, weapon system, or individual that enables a mission or function to be accomplished.

Condition

A variable of the operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that may affect performance.

Standard

The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a particular task under a specified set of conditions. Standards are established by a joint force commander.

Joint Mission Essential Task (JMET)

A task selected by a joint force commander from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) deemed essential to mission accomplishment.

Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)

A list of joint tasks considered essential to the accomplishment of assigned or anticipated missions. A JMETL includes associated conditions and standards and may identify command-linked and supporting tasks.

Supporting Task

Specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of a joint mission essential task. Supporting tasks are accomplished at the same command level or by subordinate elements of a joint force (i.e., joint staff, functional components, etc.).

Figure A.3 -- UJTL Definition of Terms

The essential tasks below are in bold and the supporting task in each case is in italics. The task conditions key is located in A.4.1.

ST 1.1.1 - Process Requests for Forces to be deployed. Validate and coordinate movement requests with supporting agencies to determine resources and assets available. Prepare movement orders. Conditions: (15-25) Standards: (a) Movement requests processed in sufficient time to support the campaign plan, (b) Movement orders prepared and issued in accordance with JTF SOP.

ST 1.1.3 - Conduct Intratheater Deployment of Forces. Coordinate and prioritize movement of US and Multinational forces within theater. Determine phasing requirements in accordance with assets available. Prepare deployment orders in accordance with JTF SOP. Conditions (3,4,15-17, 19-25). Standards: (a) Uninterrupted movement conducted in support of campaign plan. (b) Multinational and coalition movement assets and shortfalls identified and resolved in a timely manner. (c) Deployment orders prepared and issued in accordance with JTF SOP.

ST 1.1.4 - Provide Command and Control of Deploying Units. Insure that the required information and format of deployment orders are correct. Maintain requirements that implement and monitor command and control instructions as listed in deployment orders. Conditions; (3, 6-14). Standard: Control of forces during phasing is maintained at all times.

ST 2.2 - Collect Theater Strategic Information. Insure collection assets provide timely information to maintain a current target list. Assess significant battle damage of enemy targets. Conditions: (1-5, 11, 14, 20-22, 25). Standards: (a) Collection requirements on targets processed in a timely manner. Disseminate a BDA assessment within 12-36 hours of collection.

ST 2.4 - Produce Theater Strategic Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products. Maintain enemy situation and order of battle. Respond to requests for targeting and BDA information. Respond to requests for intelligence for planning purposes. Conditions: (1, 2, 11, 14, 25). Standards: (a) Enemy order of battle maintained in a timely manner. Target and BDA information requests processed in a timely manner. (c) Intelligence information requests processed in a timely manner.

ST 2.5 - Disseminate and Integrate theater Strategic Intelligence. Respond to requests for strategic intelligence products. Provide follow-on intelligence support to theater strategic planners and decision makers. Conditions: (1-4, 6-14, 20). Standards: (a) Provide prompt and comprehensive transmission, in peace and war, of theater-produced intelligence products. (b) Provide intelligence inputs in response to queries based upon furnished intelligence products or the evolution of events.

ST 4.2.2 - Provide Health Services. Provide health service support in preparing theater forces for joint operations and theater level campaigns. Manage the theater joint blood program. Coordinate patient evacuation from the AOR. Monitor and adjust preventive medicine plan. Conditions: (1, 6-13, 17-19, 21, 22). Standards: (a) Ensure coordination occurs between the theater joint blood program office and the armed services blood program office. (b) Ensure that a theater and joint patient movement requirements centers are formed and operated in accordance with JP 4-02. (c) Ensure sufficient medical capabilities exist to support campaign plan.

ST 4.2.3 - Reconstitute Theater Forces. Take extraordinary actions to restore combat-attrited units in the theater to desired level of combat effectiveness. Coordinate CONUS/theater personnel replacement systems with service components. Conditions: (1-14, 23-26). Standards: (a) Ensure no significant shortage of personnel that effects the ability of the components to accomplish their mission. (b) Ensure that planning forces to counter the emergence of a global threat has occurred.

ST 4.3 - Distribute Supplies/Services for Theater Campaign and COMMZ. Establish a Joint Movement Center to coordinate all means of transportation to support campaign plan. Provide supplies and services for theater forces. Implement theater/joint operations area transportation policy. Conditions: (3, 4, 22, 24). Standards: (a) Courses of action for logistics movement developed and analyzed as required. (b) Recommendations provided to JFC to meet projected shortfalls in intratheater lift capability as required. (c) Movement of equipment, supplies, and personnel meets CINC's timeliness for execution of campaign plan.

ST 8.1.3 - Develop Headquarters or Organizations for Coalitions. Validate the F2C2 staff functions and interaction with the battle staff in support of the campaign plan. Educate and familiarize the battle staff with the F2C2 mission. Validate augmentee manning in support of the campaign plan. Validate F2C2 overall manning in support of the campaign plan. Conditions: (3, 4, 6-15). Standards: (a) F2C2 staff provides continuous support for the maneuver and sustainment of coalition forces. (b) CINC's battle staff manifests a complete appreciation for the mission of the F2C2 by staffing and coordinating 90% of coalition issues with the F2C2 staff. No later than the completion of the second exercise stage, 95% of all staff procedures are standardized. 90% of augmentee and overall F2C2 manning are present or accounted for during the exercise.

OP 1.1 - Conduct Operational Movement. Formulate request for strategic deployment to the theater of operations/JOA. Conduct theater of operations/JOA reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Conditions: (1-14, 21-24). Standards: (a) Deployment request should be consistent with joint force command's campaign plan. (b) The staff should ensure centers are established to receive and process equipment and personnel in a timely manner in accordance with JTF SOP. (c) US and coalition forces unimpeded by host nation reception services.

OP 1.2 - Conduct Operational Maneuver. Transition joint forces to and from tactical battle formations. Concentrate forces in theater of operations/JOA. Plan and execute show of force. Plan and execute demonstration to draw attention and forces of an adversary from the area of major operations. Conditions: (1-4, 6-15, 20, 23-25). Standards: (a) Determine when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed, consider commitment to or withdraw from battle, the arrangement of battles, and major operations to achieve operational relationships, policies, procedures, and options for C2 of joint air operations through designation of a JFACC or the use of the JFC staff. (b) Use available assets to provide the minimum level of sustainment to deployed forces. (c) During amphibious operations, exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weaknesses by projecting combat power at the most advantageous location and time. (d) Provide guidance for the organization, command and control, and mission selection pertaining to SOF.

OP 2.2 - Collect Operational Information. Collect information on operational situation to include significant enemy information on force strength, vulnerabilities and locations. Provide surveillance and reconnaissance support to combatant commanders and national level agencies. Conditions: (1, 2, 11-14, 16, 18, 20, 25). Standards: (a) Employ joint force organic intelligence resources to obtain general military intelligence (GMI) in support of the joint force commander's decision making process and operational requirements. (b) Develop and maintain intelligence databases capable of meeting operational intelligence requirements. (c) Ensure that positive ID is maintained on friendly forces.

OP 2.4 - Produce Operational Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products. Evaluate, integrate, analyze, and interpret operational information for credibility, reliability, applicability, and accuracy. Determine enemy's operational capabilities, courses of action and intentions. Provide indications and warning for theater of operations/JOA. Conditions: (1, 2, 11-14, 16, 18, 20, 25). Standards: (a) Provide tailored all-source intelligence analysis support to joint operations in such a way as to ensure the correlation of new data with the existing database and the continuous assessment of the effectiveness of the collection strategy to meet evolving intelligence needs. (b) Assist is identifying and determining operational objectives by providing the joint force commander with a clear, comprehensive understanding of the adversary's intent, objectives and centers of gravity. (c) Further support to operational requirements is provided through the development and maintenance of a tailored GMI database.

OP 3.1 - Conduct Joint Force Targeting. Establish joint force targeting guidance to include prioritizing targets. Assign joint/multinational operational firepower to operational targets consistent with joint force command's guidance. Evaluate and choose operational targets for attack to achieve optimum effect on enemy decisive points and centers of gravity. Publish tasking orders for employment of air assets and other means. Determine the overall effectiveness of joint and multinational forces employment in operational objectives. Conditions: (3, 4, 6-14, 20, 24-25). Standards: (a) Select targets and match the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (b) Comply with international law, the law of war, international agreements and conventions, and NCA approved ROE. (c) All components involved in targeting, should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage the targeting function. (d) Transmit a daily air tasking order that maximizes the use of all firepower assets. (e) JFCs establish broad planning objectives and guidance for attack of enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and interdiction of enemy forces. (f) Set priorities, provide targeting guidance, and determine the weight of effort to be provided to various operations. (g) When established, the JTCB operates at the macro level and ensures targeting nominations are consistent with the JFC establish broad planning guidance. (h) Develop an unconstrained prioritized list of potential targets which reflects relative importance of targets to the enemy's ability to wage war. (i) Consider target system characteristics, target linkage, and interdependence. (j) Identify key target systems that are relevant to objectives and guidance and suitable for disruption, degradation, neutralization, or destruction. (k) Identify critical nodes, prepare preliminary documentation, validate the target, identify recommended aim points for attack, and develop a potential prioritized target list. (l) Analyze what is known about the damage inflicted on the adversary to determine what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have on the adversary's plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional actions are required to meet campaign objectives. (m) The CA effort should be a joint program supported at all levels.

OP 3.2 - Attack Operational Targets. Attack operational land and sea targets with available joint and multinational operational firepower. Engage operational land, sea, and air targets with nonlethal joint and multinational means designed to degrade, impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, tasks and facilities. Conditions: (3, 5, 9, 11, 14, 20, 24, 25). Standards: (a) Employ all available joint and multinational firepower to delay, disrupt, destroy or degrade enemy operational forces or critical tasks and facilities to effect the enemy's will to fight. (b) Employ EW to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack enemy systems; include optical, infrared, and directed-energy means. (c) Employ offensive information warfare activities. (d) Consider use of SOF when non-lethal means are insufficient and conventional means are not feasible. (e)Degrade, impair, disrupt, or delay performance of enemy operational forces, tasks, and facilities. (f) Synchronize interdiction and maneuver, as complementary operations, to assist commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level. (g) Synchronize and integrate close air support with surface fires; achieve the desired effect without suspending the use of any of the supporting arms or unnecessarily delaying the scheme of maneuver, and protect aircraft from the effects of friendly surface fire.

OP 5.1 - Acquire and Communicate Operational Level Information and Maintain Status. Send and receive operationally significant information and data from one echelon of command to another by any means. Direct, establish or control the means used in sending or receiving operational information of any kind. Determine the critical information that the commander requires to understand the flow of operations and to make timely and informed decisions. Maintain operational information and force status. Monitor the strategic situation. Conditions: (1-5, 9, 11, 14-16, 18-22, 24-25). Standards: (a) Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as to post-conflict. (b) Peacetime intelligence and logistic assessments are essential for force projection operations and rapid transition to combat operations. (c) When directed by the NCA to conduct military operations, the combatant commander refines peacetime strategies and modify existing plans or develop campaign plans as appropriate. (d) The result, expressed in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources, provides guidance for a broad range of activities. (e) Modern intelligence collection systems accumulate vast amounts of information. (f) To be useful, the information must be relevant, accurate, analyzed, formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the appropriate user. (g) The information must be appropriately classified and sanitized to the degree necessary to allow dissemination to the appropriate user level. (h) The commander specifies the critical information needed to support a decision-making process to retain the initiative. (i) The information may be derived from one or more of three broad information categories of friendly, enemy , and environmental. (j) This includes identification, management, and promulgation of critical information requirements to the joint force staff and components.

OP 5.2 - Assess Operational Situation. Evaluate information received through reports or the personal observations of the commander on the general situation in the theater of operation and conduct of the campaign or major operation. In particular, this activity includes deciding whether different actions are required from those that would result from the most recent orders issued. This includes evaluating operational requirements of subordinate task forces and components. Conditions: (1-5, 14-15, 18, 20-22, 24-25). Standards: (a) The nature, scope and tempo of military operations continually changes, requiring the commander to make new decisions and take new actions in response to these changes. (b) Although the scope and details will vary with the level and function of the command, the purpose is constant: analyze the situation and need for action; determine the course of action best suited for mission accomplishment; and carry out that course of action, with adjustments as necessary, while continuing to assess the unfolding situation. (c) Combatant commanders' plans provide strategic direction: assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement(approved by the NCA); establish constraints and restraints; and define polices and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. (d) Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. (f) Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of enemy action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

OP 5.3 - Prepare Plans and Orders. Make detailed plans, staff estimates, and decisions for implementing the theater combatant commander's theater strategy, associated sequels, and anticipated campaigns or major operations. Plans and orders address, among other things, centers of gravity, branches, sequels, culminating points, and phasing. Planning includes organizing an effective staff, structuring and organizing the force, considering multinational capabilities/ limitations, and cross-leveling or balancing Service component, joint, and national C4 means. Conditions: (3, 4, 6-14, 20-24). Standards: (a) Synchronize operations by establishing command relationships among subordinate commands, describe the concept of the operations, assign tasks and objectives, and task-organize assigned forces. (b) Campaign planning can be started prior to or during deliberate planning, but is not completed until crisis action planning. (c) Prepare OPORDs under joint procedures during crisis planning. (d) Plans should address specific missions and tasks for subordinate joint or multinational task forces, Service and functional components and supporting commands and agencies. (e) Plans should specify main effort(s) and supporting and supported relationships by phase. (f) Planning also should address rules of engagement for force employment. (g)This activity includes determining solutions to operational level needs

OP 5.4 - Command Subordinate Operational Forces. Promulgate the interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. Clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally ensures unity of command which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and the teamwork necessary for unified military action. All commanders must understand their mission, their contribution to achievement of the commander's concept and intent, and their relationship to attainment of a higher or supported commanders operational objectives. This facilitates maximum decentralized conduct of campaigns and major operations utilizing either detailed or mission-type plans and orders as the situation and time permit. Arrange land, air, sea, and space operational forces in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. This activity includes the vertical and the horizontal integration of tasks in time and space to maximize combat output. Synchronization ensures all elements of the operational force, including supported agencies' and nations' forces, are efficiently and safely employed to maximize their combined effects beyond the sum of their individual capabilities. This includes synchronizing support to a supported command. Synchronization permits the friendly commander to get inside the enemy commander's decision cycle. Conditions: (3-14, 22-24). Standards: (a) Organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. (b) COCOM is the authority to perform those function of command over assigned forces including assigning tasks designating objectives, providing authoritative direction, joint training, and logistics necessary to meet mission requirements. (c) Generate decisive joint combat power through the integration of all US military capabilities and with other nations and organizations as required. (d) Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver provides a dynamic concept available to the joint force. (e) The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

OP 5.5 - Organize a Joint Force Headquarters. Organize a headquarters for the command and control of designated and organized joint and multinational forces under the duly authorized, single, joint force commander. Conditions: (1-15, 20-25). Standards: (a) The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFC's vision and concept of operations. (b) Key considerations are unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. (c) Joint force organizations need to consider interoperability with multinational forces. (d) Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.

OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support. Coordinate with elements of the joint force, allies/coalition partners, and other government agencies to ensure cooperation and mutual support, a consistent effort, and a mutual understanding of the joint force commander's priorities, support requirements, concept and intent, and objectives. Conditions: (3-5, 15-17, 19-26). Standards: (a) Ensure the joint force commanders priorities, support requirements, concept, interest, and objectives are clearly understood and that US, allied, and friendly nations act in concert as a single and seamless force to generate decisive joint combat power. (b) Coordinate coalition support activities to provide the combined force commander the means to acquire coalition force status and capabilities.

OP 6.1 - Provide Operational Aerospace and Missile Defense. Protect operational forces from air attack by direct defense and by destroying the enemy's air attack capacity in the air. This will include the use of aircraft, interceptor missiles, air defense artillery, and weapons not used primarily in an air defense role. Provide joint and multinational operational aerospace defense. Provide airspace control. Conditions: (3, 4, 11, 14, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26). Standards: (a) Disseminate TMD voice warning consistent with available and capable organizations and equipment, direct receipt of voice warning is preferred. (b) JFC TMD cell must maintain theater-wide TMD situational awareness 90% of the time by multiple means. (c) Recommend improvements on theater TMD policy and guidance to the JFC TMD cell. (d) The JFC TMD cell delivers recommendations in a timely manner to the theater JTCB for discussion and decision.

A.4.1. Scenario Task Conditions

Common Conditions that pertain to the above training tasks are listed below. The numbers against these conditions cross reference to the numbers in parenthesis after each task. The conditions are initial starting points and become dynamic once the exercise starts.

    1. JTF will conduct operations in an arid, austere environment, with severe climatic conditions, creating harsh conditions under which military personnel and equipment will operate. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 1.3.1 (arid), C 1.3.1.3.1 (hot), C 1.3.1.3.5 (very low), and C 1.3.2 (low).)
    2. Three maritime choke points (Strait of Hormuz, Bab El Mandeb, and Suez Canal) coupled with the confining characteristics of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf may impact the CINC/JTF's ability to rapidly respond to the crisis. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 1.1.3.4 (extensive) C 1.2.1.7 (confined), C 2.5.1.4 (contested), and C 2.7.3 (partial).)
    3. CINCCENT will conduct operations integrating multinational commands and forces to accomplish coalition objectives. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.1.1.2 (partial), C 2.1.1.4 (multinational), C 2.1.1.7 (limited), C 2.2.6 (some), and C 2.3.1.2 (partial).)
    4. CINCCENT will provide critical support to nations in the AOR in terms of security assistance, forward presence of military forces, and will deploy/employ military forces rapidly to the region to maintain regional peace and stability. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.1.1.3 (overt), C 2.1.1.4 (multinational), C 2.1.5.1 (short), C 2.3.1 (multinational), C 2.5.1.2 (minimal), and C 2.5.3.1 (limited).)
    5. CINCCENT will conduct operations supported by secure yet long intertheater lines of communication (LOCs) from the Continental United States (CONUS) to the AOR. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.1.4.5 (long), C 2.5.1 (good), C 2.5.1.3 (secure), C 2.5.2.1 (robust), C 2.5.2.2 (limited) and C 2.5.2.3 (little or no).)
    6. Staff officers have required knowledge and skills necessary to perform in a staff section/board/center/cell. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.2.4 (high), C 2.2.4.5 (normal), and C 2.3.1.3 (moderate).)
    7. Section/boards/centers/cells are properly equipped to perform their tasks. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.2.5.1 (abundant), C 2.2.5.2 (abundant), and C 2.2.6 (high).)
    8. Sections/boards/centers/cells are properly formed (organized). (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.2.7 (moderate), C 2.3.1.3 (moderate) and C 2.4.3 (mature).)
    9. Headquarters support functions are in place. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.5.4 (robust) and C 2.8.1 (adequate).)
    10. Coordination procedures are established and understood by all members of a staff's section/board/cell/centers. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.3.1.2 (partial), C 2.3.1.3 (moderate), C 2.3.1.4 (partial) and C2.3.1.6 (continuous).
    11. All guidance/directives/orders/intelligence summaries that would be available are available to the appropriate section/board/center/cell. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.3.2.1 (mission orders), C 2.3.1.8 (unrestricted) and C 2.2.5.2 (abundant).
    12. All required section/board/center/cell training has been completed. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.3.1.3 (high) and C 2.2.4 (high).
    13. All sections/boards/centers/cells have knowledge of own force capabilities and limitations. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.2.5 (abundant) and C 2.3.1.3 (high).
    14. All sections/boards/centers/cells have knowledge of enemy capabilities and limitations as appropriate. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.4.2 (abundant) and C 2.4.5 (moderate).
    15. DOD media pool is deployed and dissolved. (Note: Based on UJTL condition C 3.1.1.5.
    16. Joint Information Bureau is established and operational. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.2.3 (adequate), C 2.2.4 (high), C 2.2.5.2 (abundant), and C 2.3.1.8 (unrestricted).
    17. Army Reserve Civil Affairs personnel have been notified of call-up and active duty Civil Affairs liaison personnel have been deployed to establish the scope of requirements for a Civil Military Operations Center. (Note: Based on UJTL condition C 2.1.1 (clear), C 2.1.1.3 (overt), C 2.1.1.5 (cooperative), C 2.1.1.6 (major)and C 3.1.3.3.1 (partial).
    18. Respective environmental and combat service support specialty units have been notified of pending deployment. Critical assets include water purification and transportation units, oil spill and environmental decontamination specialists, and chemical detection and decontamination units. (Note: Based on UJTL condition C 2.1.1 (clear), C 2.1.1.3 (overt), C 2.1.1.5 (cooperative), C 2.1.1.6 (major), C 2.2.1 (strong), C 2.5.1.1 (full), C 2.5.2.3 (limited), C 2.8.3 (sufficient), and C 2.8.5 (extensive)..
    19. Chaplains and social services personnel have been notified and have begun appropriate personnel sensitivity and cultural awareness training programs. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.2.3 (adequate), C 2.2.4 (partial), C 2.2.4.4 (good), and C 2.2.4.5 (normal).
    20. Information warfare and electronic warfare specialists have begun aggressive protection and COMSEC programs, as well as evaluation of potential Iranian C4I weakness for exploitation. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.3.1.8 (restricted) and C 2.4.5 (strong).
    21. Communications with host nation and a clear mandate has been published for the operation, included the desired end state and duration of the mission. The mandate may be based on international sanctions, or by invitation of the coalition partner nations. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.1.1 (clear), C 2.1.1.2 (strong), and C 2.1.1.3 (overt).
    22. Contact with US government on scene authorities (such as US consular officials and Ambassadors) have been established, to include gathering information for any potential Department of State Non Combatant Evacuation Operation (to include numbers and locations of American Citizens, special category employees, and personnel likely to be compromised by their close association with US persons or employment.). (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.1.1.5 (cooperative), C 3.1.1.3 (strong) and C 3.1.2.1 (active).
    23. Appropriate Status of Forces Agreements with host nations and Rules of Engagement for the coalition forces have been established. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.1.1.4 (multinational) and C 2.1.1.5 (cooperative).
    24. Coordination for special mission and supporting CINC assets has been accomplished, for example, SPACECOM counter-TBM capabilities for tracking the potential SCUD-B threat. (Note: Based on UJTL conditions C 2.2.2 (multiple), C 2.2.5 (abundant) and C 2.7.3 (full).
    25. Force protection, security, and law enforcement procedures have been established. (Note: Based on UJTL condition C 2.7.1 (high).

A.5. World Situation

The international political, social, and economic environments are under pressure, with access to energy resources playing an increasingly volatile role in evolutionary and, at times, revolutionary power struggles. These struggles are sustained primarily by economic dissatisfaction.

In the Middle East, radical fundamentalist religious groups have continued the pattern of fanning social and economic agendas to gain power and popular political support. Oppressive regimes, rising population burdens, and failing resources contribute to the failure of many governments to meet the needs of their people. These human needs have gained recognition with the advance of the information age and the international exposure that highlights the deep economic rift between the "haves" and "have-nots."

As a result of these factors, tensions are running high around the world. The United States has strategic concerns in many of the key hot spots -- in Asia with China and Taiwan, in the Middle East Arab-Israeli contentious zones, and in South Asia with Pakistan and India. Of immediate concern is growing instability in Iran and the Persian Gulf region. The potential threat to the flow of oil from the area, in particular through the Strait of Hormuz, is a vital interest throughout the world.

A.5.1. The Iranian and Gulf Crisis

A.5.1.1. Background

Since the Persian Gulf conflict of Desert Storm, Iran has been fraught with turbulence, both internal and external. The Iranian people have become disillusioned after nearly 20 years of Islamic Fundamentalist rule. The Mullahs and the Fundamentalist controlled Government relied upon the China paradigm to engineer rapid economic growth. This plan focused on building a strong popular base of support, initially capitalizing on promises of improving the standard of living for the burgeoning underclass.

A.5.1.2. Sociological/Economic Factors

The initial success of the first generation economic plan also diminished political and religious opposition. With internal popularity high, the government opted to defer social benefit programs; instead, it applied economic resources to strengthen its military position in the region. The armed forces have purchased sophisticated military equipment from Russia, and they have made arms purchases from China.

Iran's rapid economic growth model has faltered with the reentry of Iraq into the world oil market. The resulting competition has led to increased tensions between the two countries. The competition in the oil market provides a pressure release point to reduce internal political and religious demands by focusing on a long standing external threat.

A.5.1.3. Demographics of Resistance

In Iran the economy remains soft, living standards continue to decline and it is becoming more difficult for the present regime to control internal dissent by non-lethal means. Complicating this volatile situation, the Iranian youth population continues to grow at a very high rate. This sector of the population is troublesome to the regime as it is under employed and susceptible to criminal and anti-regime political activity.

A.5.1.4. Regime Agenda - Retain Power

Human intelligence reporting has revealed that the Iranian Islamic Consultative (Majlis) urged the President to deal with the internal crisis by adopting a very hard line domestically. The President has taken dual action - internally, through a revitalization of Fundamentalist interpretation of the Faith by purging creeping Western influence, and externally, by asserting Iranian power in the region. The combination of the actions is intended to divert public attention away from the nation's economic stagnation.

Internal Control. Reflecting the internal crackdown and surge of anti-western sentiment, European and Japanese energy firms operating in Iran have become increasingly uncertain of their continued freedom of operation and long term access to energy resources. Investment sponsors underwriting the advanced oil extraction technology expressed concern over rumors of impending nationalization by the Iranian Government. Iranian officials have denied any intent to seize foreign assets, but local Mullahs have begun harassing foreign workers and their families. Workers have encountered restrictions on local travel and movement of equipment. Family members have faced harsh enforcement of Islamic Law. Iranian shop keepers and suppliers have begun refusing service to foreigners, noting they will be fined for such contacts.

External Threats. The Iranian Government's initial external actions consisted of military reinforcement of the key islands in the southern Persian Gulf. This effort was explained to the Iranian public in a televised address. The strident Islamic Fundamentalist rhetoric enjoined the Iranian people to link arms in a shield against the threat of Iraq, the American infidels, and their lackeys in the Middle East. The President declared that endless Iranian efforts to resolve the dispute over the sovereignty of Abu Muse and the Greater and Lessor Tunb Islands have fallen on deaf ears. He expounded on the need for military strength to guarantee the safety of Iranian citizens on the islands. Tacitly, the Iranian island reinforcement was probably intended to remind the Gulf Arabs of Iran's presence.

A.5.1.5. Regional Military Action

The status quo in the region, centered on the agreements between Gulf Cooperation Council states and the western allies had effectively reduced Iran's regional influence, and served to stabilize oil prices at a level below that considered essential to sustain the Iranian economic paradigm. The Iranian Government determined a visible threat to oil resource access would best serve its interests and give the regime renewed regional voice. The Government controlled media has focused on the elite capabilities, unit training, and reinforcement activity on the islands.

Combat engineers have improved preexisting berms, water holding tanks, defensive fighting positions, airfield facilities, and bunkers. Troop strength has been increased and coastal artillery sites have been manned. Because of this action, the UAE protested to the United Nations. However, the protest has elicited very little reaction from the international community. This perceived lack of international interest encouraged the Iranian leadership to broaden their military activities in the southern Gulf.

A.5.1.6. International Shipping Provocations

Recently the Iranian Foreign Minister announced that Iran would begin to enforce the provisions of its 1993 Maritime Law, which provides that the waters between islands not more than 24 miles apart are Iranian internal waters. Passage of vessels through these waters would require Iranian permission. Specifically, the Foreign Minister's proclamation stated that any merchant shipping transiting within Iran's so-called "internal sea" will be boarded and expected to pay a 5% tariff on the cargo. Additionally, Iran stated that no foreign warships would be permitted to enter or transit through the "internal sea," and any attempts to do so would be met with force.

In the northern Gulf, the Iranians have reinforced the contested area of the Shatt al Arab territory. This resurgence of territorial claims was also heralded with Fundamentalist rhetoric. The Mullahs announced a Jihad and Allah's Call to avenge the dead of the eight year Iran-Iraq conflict. This direct challenge to the Iraqi Government has further heightened tensions in the Gulf region. Iraq is countering the Iranian action by moving their forces into the Shatt al Arab area. This movement has flamed the concerns of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular. Overall, the region is primed with dissent, heightening the concerns of all the countries in the Persian Gulf area and the world community.

A.6. Scenario Events

The foregoing JSIMS scenario provides a general picture of the political, economic, and military situation in Iran. This situation is deteriorating to the extent initial pre-hostilities force deterrent options (FDOs) can be expected to be initiated by the National Command Authority. These initial FDOs will not be intrusive or provocative from a military perspective. The JSIMS scenario includes a sequence of events that evolve to trigger progressively more aggressive political decisions and military actions by the United States, its allies, and potential coalition states.

A.6.1. Escalation - Stages One Through Four

A.6.1.1. Stage One.

The Iranian Government continues issuing strong political and military escalation rhetoric simultaneously with efforts to revitalize nationalist fervor.

External Situation

Persian Gulf. The Iranian Media has actively broadcast coverage of the military buildup on the two Tunbs, Abu Musa, and Sirri islands. Iranian military forces continue to strengthen their defensive positions on the islands. The UAE has expressed grave concern regarding Iranian intentions in the Persian Gulf.

Iran-Iraq Border. Iranian military posturing on the Iraqi border continues, and the pace of the force build-up has increased. Two army divisions located at Bakhtaran have moved to defensive positions to the west and along the border. Special forces teams from the 23d Special Forces Division have reportedly made reconnaissance forays over the border into Iraq to coordinate with the Kurds in the northern region of Iraq.

Internal Situation

In spite of the Regime's efforts to control and divert public opinion, political and economic turmoil are growing.

Resistance. Regional political and economic differences are beginning to surface in intellectual and political resistance forums. Common citizens are voicing economic concerns as unemployment increases. The willingness of the population to express opposition is greater in northern Iran, as highlighted by a recent general strike in the city of Tabriz. People in this region are calling for greater regional political autonomy and economic choices.

Military Reliability. Reports of internal military disagreements and leadership purges are coming to the attention of the Iranian public as the Iraq-Iran border is being reinforced. Army personnel in particular recall the bitter carnage endured during the previous eight year war with Iraq. The belated efforts of the regime to portray the historic claims and conflict with Iraq as a Holy cause and declaration of its victims as Martyrs have been unable to erase the negative legacy.

A.6.1.2. Stage Two

Political, military, and terrorist activities accelerate.

Political. Official proclamations indicate a shipping tax will be levied and strictly enforced. The Government issued a demarche to the UAE demanding an immediate oil price increase. The rambling demarche further demanded refusal of passage to all U.S. flagged ships into the Gulf States ports and facilities and threatened any UAE asset found communicating or cooperating with a U.S. Navy ship in the Gulf.

Outward signs of organized political dissent in northern Iran are gaining momentum. The city of Tabriz is becoming the focal point for a rival political faction of government. The local leadership has taken control of local media and is aggressively demanding self rule status. There is intense friction in negotiations and contact with the current national regime.

World opinion is beginning to take on a negative shape toward the aggressive activities of Iran. The United Nations is coming under increasing pressure to react to the belligerent tone and escalating level of Iran's political and military actions in the Persian Gulf region.

The Government of Egypt has made extraordinary diplomatic efforts to defuse the volatile situation and has offered to facilitate a review and possible negotiations on the Iranian issues and claims. The Iranian Government has spurned the Egyptian efforts and denounced the Egyptian Government as a western puppet and traitor to Islam.

Military. The Iranian Government continues its belligerent military actions on the islands adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz. Patrol boats from the Iranian coast have been making provocative runs on shipping moving through the Strait of Hormuz. Reports of Iranian military abuses of UAE citizens on the island of Abu Musa are beginning to surface.

Terrorist. A terrorist group claimed to have placed a bomb in a hotel frequented by American oil business persons in Abu Dhabi, UAE. American and European citizens were among the casualties. Investigation into the incident revealed the group had trained in Iran and maintained links to the Iranian fundamentalist advisors. In addition, several high level members of the group were noted to have received Iranian travel permissions and financial support. The Iranian Government responded to these allegations by decrying them as yet another Western conspiracy and part of an international effort to discredit legitimate Iranian businesses in an effort to hold oil prices down.

A.6.1.3. Stage Three

Military. Iran has established the long threatened tariff on merchant shipping passing through the Gulf of Hormuz. Merchant ships have been boarded and the crews forced to pay the tax before proceeding. Three ships that did not respond to radio and semaphore warning were fired upon, forced to stop, and subsequently boarded. Crews have reported being searched, having their personal property and papers seized, and enduring aggressive responses to any form of resistance. Ships' crews unable or lacking means to render payment have been forced to remain anchored under guard, without resupply, until their parent companies were forthcoming with electronic transfer payment. Several flag line carriers and tanker companies have registered international protests over the contract delays and blackmail nature of the Iranian Navy's enforcement actions.

Coastal defense batteries have been activated all along the Iranian coast. Unannounced live fire exercises against towed targets have been conducted, often in close proximity to passing merchant shipping. Iran conducted a test firing of a SCUD B missile. The missile was launched from a mobile firing position near Teheran. The dummy warhead impacted in the Gulf of Oman. The firing was not announced, nor was a "Notice to Mariners or Airmen" provided by the Iranian Navy or the Government.

A.6.1.4. Stage Four

The situation portends activation of a combined United States, allied, and coalition military response at the major theater war (MTW) level.

Military. The Iranian Army has deployed its Theater Ballistic Missile Force from garrison locations to tactical hide sites. These positions are in the vicinity of prepared launch sites. Chemical warheads are also suspected of having been pre-staged near the SCUD firing positions. Iran's military is at the highest state of alert. National mobilization efforts are underway. Mining preparations are being observed in the Strait of Hormuz area. Submarines have been reported as deployed from known pier locations at Bandar Abbas and Bandar Beheshti.

International Incidents.

An American flagged tanker was fired upon, boarded, and the crew taken hostage. The ship was subsequently set on fire and is expected to be scuttled inside the Iranian 12 mile limit north of Jazereh-ye Forur Island in the ingress shipping lane.

An Egyptian flagged commercial cargo ship transiting off Abu Mase radioed a distress call and described hull damage indicating the ship had struck a mine. The crew was taken into custody by Iranian patrol forces and transported to the Island. The damaged ship was scuttled after supplies and some of its cargo were removed.

Political. The United States issued a formal international protest of the Iranian attack on the oil tanker and demanded the immediate release of the ship's crew. The Iranian Government responded by moving the hostages to the mainland and announcing preparations to try the American captain as a spy. The state controlled Iranian media broadcast images of cryptologic equipment and communications suites ostensibly described as being seized from the tanker.

The Egyptian Government issued an immediate protest and demand for the release of the ship's crew.

Iranian radio announced obtaining proof of the Egyptian Government 's secretly cooperating with the United States to betray the faithful by placing American spies among the ship's crew.

Iran has withdrawn its Ambassador to the United Nations for emergency consultations. Government security forces have surrounded the Japanese Embassy and demanded oil royalty payments in lieu of unpaid shipping taxes. The Swiss Ambassador has reported that requests for the departure of Japanese Embassy sponsored dependents have been rebuffed.

Economic. Lloyds of London has declared the Strait of Hormuz a high risk area and tripled its insurance rates on commercial shipping bound through the Persian Gulf. Speculation on the international oil market has generated crude oil price increases. Japan and Indonesia have reported spot shortages of refined petroleum products.

Environmental. The sinking of the U.S. oil tanker threatens to release a swath of crude oil into the Gulf. Regional concern for the protection of desalinization facilities is paramount. Fresh water supplies in the region are estimated marginal. Loss of water production would exacerbate immediate health concerns and further destabilize the regional situation.

A.7. Operational Situation

A.7.1. Background

In response to this hypothetical scenario environment, planning guidance in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) will have directed the Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command (CINCCENT) to prepare operational plans for the Persian Gulf region. Because of the political, economic, and military volatility of the Persian Gulf region and because of its strategic importance, a fully developed operational plan would be ready for implementation. These war plans are developed within the context of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) "deliberate" planning process in response to specific guidance in the JSCP. Fully developed plans include a Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) file and corresponding supporting CINCs' plans.

In this hypothetical operational situation the plan would be assigned an exercise reference name under the existing OPLAN. The plan would be updated continually as events occur to maintain the plan in a "ready to execute" status awaiting a National Command Authority (NCA) execute decision. The plan concept includes five distinct stages: (1) prehostilities; (2) lodgment; (3) decisive combat and stabilization; (4) follow-through; and (5) posthostilities and redeployment. These stages support activities that constitute the five phases of war - mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.

CINC Campaign Plan: A Persian Gulf major theater war (MTW) campaign plan would exist for the region to link national strategic security objectives to the operational level joint task force (JTF) planning requirement. As a minimum this plan would include: (1) theater objectives; (2) CINC's mission statement; (3) concept of operations; (4) command and control arrangements; and (5) force allocation. In general this campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations to accomplish theater objectives and the assigned mission. The following represents a skeleton campaign plan that would set the operational stage for a CINCCENT established joint task force (JTF) to conduct this MTW operation.

A.7.2. Theater Objectives

Theater objectives for this scenario follow:

    • Assure access to strategic resources. In coordination with allies and friendly nations in the region, ensure continued, unimpeded access to the petroleum reserves in the Gulf area. In particular, prevent hostile forces from gaining control or threatening closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
    • Ensure external security for friendly regional states. Foster programs to improve the defense capabilities of friendly nations in the region. Encourage the development of political and economic activities within, and cooperative security arrangements among, friendly nations in order to enhance regional stability. When directed, provide direct U.S. military assistance to deter attacks on or defend friendly nations from external threats.
    • Develop plans to provide direct U.S. military assistance to deter attacks on friendly countries and, in the event that deterrence fails, defend them from external attack. These plans should address various levels of U.S. involvement, from logistics support only; to support of friendly regional forces by air, naval, and SOF forces; to employment of major U.S. ground, naval, and air forces.
    • Ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz from control or interdiction by hostile powers.
    • Conduct routine naval operations to ensure the freedom of navigation through international waterways in the region and develop plans to respond to attempts by hostile powers to curtail or stop freedom of navigation in vital international waterways.
    • Countering weapon proliferation, including active and passive actions and plans to counter effectively the military and political intimidation and war fighting activities of adversaries who possess weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems.

A.7.3. Mission Statement

When directed conduct military operations in the Persian Gulf operational area to prevent hostile forces from gaining and maintaining control of the international waterways in the Gulf region to insure continued free passage to and from the area, and to counter military intimidation and war fighting against allies and friendly nations. Should deterrence fail, conduct land, sea, and aerospace operations to counter the aggression and reestablish friendly force control and long term stability in the region.

A.7.4. Concept of Operations

The CINC Campaign Plan concept of operations would be segmented into the five stages as identified above. Representative strategic national, strategic theater, and operational level activities supporting these stages follows:

Stage 1 - Prehostilities: Actions in this stage include "adaptive planning" generated flexible deterrent options (FDOs) that focus on deterrent measures. These measures include political, economic, diplomatic, and military efforts to stabilize the situation in the region. USCENTCOM generated military FDOs include: (1) Increase readiness of in-place forces; (2) Upgrade the in-place force alert status; (3) Increase strategic and operational reconnaissance and intelligence collection efforts (including SOF missions); (4) Direct show of force by ordering deployment of the Army prepositioned sets (APS) and maritime prepositioning ships (MPS); deploying a CVBG to the region along with the deployed ARG/MEU, and an "advance force" JTF HQ element aboard a Navy command ship (LCC); moving Air Force tactical fighter squadrons and air command and control assets to bed-down positions in the region; bolstering command, control and communications in the area; and, upgrading the region's logistic posture. Corresponding activities at the U.S. national level include initiating actions to form an international coalition to confront this hostile activity under United Nation sponsorship.

Stage 2 - Lodgment: Military actions in this stage include reestablishing the "rights of innocent passage" through the waterways in the Gulf; establishing lodgment areas in the region to support follow-on deployment of a decisive combat force; and a corresponding logistics support buildup in the event deterrence fails. If necessary, forcible entry operations will be conducted to establish lodgments for initial defensive and subsequent offensive operations and force expansion. This stage will also include increased reconnaissance and intelligence collection efforts and expansion of command and control facilities in the theater of operations. Pre-hostilities lodgment activities will include peacetime deployment to host nation air and sea ports in the event pre-hostility deterrent activities are warranted based on hostile force reactions to deterrent measures implemented in the first stage. In-theater forces will focus on defensive measures to secure lodgment areas and on providing operational security for the forces deployed in the region, to permit lodgment activities to proceed as planned to support the buildup effort.

Stage 3 - Decisive Force and Stabilization: The initial focus of this stage will be on a rapid buildup of joint forces' offensive combat capability. Force flow will be established to expand the offensive capability to a point were decisive combat operations can be initiated to defeat the enemy forces and reestablish stability in the Persian Gulf region. Once the buildup has been completed, joint forces will transition from a defensive posture and, when feasible, conduct combat operations in the land, air, and maritime areas of operation (AOs). Decisive action will focus on winning, as directed by the NCA, by controlling the enemy territory and population and by destroying the enemy's ability and will to continue the war.

Stage 4 - Follow-through: This stage will involve a synchronized theater-wide effort to bring military operations developed in the above stages to a successful conclusion. Activities include actions to ensure the political objectives are achieved and sustained. The main thrust of this effort will be to assure that the military and/or political threat will not resurface. This will be done by addressing long term requirements to secure an enduring stability in the Gulf region. Theater forces will be prepared to conduct peacekeeping operations and transition to operations in support of other governmental agencies or UN directed activities. The emphasis will be on war termination objectives as established by the NCA. Forces will conduct military operations that will not conflict with the long-term solution to the problems that initially generated the crisis.

Stage 5 - Post-hostilities and Redeployment: This stage will evolve from military combat operations and transition to operations associated with peacekeeping. U.S. forces will initially focus on preparing to reduce the scope of military involvement in the region. These forces can expect to transition from controlling the war effort to a role of providing support as in the context of a "supporting" command to a non-military organization. As military requirements for operational forces are reduced they will be phased out of the theater of operations. Redeployment will be phased to correspond with the operational situation. Combat arms beyond security forces will be redeployed first. Support forces can be expected to remain until region stabilization efforts are assumed by non-military agencies. At this point in the stage, total redeployment will be directed, concluding the CINC's mission.

A.7.5. Command and Control

Command relationships would be specified in the CINC plan. This plan would designate a joint task force (JTF) commander to provide command and control over the joint operational effort. Command authority would be specified for the JTF commander and, in this case, operational control (OPCON) would be delegated to the JTF commander. Command relationships for dealing with coalition and allied forces would also be detailed. The basis for the notional command and control relationships is as identified in the JTF organizational structure included at Figure A.4.2.

Control measures would be specified to establish bounds for the JTF in executing the mission tasks assigned. A key bounding measure is provided in the form of designated operational areas. These areas as designated for the CINC plan follow:

    • Theater of War -- Persian Gulf Region including the countries of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait.
    • Joint Operations Area (JOA) -- The area within the theater designated by the CINC in which the JTF will conduct military operations. The JOA includes land, sea, and airspace. This area includes the western area of Iran, eastern Persian Gulf area of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the sea approaches from the Arabian Sea.
    • Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) - The land, sea, and airspace assigned to Special Operations Forces for operations by SOF units. The stage one JSOA includes the general area of the Hormozgan and the Zagos Mountains region of Iraq.
    • Joint Rear Area (JRA) -- The area wherein the JTF facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations in theater. Initial JRA is in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and Diego Garcia, B.I.O.T. Other JRAs will be designated as the operation progresses through the various stages of the operation throughout the world. Areas where stage 2 lodgments are established can be anticipated for planning purposes to become JRAs as the operation progresses.
    • Area of Operations (AO) - Land, air, and sea area where land and naval forces operate within the JOA. They will not include the entire JOA, but include areas needed to control land, sea and air operations as the war effort progresses through the designated stages.
    • Area of Interest -- Area within the theater in which the JTF commander has a general interest as activities in the area may impact on his operation. Of primary interest is the area in and from which the enemy can affect current or future operations.

A.7.6 Force Allocation

The CINC plan would allocate planning forces to conduct the operation. These forces would hypothetically be as designated in the JSCP for a Major Theater War (MTW) in the Persian Gulf Theater of Operations. These forces would identify the resources the JTF commander can expect to have available to conduct the operation if and when authorized for execution. A notional force allocation for this operation is included at Annex B.

A.8. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

The MOOTW scenario envisioned is a humanitarian relief mission subset of the major theater war scenario. It will focus on the exercise of a joint training audience nearing the conclusion of an assigned relief mission. Activities will center on preparation for closure, e.g., transition of the on-scene situation to civilian authority and military withdrawal operations.

A.8.1. Background

During the course of the MTW it comes to the attention of the international community that a minority ethnic faction in the JOA has been subjected to increasing physical and economic abuse by Iranian military forces, with the tacit approval of the Iranian Government. Members of the faction experience increasing difficulty in finding work, and many are discharged from positions they have held for several years. Methodical eviction of faction families from their homes begins, and rumors of summary executions start to circulate, some appearing in the international press. Historical religious and cultural variances from the Iranian majority provide the Iranian media with justification for the sanctions imposed by the military, but the Iranian media facade is not lost on the international press or the world community.

During the follow-through stage of the MTW, the JTF commander is alerted to prepare to provide security and support efforts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) that have initiated relief activities on behalf of faction members. Subsequently, the JTF commander is directed to execute that mission, resulting in detachment of security and support forces to the area of interest to perform necessary security and support functions associated with the humanitarian relief operation.

A.8.2. Factors Affecting Mission Execution

    • The relief operation is conducted amidst ongoing international negotiations to establish standards for the autonomy of the minority group, as a subset of a peace agreement.
    • The signature of a peace accord includes provision of immediate elections in the minority dominated area of interest.
    • International representatives note the need to conduct election training and monitoring in the contested area to ensure minority access and confidence in the electoral process. Elements of election results include decisions on self rule, autonomy, or continued minority representation within the ruling government.
    • Successful elections and repatriation of minority displaced persons to their homes are essential conditions to the conclusion of the humanitarian mission (and larger MTW).

 

A.8.3. MOOTW Development Scenario Summary

Determination of the training audience will assist refinement of the MOOTW scenario and preparation of organizational relationships for replication in the JSIMS build. Unlike the standing OPLAN ready for execution and under continuing updates, MOOTW mission requirements often develop without existing plans or guidelines. The potential for use of JSIMS to quickly replicate real world circumstances - build and rehearse or study various alternative courses of action could provide the users a unique and valuable tool for assessing and responding to high pressure situations.

A.9. Academic Seminar Training Scenario

Currently envisioned as a classroom training session for a school house audience or for an operational commander and staff, the academic seminar is the ideal forum for presentation and JSIMS facilitation of non traditional military missions. Such an event might include study of lessons learned in Somalia and Bosnia, followed by a JSIMS supported United Nations mandated mission. JSIMS training support would include replication of the United Nations entities and decisions relevant to the example scenario.

A.10. Conclusion

Use of development scenarios will facilitate the development and integration of JSIMS by providing an initial scope of effort which can grow to meet user requirements.

References:

JSIMS Functional Requirements Document, 20 November 1996

JSIMS Universal Capabilities List of 16 June 1997

JSIMS Operational Requirements Document, version 2.7, 18 June 1997

CJCSM 3500.04A "Universal Joint Tasks Lists" version 3.0, 13 September 1996

Naval Doctrine Command, "Naval Tactical Task List - Version 1.1, 30 September 1996

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Final Draft - "DA PAM 11-XX, Army Universal Task List", 14 March 1997

U.S. Air Force Task List at the Tactical Level of War, 4 April 1997

Defense Planning Guidance Illustrative Scenarios for Planning

Joint Warfare System Draft scenario of 18 June 1997

Sources:

Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations" of 1 February 1995

Armed Forces Staff College Pub I (AFSC Pub 1), "'The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1997"

 

B.1. General

The following is a notional presentation of the forces allocated to CINCCENT for planning purposes. The forces presented would be designated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). In a hypothetical environment the forces listed below will eventually be assigned to a JTF for operations in the JOA. Forces will be phased into the operation to support the operational concept. The following is a breakout of the forces expected to be deployed into the theater to meet operational requirements. N day is the the day that active duty units are notified for deployment/redeployment. C days are the days that active duty units deploy. M day is the day that reserve/air national guard units deploy.

Appendix (1) to Annex B: U.S. Forces

B.A1.1. In Place Forces - Major Theater War - Persian Gulf

The following forces can be expected to be in theater at the time the OPLAN is ordered executed by the NCA.

Army Forces

Unit

Available Date

Location

Source

Component

Remarks

APS 4a

Available

Kuwait

CENTCOM

Active

Brigade Set

APS 4b

Available

Qatar

CENTCOM

Active

Brigade Set

Air Forces

Unit

Available Date

Location

Source

Component

Remarks

Composite Wing

Available

Saudi Arabia

CENTCOM

Active

1 Sqdrn F-15s

2 Sqdrns F-16s

Naval Forces

Unit

Available Date

Location

Source

Component

Remarks

5th FLT SAG

Available

Arabian Sea

CENTCOM

Active

Note 1

Peleliu ARG

Available

Arabian Sea

CENTCOM

Active

Note 2, 15th MEU embarked

MCM-1 Ardent and Dexterous

Available

Home ported, Bahrain

CENTCOM

Active

Rotational crews, operate with 5th Flt

VP DET

Available

Masirah

CENTCOM

Active

3 P-3C ,EP-3

Note: 1. Valley Forge SAG

Designation

Name

Capability

CG-50

Valley Forge

2 SH-60 Lamps III

DD-968

Arthur W. Radford

2 SH-60 Lamps III

DD-969

Peterson

2 SH-60 Lamps III

DDG-72

Mahan

2 SH-60 Lamps III

MHC-53

Oriole

Mine Hunter

MHC-55

Pelican

Mine Hunter

MCM-8

Scout

Mine Countermeasures

MCS-12

Inchon

8 MH-53's Embarked

T-AO 202

Yukon

Oiler

Note 2. PELELIU Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)

Designation

Name

LHA-5

Peleliu

LPD-9

Denver

LSD-39

Mount Vernon

LSD-45

Comstock

15 th MEU embarked on PELELIU ARG

Designation

Capability

Battalion Landing Team 2/1

1 Infantry Bn, 12 AAV, 6 LAV, 6 M198

VMA-214

Six Harriers

HML/A

3 UH- I N & 4 AH- 1W

HMM- 164

12 CH-46, 4 CH-53

MSSG-15

 

Coast Guard Forces:

Units

Location

Available Date

Remarks

Coast Guard Port Security

Bahrain and UAE

Available

4 16 ft and

2 110 ft boats

 

B.A1.2. Allocated for Planning - Persian Gulf Region

CINC/CENTCOM Staff:

Parent Unit

Sub-Unit

Location

Available

Component

Remarks

CENTCOM

HQ staff

CONUS

N+2, C+5

Active

 

 

Army Forces:

Parent Unit

Sub-Unit

Location

Available

Component

Remarks

3rd Army

HQ 3d Army

CONUS

N+1, C+7

Active

 
 

HQ III Corps

Fort Sill, OK

N+2, C+30

Active

 
 

1st Mech Div

Germany

N+2, C+30

Active

1 Bde (Ft. Riley, KS)

 

4th Mech Div

Fort Hood, TX

N+4, C+45

Active

 
 

1st Cav Div

Fort Hood, TX

N+4, C+45

Active

 
 

3rd Armd Cav Rgt

Fort Carson, CO

N+4, C+45

Active

 
 

6th Cav Bde

Fort Hood, TX

N+4, C+45

Active

 
 

III Corps Arty

Fort Sill, OK

N+4, C+45

Active

 
 

504th MI Bde

Fort Hood, TX

N+4, C+45

Active

 
 

89th MP Bde

Fort Hood, TX

N+4, C+45

Active

 
 

31st AD Bde

Fort Hood, TX

N+4, C+45

Active

 
 

13th CosCom

Fort Hood, TX

N+4, C+30

Active

 
 

155th Cav Bde

Tupelo MS

N+2, C+30

Active

 
 

MD Bde

 

N+2, C+90

Reserve Comp

FORSCOM

   

Engr Bde

 

N+2, C+90

Reserve Comp

FORSCOM

 

XVIII ABN Corps

Fort Bragg

C+4

Active

 
 

Corps HQ

Fort Polk

C+4

Active

 
 

2 ND Lt. Armd Cav Rgt

Fort Bragg

C+10

Active

 
 

1st CosCom

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

525th Med Bde

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

44th Med Bde

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

18th Avn Bde

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

35th Signal Bde

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

16th MP Bde

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

20th Engineer Bde

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

108th AD Bde

Fort Bliss

C+2

Active

 
 

XVII ABN Corps Arty

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

82nd Air Defense Bde

Fort Bragg

C+2

Active

 
 

101st Air Assault Div

Fort Campbell

N+2, C+45

Active

 
 

3rd Mech Div

Fort Stewart

N+2, C+45

Active

 
 

10th Inf Div

Fort Drum

N+2, C+45

Active

 

Air Forces:

Unit

Location

Available

Component

Remarks

HQ 9th AF

CONUS

C+4

Active

ASOCC

CONUS

C+4

Active

Air Sector Operations Center

Composite Wing

CONUS

C+4

Active

1 Squadron F-15s/

2 Squadrons F-16s

Fighter Wing

CONUS

C+4

Active

1 Squadron F-15s

AWACS Wing

CONUS

C+4

Active

16 AWACS

Fighter Wing

CONUS

C+10

Active

4 Squadrons A-10s

Fighter Wing

CONUS

C+4

Active

2 Squadrons F-15

Fighter Wing

CONUS

C+4

Active

3 Squadrons F-16

Fighter Wing

CONUS

C+6

Active

4 Squadrons F-15E

Fighter Wing

CONUS

M+30

Air National Guard

3 Squadrons F-15E

Bomb Wing

CONUS

C+4

Active

16 B-ls

Bomb Wing

CONUS

C+14

Active

16 B-ls

Bomb Wing

CONUS

C+4

Active

12 B-52s

Bomb Wing

CONUS

C+14

Active

12 B-52s

Stealth Wing

CONUS

C+4

Active

36 F-117s

Fighter Wing

United Kingdom

C+4

Active

54 F- 15s

Fighter Wing

Italy

C+4

Active

1 Squadron F- 16s

Fighter Wing

CONUS

M+30

Air National Guard

7 Squadrons F-16s

Fighter Wing

CONUS

M+30

Air Force Reserve

2 Squadrons F-16s

JSTARS Det

CONUS

C+4

Active

3 E-8 A/C

Det 11th Recon

CONUS

C+4

Active

4 Predator UAV

Det Surveillance

CONUS

C+4

Active

3 RC-135s; 2 U-2s

AMC Squad

CONUS

C+4

Active

10 KC-10

Refuel Squads

CONUS

C+4

Active

24 KC-135

AMC Squad

CONUS

C+4

Active

12 C-17

Airlift Squads

CONUS

C+4

Active

16 C-130

 

Navy Forces:

Parent Unit

Sub-Units

Location

Available Date

Remarks

5th Fleet TF 50

 

Bahrain

   

TG 50.1

Task Force 50

Indian Ocean

N+3

Embarked Blue Ridge LCC-19

TG-50.2

Nimitz CVBG

Indian Ocean

N+2

Note 1

TG-50.3

Truman CVBG

Atlantic Ocean

N+20

Note 2

TG-50.4

Bataan ARG

Mediterranean Sea

N+7

With Truman TG/26MEU, Note 3

TG-50.5

Kearsarge ARG

Mediterranean Sea

N+7

In Work-up, Note 3

TG-50.6

Guam ARG

Norfolk

N+20

Ready ARG, Note 3

TG-50.7

MPSRON

Diego Garcia

N+6

Preposition Force

TG-50.8

ATF

Pacific Ocean

N+14

PhibGru-3

TG-50.9

MPSRON-3

Guam

N+10

Preposition Force

Note 1: Nimitz Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)

Designation/Name

Designation/Name

Designation/Name

CVN-68 Nimitz

CG-59 Princeton

CG-73 Port Royal

DDG-62 Fitzgerald

DDG-69 Milius

FFG-57 Reuben James

SSN-717 Olympia

SSN-752 Pasadena

AOE-10

PC-4 Monsoon (SOF support)

PC-5 Typhoon (SOF support)

CVW-9 (74 A/C: 14 F-14, 36 F/A-18, 4 EA-6B, 4 E-2C, 8 S3B, 4 SH-60F, 2 HH-60H, 2 ES-3A)

Note 2: Truman Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) will have similar size units and aircraft embarked to that described in the Nimitz Battle Group. One aircraft carrier with 74 aircraft, two cruisers, two guided missile destroyers, one guided missile frigate, two attack submarines, and an oiler.

Note 3: Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Guam Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) will each have units and embarked MEU similar to that described in paragraph B.a.1 above.

 

Coast Guard Forces:

Parent Unit

Units

Location

Available Date

Remarks

TG-55.3

WHEC 715

Atlantic Ocean

N+20

CGC Hamilton

TG-55.4

WHEC 716

Mediterranean Sea

N+7

CGC Dallas

TG-55.2

WHEC 721

Indian Ocean

N+2

CGC Gallatin

TG-120

WMEC 911/901

Caribbean Sea

N+30

CGC Forward & Bear

Marine Corps Forces:

Parent Unit

Sub-Units

Location

Available Date

Remarks

I MEF

 

CONUS

C+2

Camp Pendleton,CA

CE

HQ I MEF

CONUS

C+2

Command Element

 

9th Comm Bn (-)

CONUS

C+2

 
 

1st Radio Bn (-)

CONUS

C+2

 
 

1st ANGLCO (-)

CONUS

C+2

 

GCE

H&S Bn (-) 1st MARDIV

CONUS

C+2

 
 

1st MarRegt

CONUS

C+2

 
 

5th MarRegt

CONUS

M+10

 
 

7th MarRegt

CONUS

C+2

MPS Fly in Echelon

 

11 th MarRegt

CONUS

C+2

4 Arty Bns: 18x I 55tow

 

3rd AAV Bn

CONUS

C+2

4 Cos: 208 AAVs

 

1st LARBn

CONUS

C+2

4 Cos: 106 LAVs

 

1st Tk Bn

CONUS

C+2

4 Cos: 58 M-ls

 

1st Cbt Eng Bn

CONUS

C+2

4 Cbt CO's + I Eng Spt CO

 

8th Tk Bn

CONUS

C+2

4 Cos 58 M-1s

 

4th AAV

CONUS

C+2

2 Cos 102 AAVs

FSSG

HQ 1st FSSG

CONUS

C+2

 
 

H&S Bn

CONUS

C+2

 
 

7th Engr Spt Bn

CONUS

C+2

 
 

1st Supply Bn

CONUS

C+2

 
 

1st Maint Bn

CONUS

C+2

 
 

7th MT Bn

CONUS

C+2

 
 

1st Landing Spt Bn

CONUS

C+2

 
 

1st Med Bn

CONUS

C+2

 
 

1st Dental Co

CONUS

C+2

 

ACE

3rd MAW

CONUS

C+2

Cherry Point NC

 

Marine Air Control Group 38

CONUS

C+2

36 IHAWKS,

60 Avengers,

30 Stingers

 

MAG-13

CONUS

C+2

60 AV-8B, 10 RPV

 

MAG-16 & 39

CONUS

C+2

72 CH-46s

48 CH-53s

 

MAG-11

CONUS

C+2

72 F/A-18C/Ds, 12 KC-130s, 6 EA-6B

 

MAG-39

CONUS

C+2

54 AH-1W

27 UH-1N

 

MWSG-2

CONUS

C+2

Logistic/

Maintenance

II MEF

II MEF (Forward) CE

LeJeune

C+2

Amphibious MEF (FWD), Camp LeJeune, NC

 

HQ CO

CONUS

C+2

Camp Lejeune NC

 

Det 2nd SRIG

CONUS

C+2

Camp Lejeune NC

 

Det 8th Com Bn

CONUS

C+2

Camp Lejeune NC

 

Det 2nd Radio Bn

 

C+2

 
 

Det, Intel Co

 

C+2

 
 

Det 2nd Force RECON

CONUS

C+2

Camp Lejeune NC

 

Det 2nd ANGLICO

CONUS

C+2

Camp Lejeune NC

GCE

RLT-8

 

C+2

3 Infantry Bns,

1 Artillery Bn 18 M198s

2nd AAV Bn (-) 102 AAVs

Tk Co 14 M-1s

LAR Co 25 LAVs

Cbt Eng Co

ACE

MAG-26

 

C+2

16 CH-53s

36 CH-46s

18 AH-1W, 9 UH-1N

12 AV-8B

CSSE

CSSG-5

 

C+2

Det, 8th Eng Bn

Det, 2nd Maint Bn

Det, 2nd Supply Bn

Det, 2nd Med Bn

Det, 8th Motor Transportation Bn

Det, 2nd Landing Support Bn

 

Special Operations Forces (SOF):

Parent Unit

Sub-Units

Location

Available Date

Remarks

SOCOM

HQ SOCCENT

CONUS

N+2, C+7

 

Army SOF:

5th Special Forces Group (SFG)

CONUS

N+4, C+14

3 Battalions

 

19th SFG

CONUS

M+30

National Guard

 

4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) (-)

CONUS

HQ element N+7, C+21

Task organized,

BN (-)

 

96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CA BN) (-)

CONUS

LNOs N+7, C+14

Reserves M+60

Task organized

 

160th Special Operations Air Regiment (SOAR)

(-)

CONUS

N+7 to 14

MH-60/MH-47E

 

75Tth Ranger Regiment

CONUS

N+4, C+14

1 Battalion

Air Force SOF: 16th Special Operations Wing (SOW)

 

CONUS

N+4, C+7

HQ functions

 

21st Special Tactics Squadron (STS)

CONUS

N+4, C+7

 
 

20th Special Operations Squadron

(SOS)

CONUS

N+4, C+7

MH-53J

 

55th SOS

CONUS

N+4, C+7

MH-60G

 

4th SOS

CONUS

N+4, C+7

AC-130U

 

16th SOS

CONUS

N+4, C+7

AC-130H

 

8th SOS

CONUS

N+4, C+7

MC-130E

 

9th SOS

CONUS

N+4, C+7

MC-130P

 

15th SOS

 

N+4, C+7

MC-130H

Navy SOF :

Navy Special Warfare Group (NSWGRP) 1

 

CONUS

N+4, C+7

HQ Element

 

SEAL Team 1

CONUS

N+4, C+7

Task organized

 

SEAL Team 3

CONUS

N+4, C+7

Task organized

 

SEAL Team 5

CONUS

N+4, C+7

Task organized

 

Special Dive Vehicle (SDV) Team 1

CONUS

N+14, C+21

 
 

Navy Special Boat Squadron (NAVSPECBOATRON) 1

CONUS

N+14, C+21

Task organized

 

Special Boat Unit (SBU) 12

CONUS

N+14, C+21

Task organized

(PC/MK-V/RHIB)

 

Det MRC 5 Unit

CONUS

N+7 to 14,

C+14 to 21

 

 

Appendix (2) to Annex B: Combined/Coalition Forces

B.A2.1. SAUDI ARABIA

B.A2.1.1. Saudi Land Forces

Ground Forces

Number

Remarks

Armored Brigades

3

M-1 Abrams and M60s mix

Airborne Brigades

1

 

Infantry Brigades

5

 

Artillery Battalions

8

 

Anti-Tank Weapons

1,029

(TOW and Dragon)

Air Defense Systems

   

I-HAWK

8 batteries

 

Patriot

2 batteries

 

Helicopters

   

AH-64

72

 

Major Equipment:

   

Tanks

600

 

Armored Personnel Carriers

1,000

(M-113, LAV and IFV)

B.A2.1.2. Saudi Air Forces:

Aircraft Type

Number

Remarks

Fighter, Interceptor, Ground Attack

   

F-15C/D

98

 

Mirage 2000

48

 

F- 15E

48

 

F- 16C

36

 

Reconnaissance

   

RF-5

24

 

E-3

3

 

Transport

   

KC- 130

7

 

KC-10

4

 

UH-60

16

 

B.A2.1.3. Saudi Navy Forces:

Ship Type

Number

Remarks

Missile Patrol Craft

11

 

Frigates

8

 

Mine Countermeasures

7

 

Patrol

29

 

Helicopters

   

AS-365N

21

 

Helicopters

   

AS-332B/F

12

 

 

B.A2.2. KUWAIT

B.A2.2.1. Kuwaiti Land Forces:

Ground Forces

Number

Remarks

Armored Brigades

2

M-1 Abrams

Mechanized Brigades

1

 

Infantry Brigades

   

Major Equipment

   

Tanks

373

 

Armored Personnel Carriers

389

M- 1 13, IFV TOW, BNT-AT-3

Surface-to-Surface Missiles

18

MLRS

Anti-Tank Weapons

938

TOW/Dragon

Air Defense Systems

   

Patriot

1 battalion

 

Ground Forces

Number

Remarks

Rapier, Roland

10 launchers

 

Avenger PAADS

18 launchers

 

Helicopters

   

AH- 1

24

 

B.A2.2.2. Kuwaiti Air Forces:

Aircraft Type

Number

Remarks

Fighter, Interceptor, Ground Attack

   

F/A-18C

40

 

Helicopter, Transport Misc.

   

AH-64, SA-342

23

 

SA-330, AS332

11

 

UH-60S

16

 

L-100

3

 

DC-9

1

 

 

B.A2.3. EGYPT:

B.A2.3.1. Egyptian Land Forces:

Ground Forces

Number

Remarks

Armored Brigades

2

M-1 Abrams

Infantry Brigades

3

 

B.A2.3.2. Egyptian Air Forces:

Aircraft Type

Number

Remarks

F/A-16

40

2 Squadrons

 

B.A2.4. GULF STATES (BAHRAIN, QATAR, UAE, OMAN)

Forces are displayed in combined aggregate unless otherwise noted.

B.A2.4.1. Gulf States Land Forces:

Ground Forces

Number

Remarks

Armored Brigades

2

Various Older Models Models

Armored Regiments

2

 

Artillery Brigades

2

 

Artillery Regiments

4

 

Field Artillery Regiments

1

 

Infantry Brigades

3

 

Infantry Regiments

9

 

Mechanized Infantry Battalions

4

 

Mechanized Infantry Brigades

1

 

Tank Battalions

1

 

Major Equipment:

   

Tanks

354

 

Armored Personnel Carriers

826

 

Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers

   

Scud-B

6

 

Anti-Tank Weapons

420

 

Air Defense

158

 

Helicopters

154

 

B.A2.4.2. Gulf States Air Forces:

Fighter, Interceptor/Ground Attack

Number

 

Country

   

Bahrain

24

 

Fighter, Interceptor/Ground Attack

Number

 

Qatar

12

 

UAE

34

 

Oman

27

 

Reconnaissance

8

 

Transport

48

 

B.A2.4.3. Gulf States Navy:

Ship Type

Number

 

Missile Patrol Craft

19

 

Frigates

2

 

Patrol

50

 

Corvettes

4

 

Mine Countermeasures

14

7 Oman, 7 UAE

 

Appendix (3) to Annex B: Opposing Forces Order of Battle

B.A3.1. IRAN

B.A3.1.1. Land Forces:

Unit

Location

Remarks

58th Infantry Div

Tabriz

 

40th Infantry Div

Tehran

 

55th Parachute Div

Tehran

 

23rd Special Forces Div

Tehran

 

18th Armored Div

Qazvin

 

77th Infantry Div

Mashed

 

88th Armored Div

Bakhtaran

 

64th Infantry Div

Bakhtaran

 

28th Mechanized Div

Ahvaz

 

84th Mechanized Div

Shiraz

 

30th Infantry Div

Bandar Abbas

 

451st Mechanized Brigade

Bandar Abbas

 

478th Mechanized Brigade

Chah Bagar

 

81st Armored Division

Zahedan

 

B.A3.1.2. Air Forces:

Aircraft Type/Unit

Location

Number

Remarks

F-4E Squadron

Bandar Abbas

10 A/C

 

MIG-29 Squadron

Bandar Abbas

10 A/C

 

F- I 4A Squadron

Bandar Bushehr

10 A/C

 

F-4E Squadron

Bandar Bushehr

10 A/C

 

SU-27 Squadron

Bandar Bushehr

10 A/C

 

F-5E/F Squadron

Shiraz

10 A/C

 

SU-22 Squadron

Shiraz

10 A/C

 

SU-27 Squadron

Shiraz

10 A/C

 

P-3 Surveillance Sqdrn

Shiraz

3 A/C

 

C-130 Transport Sqdrn

Shiraz

25 A/C

 

SU-24 Group

Shiraz

30 A/C

 

F-7 Squadron

Ahvaz

18 A/C

 

F-6 Squadron

Ahvaz

16 A/C

 

F-4E Squadron

Mehrabad (Tehran)

10 A/C

 

RF-4E Recon Squadron

Mehrabad

10 A/C

 

F-5E/F Group

Mehrabad

20 A/C

 

MIG-29 Squadron

Mehrabad

20 A/C

 

SU-25 Squadron

Mehrabad

20 A/C

 

SU-24 Squadron

Mehrabad

10 A/C

 

F-4E Squadron

Hamadan

10 A/C

 

RF-4E Recon Squadron

Hamadan

5 A/C

 

SU-22 Squadron

Hamadan

10 A/C

 

F-5E/F Group

Tabriz

20 A/C

 

MIG-29 Squadron

Tabriz

15 A/C

 

MIG-23 Squadron

Tabriz

10 A/C

 

F-5E\F Squadron

Dezful

10 A/C

 

SU-24 Squadron

Dezful

10 A/C

 

F- I Mirage Squadron

Dezful

12 A/C

 

F-14A Squadron

Esfahan

10 A/C

 

SU-22 Squadron

Esfahan

10 A/C

 

F- I Mirage Squadron

Zahedan

12 A/C

 

SU-22 Squadron

Zahedan

10 A/C

 

B.A3.1.3. Navy Forces:

Ship Type/Unit

Location

Remarks

Squadron Tareq Submarines

Bandar Abbas

3 Kilo Class Submarines

Squadron SSM Submarines

Bandar Abbas

3 Iranian Design

Yugo Submarines

Bandar Abbas

6 SSMs

Damavand Destroyer

Bandar Bushehr

1 ship

Alvand Frigates

Bandar Abbas

3 ships

Bayandor FSs

Bandar Abbas

2 ships

Houdongs

Bandar Bushehr

25 patrol craft

Kaman PGFs

Bandar Bushehr

10 craft

Chaho

Bandar Bushehr

3 craft

Kaivan Patrol Craft

Bandar Bushehr

3 craft

Parvin Patrol Craft

Bandar Bushehr

3 craft

Small Patrol Craft

Coastal Ports Throughout

213 craft

BH7 Hovercraft

Bandar Bushehr

4 craft

Landing Ships/Craft

Bandar Bushehr

24 assorted

Mine Countermeasures

Bandar Bushehr

2 ships

B.A3.1.4. Iranian Missile Forces:

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range

SCUD B

24-36

300

320km

SCUD C

24-36

250

600km

NO DONG I

18-24

100

1300km

CSS - 2 SILKWORM

12

50

30nm



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