USAF
TACS Battle Management: Preparing for High Tempo Future Operations
CSC
1997
Subject
Area - Aviation
Executive
Summary
Title: USAF TACS Battle Management: Preparing for High Tempo Future
Operations
Author: Major C.B. Miller, Officer, United States Air Force
Thesis: The shifting nature of warfare will bring with it demands on the
USAF theater air control system (TACS) that the current USAF command, control,
and execution framework and battle management training system are not preparing
it for.
Background: The conceptual approach to
warfare prior to Desert Storm was, for the most part, very sequential in
nature. Operations were time sequenced
with very specific constraints on the order of each phase, which steps preceded
which, with operations progressing along a fairly set time schedule. In essence it was a building block approach
to the conduct of armed conflict. The
analogy of peeling an onion is very close to describing the historical approach
to warfare. Beginning at the outer
layer and working sequentially towards the heart. According to some scholars, Desert Storm, the war everyone speaks
of as being so revolutionary, conducted operations in much the same way as they
always had been. This step-stone method
would try to degrade or destroy, in order, those target sets that Col John
Warden described in his five-ring model of the modern nation-state. The actual air war during Desert Storm
attacked targets in each of the five target categories. Although occurring in sequential phases, the
phases overlapped and were time compressed to the point of apparent
simultaneity. This shift, from the
distinct sequential application of airpower against individual target sets, to
application of forces in a systemic approach to attack, is characteristic of
what many believe is the new approach to warfare that armed forces will use in
future years. Enhanced mobility of
fighting systems and improved communications systems have dispersed and
mobilized the battlefield beyond Clausewitz’s wildest dreams. As a result, the US and other friendly
nations will be forced to use maneuver, dispersion, speed, mobility, range, and
deception to a far greater extent when facing unpredictable enemies who may
potentially be armed with weapons of mass destruction. The shifting nature of warfare that we will
face in the future, with its whirlwind tempo, fluidity, and reliance on
responsive flexible command and control structures, begs the question--is our
TACS ready for the future.
Although very successful during the
Gulf War, the doctrinal approaches of centralized command and control with
decentralized execution may prove too cumbersome and restrictive to win the
fluid battle of the future. Criticisms
of the Air Force planning and execution process during Desert Storm centered
around the lengthy air tasking order (ATO) process and the sluggish
responsiveness to real-time needs.
Additionally, several manpower
changes and events which took place during the early 90s degraded the officer
air battle management career field and with it the system for training new
battle managers. Conversion of 50% of
the officer battle manager positions to enlisted billets, consolidation of
three other unrelated career fields with the battle management career field,
selective early retirement boards, and reduction in forces all had compounding
disastrous effects on the USAF battle management manpower pool. During the onset of these disastrous
manpower events, training for battle management officers was dismantled, and
has only now just begun to be rectified.
The problem, however, is the fixes are merely Band-Aids on the wound.
Recommendation: If the Air Force wants to continue to dominate air operations in
the battlefield of the future it must take steps now to ensure that it stays
ahead of the OODA loop power curve. The
Air Force must be able to command, control, and execute air operations faster,
and more efficiently than the enemy can.
As a first measure the conceptual approach to command, control, and
execution of air operations must change. To maintain maximum flexibility,
responsiveness, and timeliness in the application of scarce air resources,
control and execution must be decentralized to the lowest possible command
levels. The keys to effective decentralization are many faceted. First, all forces involved must have a
common operational outlook; they must be oriented similarly towards the task at
hand. Additionally, the main focus of
effort or desired outcome must be clearly identified and communicated
continuously to all participants.
Further, lower command levels must be given the latitude to use their
initiative in order to capitalize on fleeting opportunities when they fall
within the framework of the commander’s intent.
We must act now to design a training
system which will prepare our battle managers for future warfare, otherwise we
must prepare ourselves to accept the consequences. The entry level Air Battle Manager course at Tyndall AFB is
appropriately focused on giving the new accessions the basics of controlling
and Air Force aviation tactics. The
shortfall in the training system, however, is in advanced battle management
training. Advanced training for actual battle management positions, like senior
director (SD), mission crew commander (MCC), and battle commander (BC), must be
formalized. These positions bring with
them the responsibilities of integrating, supporting, and redirecting the
joint/combined air effort in support of the air, land and maritime component
commander’s schemes of maneuver as well as the joint force commander’s intent
and desired focus of effort. The battle
manager’s position, as the fulcrum in the effort to leverage our combat forces,
demands that training be conducted in formal courses that are manned, equipped,
and funded to do the job right. To do
this correctly, the Air Force needs to create two new formal training courses.
The Initial Battle Management Training course (IBMT) for SDs would focus
primarily on the mid to upper end of the tactical level of warfare while just
touching on the lower operational level.
Students would attend this course after their control focused
apprenticeship period when enroute to their second assignment. The Advanced
Battle Management Training course (ABMT) for MCCs, on the other hand, would
focus primarily on the upper end of the tactical level through the mid to upper
end of the operational level of warfare.
Students would attend while enroute between assignments at the
appropriate point in their career (possible the eight to ten year point). The
importance of training cannot be understated.
It is the key to producing and maintaining effective, ready, combat
forces, and therefore must be attended to with relish in peacetime. If we are to continue to espouse the old
adage of “train how you plan to fight”, then we as a service must be ready to
put our money where our mouth is.
Professional quality, realistic training is not a frivolous waste, it is
a necessity for ensuring success in the future.
USAF TACS
Battle Management:
Preparing for
High Tempo Future Operations
The
conflict in South West Asia (Desert Storm), in the minds of many people, was a
turning point in the rapidly progressing revolution in military affairs. Never in the history of mankind has the
employment of information and weaponry taken place at the blistering pace of
that witnessed during the Gulf War.
This warfare of hyper tempo created stresses on the supporting USAF
Theater Air Control System (TACS) command, control, and execution network that
stretched it to its limits. The expected
trend is for the tempo of warfare and the levels of information overload to
continue their upward spiral. The USAF
Theater Air Control Systems (TACS) battle management capabilities are at a fork
in the road which will determine their capability to orchestrate and execute
the air war in future conflicts. The
pace of real-time information updates and the focus on information dominance
will demand more and more time-critical/real-time decision making be made by
the operators at the lower level command and control platforms orchestrating
the show. This decentralization will be
crucial to ensuring we can operate at a tempo faster than the enemy can react
to. The increased operations tempo and
reduced margins for error will put demands on the USAF TACS that the current
framework for command and the training process isn’t preparing it for. More importantly it calls for a shift in the
current conceptual framework of lower-level USAF command, control, and
execution.
In
this paper I will suggest ways in which the USAF TACS battle management system
can be changed to make it viable and reliable, with the long term ability to
produce proficient battle managers that are able to perform at the tempo that
future operations will require. I will
begin by describing the character of warfare, both past and future. I will then assess the USAF TACS and its
ability to enhance the flexibility of air power employment. Specifically I’ll review the current
doctrinal approach to command, control and execution, as well as a review of
the current USAF TACS training system.
Finally I will outline some changes which must take place in two
areas. first, there are doctrinal
changes which must take place; in terms of our approach to command, control and
execution. Second, changes must take
place in the structure of the USAF TACS battle management training system. These changes are crucial to ensuring that
the USAF TACS can meet the needs that future warfare will demand.
The Shifting Nature of Warfare
Clausewitz,
in his masterpiece On War, defined
war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”[1] In many ways, early approaches to conflict
followed the essence of this often quoted description of warfare. Set piece battles, lines of warriors
squaring off against one another, plans laid out down to the finest detail all
serve as examples throughout history of an extremely linear approach to the
conduct of war. The conceptual approach
to warfare prior to Desert Storm was, for the most part, very sequential in
nature. Operations were time sequenced
with very specific constraints on the order of each phase, which steps preceded
which, with operations progressing along a
fairly set time schedule. In essence it was a building block approach to the conduct of
armed conflict. The analogy of peeling
an onion is very close to describing the historical approach to warfare. Beginning at the outer layer and working
sequentially towards the heart. Even
today Army Field Manual 100-5 talks specifically of the sequencing, phasing and
synchronization of different parts of an operation.[2] According to some scholars, Desert Storm,
the war everyone speaks of as being so revolutionary, conducted operations in
much the same way as they always had been.
As Colonel Mann said in his book Thunder
and Lightening: Desert Storm and the Air Power Debates:
In accordance with FM 100-20, the
campaign would employ the whole
weight of the available air power
against selected target areas in turn.
Airpower would be the principal
weapon in a coordinated multi-axis
air, naval, and ground attack
beginning with Phase I, the strategic air
campaign.[3]
This sequentially phased approach to warfare was
normally designed to set up the decisive battle which would result in the
defeat of the enemy. This step-stone
method would try to degrade or destroy, in order, those target sets that Col
John Warden described in his five-ring model of the modern nation-state. Military operations would, for the most
part, sequentially attack the enemy’s fielded forces, national population,
national infrastructure, key production essentials, and finally national
leadership (peeling the onion from outside in). In planning the air campaign for what was to eventually be Desert
Storm, Col Warden developed a concept of inside-out-warfare which, in essence,
called for targeting Iraqi leadership and other key targets while bypassing the
Iraqi army until very near the end.[4] The actual air war during Desert Storm
attacked targets in each of the five target categories. Although occurring in sequential phases, the
phases overlapped and were time compressed to the point of apparent
simultaneity. This shift, from the
distinct sequential application of airpower against individual target sets, to
application of forces in a systemic approach to attack, is characteristic of
what many believe is the new approach to warfare that armed forces will use in
future years.
Modern
military technology has had a tremendous impact on the shape and characteristic
of the modern battlefield. Enhanced
mobility of fighting systems and improved communications systems that are
available down to practically every fighting platform have dispersed and
mobilized the battlefield beyond Clausewitz’s wildest dreams. Many experts see this trend continuing far
into the future. As a result, the US
and other friendly nations will be forced to use maneuver, dispersion, speed,
mobility, range, and deception to a far greater extent when facing
unpredictable enemies who may potentially be armed with weapons of mass
destruction.[5] Although this will detract from our freedom
to mass forces for an attack, modern systems are capable of delivering
effective fires while remaining relatively dispersed right up until the moment
of attack. Where in the past, even as
late as Vietnam, hundreds or thousands of bomber sorties had to attack a single
target group at a time (often a single target), the smart weapons and stealth
technologies of today enable a single aircraft to attack a single target while
providing a high degree of certainty that the target will be destroyed or
disabled. This
increased efficiency of airpower allows the
offensive capability of the air arm to be used in a way that theorists like
Douhet and Mitchell dreamed it would be.
In 1943 the US Army Air Corps bombers of 8th Air Force were only able to
effectively strike 50 strategic targets in the entire year, while the coalition
air forces of Desert Storm struck over 150 targets in the first 24 hours of
that war.[6] This expanded ability to strike an astronomical
number of targets nearly simultaneously is what many experts believe allows the
new parallel approach to warfare.
Parallel
warfare allows the key nodes (centers of gravity) in each of Warden’s five
rings to be struck nearly simultaneously.
The objective of parallel warfare is to rapidly bring on the effect of
strategic systemic paralysis by overcoming the enemy with destruction beyond
his ability to recover.[7] The resulting characteristics of an air war
prosecuted following the principle of parallelism is an operation of
astonishing tempo, volume, and overwhelming complexity, attacking systemically
across the depth and breadth of the enemy’s nation-state. During Desert Storm the Coalition used its
massive air forces in just this manner.
Beginning on 17 January 1991 they targeted strategic military forces,
leadership, infrastructure facilities, early warning sites, airfields,
integrated air defense nodes, communications facilities, electrical power
facilities, as well as many other target sets.[8] As Col John Boyd would say, the overarching
goal of this warfare of increased operations tempo is to overwhelm one’s enemy
by being able to observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) faster than he is able
to. To do this, however, a force must
have three things. It must have access
to nearly instantaneous information, the ability to use that information to
adapt and focus the effort where and when it is needed, and an effectively
trained system to carry out the newly focused effort. Our enemies (e.g. PRC or North Korea) around the world watched
the progression and outcome of Desert Storm and surely learned many lessons
from it. Enemies in the future will go
to great lengths to disguise, disperse, mobilize, camouflage, hide, and harden
their critical resources, nodes, and weapons.
They will use disinformation and deceit to try to increase the fog and
friction on our side of the conflict.
The effects of successfully winning this information and communication
battle were evident during Desert Storm and are likely to be lessons our
enemies surely won’t miss capitalizing on in the future.
Knowing
this, we must ask ourselves...what will the battle of the future look
like? The answer is simply it will be
faster, more fluid, more dispersed, more accurate, more lethal, and more
difficult to get our arms around than anything we’ve ever seen before. The following simple table gives a flavor
for the shift in OODA loop processing that has taken place throughout the last
couple centuries of warfare[9].
Revolutionary Civil War World
War Gulf War Tomorrow’s
War II War
Observe Telescope Telegraph Radio/Wire Near
Real Time Real Time
Orient Weeks Days Hours Minutes Continuous
Decide Months Weeks Days Hours Immediate
Act A Season A
Month A Week A Day Hour or Less
Table 1
The most difficult of these characteristics to deal
with, however, are the tempo and volume of future operations as well as the
fluidity of the battlefield. High
tempo, high volume operations will demand an enhanced ability to rapidly and
efficiently communicate with and direct, forces during on-going
operations. Additionally, the fluidity
of the modern battlefield will require the ability to shift focus rapidly
enough to retain the initiative and the ability to deal with highly mobile
target sets. The question then is
whether our current command and control structure, methods, systems, and
training are preparing us for the high tempo, fluid, highly dynamic battle to
come.
USAF TACS
The
structure of the Theater Air Control System we operate under today has its
roots in the early command and control architecture of World War II. The components, functions, and command
structure are virtually identical.
Although technology has resulted in a few of the components falling by the
wayside, most of the major pieces have remained the same (aside from some minor
name changes) through World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm.
As with the structure of today’s TACS, the
structures of the past were vertical in nature, both for command and for
information flow. Planning and close
supervision of the employment of airpower has always been done at the very
highest levels. Although Vietnam saw
the fielding of an entirely new type of command and control platform, the
airborne elements of the TACS did not change the underlying
fundamental principle of centralized command and
control with decentralized execution.
Today’s command and control structure, like that of Desert Storm, is not
all that different from those structures of the distant past. Although ground radar elements of the TACS
did not play a significant part in the execution of the Desert Storm air
campaign, many of them were present and capable of performing their doctrinally
assigned tasks. The end result is that
the command, control, and execution concepts for the TACS today is virtually
identical to what it has been for over 50 years.
Having
thought through the shifting nature of warfare that we will face in the future,
with its whirlwind tempo, fluidity, and reliance on responsive flexible command
and control structures, the question to be dealt with is--is our TACS ready for
the future? Is our TACS structure, methodology, and training optimized to prepare
us for the future conflicts we will undoubtedly face?
Current Command, Control, and Execution
Concepts
The
true test of the Air Force’s ability to meet the demands of future battle will
be determined by its approach to the tasks of planning, commanding,
controlling, and executing the use of air power in pursuit of future military
objectives. As with everything in life,
success will be measured as a bi-product of a tradeoff between total
flexibility and efficient use of the scarce and precious
resource--airpower.
Much
has been written in condemnation of the USAF approach to daily planning during
Desert Storm. Most of the criticism
stems from what, to most casual observers, appears to be the inordinate amount
of time and effort it took to put together the daily Air Tasking Order
(ATO). The volume of reports and
intelligence processed by the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) resulted in
the TACC staff swelling to roughly 2000 people, and often stretched the
planning cycle out to 48-72 hours. The
result was that the ATO often lagged significantly behind the ongoing war.[10] This completely centralized approach to
planning stems from the Air Force’s doctrinal tenets on airpower planning and
employment, that of centralized control and decentralized execution.
Centralized
control is the tool by which the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
achieves unity of effort, focusing all available resources on achieving the
intended results of the Joint Force Commander (JFC).[11] The problem occurs when the planning is done
down to excruciating levels of detail and when control is extended into the
execution phase. Decentralized
execution is the implementation of the plan established under centralized
control. The current air tasking order
(ATO) process assigns the instruments of airpower (weapon systems and support
assets) exact tasks to accomplish, but does little to communicate the JFACC’s
vision and intent for the overall operation to those same instruments of
airpower. This shortfall in commander’s
intent is what drives far-reaching centralized control, from the highest levels
of the TACS, throughout the execution phase.
The deleterious result, however, is that the front line warriors are
often relegated to being simple mouthpieces relaying directions from higher
command echelons that are overcome with information overload.
Our
system is currently structured for the
many fielded sensors, both tactical and strategic, to feed information up the
command structure to a centralized node for processing and decision
making. Once decisions are reached the
new command guidance is disseminated down the command channel until it finally
reaches the operators where action is finally taken. This linear command and control structure works fine in reaction
to targeting decisions needed on the order of hours or days, but will be
virtually useless in light of the exploding demands of the battlefield of the
future.[12] Like Napoleon at Leipzig and Waterloo,
forces that operate under a centralized command system, lacking detailed
instructions and a clear understanding of the intent of the commander, are
ill-prepared to take independent action which is in concert with the intended
focus of effort.[13] Desert Storm, in contradistinction to this doctrinal
approach to command and control, had many good examples of control being
decentralized to lower levels of the TACS.
Airborne Command Elements (ACE) aboard airborne warning and control
system (AWACS), airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC), and
joint strategic target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft were given the
authority to divert missions from their primary ATO assigned targets in order
to hit fleeting targets of opportunity.[14] To institutionalize this successful process
all the time, however, the lower echelons of the USAF TACS must have two
things--timely access to critical intelligence and information, and the
training and experience necessary to carry it out.
Our
information/intelligence structure, systems, and methods are designed to feed
information and intelligence up channel for processing before it is finally
sent down to the actual users. Often
the information or intelligence needed is available but is hung up being processed
at higher levels or working its way up
and down the command and communications chain.
The SCUD hunt experiences during Desert Storm are testimony to the need
for timely information/intelligence, and a command and communications system
which is responsive enough to capitalize on the momentary vulnerability of
mobile targets.[15] Many information and intelligence fusion
systems are being developed for fielding in the near future which may or may
not meet this need. Systems which
centralize information/intelligence at the highest command levels, however,
will have a high propensity of reducing our ability to prosecute timely actions
in the battles of the future. The
highest echelons of command will have extremely accurate yet perishable
intelligence information. By the time
it reaches the forces carrying out the commander’s intent, the window for
exploiting the fleeting opportunity will be gone.
Current TACS Training
Beginning
in 1991 the TACS battle management forces were subject to tremendous changes
directed by the highest level of USAF leadership. The conversion of nearly 50% of the entry level company grade
officer positions to enlisted billets; consolidation of four dissimilar career
fields into one; and Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB) and Reduction In
Forces (RIF), which decapitated the field, all began to cause a degenerative
slide from which we are still trying to recover. The company grade to field grade manning imbalance caused by the
conversion left a critical segment of the operational air force that was shaped
like an upside down pyramid, unable to grow the field grade officers the system
would need over time. The consolidation
created the potential for officers from drastically different career fields,
with absolutely no battlefield command and control (TACS) experience, to cross
over into critical battle management leadership positions. The effects of the SERB and RIF devastated
the experience base of the battle management community at a time when that
experience was most needed.
Unfortunately, in the midst of all this turmoil, the element that has
always given US armed forces an edge in previous conflicts, was left
languishing. The training system for
TACS battle managers was dismantled by the conversion, consolidation, SERB and RIF of the early 1990s, and is only
now beginning to be repaired. The
question is; will the new training system be structured to prepare future USAF
TACS battle managers for the demands they will face in future conflicts?
The
training system now in place and that which will take shape in the near future
will prove to be woefully inadequate in preparing our future battle managers.
Most of the formal courses are either introductory in nature, aimed primarily
at controlling, or are only available for a select few students. When set against the monumental task of
training a large number of operators, that have minimal lower tactical level
experience, to orchestrate and manipulate the fluid dynamic air battle of the
future, the true size of the problem comes to light. Our formal training courses, as a system, are completely
inadequate for the task.
Formal
entry level training for tomorrow’s USAF TACS battle managers begins with the
entry level Air Battle Manager school which was reopened for officers at
Tyndall AFB in the later part of 1996.
The focus of this course is divergent, in that it is trying to do
several things at once. It is designed
to orient new officers to the concepts of battle management, while at the same
time trying to prepare these officers for the duties they will perform when
they arrive at their first unit. Their
first duty will be as battle management apprentices, where they will conduct
anywhere from 18 months to three years of orientation level weapons controller
training while they begin transition to their first battle management position
(either as a senior director or air surveillance officer). The nine month course is broken into three
major blocks which teach air surveillance concepts, basic controlling
techniques and weapons system capabilities and tactics, and a cursory exposure
to the basics of integrated (weapons and surveillance) battle management. As of this date, this is the last formal
school that all battle management
officers will attend.[16] The course lacks the ability to participate
in any large scale live flying battle management exercises, and is not equipped
to participate with any joint agencies during any large scale simulation
exercises. Once the students graduate
from this course, they proceed to their first unit where they enter into a
program of unit level upgrade training.
The focus of unit level upgrade training is on refining controlling
skills and enlarging the base of knowledge that the beginning controllers have
on their own system. The career field
plan is for entry level officers to perform controlling duties in their first
unit for a maximum of 18 months to three years. The hope is that this brief orientation period will allow the
young officers to garner a base line of experience that will serve as a
foundation for their battle management training. There are, however, critical flaws in this plan. Depending on where the officer is stationed
during this period, he/she will probably not experience anything larger than an
occasional four aircraft versus four aircraft (4v4). In all likelihood the majority of experience the new battle
manager will get during this 24 month period will be very narrow exposure to
2v2 and 2v4 air combat training (ACT/DACT) mission profiles with an occasional
single receiver--single tanker refueling.
Although there are controlling assignments where a new officer will be
exposed to large force employment missions, the volume of those they will get,
in the brief orientation period, will make proficiency highly doubtful. During this same apprenticeship period they
will enter upgrade training for their first battle management position,
normally senior director (SD) or air surveillance officer (ASO). This dual direction focus creates a dilemma
for the trainee and the unit--what should they focus the scarce training
resources on. The high value training
opportunities, like large force employment missions, will most likely be given
to the enlisted weapons controllers (rightly so) who will be performing those
duties for the long run, while the young battle manager apprentice will get the
left-overs. Additionally, they won’t
ever really be qualified as a weapons controller, so the pressure will be to
focus on training for the battle management position they are getting qualified
in. The short orientation period will provide
very limited exposure to actual warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures
from a controlling perspective, and as a result we will be filling the battle
management ranks with individuals who lack a solid tactical base. Years down the road, that same battle
manager may enter training for mission crew commander (MCC) and eventually
battle commander (BC) positions. In
most units, training for these positions is conducted entirely through unit
level, on-the-job (OJT) training.
Historically there have always been advanced training opportunities,
although there is a drastic mismatch between the current qualification
pre-requisites for these courses, the focus of these advanced courses, and the
experience levels the planned career field path will provide prospective
selectees. The Counter Air Tactics
Awareness Training Course (CATATC), at Tyndall AFB, is designed as an
intermediate level controller course focused on enhancing the controlling
skills in a two/four fighter, multi-bogey environment. Since this course normally requires three
years controlling experience before attending, most young battle management officers will never
qualify. Additionally, the CATATC course
is only equipped to handle approximately 32 students per year.[17] Another avenue for advanced training is
through the USAF Weapons School at Nellis AFB.
The Weapons School, although originally designed around a heavy
controlling syllabus, has been shifting its concentration to battle management
concepts since early 1990. The school’s
primary reason for existence is to enhance the officer’s knowledge of threat
tactics and techniques, joint and combined large force employment tactics, and
to enhance the student’s instructional skills.
The goal is for graduates to return to their units to function as the
squadron weapons and tactics officer.
The Weapons School could serve as an excellent advanced battle
management course except for several key weaknesses. Admission to the school still requires applicants to have four to
seven years controlling (or operational) experience. Additionally, due to the specialized focus on preparing future
weapons and tactics officers, the Weapons School is only equipped to handle a
maximum of 12 students per year[18]. An additional limitation on the utility of
the Weapons School as an advanced battle management course for the community at
large is the fact that the school currently has no capability for large scale
joint air battle simulation. Since
live, large-scale joint training exercises are so expensive and so few and far
between, this lack of a simulation capability creates an almost insurmountable
barrier to expanded course utility (note:
The Weapons School originally asked Tactical Air Command (TAC)) to fund this
capability in 1987).
As
is readily apparent, the system set up to train the Air Force’s battle managers
of the future is rife with weaknesses.
There is no solid formal battle management training, beyond the
introductory course, that all battle management officers
go through. Whatever basic level
academic exposure to battle management concepts the young second lieutenants
may get at the basic controller course will soon be forgotten in the wake of
focusing on honing the controlling skills they need to build their knowledge
base on the tactical level of war. By
the time they begin their concerted OJT upgrade to their first battle
management position, the academic overviews they received at the entry level
course at Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB) will be all but distant memories.
Another major problem with the structure of the
current and planned training system is the reliance on the OJT method to train
future battle managers. This puts the
education and nurturing of the Air Force’s battle management forces into the
hands of those who are least able to deliver on this task--unit personnel. It’s not that the unit instructors aren’t
able to teach, it is a question of overloading. With operations tempos driving average TDY rates above 180 days a
year; maintenance of personal qualification and training requirements; limited
access to large-scale, live joint training events; and poor simulation training
support equipment; in-depth, high pay-off battle management training for junior
officers is at best deficient.[19]
In
summary, the Air Force’s ability to successfully prosecute future conflict is
clearly in question. If the nature of
warfare in the not-to-distant future does shift more and more towards one of
increased mobility, dispersion, deception, and lethality as expected, then our
approach to the command, control, and execution of the air effort must
change. Our current conceptual
framework of detailed precise planning of every level of minutiae, along with
over-centralization of decision making will rob us of our ability to win the
war of the OODA loop. We must develop a
method for maintaining a healthy measure of centralized command, while retaining the flexibility inherent in decentralizing
the control and execution as much as possible.
Additionally, we must create a formal training system which has the resources, expertise, and time to train our battle managers to
handle the increased complexity and responsibility of decentralization. In other words, our system must retain the
benefits of the tenet of unity of effort, while unleashing the enhanced
flexibility, timeliness, and responsiveness inherent in the aggressive
initiative of subordinate command levels.
If done properly the enemy can always be kept two steps behind the power
curve.
Conclusions/Recommendations
Command, Control, and Execution:
If the Air Force wants to continue to
dominate air operations in the battlefield of the future it must take steps now
to ensure that it stays ahead of the OODA loop power curve. The Air Force must be able to command,
control, and execute air operations faster, and more efficiently than the enemy
can. As a first measure the conceptual
approach to command, control, and execution of air operations must change. To maintain maximum flexibility,
responsiveness, and timeliness in the application of scarce air resources,
control and execution must be decentralized to the lowest possible command
levels. The keys to effective
decentralization are many faceted.
First, all forces involved must have a common operational outlook; they
must be oriented similarly towards the task at hand. Additionally, the main focus of effort or desired outcome must be
clearly identified and communicated continuously to all participants. Further, lower command levels must be given
the latitude to use their initiative in order to capitalize on fleeting
opportunities when they fall within the framework of the commander’s
intent. The information/intelligence
structure and systems must provide all levels an equally clear, timely
understanding of the battlefield without having to flow
information/intelligence up and down vertical command channels (fig 5). Finally, effective communications must exist
to allow the highest command levels to redirect the main effort when needed.[20]
As a simple example, the trend in planning must move
towards a system that combines the best elements (integration, coordination,
synchronization, and deconfliction) of the current highly scripted, detailed,
lock-step type air tasking orders with a system that clearly delineates and
communicates commander’s intent, guidelines, and acceptable retargeting limits
to ensure maximum flexibility. This
system needs to go way beyond simple identification of alternate targets, to a
point where lower levels can react to and capitalize on fleeting moments of
vulnerability of the enemy. The
structure of the system must provide the flexibility for lower command echelons
to conduct real-time, immediate alteration and reallocation of mission
resources when the combat situation demands.
This system of mission-type orders,
originally conceptualized under the early Prussian General Staff of General Von
Moltke, would place a premium on maintaining the room for application of
individual judgment by the command elements closest to the action that have the
information necessary to make decisions.[21] This decentralization of on-scene decision
making is very similar to the principle of
mission-type orders used by the US Marine Corps and US Army, as well as
the Navy’s command by negation.
Battle Management Training System
As
seen during operations from Panama, to Desert Storm, to Haiti, to Bosnia;
command and control forces are positioned and tasked in a manner that can make
or break an operation. Conduct of
Operation Desert Storm, without a trained and ready battle management system,
would have been difficult, if not impossible to orchestrate and execute. This fact is even more striking when you
consider the fact that we dictated the terms and tempo of the battle with Iraq
from the very beginning. It is
imperative, therefore, that we ensure our battle managers receive the best
training we can give them. Erwin
Rommel, during World War II, said: “the best form of welfare for the troops is
first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties.”[22] We must act now to design a training system
which will prepare our battle managers for future warfare, otherwise we must
prepare ourselves to accept the consequences.
The
entry level Air Battle Manager course at Tyndall AFB, although not far
off-base, would be more appropriately focused on ensuring the new accessions
firmly grasp the basics of controlling and Air Force aviation tactics, while
providing a sound orientation to battle management concepts and techniques. The dangerous shortfall in the training
system, however, is in advanced battle management training. Advanced training for actual battle
management positions, like senior director (SD), mission crew commander (MCC),
and battle commander (BC), must be formalized.
These positions bring with them the responsibilities of integrating,
supporting, and redirecting the joint/combined air effort in support of the
air, land and maritime component commander’s schemes of maneuver as well as the
joint force commander’s intent and desired focus of effort. The battle manager’s position, as the
fulcrum in the effort to leverage our combat forces, demands that training be
conducted in formal courses that are manned, equipped, and funded to do the job
right.
To
do this correctly, two new formal courses need to be created. These courses would provide the initial
battle management training for SDs and advanced battle management training for
MCCs. The Initial Battle Management
Training course (IBMT) for SDs would focus primarily on the mid to upper end of
the tactical level of warfare while just touching on the lower operational
level. Students would attend this
course after their control focused apprenticeship period when enroute to their
second assignment. This course would concentrate
on the coordination, integration, and management of air assets in the
prosecution of offensive, defensive, and support missions. Additionally, it would expand the SDs
knowledge base of joint command and control systems integration, offensive air
support to ground forces, and control and employment of ground based air
defense assets (fig 6). Most
importantly it would provide the foundational knowledge and skills required to
conduct real-time resource allocation decisions at the tactical level of warfare.
The
Advanced Battle Management Training course (ABMT) for MCCs, on the other hand,
would focus primarily on the upper end of the tactical level through the mid to
upper end of the operational level of warfare.
Students would attend while enroute between assignments at the
appropriate point in their career (possible the eight to ten year point). It would concentrate on the integration of
joint air power with the ground and naval maneuver warfare concepts. The course would be designed to give the MCC
a solid foundational understanding of campaign level force integration
concepts, as well as the hands-on skills to make it happen. It would ground the MCC in concepts such as
battle-field shaping, joint fires coordination, special forces integration, and
other areas. Additionally, it would
give the MCC in-depth knowledge of joint command and control systems
integration, offensive air support to ground forces; as well as concepts of
integration, control, and employment of joint theater air and missile defense
system assets. Like the IBMT course, it
would continue to develop the MCC’s real-time resource allocation decision
making capabilities only at the higher operational level of war. Finally, it would begin to expose the MCC to
capabilities, limitations, and concepts of exploitation and integration of
theater, service, and national level intelligence sensors into the battle
management effort(fig 6).
The
IBMT and ABMT courses could easily be meshed with the Undergraduate Controller
Training course (UCT) for entry level enlisted controllers for those portions
of the course that are focused on development of hands-on execution level
skills. These courses could be
integrated into exercises such as US Forces Command’s Joint System Training
Exercise as a capstone exercise for all three courses.
When
a battle management officer reaches the point of being ready for a position
such as battle commander or higher, the focus must shift towards the upper
operational/lower strategic level of war.
At this point in an officer’s travels he/she would have had an extensive
level of formal, technical, tactical, and operational training through the
battle management training system.
Additionally, their experience level would be such that an appropriate
level of further education can be found in the intermediate or senior level
professional military education (PME) courses offered by all the services. These courses, with their focus on operational
campaign planning as well as strategic and National Command Authority level
planning and operation, would provide just the right mixture of education to
top-off the battle managers clue-bag (fig 6).
Senior
Air Force leadership must ensure that the existing critical advanced courses
such as CATATC and the Weapons School are fully
manned and equipped to continue to function much as they do today in order to
develop the highly skilled officer and enlisted operators. Battle management officers who show
exceptional operational skills should maintain a controlling qualification just
long enough to qualify for and attend the CATATC course prior to attending the
IBMT course and beginning their transition into their first battle management
position of SD (fig 7). These same
individuals would most likely make very good candidates for Weapons School when
the timing is appropriate. Retaining
this capability for officers to attend CATATC will ensure they gain enough
lower end tactical skill to apply the weapons officer concepts learned at the
Weapons School across the full spectrum of command and control employment. This enhanced foundation of lower level
tactical acumen would ensure that they have the solid base of knowledge and
skills necessary for good weapons officership.
Additionally, this will ensure that the Weapons School will continue to
have a healthy base of battle managers, with solid tactical backgrounds, from
which to select potential weapons and tactics officers (WTO). Another benefit, therefore, is that battle management units like AWACS, JSTARS,
control and reporting centers (CRC), control and reporting elements (CRE), and
ABCCC will continue to get the WTOs that have proven so crucial over the last
12 years (fig 7). Additionally, since
the Weapons School has shifted its focus to higher level battle management over
the past several years, it could easily perform double duty, delivering weapons
officer and MCC centered training.
This would prevent prospective weapons officers from
having to go to ABMT in addition to weapons school (fig 7).
The
importance of training can not be understated.
It is the key to producing and maintaining effective, ready, combat
forces, and therefore must be attended to with relish in peacetime.[23] If we are to continue to espouse the old
adage of “train how you plan to fight”, then we as a service must be ready to
put our money where our mouth is.
Professional quality, realistic training is not a frivolous waste, it is
a necessity for ensuring success in the future.[24] Force cutbacks which came out of Secretary
Aspin’s bottom-up-review , and those we are undoubtedly about to face in the
near future under quadrennial reviews, demand we face this issue squarely. Declining force levels and funding mixed
with increased operations tempo means only one thing--fewer opportunities for
battle managers to effectively train to develop/hone critical warfighting
skills.[25]
It
is a critical mistake to think that by starting up an entry level course for
battle management officers we have solved all the problems for the
community. Until we analyze what the
future of warfare holds for us and how we want to deal with it, battle
management will be a hit-or-miss element in the complex events that will
determine our success or failure. After
witnessing the success of Desert Storm, our enemies around the globe have
surely learned the importance of negating the effective operation of critical
command nodes. We doom ourselves if we
continue our trek down the path of increasing verticalization and centralization
of information, intelligence, command, and control. Like our precious combat forces, we must find ways to
decentralize, disperse, and flatten the command, control, and execution of air
power. Our goal must be a system that
is flexible, responsive, and robust. We
must take this as far as possible while still ensuring our ability to
determine, communicate, and prosecute a given focus of effort while retaining
unity of effort of the scarce resource--air power.
The
most sure way of making uncoordinated noise is by having the orchestra filled
with very talented musicians, using the newest top-of-the-line musical
instruments, led by a wino with poor to no musical training. We must ensure that the forces that will
orchestrate, direct, adapt, coordinate, and facilitate the air effort are up to
the task at hand. USAF battle
management concepts and training must be scrubbed from top to bottom.
Glossary of
Acronyms
ABCCC: airborne battlefield
command, control, and communications system
ABM: Air Battle Management
course at Tyndall AFB
ABMT: Advanced Battle Management
Training
ACE: airborne command element
ACT: air combat training
ADA: air defense artillery
AEWC: airborne early warning and
control
AFB: air force base
AOC: air operations center
ASOC: air support operations
center
ATO: air tasking order
AWACS: airborne warning and
control system
BC: battle commander
CATATC: Counter Air Tactics
Awareness Training Course
CRC: control and reporting
center
CRE: control and reporting
element
CRP: control and reporting post
DACT: dissimilar air combat
training
FDP: forward director post
IBMT: Initial Battle Management
Training
JFACC: joint force air component
commander
JFC: joint force commander
JSTARS: joint strategic target
attack radar system
LCC: land component commander
LFECC: Large Force Employment
Controller Course
MCC: mission crew commander
MEWU: microwave early warning
unit
OJT: on the job training
OODA: observe, orient, decide,
act
RIF: reduction in forces
SD: senior director
SERB: selective early retirement
board
TACC: tactical air control
center
TACP: tactical air control party
TACS: theater air control system
TADC: tactical air direction
center
TCC: tactical control center
TDY: temporary duty
UCT: Undergraduate Controller
Training
USAF: United States Air Force
WD: weapons director (used
interchangeably with WC: weapons controller)
WS: Weapons School
WTO: weapons and tactics
officer
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