Command and Control Warfare: An Operational Imperative In The Information Age

CSC 1997

Subject Area – C4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Command and Control Warfare: An Operational

Imperative in the Information Age.

Author: Major Jerome M. Lynes USMC

Thesis: That waging successful information war is how wars will be won in the future and that the key to operational success by military forces in information war is in the strategy and target set known as Command and Control Warfare (C2W).

Discussion: The information age posits information war and a fundamental shift in how wars will be waged in the future. CJCS General John Shalikashvili's Joint Vision 2010: Force of the Future (JV 2010) is the mechanism used to explore information warfare at the operational level. Analyzed in depth is JV 2010's lynch pin concept of 'information superiority,' as gaining information superiority is the heart of successful information warfare.

In the course of analyzing how military forces gain information superiority, the idea that all military information invariably follows a path from 'sensor to decision-maker to shooter' is developed. This "military information path" idea illuminates the specific fundamental changes and corresponding impacts on warfare in the information age. From these 'changes and impacts' comes an assessment of the military tasks to be accomplished to wage successful operational information war. This serves as a springboard into the concept of C2W.

C2W is taken apart, analyzed and put back together as an integrated whole as a strategy and target set to wage successful information war. A relatively recent doctrine, its pillars are classified by their moral and physical aspects as a new way of understanding their relationship to one another. Doctrine and historical example are fused to support the thesis that C2W is the key to victory for operational level warfighters. A case study of the first war of the information age, Operation Desert Storm, is provided to test the thesis.

Conclusions/Recommendations: From the research presented, four major points accrue which combine to support the thesis. These are:

1) A recognition of the information war battlespace of information systems and systems-of-systems.

2) That the impetus to change in the new battlespace is to avoid defeat on the scale of Iraq's, as Iraq was an industrial age force crushed in part by the U.S nascent information age capabilities.

3) That the prize of information warfare is information superiority. Information superiority is the ability to influence the enemy commander's decision loop while maintaining the sanctity of one's own.

4) Therefore, the key to victory in operational level information war is adoption of the strategy and target set that is C2W. C2W is the way military forces gain information superiority in the information age.

Following from the above, it is recommended that C2W:

1) Be viewed and employed as a discrete strategic whole vice in its traditional individual pillars.

2) Be considered a co-equal battlespace function to maneuver, shaping, force protection, and support, for operational planning purposes.

3) Be recognized as imperative to successful operational level of warfighting in the information age. C2W cannot be viewed as a purely strategic level of war concern.

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE:

AN OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVE IN

THE INFORMATION AGE

PREFACE

The United States is at a "strategic inflection point"; a time in the life of an organization "...when its fundamentals are about to change."^[1] The technological advances of the information age are the progenitor of this strategic inflection point. For the United States military, the information age causes a fundamental shift in the way warfare will be conducted in the next century. 'Information War'--the broad rubric for war in the information age--is upon us.

This paper addresses the conduct of information war at the operational level of war. Its thesis is that waging successful information war is how wars will be won in the future and that winning the 'Command and Control Warfare' (C2W) battle is how military forces wage successful information war. Conclusions and recommendations that follow from the thesis are expressed to advance the understanding of operational information war and to enhance the ability of the United States military to successfully conduct it.

Specifically not taken up is the strategic implications

of information war as the majority of writings to date seem

to be concentrated at that level. The work therefore answers to a perceived shortfall in the on-going discussion concerning information warfare, namely a lack of a studied focus on the operational battlespace and the collision of military forces.

Chapter One delves into the nature and relevance of information war. The intent of the chapter is to develop the first half of the thesis, specifically that the way wars will be won in the future is through information warfare. Examined are the factors that combine to create the conditions that necessitate operational information warfare.

Chapter Two accomplishes several objectives. First it is designed to examine the second half of the thesis, namely that winning the C2W battle is how military forces wage successful information war. Second, because C2W is a new concept, the paper consciously serves as a primer, delving into each of its five pillars in depth. The intent is to bring under one source a detailed intellectual examination of each of the pillars, supported by historical example. In this examination, the pillars of C2W are grouped by the moral and the physical as a new way of understanding how the pillars relate to each other.

Third, Chapter Two considers that the way to win the C2W battle is to integrate the individual pillars in a synergistic

way. A historical example from WW II supports this statement.

Chapter Three examines through the prism of C2W the first war of the information age, Operation Desert Storm. How well C2W animated the Coalition's strategy and execution of operations is exposed and analyzed. C2W is viewed through both its moral and physical expression, and sought is an assessment of C2W's decisiveness in Desert Storm.

The paper concludes with Chapter Four, where the conclusions drawn from the research and analysis are presented. Specific recommendations and related questions bearing further examination are also raised.

The United States military must be able to win on any battlefield. The changes to warfare wrought by the dawning of the information age therefore can not be overlooked. At the strategic inflection point, America's military must pivot smartly and embrace the future, or become outdated and ultimately defeated on future fields of conflict.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili's Joint Vision 2010: Force of the Future (JV 2010) is the mechanism used to explore information warfare at the operational level. Analyzed in depth is JV 2010's lynch pin concept of 'information superiority' as gaining information superiority is the heart of successful information warfare.

In the course of analyzing how military forces gain information superiority, the idea that all military information invariably follows a path from 'sensor to decision-maker to shooter' is expressed. The military information path idea is used to illuminate the specific fundamental changes and corresponding impacts on warfare in the information age. From the 'changes and impacts' come an assessment of the military tasks to be accomplished to wage successful operational information war. This serves as a springboard into Chapter Two and the concept of Command and Control Warfare.

and is a bridge into Chapter Three, where this idea is examined through the vehicle of an extended case study

CHAPTER ONE	1
A Joint Vision of Information Superiority	1
The Search for Information Superiority	3
The Information Age	4
Warfare in the Information Age	5
The Significance of Information Warfare	8
Achieving Information Superiority: C2W	14
CHAPTER TWO	16
Command and Control Warfare	16
Military Deception	19
Operations Security	23
Psychological Operations	26
Electronic Warfare	30
C2W Physical Destruction	33
The Greater Whole of C2W	34
CHAPTER THREE	38
Operation Desert Storm and C2W	38
Operation Desert Storm: The Plan	40
Commander's Intent and C2W	41
Information Superiority in ODS	42
C2W in ODS	45
Douhet's Dream Refined: Airpower in ODS	46
Tricking the Devil: Military Deception in ODS	50
C2W in ODS: Decisive	54
CHAPTER FOUR	56
What to Make of All of This	56
The New Battlespace	56
The Impetus to Change	57
The Prize	58
The Key to Victory	59
Miles to Go Before I Sleep	62
BIBLIOGRAPHY	65
Books	65
Monographs	67
Periodicals	67
Government Publications	70
Unpublished Materials	71
Unpublished Interview	71

CHAPTER ONE

A Joint Vision of Information Superiority

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General John M. Shalikashvili published in July 1996 his personal vision of how U.S. forces will fight in the next century.^[2] Entitled Joint Vision 2010: Force of the Future, his vision is a conceptual template articulating the ways U.S. forces will realize new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting in the next century. The document envisions joint forces achieving dominance across the spectrum of military operations through the synergistic integration of new operational concepts. The goal is for a small(er than now), high-quality force to win in the next century by leveraging new concepts to achieve the effects of mass without massed forces and sequential operations. Dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics are the key concepts of the vision. Linking these concepts is the enabling concept of information superiority.^[3]

Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) fundamentally has an operational perspective. Technological advances guiding weaponry over longer ranges to precise targets and improved command, control, and intelligence capabilities are harnessed synergistically. U.S. forces benefit from increased awareness of both the enemy and friendly situation in the battlespace as a result of improved, all-source intelligence fusion efforts. Dominant maneuver follows as the simultaneous application of decisive force against enemy centers of gravity (COG) at all levels. COG identification is enabled by increased battlespace awareness. The sum goal is the multi-dimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to achieve full spectrum dominance.

The ability of dispersed U.S. forces to control the breadth, depth, and height of future battlespaces inherently pivots on an improved, 'real time' awareness of what is going on in the battlespace superior to that of any adversary. This is the soul and the purpose of the concept of information superiority.

JV 2010, therefore, pivots on information superiority. Recognizing that throughout history "...gathering, exploiting, and protecting information have been critical,"^[4] JV 2010 anticipates the effects of increased access to information and the enhanced speed, precision, and accuracy of its transmission. Defined in JV 2010 as "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting

or denying an adversary's ability to do the same,"^[5] information superiority is the keystone upon which the success of JV 2010 rests. Information superiority is the high ground that provides the asymmetrical advantage sought by commanders through history. Having it is essential to achieving the full scope of JV 2010.

The Search for Information Superiority

The search for information superiority is not new. Sun Tzu's observation to "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril"^[6] is well-known and timelessly accurate. Scouting the enemy in order to gain advantage from knowing his dispositions (and simultaneously protecting against his scouts) is likewise ancient. Intuitively, this task is also the essence of practicality. In this age-old quest for knowledge of the enemy, history abounds with examples of commanders who either gained or lost the race for information superiority to decisive effect. Prominent American examples include the Gettysburg campaign of 1863, where General Robert E. Lee lost his picture of the Union Army and blundered into a meeting engagement without a battle plan and on inferior ground. Operation Desert Storm presents a recent example of the decisive effect of achieving information superiority. We will examine

this conflict in greater detail later in this paper. However, before reaching that juncture, we must first discuss what is new about the quest for information superiority that makes it different and relevant for today's warfighter. That difference is in the character of the dawning 'information age.'

The Information Age

A new age is upon us. In this new age, information flows like water. In some form it is everywhere, and like water, it is essential. Information as a concept is old, but how we manipulate, transfer, collate, store, and use it is changing with the force of a tidal wave. Information as water has become a raging torrent. This change is revolutionary in impact and scope. Increasingly, theorists note that modern times are transitioning to what is being hailed as 'The Information Age.'

Home computers, home satellite dishes, the Internet, cellular phones, etc., are all examples of how accessible information is to the common citizen. Due to the world-wide media, we can watch live events unfold in real-time, or watch satellite images of weather patterns across the globe. LtCol T.X. Hammes USMC observes that, "Hierarchical structures are breaking down as information systems are connecting people in new ways. The world is organizing into webs tied together by the

Internet and meshes tied together by powerful personal computers."^[7]

The 'information superhighway' of popular rhetoric is real. On-ramps, off-ramps, as well as spur, connector and ring roads are appearing overnight and continually moving off in unexpected directions. Additionally, the information superhighway is an autobahn with no posted speeds. Dominating this highway are advanced-technology, high-performance machines that inherently realize that the race is to the swift.

Ultimately, the dawning of the information age represents acceptance of information (and all that it entails in this sense) as a tangible medium of human exchange, akin to earth, water, and sky. Like those familiar settings, it can not help but be an arena for human conflict. This conflict is emerging under the rubric of information warfare. Information superiority must and will be the result of successful information warfare.

Warfare in the Information Age

The intellectual roots of information war thinking lies in the work done by noted futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Their thesis is that the way we make wealth is the way we make war and that in the future, the manipulation of information is the way we will make wealth.^[8] Building on their earlier work, The Third Wave (1980), they offer a corresponding emerging third wave of warfare. In the Tofflerian view, third wave warfare will supplant our current (or second wave) industrial way of warfare by harnessing information technology much as third wave economies will eventually supplant second wave economies.^[9] We will make war by manipulating information.

The change from second wave to third begins with the technological ability to gain and exchange rapidly--and therefore more efficiently use--information on a wide scale. Increasingly, dispersal (the opposite of mass), systems integration, networks, fiber optics, miniaturization, and other innovations now being seen in commercial applications are being translated into military applications with unprecedented effects on how we organize and wage war. For example, networked computers massage a common data base (specifically, the Time Phased Force Deployment Data or TPFDD) to plan and monitor the world wide deployment and redeployment of U.S. forces. On the ground and at sea, we are gaining continuous and precise understanding of where our troops are through the Global Positioning System (GPS). Enhanced information gathering capabilities (satellite imagery, laser range-finders, etc.) are improving our certainty on where the enemy is. Couple all of this with precision weaponry and you get an "If I can sense you, I can kill you" paradigm. The fog of war is lifting--if perhaps only for a short while--through technological means.^[10]

Tofflerian thought on information warfare found ready acceptance in the U.S. Department of Defense, most notably in the Air Force and Army. Former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan cited them repeatedly in a 1994 article on war in the information age.^[11] R.L. DiNardo and Daniel Hughes detail the influence of the Tofflers in a cautionary article on information warfare.^[12] A review of the literature suggests the highest level of acceptance resides in the Air Force.^[13] Much of Air Force acceptance seems the result of Operation Desert Storm, a perspective addressed later in this work.

Information war at the strategic level is the employment of all the tools of national power to gain information superiority over the enemy. Today, the cybernetic loop connecting sensor to shooter is dominated by technology. Intrinsically information warfare at all levels is associated with information systems

(Admiral William Owens' "system-of-systems"^[14]) and the struggle between opponents for control of the information realm.^[15] Our focus here is on the operational level of war. On this level, information war's basic premise hinges upon: (1) the rapid collection and processing of information to gain accurate understanding of a given situation; (2) the following rapid transmission of 'intelligent' (processed information equals intelligence) direction to forces that can speedily act with precision and effect.^[16]

JV 2010's measure of success as an operational vision hinges on the ability to use the information advantage (asymmetric battlespace awareness gained through superior speed of transmission from sensor to shooter) in a decisive way--that is, dominant maneuver.

The Significance of Information Warfare

Fundamentally, information warfare is not a change in the nature of warfare; war is still Clausewitz's "... act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."^[17] Information war is instead a way to conduct warfare that intrinsically recognizes the changing

nature of the modern world. For the military, the most immediate and tangible aspect is the significantly increased speed in which military information travels the path from a force's sensory organs, to its brain, and on to the muscle. To demonstrate this, we must first look deeper into the path that military information inevitably follows. This is relevant to our inquiry, as in truth, information does not flow merely from 'sensor to shooter', but instead makes an intermediate--and critical --stop along the way.

Stripped to its bare essentials, all combat significant information moves along a path from sensor to decision-maker to shooter (Figure A). Information is valueless until it is processed into intelligence. This is to say information must be analyzed and placed into context in order to have full value. This of course is the intelligence cycle. Further, the value of intelligence is that it drives operations. Together, intelligence and operations comprise the thinking and creative parts of the loop, the end product of which are decisions and direction (orders).

In this model, something is seen (sensor) and is reported to a 'decision-maker.' The decision-maker decides what it is and

what ought to be done about it. There may be hierarchies of decision-makers (the chain of command), but ultimately, if action is to be taken, it is directed by the decision-maker to the shooter. 'Shooter' reflects the concept that intrinsically military forces are designed to kill people and break things. Shooter represents some unit, weapon, system (or a combination of the three) that takes action in response to the decision-maker's interpretation and use of the sensed information.^[18] All of these steps--'sensor to decision-maker to shooter'--are taken relative to the enemy. The model cycles back on itself through the sensing of new information about the result of its previous action (battle damage assessment) or some new enemy action.

The military information path is Colonel John Boyd's "OODA"^[19] loop through Alice's looking glass. Like information itself, the path is old. Scouts report enemy movement to their command post and, as a result, a force is dispatched to counter or take advantage of an (unexpected) opportunity. While information age capabilities do not change the stations along the path, the changes do have

several impacts on the process that are relevant.

The information age causes four fundamental changes in the conduct of war at the operational level, each with a corresponding impact. The four changes are: (1) a dramatic increase in sensor capability and output; (2) a volume of data that stresses the functional (or Napoleonic) staff model; (3) a dependency on systems to wage war; and (4) an increased speed of data transmission. The related impacts are: (1) an overwhelmed decision process due to information overload; (2) an information-organization mismatch; (3) identification of information systems as a critical vulnerability; and (4) the potential for real-time awareness of the situation, leading to information superiority and dominant maneuver. As each of the changes and impacts are linked, we will discuss each duality in turn.

The first change is that new technologies greatly increase the capabilities and outputs of the sensory organs. Satellites, as well as systems such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and a host of sophisticated radars, infrared devices, sonars, etc., are the new high ground. As a result, more facts are added into the decision formula. Logically it follows that since we see so much more, the brain has much more to think about. The related impact is a potentially overwhelmed decision process.

For example, during Operation Desert Storm, the Marine Corps local area network processed 1.3 million electronic mail messages in the first 36 hours of the ground war.^[20] At a bare minimum, just the human sorting of the messages--some of which were undoubtedly important--consumed time and delayed decision.

Second, the new technologies--created by industrial age societies--tend to serve masters in hierarchical organizations. As a result, the data collected by sensory organs have but one destination--the top--and one road to it. Information in Napoleonic command and staff structures is owned, not shared. Staffs collect, collate and analyze information principally for their commander. The second change therefore, is that the volume of data stresses functional staffs and causes friction in the decision process. Important data can be obscured in a haystack of white noise and inconclusive or false reporting. Marine Commanders in Beirut "...received a great volume of intelligence warnings about potential terrorist threats..."^[21] prior to the terrorist attack of 23 October 1983, yet were unable to pick the real threat out of the pile. The impact is a mismatch between information and organization where the current staff structures can not bear the weight of the data pouring in. Until command structures implement the lattice potential of networked information age technologies, and make information a shared asset, much of the potential of increased information gathering is wasted.

Third, the ever growing use of inter-connected information systems causes a concurrent dependency on them. Dependency breeds vulnerability, perhaps a critical vulnerability. Brigadier General Robert F. Dees of the Joint Staff maintains that, "Information systems may very well be an Achilles heel."^[22] As an example, consider the U.S. TPFDD system. Earlier, this system was cited as the system by which the U.S. plans and monitors the world-wide deployment of forces. Imagine then, the impact on U.S. capability to project power rapidly if that system were to be shut down, degraded or disrupted. Time Magazine reported that Belgian hackers offered (for a million dollar fee) to disrupt U.S. deployment to Operation Desert Shield; post-war investigation supported their claimed capability.^[23]

The point follows then, that as hierarchical management nodes are commonly found at road junctions along the information path, they become key terrain to be attacked and defended. This notion has its own logic: capture the intersection, block the road, degrade the force.

Threats of this nature can only be expected to increase as new technology appears. They must be guarded against, lest information superiority be surrendered.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, when unimpeded, information is capable of moving to the decision-maker at unprecedented speeds. The impact of this change is that near real-time battlefield awareness is available. Real-time awareness is just around the corner. Real time awareness--electronically leading from the front--can engender better decisions.^[24] Optimally, this enhanced battlespace awareness is shared, creating common battlespace awareness. The potential synergy from common battlespace awareness will increase execution proficiency by an order of magnitude. This is the motive for embracing the potential of organizational structures that allow information to flow rapidly to all that need it. The failure to do so will be at the cost of information superiority. Without information superiority, the dominant maneuver envisioned by JV 2010 is not attainable.

Achieving Information Superiority: C2W

Superior situational awareness is the end product of information superiority, and, throughout history, a force multiplier of decisive effect. Information superiority accrues

to those who can get the information quickest from sensor to decision-maker to shooter. Adversaries will use the new technologies to enhance their efforts and to attack each other's systems. Therefore, information systems and information itself are increasingly centers of gravity in the classic Clausewitzian sense. Attacking and defending those centers of gravity are intrinsic functions of information warfare. In this light, two specific military tasks accrue as a result of the information age.

First, the information path of the enemy must be attacked and degraded. Second, but equally important, one must protect one's own military information path, specifically the technologically sophisticated version characteristic of the information age. These tasks are not simply centered on the destruction or protection of systems hardware or software. Information systems are dependent on the quality of the inputted information ('garbage in is garbage out'). Attempts to attack information will also be based upon feeding systems--and decision-makers--bad data.

The tasks are not new. However, as shown, they are of central importance given the nature of the information age. At the operational level of war, the military aspects of these tasks are captured in the concept of Command and Control Warfare (C2W). We will look into C2W in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

For it is by upsetting the enemy's "balance" that the victory is won; the concentration of fire and the opening of the breach are only the means to the true end -- the psychological destruction of the enemy's will to continue resistance.

David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon^[25]

Command and Control Warfare

In the previous chapter, we discussed the impact of the information age on the age-old quest for knowledge of the enemy. Information age technologies change the dynamic of this ancient quest by increasing the coverage of data gathering sensors and the speed by which information travels from sensor to decision-maker to shooter. Reliance on the technological systems that animate the information age mark the information sphere as a battleground. Consequently, two tasks accrue in the information war: protect one's own information systems and attack the enemy's.

The military aspect of this struggle is called command and control warfare (C2W). C2W is a strategy and a target set; combined are both ancient concepts and modern capabilities. Like much of war, C2W is heavily dependent on intelligence and communications. In this regard, it is a subset of information war; information war in full battle array is the use of all the tools of national power to create a competitive advantage at the national strategic level.^[26]

Air Force LtCol Norman Hutcherson describes C2W as an implementing strategy that attacks, "...the command and control (C2) decision-making capabilities of an adversary while protecting friendly C2."^[27] C2W is a military tool to be employed against opposing commanders and forces. It is applicable at all levels of war and in all spectrums of conflict.

C2W in its offensive mode is called C2-attack.^[28] C2-attack assails decision-making by attacking information and the path that information travels from sensor to shooter. It blinds the eyes and clogs the ears. It confuses the brain through false information. It dulls or cuts the nerve connections between sensory organs and brain, as well as between brain and muscle. It fosters bad decision making and contributes to inaction, indecision, and mental paralysis by disrupting the opposing commander's OODA loop.

C2W's defensive mode is C2-protect.^[29] C2-protect shields decision processes and command and control capabilities. It works to maintain friendly balance while shoving the enemy off balance. C2-protect activities include electronic signature

reduction, proper command post sighting, and the coordination needed to ensure that friendly C2-attack efforts do not adversely effect friendly operations.

C2W has five pillars: military deception, operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PYSOPS), electronic warfare (EW), and C2W physical destruction.^[30] All serve the functional C2-attack and C2-protect roles of C2W. Combined they render C2W as an integrated, synergistic strategy designed to "decapitate the enemy's command structure from it's body of combat forces."^[31]

C2W's pillars can be viewed in two groupings. The first is through the relationship of C2W to truth. The C2W pillars of OPSEC, military deception, and PSYOPS deal with different aspects of the truth of friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions. Accordingly, OPSEC hides truth, military deception tells 'untruths', and PSYOPS (truth-based) presents half-truths. Individually or combined they attack understanding, and consequently, decision. The focus is a soft-kill on the moral heart of decision-making.

The second grouping includes EW and C2W physical destruction. Physical systems receive attack from both electromagnetic energy and kinetic energy weapons. The

intent is to control the systems (including, in a broad

sense, the electromagnetic spectrum) that collect and

transmit information. The focus is a hard-kill on the ways and means of decision-making and information handling.

Clausewitz spoke of the "remarkable trinity" of war and the impossibility of fixing an arbitrary relationship between the government, the army and the people.^[32] All three remain perpetually in a balanced tension. The pillars of C2W are the same. Viewing the pillars either individually, functionally as C2-attack or C2-protect, or through moral or physical lenses, does not obscure that all are inexhaustibly combinable in pursuit of the larger goal-- achieving information dominance over the enemy.

Each of the pillars of C2W bear deeper exploration. We will address each in turn, grouped by the moral and physical. We will begin with military deception.

Military Deception

Though fraud [deception] in other activities be detestable, in the management of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomes the enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who does so by force.

Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses, 1517^[33]

Military deception is as old as war. Sun Tzu's twenty-five century old observation that "all warfare is based upon deception"^[34] articulates the timeless presence of deception in war. Marine Major John LeHockey concurs when he begins a contemporary paper on strategic and operational military deception with a review of the art of military deception in the ancient and classical worlds.^[35] Although it has been argued that deception has not been a pre-eminent U.S. stratagem due to Clausewitz's disdain for using deceit to generate military surprise,^[36] it is now fully recognized as a vital part of C2W.

Military deception requires little definition. It is trickery and deceit to create a picture that does not accord with the facts. Deception creates false information so as to skew the enemy's decision path. (Figure B) It leads the enemy to an incorrect estimate of the situation.^[37] His false situational

awareness is the poisonous tree, the disaster of his related operations its bitter fruit. The

object of military deception under C2-attack is the enemy commander and his decision process.

A classic example of military deception is a World War

II British effort code-named "Operation Mincemeat." Mounted

in early 1943, Mincemeat supported Operation Husky--the planned July 1943 Allied invasion of Sicily. Sicily was an obvious next operational objective for the Allies on the heels of the successful North African campaign. Mincemeat was born to deceive the Germans that the invasion would be elsewhere.^[38]

Mincemeat revolved around the placement of a briefcase containing documents detailing "Operation Brimstone"--an entirely fictious invasion of Sardinia--into Spanish hands. Once there the Allies were certain it would be shared with the Germans. The same documents would let slip that Husky was to be the deceptive cover for Brimstone--to include pre-invasion bombardment of Sicilian airfields. Mincemeat's lie--that Husky was deception and Brimstone was real--was a big one.^[39]

The key documents were delivered to the Spanish at the correct time and place by a Major William Martin, Royal Marines. Major Martin was a corpse--an officer courier seemingly washed

ashore in Spain after a plane crash at sea. He was a "mule" and the insert was staged--but the briefcase containing the essential documents was chained to his wrist. The "art" of Mincemeat was in the British presentation of the deception story, supported by the invention of the myriad details concerning Major Martin to convince the Germans that the courier, and therefore the information he carried, was valid. The "man who never was" was a persuasive liar and the Germans believed him.

Mincemeat was stunningly successful. Post-WW II examination of German records indicated that prior to Mincemeat, the Germans had correctly deduced that Sicily was to be the location of the next Allied invasion. Their perception showed an immediate shift away from Sicily after the arrival of Major Martin. Once Sicily was eliminated as an option, other options received support and serious discussion. Hitler, for one, believed the true effort would be in Greece and sent Irwin Rommel to command the effort there. German defensive efforts and force dispositions were disrupted by the Mincemeat documents, and the shifts aided the successful prosecution of Husky.^[40]

As shown, military deception seeks to give the enemy a false understanding of friendly situation and intentions and by such, adversely effect his decisions and actions. Relatedly, efforts

are also taken to ensure that an adversary does not gain a correct portrait of the friendly situation. Efforts taken to deny critical information about friendly forces are called OPSEC. Accordingly, it is the next pillar of C2W we will examine.

Operations Security

The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War^[41]

OPSEC is vital because as assiduously as we watch the

enemy, the enemy watches us. OPSEC is the epitome of C2-protect. Its goal is to ensure that the enemy does not gain an accurate read on friendly operation, dispositions, and intent. Much as military deception seeks to create a false estimate of the situation, OPSEC seeks to ensure an incompletely accurate version. Deception and OPSEC work hand in glove; OPSEC protects the truth while deception fills in the blank spaces in the enemy's curiosity with believable lies.

Certain actions, when taken in context to the situation and the capabilities of the force, telegraph intent prematurely. The eye is attracted to movement; a savvy enemy can detect--and therefore sometimes deflect--the blow before it lands. Often it is little indicators, puzzle pieces, that when combined with other indicators, loudly shout "Here I am!" to the enemy. OPSEC's task is to sort through the possible puzzle pieces, determine those that are most ruinous to our scheme if exposed, and obscure them.

OPSEC (Figure C) begins with an understanding that the enemy can see and hear; that is, gather information about us. OPSEC is therefore concerned with camouflage and concealment, dimming the light and muffling footsteps. It is a process of identifying and analyzing those items of critical information the enemy would most like to obtain, factoring which of these are observable through his collection means, and instituting measures to reduce friendly vulnerability to collection.^[42]

OPSEC's biggest challenge lies in the area of unclassified or open source materials or actions. The global village connectivity of the information age heightens the difficulty of OPSEC. A free press operating in an open society can be a fountain of information for the enemy. In August 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, Prussian Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) learned of the whereabouts of the French Army courtesy of the Paris press. French general MacMahon's Army of

Chalons was caught executing an unexpected operational movement to relieve the

city of Metz. Surprise was lost and he was fell upon by

Moltke's numerically superior force, and defeated.^[43]

Imagine if von Moltke could have watched his counterpart MacMahon on CNN. What could he have discerned? How fast could he have discerned it? Factor in retired generals giving analysis and 'color commentary' and the challenges of OPSEC in the information age become staggering.

Lastly, 'Red Cell' teams simulating a thinking enemy are a crucial component in determining what critical truths must be hidden. The key to OPSEC is to combine knowledge of friendly situation and intent with empathy for the enemy's perspective and of his information gathering capabilities. Knowing what must be protected is the key first step in formulating the entire C2W strategy. OPSEC is the base of the C2W effort. From it flows the integrated efforts of the other pillars.

To this point we have discussed both truth and untruth. In between lies the shadowy world of half-truth. PSYOPS uses bits of the truth to achieve its effect. We will discuss it next.

Psychological Operations

To seduce the enemy's soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter.

Vegetius, De Re Militari, circa 378 A.D.^[44]

Clausewitz observed that a war "...cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's will has not been broken."^[45] The Chandler quote at the beginning of this chapter reinforces the notion that the true objective is the psychological aspect of the enemy's will. PSYOPS is that portion of C2W aimed directly at the psychology of the enemy. Its lingua franca is a pastiche of half-truths; we will return to this point momentarily.

Joint doctrine correctly asserts that "The employment of any element of national power, particularly the military element, always has a psychological dimension."^[46] However, PSYOPS is more than the calculated recognition of the psychological impact of operations. PSYOPS is a shaping tool where emotions and attitudes are fostered in the enemy to our advantage.

PSYOPS is defined in Joint doctrine as:

"Operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their attitudes, emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and

ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."^[47]

The key words are influence, attitudes, and behavior.

PSYOPS (Figure D) (under the C2-attack function) seeks to create or strengthen enemy perceptions so that his actions are affected in a way favorable to friendly purposes. PSYOPS is a soft kill on the enemy's decision process and includes undermining of his forces by sowing "dissidence or disaffection"^[48] amongst his ranks. PSYOPS seeks to convince the enemy to do, or not to do, some action of his own volition; it is a persuasive attack.

PSYOPS is talking to the enemy. It is a non-lethal way to multiply the effects of military capabilities through the direct communication of information to the enemy.