Military

Beyond The Clinton Doctrine: U.S. Military Intervention Policy

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area – National Security

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Beyond The Clinton Doctrine: U.S. Military Intervention Policy

 

Author: Major Robert W. Lanham, USMC

 

Thesis: The Clinton Doctrine, currently governing U.S. military intervention policy, is based upon a decision framework which is not suitable for discerning and prioritizing the nation's interests, resulting in reduced diplomatic credibility abroad.

 

Discussion: The paper examines the evolution of military intervention policy, focusing on the post-Cold War trends. Beginning with the Weinberger Doctrine, intervention policy is seen to drift away over time from two key policy elements that have been part of the U.S. historical tradition: (1) Americans are sent into combat primarily to protect vital national security interests; and (2)  military force is a last resort option, used once it is determined that other policy means to have failed. Although military intervention has been used to protect less-than-vital interests, it has been done with increased risk of failure of attaining both the military and political objectives.

            Although the Clinton Doctrine (as articulated in the 1996 National Security Strategy and Presidential Decision Directive-25) states President Clinton's definitions of vital interests, and does clearly recognize the need for carefully considered criteria whenever forces are committed; the Clinton Doctrine is based on defending American values vice interests and therefore misses the mark. America has neither the resources nor the desire to defend every instance in which it's collective values are challenged. In order for military intervention (or even threat of intervention) to be credible, it must be clear, uncompromised, and supported by the majority of Americans and their elected representatives. The only way the President can be sure of that degree of support, is to reserve the commitment of his armed forces for only those interests which Americans hold most dear. Anything short of this leads to the commitment of national blood and treasure over issues that may later be compromised. Over the long haul, this process reduces American credibility on the global scene, thereby reducing national security.

 

Conclusion:  Therefore, intervention policy must be approached with a firm grasp of the nation's priorities and interests, as well as of military capabilities. The President must be keenly aware of the many complex issues within a particular situation before he or she can make an intelligent military intervention decision. The decision process derived from the intervention policy must ask the right questions, and must lead the President to make a cost/benefit analysis which is grounded on relevant information.  Following are some suggestions for improving U.S. military intervention policy:

1. Invest in human intelligence collection capabilities and country/region expertise.

2. Define national interest in terms of interests; not values.

3. When decided upon as an appropriate option, military intervention must be done in a way     which ensures that the military commander can seize and maintain the initiative.

4. Much effort must be put into determining the cost/benefit relationship.

5. Particular care must be given to military intervention decisions which involve UN or other     multinational coalitions.

 

 

Table of Contents

 

              Chapter                                                        Page

 

           Inroduction                                                2

 

I.           Defining National Interests                         5

 

II.       The Historical Tradition                                    8

 

III.      U.S. Post-Cold War Intervention Policy 14

 

IV.      The Clinton Doctrine                                    23

 

V.           Assessment                                                  28

 

VI.           Summary and Conclusion                       42

 

           End Notes                                                   51

 

           Bilbliography                                                354

 

 

 

BEYOND THE CLINTON DOCTRINE:

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION POLICY

 

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has had to deal with increased uncertainty in the international security environment. The absence of a primary peer competitor to focus the energy of U.S. foreign policy has made it more difficult for the nation's leaders to envision and carry out policies that are clearly based on America's national interests. Indeed, defining U.S. interests in the absence of a peer competitor on the global scene is a daunting challenge for the country's leadership.

In such an environment, U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy have evolved. Of particular interest to this paper is that facet of policy which governs the use of U.S. military forces in support of the nation's policies. Since the end of the Cold War, policies regarding the support and protection of American interests have grown to reflect changing realities and priorities, but these challenges have been met with varying success. Policy failures in Somalia, Iraq, and Bosnia-Herzegovina raise questions about the underlying soundness of the policies and about current decisions to commit U.S. military power.

This paper explores the elements of military intervention policy. First, national interests are defined to provide some common ground on which further discussion can develop. Second, the general history of the relationship between United States interests and policies is explored in an effort to understand the context within which the decision to commit military forces takes place. Third, current intervention policy is examined to determine the role deployment of military forces currently fulfills in the defense of U.S. interests.

This paper argues that the Clinton Doctrine currently governing commitment of U.S. military forces is based upon a decision framework which is not suitable for discerning and prioritizing the nation's interests. It will argue further that U.S. vital interests are, in reality, it's security interests and that U.S. military power should primarily be reserved for the defense of these vital interests.  Finally, the paper will argue that, because intervention policy is not currently based on the definition and defense of vital interests, the policy leads to reduced diplomatic credibility abroad.

Having criticized the Clinton Doctrine, an alternative intervention decision framework is offered in the hopes of providing military intervention policy that is more credible and consistent in the long run. Though no uniquely original concepts are proposed here, the framework itself seeks to revitalize the link between vital interests and military intervention --that in order for military intervention (or even threat of intervention) to be credible, it must be clear, uncompromised, and supported by the majority of Americans and their elected representatives. The only way the President can be sure of that degree of support, is to reserve the commitment of his armed forces for only those interests which Americans hold most dear.

I.  Defining National Interests

 

This paper begins with Donald Nuechterlein's construct which divides national interests into categories of type and intensity.¹ Basic types of U.S. national interest include (1)defense of homeland, (2) economic well-being, (3)favorable world order, and (4) promotion of American values abroad. Neuchterlein states that, within each of these four broad categories, the "intensity" with which Americans approach that interest will vary. The most intense interest for Americans is the Survival interest, or those events which threaten the very existence of the country. Next in intensity comes Vital interest, where serious harm can happen unless strong measures (often, but not always including the use of military force) are taken. Major interests are defined as instances when a country's political, economic, and social well-being may be affected adversely by events and trends abroad. Last in order of intensity are Peripheral interests--when a nation's well being is not directly affected, but harm to some segment of U.S. society (most often U.S. corporations with operations overseas) may be sustained. These categories are useful for arranging and prioritizing interests so they can somehow reflect the national will during the process of policy formulation.

Generally, the basic interests of "defense of homeland" and "economic well-being" are apt to take on survival and vital intensity. For this reason, the term "national security interest" is often used interchangeably with "vital interest". The basic interests concerning "favorable world order" and "promotion of American values" tend not to be vital interests which threaten serious harm to the U.S.; instead, they tend to dominate the intensities asscoiated with major and peripheral interests. The tendencies cited here are generalizations, of course, but the tendencies exist nonetheless.

 

It is the role of the President--with balanced opposition from the Congress-- to discern and define American interests. It is also his role to exercise judgment as to the intensity of interest that Americans should have in a particular development. There is usually little disagreement on survival issues. If America is attacked, even indirectly, U.S. leadership is quick to respond, courses of action are rapidly developed, and public support rises quickly and is relatively sustained. It is much more difficult to draw the line between major and peripheral interests, but according to Neuchterlein, "If the policy maker believes the United States cannot tolerate a developing threat, the level of national interest for him is vital; if, however, he concludes that the issues involved can and should be compromised, even though the result can be painful, the interest is major."² (Italics added) These categories and intensities of interest can be applied to any geo-political area for which U.S. security policy is being developed.

Throughout American history, the U.S. has traditionally--but not always-- committed its military forces in the name of vital interests. In light of  Neuchterlein's definitions this only makes sense, since compromising an interest becomes politically difficult once the nation has spent money and lives to secure it . This is not to say that the military cannot, nor should not, be committed to protect and preserve major or peripheral interests; only that to do so involves certain risks. Not the least of these risks is to lose American public support for military operations defending an interest that is not vital, if combat casualties begin to mount.

II.  The Historical TRADITION

 

An examination of America's historical experience will reveal that there have long been distinct elements of American foreign policy which still influence policy makers today: (1) Americans generally resort to military force only after other policy options have failed; (2) Americans have always attempted to spread democratic values and influence over wider and wider geographic areas; and (3) Americans generally support military intervention in those instances where vital national interests (national security interests) are at stake. In other instances, public and Congressional support falter before the political objectives are reached, signifying a fourth distinct element: Americans do not like to think of promoting and protecting their interests in terms of brokering power, but rather, they couch their policy in the ideology of promoting American democracy and individual (or human) rights. It is unreasonable to expect Americans to begin thinking in terms of power politics because they rarely have. It is also unreasonable to expect Americans to give up the cause of spreading the values which have brought so much bounty and individual freedom to their country.

The current U.S. foreign policy of enlargement and engagement which has developed since the end of the Cold War is actually the latest installment of an evolutionary process that began at the nation's birth. The United States was born as a working model of republican democracy. As the first such experiment, the very  idea of American-style democracy, based on majority rule and a degree of individual freedoms (though quite limited at the outset for many Americans), resides at the foundation of the American character.  So, too, does the notion that America will resort to armed conflict only as a last resort as it attempts to solve its foreign policy challenges. From the very beginning, George Washington believed in the sword as "the last resort for the preservation of our liberties".³

U.S. policy sought to extend the benefits of democratic ideology to others. Even when Americans seem, on the surface, isolationist in character, closer scrutiny reveals that there has been an ongoing effort to promote American values of democracy and individual rights. In 1801, Thomas Jefferson, in his inaugural speech to the nation, spoke of the need for "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."  The emphasis was not isolationist at all, but emphasized engagement with the community of nations while avoiding entanglements. These entanglements  might require American involvement in spite of whether or not it was in the best U.S. interest to be involved. Within a very short time, in fact, Jefferson was able to close the Louisiana Purchase with Napoleon of France. This extremely beneficial arrangement was possible largely because Jefferson had maintained a free hand on the global economic scene by not being entangled in the ongoing dispute between Britain and France.⁴ Additionally, the land purchase fueled America's great westward expansion (hardly isolationist in nature) and extended the "benefits" of American democracy to the inhabitants of the North American continent.

The War of 1812 was largely a misguided attempt by the U.S. to annex the Canadian territory. Shortly thereafter, American eyes turned southwesterly. The War with Mexico was fought to expand influence into Texas.

As America extended its influence westward, it also began to reach outward. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine put the world on notice that, in addition to increasing its territorial boundaries, the United States was intent on carving out a regional sphere of influence as well.  No longer would the United States accept European encroachment in the Western Hemisphere. The Doctrine gradually solidified over time into a centerpiece of the U.S. security framework. The Open Door Policy , extending across the Pacific to China, emphasized the commercial and economic nature underlying U.S. interests.

With territorial borders secured and a sphere of influence established, the extension of American ideals and beliefs turned inward for a brief period.  At least in part, the American Civil War was fought to resolve existing conflicts over the ideology of individual rights and majority rule. As such, the Civil War was a continuation of the refining process; a consolidation of those ideas which the American Revolution had affirmed. Resolution of those ideological conflicts was necessary for the nation to define itself and set the stage for further attempts to promote those ideals abroad.

At the turn of the century  the United States was a nation growing in power and economic might, but certainly not a major player on the world stage. The experiences of the First World War and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points were to change that reality forever. Once again the nation was reluctant to pick up the sword and involve itself militarily. As the American giant finally lumbered into action in WWI, American military power grew quickly. As the war ended, Americans were anxious to see the rapid reduction of their forces in their rush to return to normalcy.  The U.S. situation and responsibilities had changed however.  Due to the extent of economic strength which the U.S. possessed, and due to the Wilsonian ideology it had now purchased through the blood and treasure spent during the Great War, America's place on the world stage had changed. No longer a bit player, the United States played a much larger part in world diplomacy, but refused to remain actively involved after the war's end. In the words of Walter Lippman,

The Wilsonian thesis was, if I may put it in this way, that since the world was no longer safe for the American democracy, the American people were called upon to conduct a crusade to make the real world safe for American democracy. In order to do this the principles of the American democracy would have to be made universal throughout the world.⁵

In essence, Lippman argues, Wilsonian ideology extended the traditional, historic fascination with expansion of liberal democracy and individual rights to the world arena.

Whereas once the American focus had been on the continent, then the hemisphere, the nation's ideology became a crusade to extend the benefits of its political and historical experience to the world at large. It is true that the American people resisted this urge for awhile during the interwar years, but when WWII once again thrust America onto center stage, Wilsonianism sounded the battle cry--now pledging to defend FDR's Four Freedoms.  Once again Lippman characterized the ideology as a great crusade:

 

Therefore, all wars are to end all wars, all wars are crusades which can be concluded only when all the peoples have submitted to the only true political religion. ...No war can end rightly , therefore, except by the unconditional surrender of the aggressor nation and by the overthrow and transformation of its political regime.⁶

 

Clearly, the events of WWII gave credence to this view. After a period of reluctance to enter the war, America embraced the crusade for democracy and freedom with all its energy.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, America found itself as the most powerful and influential nation on earth. Very soon America would be confronted with a major competitor on the world stage whose determination to export its ideology (one totally opposed to American liberal democracy) was equal to her own.  During the Cold War, America would carry the brunt of the effort to fight the Soviet Union, ideologically and physically opposed in a protracted struggle for the global sphere of influence.

The subsequent struggle posed two very substantial challenges to the framers of U.S. foreign policy and security strategy. First, the challenges which the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union placed before America occurred rapidly and spanned the globe. The efforts to "contain" such direct challenges were primarily reactive; events drove the formulation of policy more so than a framework focused on developing strategic policy which directly related to interests.⁷ Secondly, America became engaged to counter Soviet expansion wherever it occurred. This precept took precedence over whether the underlying situation was a vital interest or not. The vital interest became: "to combat Communism".  Because communism was involved (the spread of which is anathema to American democratic crusaders), the situation automatically became a vital interest no matter what the underlying situation demanded.  The Korean peninsula was not considered a vital interest until the North Koreans, ostensibly at the request of the Kremlin, invaded South Korea.  Vietnam held no relation to American vital interests until it was perceived as another thrust at expanding the Communist domain. 

The fact that neither Korea, nor Viet Nam really represented vital U.S. interests manifested itself later on as loss of public support for those conflicts.  As the Korean conflict turned into a U.S. versus China confrontation, Americans ceased viewing the war as being in their best interests. In fact, they perceived an increased threat to national security as a result of fighting the Red Chinese. As the Viet Nam conflict became more and more protracted, Americans perceived that its leadership lacked either the will or the capability to "win", and therefore were unwilling to invest more lives and money.  This context reveals that America is sensitive to the ideals and interests for which it is willing to shed the blood of its citizens. Both cases support the idea that, at least insofar as committing the American military is concerned, vital national interests are national security interests. When military involvement increases national security risk (as it did during the Korean conflict), or decreases national security policy credibility (as during Viet Nam), American public support wanes. Leaders ignore history if they imagine that the American public will tolerate combat casualties for causes which are not linked to underlying vital interests and are not committed with the intention of winning the political objective.

 

iii. U.S. Post-Cold War INTERVENTION Policy

 The American public was never particularly fond of the concept of managing national power to pursue national interest. Instead, they preferred to wrap the concept of interests (power) inside the cloak of principles (ideology).⁸ So it is natural that America's leaders have taken to devising some form of political theology when articulating their foreign policy, rather than articulating the interests which they believe are the most important to protect and promote. A policy which clearly discriminated between various interests, then prioritized them and delineated clearly for which of those interests the country should be willing to sacrifice its sons, daughters, and treasure, has seldom existed in the United States.

Since the end of the Cold War, the fundamental change has been the movement from a bi-polar world (in terms of primary centers of power) back to a multi-polar world. As Henry Kissinger pointed out, "America is more preponderant than it was ten years ago, yet, ironically, power has also become more diffuse."⁸ In this environment the United States has had to learn new ways of relating to the community of nations. As the single most powerful nation on earth (in terms of its combined economic, diplomatic, and military might), the U.S. has had to balance leadership with building consensus on certain issues. It has had to achieve this balance without acting unilaterally simply because it had the power, or because it was easier diplomatically, to do so.

At the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy for the use of force in defending its interests was defined by the Weinberger Doctrine. The doctrine stated that, when committing U.S. combat forces, six conditions should be satisfied: (1) The interest at stake was a vital U.S. interest, or that of one of its allies; (2) resources committed to victory (however "victory" was defined) were committed wholeheartedly; (3) clear political and military objectives were defined; (4) policy makers had to continually review the match between objectives and resources; (5) a reasonable assurance of congressional and public support must exist; and (6) commitment of U.S. forces should be a last resort, once all alternatives had been exhausted. ⁹

Although the Weinberger Doctrine greatly facilitates making sound decisions in the commitment of the military, it came under criticism from many directions. The point was made that diplomacy would not work unless the U.S. showed a willingness to use force as the "teeth" in its policy. The Weinberger Doctrine was seen as being too restrictive, seeking to constrain American power.¹⁰   Secretary of State George Shultz wanted to use military power to support "coercive diplomacy" in situations where less than vital national interests were at stake.¹¹ Neither Weinberger nor Shultz defined "vital interests" in their debates, but Secretary Shultz clearly envisioned a wider range of circumstances in which military power would be employed.

Many of Weinberger's critics lost sight of the fact that the Weinberger Doctrine was intended to provide guidelines for conventional combat operations. In his remarks to the National Press Club in 1984, Weinberger stated, "If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job--and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping."  Clearly he envisioned his guidelines as governing just conventional combat operations.  What never materialized was a set of similar guidelines for operations other than war which  may have allayed the concern of Secretary Shultz that the Weinberger Doctrine was too restrictive.

During the Bush administration, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was General Colin L. Powell. Much current literature discusses the impact on policy of the "Powell Doctrine", but many authors decline to define the Doctrine.  The Powell Doctrine states that the concept of applying overwhelming (later changed to "decisive") force against the enemy to achieve a rapid victory, would be layered atop the Weinberger Doctrine to form the new guideline for deciding when to commit U.S. forces.

In an article for Foreign Affairs, General Powell set out his own ideas in these words: 

When a 'fire' starts that might require committing armed forces, we need to reevaluate the circumstances. Relevant questions include: Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other non-violent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost?  Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences? ¹²

There are many similarities to the Weinberger Doctrine. However, the call for a link to vital interests is replaced by the requirement that the political objective be "important". The desire that committing forces remain an act of last resort is still present. General Powell went on to caution against incremental commitment of forces as was the case in Viet Nam, claiming that the use of "decisive means and results are always to be preferred". So, the Chairman reasoned, "that use of force should always be restricted to occasions where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue". ¹³  In this last statement Gen. Powell underscores his belief that the primary cause for a reluctance to resort to force is that the Commander-in- Chief is going to risk American lives in doing so.  This fact is not lost on the Chairman, and he implores the nation's leadership to make a thorough accounting for that fact throughout the decision-making process.  Once again, Powell's guidelines address the commitment of forces to a combat situation, but do not address the use of the military in operations other than war. Powell argued that although force should be proportionate to the goal, force must be decisive whenever it is committed--even for a limited objective.  This leaves little room for employing the threat of force in support of the coercive diplomacy that Shultz and other diplomats seem to require.

The Powell Doctrine governed the way General Powell, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, approached his work. But it did not always govern the approach taken by Defense Secretary Cheaney and President George Bush.  Powell's opposition to committing troops to both Kuwait and Bosnia is well documented. It follows, then that President Bush had some guidelines of his own. Indeed, those guidelines are spelled out quite clearly in an address to the Corps of Cadets at West Point at the end of his term of office. ¹⁴

President Bush was not averse to carrying on the American historical tradition of crusading for democracy and individual rights. In his speech he discussed his overall political aim for his foreign policy: "Our objective must be to exploit the unparalleled opportunity presented by the cold war's end to work toward transforming this new world into a new world order; one of governments that are democratic, tolerant, and economically free at home and committed abroad to settling inevitable differences peacefully, without the threat or use of force."  He quickly recognized, however, that "Unfortunately, not everyone subscribes to these principles." His proposal, therefore, was to engage in building a world order "compatible with our values and congenial to our interests".

So President Bush saw it as a duty to spread the "theology" of the American historical tradition, recognizing a window of opportunity presented by the fact that U.S. influence in the world was relatively greater than at any time in history. But he did acknowledge limits, saying: "The fact that America can act does not mean that it must. A nation's sense of idealism need not be at odds with its interests, nor does principle displace prudence."

Although recognizing some limitation, the above statement begins to obscure the relationship between interests and ideology. In effect, it fuses the two so that the ideology can become the interest. Such a policy is of no use if it cannot prioritize its national interests, or determine which of those interests it will defend by force.  According to President Bush, intervention decisions would require judgment on a case by case basis; "To adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives." This seems sound enough, but he went on to say, "The relative importance of an interest is not a guide: Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital."  Here, the break between vital interest and commitment of forces has become complete. Vital interests should not be viewed as those interests which can be defended only by military force; but that military force should only be used to defend interests that are vital--and only after all other options have failed. President Bush does not differentiate between the intensity of interests which may be promoting American values. According to this policy American military members will be thrust into harm's way when there is no cause that has been deemed a "vital interest" to the United States .

President Bush then went on to outline some considerations for deciding when to use force. After warning against looking for a set of hard-and-fast rules, the President listed his six guidelines:

"Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice. Once we are satisfied that force makes sense, we must act with the maximum possible support."

 

The similarities to the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines are apparent. There is an attempt to match capabilities with political aims, and a recognition of the importance of using force as a last resort (though Bush states it as "no other policies are likely to prove effective"). President Bush seems to support Powell's call for decisive force once the decision to commit has been made. Still, no clear guidelines have been issued for committing forces in situations other than in combat operations. This may have been due to a real reluctance to admit that there was a role for the military other than combat operations in the post-Cold War environment.

At this point there still existed a lack of consensus in Washington regarding America's "proper role" in the post-Cold War. In a 1992 speech, Representative Les Aspin (later to become President Clinton's Secretary of Defense) described two schools of thought regarding the use of military force:

Under the 'all-or-nothing' school, the U.S. military is likely to be used only very, very rarely. The 'limited objectives' camp says the military will become, in fact, very much like the nuclear weapons program during the Cold War--important, expensive, but not useful. It will not be a useful tool for achieving objectives if it's only going to be used in the extreme cases. And therefore, this argument goes, support for it will diminish and it will become basically irrelevant to the problems that the United States faces on a day to day basis in the post-Cold War world. ...It may be that to maintain a military for the extreme contingencies, it will be necessary to show that it is useful in lesser contingencies, too.¹⁵

 

Aspin describes the polarity of the two views regarding America's military role. On the one hand, those in the "all-or-nothing" school wish not to commit the military short of all out war. The "limited objectives" school wishes to use military force to threaten or coerce in "lesser contingencies" as well.

The final steps in the evolution of current policy came during the Clinton administration. President Clinton inherited the Iraqi, Bosnian, and Somalian situations from his predecessor. But in Somalia, as the mission shifted from U.S. to U.N. control, the mission changed from one of protecting food distribution efforts to one of nation building.  The Clinton administration failed to reassess this situation as it developed, and the loss of 18 U.S. Army Rangers, some of which were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in front of the worldwide press, led to the U.S. pullout from the Somalia mission.

In the wake of the Mogadishu incident, the Clinton administration implemented six "tests" meant to be applied to the decision of committing U.S. troops. This tests were included in the President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement  (NSS) of 1994. These six tests resembled the six elements of the earlier Weinberger Doctrine, but with some important differences.  The tests are listed here highlighting the Weinberger Doctrine, presumably in the interest of making them less restrictive:

(1) are cost and risk commensurate with the stakes? (no direct link to vital interests)

(2) have non-military means been given sufficient consideration? (vice last resort)

(3) is the use of force carefully matched to U.S. political objectives?

(4) is there a reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?

(5) is there an exit strategy ? (vice continual reassessment)

(6) will U.S. action bring lasting improvements? (versus forces committed wholeheartedly to achieve "victory")

While it is easy to be critical of President Clinton when comparing his list of tests to Weinberger's and others', there is a positive trend beginning in the 1994 NSS that is not so readily apparent. There is, for the first time, a positive effort by the President to realize and articulate a broader framework for considering the appropriate use of military force which meets the requirements of the post-Cold War era. This realization matures in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (February 1996), to be discussed shortly.

 Table (2) traces the evolution in the post-cold war period from the Weinberger Doctrine through the Clinton Tests. None of these policies were intended to be a panacea for the nation's foreign policy challenges. None fully delineated when America should and could use force, and when it should not or could not. But it is interesting to trace the changes in the underlying ideas.

There is a drift away from the link between the decision to commit forces and the presence of a vital interest. There is an obfuscation of the differences between intensity of interest and promotion of values (a basic interest in itself). And, finally there is a distinct softening of the intent to use military forces only as a last resort. For an American, given the historical experience of this country, these should be disturbing trends.

 

U.S. forces can be committed to combat when...

Weinberger	Powell	Bush	Clinton (1994)
1. Vital U.S. or Allied interest at stake	1. Political objective is important	1. The stakes warrant using military force.	1. Cost and risk are commensurate with the stakes
2. Resources will be wholeheartedly committed to victory	2. Military force will  achieve the objective. Decisive means and results are preferred.	2.  We act with maximum possible support	2. U.S. action will bring lasting improvements
3. Clearly defined political and military objectives are in mind	3. The objective is clearly defined and understood	3. We use force where and when it can be effective	3. The use of  force is carefully matched to U.S. political objectives
4. A continuous review to match  resources and objectives will be conducted	4. How might the situation we wish to alter, once altered by force, develop further and with what consequences?	4. Application of force can be limited in scope and time	4. There is an exit strategy
5. Reasonable assurance of public & Congressional support exists	5. The costs have been determined. Have the gains and risks been analyzed?	5.  Potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.	5. Reasonable assurance exists of support from the American people and their elected representatives
6. Commitment of U.S. forces is a last resort	6. All other non-violent policy have means failed	6. No other policies are likely to prove effective	6. Non-military means have been given sufficient consideration
Table (2)

 

IV.  THE CLINTON DOCTRINE

 

Most recently, President Clinton spoke of his vision of American power: "The United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem in the world. But where our interests are clear and our values are at stake, where we can make a difference, we can act and we must lead."¹⁵ Michael Dobbs, a staff writer for The Washington Post, termed this view "the Clinton Doctrine". The intent to use U.S. military power where "interests are clear and values are at stake" raises many questions. What sort of interests and values justify the use of military force? Since we cannot solve all of the world's problems, what mechanism do we use to discriminate and prioritize the problems we wish to solve and the situations in which we will choose to use military force? In The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement -February 1996 (NSS-96) President Clinton gave his answers to those questions.

Clinton fully embraces the notion that military force may be appropriate to support coercive diplomacy in situations where less-than-vital national interests are at stake. In this respect, he falls squarely within Les Aspin's "limited objectives" camp. But in NSS-96, President Clinton spelled out his concept of committing forces in defense of those lesser interests better than any other post-Cold War President. He began by defining "national interest" in his own terms.

The NSS lists three basic categories of national interest, the first being those which are "vital". Vital interests, according to President Clinton, are those "that are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of our national entity--the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies, and our economic well-being."  The conflict underlying Desert Storm was listed as an example of the defense of this interest (though no specific rationale is offered). The next category concerns "important, but not vital" interests.  These are "interests which do not affect our national survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live." The situations in Haiti and Bosnia were listed as examples of "important, but not vital" interests. The third category involves "humanitarian" interests, such as the relief operations in Somalia and Rwanda. The NSS states: "Generally, the military is not the best tool to address humanitarian concerns. But under certain conditions, the use of armed forces may be appropriate."

 In the defense of vital interests, the NSS states that the "use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. In other areas of less than vital interest, "military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most affect our national interests--for instance, areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies and areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies'."  Additionally, in all cases, the NSS states that the costs and risks of military involvement must be judged against the stakes involved.

The Clinton Doctrine as stated in the NSS(-96), therefore, is quite involved. It delineates the fact that military involvement in less than vital interests warrants its own set of guidelines which are different than those for defending against more direct threats to U.S. vital interests. Table (3) summarizes the elements of the Clinton Doctrine in detail.