Military

           

            “The breathing is difficult.  It  seems that there is nothing I can do to bring more air to my lungs.  The sweat drains on my head and forms a gutter on my nose.  I gave up to dry it.  I ignore the leaves, plenty of insects that touch my face making me uncomfortable.  My knapsack on my back is heavy and my clothes are wet with sweat.  Each step is painful.  We just left a small road forty five minutes ago and I already find it difficult to follow the others.  The sensation is similar to running in a sauna with an obstructed nose.  At each step my boots sink in the mud of the forest, full of material in decomposition.  My slack legs are covered with wet leaves and some small spiders.  Big vines are everywhere while hundreds of thorns just wait for my hands on the surrounded trees.  Sometimes the terrain goes up and other times it goes down.  The terrain is only flat near the river.  Some blue dots above show that the sky is still over us, but that is all I can see, besides, all the green.  My energy is almost expended and my respiration is difficult.  I feel a pain on my back and I am dizzy.  I stop and drink many gulps of water. I am in the hell.”[[1]]

            This can be a scenario where a military force must carry out a combat mission in spite of the very hard limitations imposed on human life in this environment known as jungle.

    

     After the fall of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world is more unstable than ever before.  Ethnic, religious, economic, and border problems  among new and immature states may become challenges to peace.  In this new world order (or disorder) there is a great possibility of conflicts in the jungle environment. 

     The spectrum of jungle warfare can vary from low-intensity to medium-intensity conflict based on the prospective future scenarios.  A look at the map can show the following regions and countries that have a jungle environment:

     - Central America: Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama.

     - South America: Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Guyana, Surinam, French Guinea, Bolivia, and Brazil.

     - Africa: Costa do Marfim, Gana, Togo, Niger, Camaroes, Congo, Gabao, and Zaire.

     - Asia: Bangladesh, Butao, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, China, Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Papua and New Guinea.

     - Oceania: Australia.

     All of these countries are developing or underdeveloped.  Many face economic or political problems.  Others are fighting against drug dealers in their territory.  In most of them the population is not satisfied with the conditions of life.  Some of them have problems along the borders with their neighbors. 

     In conclusion, there are many conditions that can disrupt the stability or, in other words, can generate conflicts between states in a jungle environment.

 

A. CHARACTERISTICS

     The dominating features of jungle areas are high and constant temperature, heavy rainfall during the greater part of the year and oppressive humidity.  Seasonal changes of temperature are insignificant compared with seasonal rainfall variation.  The year has no summer or winter, only cyclic wet and dry seasons.  The mean annual temperature seldom varies more than five degrees, averaging between 78 and 82 degrees Fahrenheit.  At the Equator, rain falls during all seasons.  Tropical rainfall is also relatively constant in its daily timing, usually occurring in the afternoon or early evening.  The relative humidity in a tropical rain forest area averages between 65 and 75% during the day and over 90% at night.  In some jungle areas, the canopy is so dense  that it provides a cover within which the jungle develops its own miniature climate or micro climate.  In such environment, the sun may be shining brightly above the canopy, while a brisk shower may be in progress at ground level.  The canopy not only intercepts and redirects a considerable proportion of the rain, it also shelters the jungle from the wind, preventing a sharp rise and fall in temperature.  Finally, the canopy diffuses the interior light, tinting it green and rendering it considerably less intense on the forest floor than on the canopy surface.[[2]] 

        

B. EFFECTS

     The extreme humid jungle environment affects equipment as well as the soldier.  The humid heat causes problems of physical exhaustion and also physical malfunctions such as fatigue, apathy, etc.  The natural weariness produced by the climate is additional to the exhaustion that supposedly moves in a land extraordinarily luxuriant, in which it is often necessary to break through it with an ax and which the distances that may be walked during one journey, are, often minimum.  If we add the frequent partial immersion -especially of the feet- in water, the constant tropical rain that seems impossible to take refuge from, plus the constant hounding of the insects, it is not difficult to infer that the morale of the combatant is seriously affected by the environment.

     In the jungle, the visibility is very low.  It can frequently fluctuate between six and thirty feet, depending on the type of vegetation, be it primary or secondary.  Apart from the trees, the plants and bushes grow in heights greater than a man, and creep up the trunks of the trees, sometimes forming impenetrable barriers.  It is normal that the tree tops have an altitude that can vary from thirty to ninety feet, and form a vault of vegetation so thick that it prevents the sun rays from passing through.  In reference to hygiene, the conditions are absolutely adverse: the filth is constant, clothes that never dry completely and feel like wet rags against the body; the most minute scratch produces an infection, the big wounds result in gangrene.  Personnel in the jungle have a high level of gastrointestinal and skin diseases; the damp skin produces ulcers with the rags rubbing against it, even with simple clothes.  Also damp feet, can be a real problem.  Diseases caused by the bite of insects are many; the fever is also frequently present.  And we can not ignore the animal bites, sometimes poisonous, from spiders to snakes, as well as all type of parasites, that immigrate internally and externally in the human organism. 

     With regard to this combination of facts, we must add an additional type of tension that assumes the presence more or less proximate of the human enemy.  It is not unusual that the combatant suffer sometimes a serious psychic crumbling, caused by the combined result of fatigue, tension, diseases, the lack of hygiene, and fear.  The extension of these conditions during long periods of time, weeks or months, make it bearable only by specially selected and trained men to face such challenges with success.

 

    

     A.“Combat in the jungle is almost blind”

     Ground observation is limited to about fifty feet.  Aerial observation is ineffective in the jungle; however, it is improved along rivers and small creeks called “igarapes”[[3]] or “igapos.”[[4]]  To facilitate observation, special methods must be practiced.  Many natives climb trees to see further.  Due to restricted observation,troops tend to bunch together.  The movement and control of large elements are very difficult and sometimes, impossible.  During the rainy season, the observation, already limited, will further decrease.  Fields of fire are very restricted in the jungle.  Generally, it is necessary to clear lanes.  The exception to this rule are some trails near the rivers, linking small villages or along small creeks that run to low areas called “socavao.” [[5]]

            B. “The communications are affected in the jungle.”

     Transmissions are limited in the jungle due to the atmospheric characteristics, particularly the humidity, as well as to dense vegetation.  There are places where it is impossible to transmit and receive.

     C. “The jungle favors the surprise”

     The jungle provides unlimited concealment from air and ground observation for both offensive and defensive operations.  The concealment favors the surprise and stealthy movements of small formations.  The trees and small folds of the terrain provide necessary cover for the troops in the jungle.

     D. “The river is the great avenue of approach to the jungle”

     The rivers are the blood that irrigate the jungle.  If someone wants to conquer the jungle it is mandatory to control the rivers and the borders that surround it.  The rivers and the borders are key terrain.

     E. “Discipline is essential to the troops operating in the jungle.”

     Normally combat in the jungle takes place at a short distance.  A soldier if he leaves his weapon is considered dead because of ambush.  An engagement such as this calls for immediate reaction and an adequate response to enemy fire.  A great volume of fire, generally with violent and brief clashes, and attacking the ambush is the only way to defeat it.  Combat in the jungle is essentially a combat of individual arms, in which man and his wit, his training, and personal qualities tend to decide the matter.  The struggle in the chaos represented by the jungle environment and its uncertainties are characterized by a quick disintegration of the units during the course of the ambush, finding it very difficult to control the elements that are in contact. Specific instructions should be given to the troops (immediate reaction technique) before the action takes place. Only discipline can put order into the chaos.   

     F. “The jungle is the domain of the infiltration and the ambush”

     Jungle favors infiltration and the ambush, and this shows a distant and peculiar similarity with street combat in urban population centers.  The combatant must be trained to detect traps as well as to use them himself.  He must be able to obtain the material to make booby traps, using his initiative,  exploiting and transforming ordinary things into deadly devices to be used against the enemy.  With a few feet of cord, wire, and an ax and sharp branches resistant to fire, it is possible to build some creative devices with fatal effect.  The use of antipersonnel mines in paths and trails, as well as the use of hand grenades adapted to camouflage strings, become highly profitable if they are used in an adequate form.

     G. “Orientation is a hard problem in the jungle”

     In the jungle, one of the most serious problems that the combatant must face is orientation.  In the jungle denseness there are no points of reference, the trees very often prevent the spotting of the sun and stars.  The compass and the map are of very limited help, and on the march, the units often find themselves many miles away from their original destination.  These problems are difficult to solve, and only overcome with a good knowledge of the terrain and a thorough study of trails and courses of water.  Intensive training, so that the men can move with ease through this hostile environment, will reduce, to some degree, the many difficulties.  In any case, even for the experts,  orientation frequently creates problems almost unsolvable in the jungle.  It has sometimes happened that a man who was isolated from the rest of the unit, with whom they were able to communicate, would disappear forever because he was incapable of orienting himself.  Sound amplification is not the same in the jungle as it would be in an open field, and it often occurs that a voice can sound in a different direction from the place it is really coming from.

    

 

A. WOUNDED EVACUATION

     Morale of troops depend on the effectiveness of the evacuation  of wounded from the battlefield.  In the jungle,  units tend to operate far from their bases.  There are no roads and only a perfect locality defended by the proper force, free from enemy threats, makes the evacuation by helicopter possible under reasonable conditions.

B. SUSTAINMENT

     The dropping of supplies by parachute is not very effective in the jungle, partly because it can easily fall into the hands of the enemy or in a zone attacked by fire and partly because the material spreads out or it gets destroyed between the trees.  The provisioning by helicopter faces the same difficulties of those described for the evacuation of injured and only the existence of determined sites where depots are previously installed allow the sustainment of the troops.  Another solution is the establishment of regional bases, by areas, that act as command posts and supply points for units operating in a specific sector.  If possible, a ship can operate as a supply base along rivers, loading units supplies in helicopters, then transporting them to points inland.

    

    C. EQUIPMENT

     In the jungle, the clothes of the combatant must be light and resistant, permitting the evaporation of perspiration, and made of a material that can dry as quickly as possible.  Boots must be made of a mixture of materials that can protect the foot and allow it to breath. Combinations of canvas and rubber or canvas and a special type of leather can be effective.  In the jungle, the use of a steel helmet or one that is fabricated with more updated material made to protect the head is not worth the discomfort that it causes.  Nevertheless, a jungle hat that is made of canvas with openings that permit ventilation, that protects from the sun and rain and from the falling of insects is indispensable.  Among the accessories, mosquito nets and hammocks are important, so that, when bivouacking, the combatant may remain at an adequate altitude from the ground to avoid the humidity, water, animals and snakes that move on the ground level.  The waterproof poncho, can be transformed into a basic tent.  This equipment is vitally important, especially during the rainy season.  Another useful accessory during combat is a green camouflage cream for the face and hands used for camouflage in the jungle.

     The pack must be light and comfortable so that it will not damage the skin. The equipment must also include a canteen, pills to potabilize the water, alcohol pills to warm up rations.

     The meals must include a source of proteins and carbohydrates because there is a big loss of energy in the jungle.  If possible, a good supply of vitamins and energizers must be carried as well as a large amount of salt.  The use of these substances is  recommended after exhausting marches or long periods without sleep.

     Weapons must be easy and quick to clean and have high rates of fire at short distances.  Ammunition levels must be increased because of the high consumption rate during jungle combat and the resupply difficulties.  Also hand grenades constitute an essential auxiliary mean as well as a knife.[[6]]

 

A. THE PROBLEM

     During the early seventies, the then illegal Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), which had a Maoist orientation established a guerrilla center in the region around the cities of Maraba[[7]], state of Para, and Xambioa[[8]], state of Goias, with hopes to develop a liberated zone.

     The Araguaia Guerrilha Force(FOGUERA), as the revolutionary movement had named itself, was established with a large sum of resources from the international communist movement, a majority of which were from Albania.  The relationship of the Communist Party of Albania with the FOGUERA was such that everyday at 9 PM, a one-hour Portuguese language program was broadcast via short wave from the Radio of Tirana, capital of Albania.  The program was specifically directed to the movement of Araguaia, and the radio programs that were transmitted to the region, always gave a heroic connotation to guerrilla actions.  There was a long range network integrating the guerrilla force, an intermediate station and the Tirana station. 

     The area chosen by the PC do B was extremely susceptible to subversive actions.  The region was one where the state and local governments were only able to maintain a small presence.  The hospital and state of sanitation were deficient.  Malaria and leishmaniasis (protozoan infection) were at epidemic levels in the region, and a large part of the population was anemic and infested with various other diseases.  There was no potable water and very little drainage in the localities.  The economy of the region was based on harvesting naturally occurring items, like nuts in the spring and wood in the winter.  Agriculture was subsistence farming of corn, cassava (manioc), and rice.  The quality of life of the population was really very low.

     On the other hand, the location of the area, close to important roadways, was extremely favorable to the PC do B because the region received a considerable number of new colonists and this permitted the secret infiltration of guerrilla reinforcements.  Militarily, the guerrilla’s choice of this area was very intelligent because the region fell on the boundary between two Brazilian Army Military Area Commands, that of the Amazon (CMA) and of the Planalto (CMP).  In the beginning of operations this caused command and control problems for the army commands and gave a substantial advantage to the guerrilla forces.

     In May 1972, when the Brazilian military operation effectively started, FOGUERA had about 80 guerrilla fighters of which about 15 were women.  The movement was organized into a Political Bureau, a Military Commission, and three Guerrilla detachments, each one with three groups of 8 to 10 members.

     The Political Bureau was the head organization of the PC do B, which in that time frame had split away from the Soviet inspired Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) in order to follow the Chinese Moist line.  Adopting the principles of Mao Tse Tung, the PC do B  idealized the escalation of a guerrilla movement in rural areas which, after receiving the support required by the rural population, would be extended to urban areas.  The members of the PC do B Political Bureau rarely were in the area but they instructed others and kept abreast of everything as it happened.  All Military Commission decisions were subordinate to the approval of the Political Bureau.

     The Military Commission constituted the command of FOGUERA.  Its mission was to plan, coordinate, and conduct guerrilla force actions.  The leadership as well as other elements in command of the Detachments and groups were almost totally made up of members who had completed guerrilla warfare course abroad, notably in Beijing, Tirana, and Havana.

     Subordinate to the Military Commission were the three Detachments which were the true maneuver elements of the terrorist organization.  The Faveiro Detachment was the northern-most unit with the responsibility for an area close to the Transamazon highway; the Gameleira Detachment was in the center; and the Caiano Detachment was in the south.  For security reasons, these detachments operated in a compartment fashion without knowing the planned or current operations of the others.  The deputy commander of the detachment exercised the functions of the Political Comissar to improve the guerrillas’ understanding of communist ideology.  The system of command and control of the Military Commission over the Detachments was based on contacts at selected locations and predetermined dates and hours, established by strict compartmentalized methods and the use of passwords.  This system made captured the guerrillas an important and necessary information source for counter guerrilla operations.

     Subordinate to each Detachment were 9 Fire Groups; these were the basic guerrilla elements.  A Fire Group’s autonomy was extremely restricted and it operated under strict control of the Detachment Commander.

     For the most part, members of FOGUERA were recruited by the PC do B from University students in large urban centers of Fortaleza, state of Ceara, Salvador, state of Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, state of Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo, state of Sao Paulo.  A good number of them were already living a clandestine life that had been compromised by their urban terrorism actions.      Guerrilla training was designed to achieve two basic objectives, one of a practical character and the other, theoretical.  The practical part was directed at the preparation of the soldier and of the elementary units for combat in a jungle environment.  The instruction included map reading, ambushes, explosives and destruction with improvised material.

     The theoretical part had the specific goal of strengthening the ideological knowledge of FOGUERA members.  In a general way the morale and the belief in the cause were elevated through teaching party doctrine.  Besides the military training, the Groups were also used in the “productive work”, principally in newly cleared areas, in order to sustain the guerrilla forces.

     Together with the local rural population, the guerrillas developed a psychological section program called the “work of the masses” with the objective of obtaining the support of the population.  The result work was very effective in some areas where they could organize a support force.  But at no time did the FOGUERA recruit into its guerrilla forces elements of the local population which may have been likely to fight alongside them.

     In truth, FOGUERA was a guerrilla force in an initial and incipient stage.  Its armament consisted of hand guns, hunting weapons and some rifles obtained from isolated actions against the outposts of the state Police of Para.

    

B. THE FIRST MILITARY APPROACH

     One of the most serious mistakes committed by the federal forces was to initiate operations which are normally used against guerrilla forces in their final stages of organization and development.  The first phase, from April to October 1972, was characterized by the massive use of Brazilian troops.  In August 1972, these troops numbered about 1,500 men.  Fundamentally, two batallion-sized combat bases were established, one in Maraba and the other in Xambioa.  Six company-sized combat bases were set up in the interior of the operational area.  In the first phase, a series of mistakes were made.

C. THE MISTAKES

     The planning and conduct of the initial operations in the “Bico do Papagaio”[[9]] region started from the assumption that the counter guerrilla actions to be conducted would be the type that are normally unleashed against forces already in the stage of a National Liberation Army (Hammer-Anvil, Pyston-Cylinder.etc).  One of the first operations completed in the area was a clean-sweep action over the only existing mountains in the region, the Andorinhas Mountains, which do not have natural cover.  After being bombarded with napalm by the Air Force, the mountains were the object of a vigorous search and encirclement mission conducted by a large force.  The results were dismal because the guerrillas were never there.  In jungle lands, the federal patrols moved in large platoon formations of 35 to 45 men.  They followed the trails.  The guerrilla groups moved through the jungle in smaller groups of 5 to 10 members.  It was no surprise that the initial actions were very ineffective.

     Unity of effort was lost in planning and operations because the combat base in Maraba was under the control of Military Command of Amazon while the one in Xambioa was under the command of the Military Command of Planalto.  A simple call for aero-medical evacuation produced a complex coordination problem.

     There were no maps or aerial photographs of the operational area in compatible scales.  Lack of knowledge of the terrain was enormous.  The disposition and composition of FOGUERA was unknown.  Combat intelligence was extremely scarce about recent and current enemy activities, peculiarities, and deficiencies.

     Units from different parts of the Brazilian territory were used in this phase.  Some of them had serious training deficiencies in jungle counter guerrilla operations.  Many  units consisted of new recruits who had not completed a half year of instruction; they were psychologically immature.  Some casualties occurred by accidental discharge of weapons and by mistaken shots fired when patrols inadvertently met in the jungle.

     Unlike the guerrilla force, which had been in the area for some time and remained there, the troops were used for predetermined periods.  They never remained more than 20 days, and returned to their base camps without being replaced.  This discontinuity hurt the operations and created a serious negative view of the military among the population.

     D. THE NEW APPROACH

     In October 1972, the operations were interrupted.  A major intelligence operation was planned in minute detail and cautiously launched.  The results were exceptional and all intelligence collection goals were clearly reached.

     The information obtained indicated to the higher command that the problem could not have only a military solution.  There would be a need to integrate military actions with diverse national and state civilian governmental organizations in order to ensure a complete elimination of the subversive center.

     In the last phase, called Operation Marajoara, the Military Command of Amazon was appointed the overall command with responsibility of all units including several civilian federal and state governmental agencies.  Professional troops were selected from the best trained jungle infantry, the Marines and Airborne units.  Three bases were established, one in Maraba with the main CP; one in Xambioa, and the third in Bacaba on the outskirts of the Transamazon highway.  An efficient and secure communications system was established which greatly enhanced  command and control.  Likewise, an efficient logistical support system was created which accounted for all the highly specialized characteristics of the mission and operational environment.

     The patrols began to operate with only five to ten men, comparable to the combat power of the guerrilla enemy.  Also, Brazilian patrols began using the considerable skills of selected local inhabitants acting as guides.  These elements proved to be decisive for the success of the operation.  Instead of moving on the trails, the patrols were able to move through the jungle, making use of the aerial photo products of the Air Force.  Once again, the lesson that the guerrillas are best fought by other guerrillas was reinforced.  Another important role noted in the achievement of the counter guerrilla campaign objectives was the success of the helicopter squadrons.  Performing infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and aeromedical evacuation missions, these units were a prime factor in the success of the operation.

     It is time to make some conclusions about jungle combat based on the aspects related above.  It is not my intention to establish rules about this complex thing that is a clash between two opposed wills, but to develop food for thought on this matter that fascinates military people all over the world.  The ideas expressed here are a background of my experience, study, and discussion about this topic.  Maybe I have the fascination

about the jungle because I had the opportunity to live there for two years and spent more than 300 full days operating in this environment conducting riverine operations, combat patrols, reconnaissance patrols, and a lot of other tasks such as operating as a guerrilla force against regular forces in a free play training, survival exercises and providing assistance to the riverine population along the Amazon River and its tributaries.  My intent is to make one think about the things that happen in jungle combat and remember that in the future there is a great possibility of conflict in this environment.   

     Jungle combat is exhausting, the movement is very slow and a big challenge.  Sometimes it is impossible to see the sun for days, the heat is unusual and compounded by high humidity creating a sensation of weariness and discomfort.  Many people are not able to exist in this kind of environment because of the demand of superior physical and psychological conditioning.  To avoid exhaustion it is necessary to improve  physical fitness and to become acclimitized this new environment for at least two weeks in a region similar to the operations area.  Another important thing is to operate in small units in the jungle and to develop  and train “immediate action techniques” that can vary no more than four different situations.  These skills will ensure success during the contact with the enemy and avoid fratricide and loss of ammunition.  Generally, the soldiers must be able to conduct fire against enemy positions.  It is also very useful to carry a 60 mm mortar tube to be employed in direct fire using expeditious methods.  It must be emphasized that there is no rear or safe area in the jungle.  The enemy can attack from any direction.  Movement is limited to 400 to 600 meters an hour.  More than that, a troop is decreasing his attention and the capability to fight and is running to death.  There is no hurry in the jungle.  You must be patient and have self-control. Again, discipline is essential.  Avoid any movement along trails.  Go through the jungle, avoid the simple ways.  Move, stop, see, and listen.  Act as a hunter.  Do not underestimate the enemy.  If you are in an ambush, use the maximum firepower to suppress the enemy initially and use one of the techniques appropriate to the situation.  Act vigorously, do not hesitate, maintain the mental initiative.  Remember that any reaction is better than no reaction.  Time makes a big difference.  When moving or stopped be prepared to defend at 360 degrees.  Give sectors of observation and fire to your subordinates.  Do not develop complex sketches, keep it simple.  Use the clock as a reference. 

     The jungle is a non linear battlefield, there is no rear, front or lateral areas, with rare exceptions.  In the jungle, you will seldom fight a battle to seize a portion of the terrain.  In fact, it is very difficult to have boundaries and other control measures used in a conventional battlefield.  The jungle is a environment that requires very fluid and decentralized operations, with full employment of small units reinforced by engineer and liaison teams to provide mobility, counter mobility, and fire support.  The meeting engagement and ambush are the most probable form of combat in the jungle.  The best way to defeat the enemy is to cut off his lines of communication and develop intelligence operations to obtain information about his size, activities, location, and battle order.  Remember that populated areas are the best sources of human intelligence for you and the enemy.  Each battalion is responsible to develop operations in a zone of tactical responsibility, where it has the freedom of action to employ its companies in sectors.  The battalion’s command post can be located near the river.  The reserve must be strong and totally air transportable.  Each battalion must be task-organized and self-sufficient in combat support and combat service support.  Each company must report landing zones while operating in its sectors and must be able to signal them with smoke grenades.  While moving, units must identify meeting points that must be known by everybody to find each other again in case of dispersion.  The aim in jungle warfare is the destruction of the enemy. The companies must locate and fix the enemy.  The reserve force must be employed to destroy the enemy. The company headquarters must not be in the same location everyday nor should firing positions for mortars and artillery.  Every soldier must be able to call for air support fires against the enemy.  Communications must be tested frequently and the best locations must be placed on the map or overlay and known by all.  Locations where you probably can prevail against any enemy action and be prepared for contingencies and evacuations should be identified.  Generally this saves time and lives.  Change passwords everyday and have some identification signal for day and night.  Do not carry maps with friendly positions for fear they may fall into enemy hands.  Do not use repellent lotions or anything else that smells and gives away your presence. 

     Concerning vegetation,  Clausewitz only made one single and important statement “...What is more, in the depth of the forest he will hardly be in a position to impress the omnipresent enemy with the superior weight of his numbers.  This is without doubt one of the worst situations in which an attacker can find himself.”[[10]]  The manual FMRP 12-9 JUNGLE WARFARE makes the following statement  “ Before the infantry men can overcome the enemy they must overcome the jungle.”  Another  commentary found in a book about jungle warfare states “ Despite the fact that the immense technical progress achieved in recent years has eased the soldier’s burden considerably, one would say that jungle war remains one of the most grueling of all forms of warfare and one which makes the severest demands on its participants.”[[11]]

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