“Hue, The Mirror On The Pole View Around The Corner To Future Urban
combat”
CSC 1997
Subject Area - History
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION PG 1
CHAPTER ONE THE LOTUS FLOWER PG 5
CHAPTER TWO THE YEAR OF THE MONKEY PG 7
CHAPTER THREE CHAOS IN THE LITTORALS PG 10
CHAPTER FOUR THE LONG WALK DOWN LE LOI STREET PG 14
CHAPTER FIVE TAKE AWAYS FOR THE FUTURE PG 28
CONCLUSIONS PG 35
ENDNOTES PG 38
BIBLIOGRAPHY PG 41
MAP OF VIETNAM PG 45
MAP OF HUE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PG 46
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Hue, the Mirror on the Pole View Around the Corner to Future Urban Combat
Author: Major Jonathan P. Hull United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The United States Marine Corps has adopted Operational Maneuver From the Sea, and in conjunction with this revolutionized means of power projection, is evaluating small, highly mobile "Killer Team" organizations, heavily reliant on technology and indirect firepower, as the executor of operations ashore. The preponderance of the world's population, cities, and market centers are located on the littorals, where naval forces will find themselves engaged. This being the case, Marines must expect to fight in urban areas. An examination of the Battle for Hue in the Republic of Vietnam during the Tet Offensive of 1968, serves to illustrate that these small conceptual Killer Teams would be greatly pressed, and most likely fail in urban combat.
Discussion: The Department of the Navy's "Forward....From the Sea", coupled with the Commandant of the Marine Corps' "Operational Maneuver From the Sea", have served to highlight and make vital the capability of United States Naval Forces to rapidly project influence and power into foreign littorals. The Commandant has further directed the examination and development of conceptual units, which are small Killer Teams, vice the traditional force organizations to be incorporated into this new maneuver doctrine. These small teams will rely upon unprecedented firepower, technology, mobility, and elusiveness, to defeat an equally elusive enemy employing guerrilla tactics, in a manner "conceptually" expected to be far more successful than current Marine conventional forces.
By the year 2000, between 40 and 44 percent of the world's population is expected to be living in urban areas, with more than 17 of the world's largest 25 cities being in Third World nations. Most of these nations will not possess the ability to handle the social, infrastructure, cultural, and associated problems inherent to these cities. Though littoral represents a relatively small area, 80 percent of the World's national capitols are found there alone, and they contain an estimated 75 percent of the total population of the world. Additionally, nearly every significant world market place can be found in the littorals. This being this case, and with the link between naval forces and the littorals, United States Marines will find themselves deployed to and engaged in the cities and urban areas of the world.
Though nearly thirty years ago, the battle to recapture Hue during the Tet Offensive of 1968, in the Republic of Vietnam, was the last true military operation in an urban area the Marine Corps has been involved in. An examination of the actions of one infantry battalion during a portion of that battle offers great insight into combat in a city, and the difficult lessons learned there must play a part in the development of any future operational concept. The city offered an environment, terrain, tactical situation, and rogue enemy much like one which can be expected to arise on the littorals of present day. Further in the absence of the technological advances expected to fully support Operational Maneuver From the Sea and the conceptual Killer Teams, Marines entering Hue to recapture it in 1997, would be organized and equipped much like those who fought there in 1968. The events in Hue serve to cast great doubt over the ability of any small independent units, regardless of the technological advances they possess to succeed in an situation such as that presented by Hue.
Conclusions: Operational Maneuver From the Sea is a flexible and dynamic doctrine that possesses great potential to serve the Marine Corps upon the littorals of the world. Likewise the small conceptual Killer Teams have great merit which must be fully explored. However, these teams, based on the lessons at Hue, would not have succeeded in regaining the city, and containing the challenges that arose there. As the Marine Corps is driven toward urban combat based on the organization's littoral prowess and the shift of world demographics, effort and procurement must be directed toward improving the vitality of the infantry battalion in this costly and difficult type of operation. Additionally, the greatest scrutiny must be applied to limited monetary resources to ensure the application of technological advances across the full spectrum of war, on both urban and non-urban battlefields.
INTRODUCTION
"Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted only when required and that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than risking a costly, time-consuming operation in this difficult environment."
U.S. Army Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain
Dated 15 August 1979
The United States Armed Forces are increasingly likely to engage in combat operations in
cities. Urban warfare's characteristics of high casualty rates, short engagement ranges, denseness,
and rapid ammunition consumption, coupled with the constraints to minimize non-combatant
casualties and collateral damage, make it an environment avoided by commanders when at all
possible. However, the potential of avoidance diminishes with each passing day, as the
demographics of the world constantly change. In 1920, the only nation with more than 50 percent
of its population in towns of over 20,000 was the United States. By 1993, the world had 286
cities of over one million inhabitants. Current estimates have between 40 and 44 percent of the
world's population will reside in urban areas by the year 2000.[1] By 1990, seven of the world's
ten largest cities were in Third World, vice developed nations. Only three years later, in 1993, the
number had grown so that seventeen of the twenty five most populous cities of the world were in
Third World nations.[2] Worst, the inability of most Third World governments to handle the social,
infrastructure, cultural, and associated problems inherent to congested urban areas make them
potential sources of great unrest.
As the population of the world increases and a disproportionate distribution of this
growth move to urban areas, the deployment of American forces into these areas becomes very
likely. Our current national strategy centers on a theme of advancing our efforts through selective
engagement and enlargement. Beyond addressing the ability to win two nearly simultaneous
major regional conflicts, it specifically highlights the exercise of global leadership, as the world's
premier economic and military power.[3] Beyond the employment of Armed Forces in response to
threats to American vital national interests, the strategy specifically discusses engagement when
the well-being and character of our current world order is threatened, as well as action in
response to humanitarian interests.[4] This encompassing strategy is established at a time when the
American government finds itself wrestling with possibly the greatest economic and budgetary
challenges in the nation's history. These challenges and the end of the Cold War has forced the
Armed Forces into a period of critical self-examination. Required to support the national strategy
and faced with reduced resources, each service component strives for vitality in the 21st century.
The dynamics of the current national strategy, diminishing budgets, and the need for
consistent operational success, call loudly for adaptable naval forces able to project power and
influence across the seas into
foreign waters and shores, in both war and peace. " Forward
....From the Sea," published in 1994 by the Department of the Navy specifically addresses the
unique capabilities of Naval Expeditionary Forces to rapidly influence events in the littoral
regions of the world.[5] In his Planning Guidance of August 1995, the 31st Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General C.C. Krulak amplified and redefined the Marine Corps' contribution to
"Forward ....From the Sea," as "Operational Maneuver From the Sea," a philosophy for current,
as well as future power projection ashore. [6] This concept couples maneuver doctrine with
technological advances in speed, mobility, firepower, communications, and navigation to achieve
a seamless transition from ship to shore, and rapid movement inland to exploit enemy
weaknesses.[7] Included in this guidance, the Commandant directed the Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia to develop the Operational
Maneuver From the Sea concept with an orientation toward the littorals.
In June 1996, the Marine Corps concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea was
published, and has revolutionized power projection ashore. This new direction demands that the
Marine Corps critically evaluate the manner in which it conducts combat operations in an urban
environment. Though the littorals represent a relatively small portion of the earth's surface, over
75 percent of the world's population, more than 80 percent of the world's national capitol cities,
and nearly all the market places to international trade reside there.[8] Clearly, naval forces must
expect to fight in the littorals. Specifically, Marines must expect to be deployed to the urban
areas found there, prepared to fight and win, while minimizing non-combatant casualties and
collateral damage.
In developing this concept, the Marine Corps believes that new technology
providing unprecedented firepower, coupled with small, highly mobile units operating in a
manner elusive of detection, will be far more successful in the urban environment than the
organization and equipment of current forces. The thought being that our current mobility and
fire support capabilities available to conventional forces would fail against the elusiveness of an
enemy employing guerrilla tactics.[9] For the purpose of this examination, these small conceptual
units will be referred to as "Killer Teams."
As the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in concert with the
Commandant's Warfighting Lab at Quantico, Virginia, develops and tests new concepts and
technologies, Marines today must be able to fight in the urban areas of the littorals, organized
and equipped as they currently find themselves. This in mind, an examination of the Corps'
most recent combat engagement in an urban littoral is warranted. That engagement, fought
nearly thirty years ago in the city of Hue, Republic of Vietnam, offers great insight into urban
warfare along with several considerations and combat applications which remain as crucial today
as then. The timeless illustrations of this epic battle remain constant and provide a resource
which could serve to shape the development of technology and force organization, such as Killer
Teams, adapted to support Operational Maneuver From the Sea. My study will focus on Marine
Corps actions in the southern portion of the city of Hue, during the period 31 January 1968 to 10
February 1968, specifically focused on the experience of Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First
Marine Division. Using this battalion's actions to identify key considerations for urban combat
operations, I will discuss the lessons learned, their current application, and the impact they
will have on the Killer Team concept applied in future urban conflict. Because this epic battle
became known as Operation Hue City, I will occasionally refer to this imperial city Hue as Hue
City, throughout the paper.
Chapter One....The Lotus Flower
Located approximately fifty miles south of the 17th parallel dividing North and South
Vietnam, Hue lies on the littoral roughly five miles from the South China Sea. Throughout
the many years of the Vietnam War, the city had remained the intellectual and cultural center of
the country.[10] Leaders from both sides, including former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
President Ngo Dinh Diem, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) President Ho Chi
Minh, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, had been educated in the city's famed Quoc Hoc High
School.[11] As the former imperial capitol, Hue's intellectual and religious leaders advocated local
autonomy and traditional national values which led to a distrust of the Communists in the north
and the centralized government supported by the United States of the south. Aloof from active
participation in the War, the city's population of 140,000 lived in relative peace, while the war
raged on just miles away.[12]
As the city the war forgot, Hue was divided it into two distinct areas by the Perfume
River. To the north, a medieval walled city fashioned during the Nguyen Dynasty, composed of
moats, ramparts, and towers, forming a three square mile Citadel.[13] While on the south bank of
the river, the modern city of Hue thrived. Influenced by the French Colonial period, it was made
up of modern facilities dominated by two to three story detached structures, and covered an area
roughly half the size of the Citadel. [14] This portion of the city was bordered to the south by the
Phu Cam Canal, running from the Perfume River, and was triangular in shape, broadest to the
east and narrowing to the west at the intersection of the canal and the river. Linking the old and
new portions of the city across the Perfume River was the Nguyen Hoang Bridge, while the An
Cuu Bridge crossed the Phu Cam Canal, and linked the city to Highway One, the coastal road.
With the exception of the 1966 Struggle Movement in protest of the government, and
beyond being considered a bastion of dissent, Hue City engrossed serenity and peace amidst
chaos. Its immaculent gardens and groomed streets lent truth to the Vietnamese legend that the
city was symbolic of the lotus flower rising from the mud.[15] The beauty of Hue City, despite the
conflict throughout the country, was intoxicating to even the non-Vietnamese. James R.
Bullington, who served in the city as the American Vice Consulate from 1965 to 1966 described
Hue City as "Camelot."[16]
Although described as it was thirty years ago, the Battle of Hue City offers an example of
population, structures, political/religious climate and determined, comparably equipped enemy,
employing non-conventional tactics, very similar to that which Marines will undoubtedly find
themselves engaged in during any action in the current world environment.
CHAPTER TWO....THE YEAR OF THE MONKEY
To fully appreciate the situation Marines going into Hue City faced, the significance of
the Lunar holiday must be examined. The Lunar holiday, or Tet, is a three week celebration, and
is represented by an animal. It is the most important of all Vietnamese holidays. Transcending all
levels of Vietnamese society, the new "Year of the Monkey" would commence on 30 January
1968.[17] With Tet had commonly come truces on the part of both North and South Vietnamese
forces. This adherence, at least to some limited extent, was expected to be the case for 1968.
Since 1965, the I Corps region of South Vietnam, consisting of the five northern
providences, had been know as "Marine Land."[18] III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF)
controlled all military operations in the region.* Over 100,000 American service men, a quarter
of all American forces in the country were deployed there. Commanded by Lieutenant General
Robert E. Cushman, Jr., III MAF was spread over 220 miles of coastal plains to the east and
mountain ranges to the west. It was headquartered at Da Nang.[19] Army General William C.
Westmoreland was overall commander of the American effort. Since late 1967, Westmoreland
had become focused on the northern region of I Corps, concerned with the enemy's ability to
infiltrate forces southward through the Demilitarized Zone. Westmoreland saw the American
mission as the destruction of enemy main forces, while Cushman was focused on pacification
______________________________________________________________________________
* The Marine command entered South Vietnam in 1965 as the III Marine Expeditionary Force.
To avoid comparisons to the former French Expeditionary Force, the Marines changed the name to III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF).
and small unit war in the villages. In time Westmoreland grew apprehensive of the Marines
ability to be successful in I Corps. However, both Generals shared a common concern as the Tet
holiday approached.[20]
Intelligence and all other indicators at the time were of a massive enemy force build up
along the Demilitarized Zone and the Laotian border.[21] Enemy actions commencing on 20
January 1968 around the Marine firebase at Khe Sanh lead Westmoreland to believe the decisive
battle of the war was near at hand. An enemy attack appeared to be imminent, as Khe Sanh's
6000 defenders faced an estimated 40,000 North Vietnamese. Cushman ordered the shift of
forces toward Khe Sanh, reorienting against attack from the north. Westmoreland provided
additional support in the form of a South Vietnamese Airborne Battalion, while a brigade of the
United States Army's 1st Air Cavalry reinforced areas south of Khe Sanh as Marine units moved
northward.[22] As the Year of the Monkey began, Khe Sanh and the surrounding region was the
absolute focus of the allied effort. On 30 January 1968, throughout South Vietnam, communist
forces launched their attack, however not as expected at Khe Sanh.
In a two day period, 30-31 January 1968, the Communists sent approximately 74,000
troops into action throughout South Vietnam. Among the areas hit were 36 provincial capitols,
five of the six autonomous cities, 64 of the 242 district capitols, and over 50 hamlets.
Communists thrusts were primarily against South Vietnamese forces, with Saigon being the
exception. The American Embassy, the Tan Son Nhat airfield complex, and the base at Long
Binh were the key American facilities subjected to violent attack.[23]
The North Vietnamese decision to launch the Tet Offensive was made in July 1967.[24]
Willing to gamble that the offensive, coupled with a general uprising of those loyalists in the
south sympathetic to the communist cause would result in bringing the war to a conclusion, or
even be only partially successful, Ho Chi Minh ordered the attack. The resolution directing the
offensive was founded on these simple tenants:
-Such an offensive could only occur every 1000 years
-It would likely decide the fate of the nation
-It would end the war
-It constituted the wishes of both the party and the people[25]
Many incidents illustrate the overwhelming commitment of the Communists to the
success of the offensive and general uprising. None better illustrates this determination than
events at the Ba To district headquarters in Quang Ngai providence. There, a 2,000 man Viet
Cong guerrilla force, armed only with knives, spears and a few carbines successfully attacked the
headquarters and burned the district chief's home.[26]
Responding to the call to uprise, Viet Cong and sympathizers in the south, along with
attacking regular communists forces from the north, brought in the Year of the Monkey,
shocking allied forces with the size and breadth of the offensive, and the seemingly undetected
build up and infiltration of forces. This significant intelligence failure on the American's part,
resulted in a disoriented defensive posture and, initially, great confusion and inadequate
responsive actions.
CHAPTER THREE....CHAOS IN THE LITTORALS
As the Tet holiday approached, Hue City residents characteristically prepared for the
holiday. The First Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Division was headquartered in
the Mang Cu Military Compound, located in the northwest corner of the Citadel.[27] Commanded
by Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, most members of the division were on holiday leave.
In response to events throughout the country on 30 January 1968, Truong had canceled all
leaves and placed all available units on full alert. These units composed of the division staff,
headquarters company, and the division's elite Black Panther company were positioned to defend
the compound and the Tac Loc airfield located within the Citadel.[28] The American Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) in Hue City was composed primarily of advisors to the
1st ARVN Division, and was located in a walled compound in the southern portion of the city.[29]
Allied intelligence reported elements of two North Vietnamese Regiments in the Thau
Thein Providence, which contains Hue, but no indications that these elements, believed to be at
least 20 kilometers from the city, threaten to attack. In actuality, sappers had infiltrated well
before the Tet holiday, disguised as peasants and South Vietnamese soldiers. The Sixth North
Vietnamese Regiment was assigned to the northern portion of the city, with the objectives of
capturing the 1st ARVN Division headquarters in the Mang Cu Compound, the Tac Loc Airfield,
and the Imperial Palace, all located within the walls of the Citadel. The 4th North Vietnamese
Regiment was assigned to seize the southern portion of the city, with the MACV Compound, the
Provisional Capitol Building, and the Prison as their specific objectives.[30] This was the
organization Second Battalion, Fifth Marines (2/5) would soon face. In addition to these primary
objectives, the two regiments had a specific target list of over 200 facilities, government
officials, and individuals. The list was so accurate that it included the location and names
of occupants at an American Central Intelligence Agency facility in Hue City, which officers at
the MACV Headquarters knew nothing about.[31] Despite the report by an ARVN reconnaissance
unit to the west of the city that large groups of North Vietnamese were headed toward the Hue,
the warning went unheeded and no response was mounted, nor the MACV personnel advised.
At 0233 on 31 January 1968, the North Vietnamese attack on Hue began. By
morning the 6th North Vietnamese Regiment held 60 percent of the Citadel, but had failed to
capture the Mang Ca Compound and the Tay Loc Airfield. The Imperial Palace had fallen into
Communists hands, and their victory was symbolized by the Viet Cong flag of blue and red,
with a gold star, that had been raised over the structure.[32] The focus of this study however is the
events in the southern portion of the city, attacked by the 4th North Vietnamese Regiment.
The 4th North Vietnamese Regiment, reinforced by the 804th North Vietnamese
Battalion, had launched their attack into southern Hue simultaneously with commencement of
actions in the Citadel. Divided into several separate attack groups, the assault forces focused on
the key civilian and military facilities. Because some groups became lost enroute to their targets,
a lack of cohesion of the assault existed, and the full potential of the attack was not realized.
Although they controlled the majority of the southern portion of the city by morning, the
attackers had failed to gain full control of the Prison, and had been repulsed at the MACV
Compound. Immediately improving their now defensive positions, the North Vietnamese
were positioned to bring fire upon the road entering the city from Highway One, but failed to
capture the boat ramp to the northeast of the MACV compound, on the Perfume River.[33] Whether
it was an objective the communists failed to gain, or a position never identified to capture, the
ramp, unprotected at the time of the attack, would play a critical role in the days ahead.
Throughout the 31st of January 1968, various ARVN units, supported by armor,
attempted to penetrate the city, only to be repulsed by the well equipped and entrenched enemy.
The day ended with the Americans at the MACV Compound holding on against repeated attacks
and constant bombardment with rockets and mortars. The attackers strengthened their positions
and established fields of fire making every corner in the city a killing zone. Meanwhile, the
Communists attackers began their round up of officials and citizens whom they felt were
"enemies of the people." A systematic execution followed. After the battle, the graves of over
2,800 residents of Hue City were found and an additional 3,000 were never accounted for.[34] This
round up was the catalyst behind a voluminous refugee movement from the city, as Hue citizens
attempted to find a route out of this maze of death.
Southern Hue City offers the example of a littoral city much like Marines may find
themselves engaged in during present day operations. Prior to Tet, its environment was one
similar to peacekeeping operations, with heavy reliance upon a coalition force. The
orientation northward in I Corps, the failure of intelligence to appreciate and accurately
interpretate enemy intentions, and the scope and surprise of the Tet offensive throughout the
country overwhelmed the resources and confused the response of American forces. The result
was that for a period of time, Hue City was an isolated crucible of defended urban terrain.
Because of poor weather conditions and an allied demand to minimize collateral damage, the city
would offer a unique stage for a nearly infantry pure engagement. A determined, prepared, and
well equipped enemy reinforced regiment, committed to holding their gains, faced off against
Marine Infantry units, unable to call upon any significant supporting arms, and charged to regain
the city. The subsequent days and actions of 2/5 would not only contribute a chapter in Marine
Corps history, but would offer lessons on leadership, the fighting character of the individual
Marine, weapons, and urban combat tactics. Further, the battle can serve to orientate the Corps
along an avenue of approach toward the future combat it will face when engaged upon the
world's littorals in Operational Maneuver From the Sea and employing of Killer Teams in such
an environment and situation. Hue City presented an urban arena for combat, which was truly
nonlinear and dynamic; an exceptional and rare insight into the battlefields of the future.
CHAPTER FOUR....THE LONG WALK DOWN LE LOI STREET
"Estimates of the enemy situation prior to 31 January did not indicate a divisional size attack against Hue; no reliable indicators of a large scale deployment of forces toward Hue. The enemy had tactical surprise. Throughout the first days of the battle, an amazing amount of misinformation was given the Marine Command, the U.S. High Command, and ultimately the American public."
Colonel Charles Meadows USMC (Ret)
As the communists conducted their attack on Hue City, the Marines of 2/5 found
themselves thoroughly engaged on 30 and 31 January 1968, in the Phu Bai area of operations,
south of Hue City. Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham was directing the efforts of his rifle
companies(**) to relieve Combined Action Platoons (***) in the Troui River and Phu Loc
sectors, with the key Troui River bridge under attack and threatened to be lost.[35] The success
of the companies aggressive response, sent the enemy forces retreating in a direction which
would ultimately trap them at the river. Captain George R. (Ron) Christmas, commander of
Hotel Company, 2/5 recalls the situation as the first time since his tour in Vietnam had started
that the enemy was in a position to be fully engaged by the fire power the companies could bring
to bear. They had no where to retreat and were forced to stand and fight. It was the fruitfulness of
this situation which would lead to his great frustration, when directed to disengage the enemy
and assume defensive positions.[36]
__________________________________________________________________________
**During the Vietnam era, Marine Infantry Battalions had a Headquarters and Service Company and four infantry companies (colloquially called "rifle" companies. The companies in the Second Battalion were F, G, H, and I, (Fox, Golf, Hotel, and India under the phonetic alphabet.)
***Combined Action Platoons (CAP) typically consisted of a squad of Marines and a squad from the South Vietnamese Popular Forces, essentially an uniformed full-time militia, working closely with the local population.
Captain Charles L. Meadows, commander of Golf Company, 2/5 was in reserve at Phu
Bai, having just completed a security mission prior to the offensive.[37] At Phu Bai, the newly
formed Task Force X-Ray, commanded Brigadier General Foster C. LaHue, was task organized
and comprised of Fifth Marines with two battalions, and First Marines with just one battalion.
The two regimental commanders, as well as General LaHue, had been in the Phu Bai area less
than three weeks.[38] Receiving word of enemy action along Highway One and Hue City, Alpha
Company First Battalion, First Marines (1/1) was expeditiously deployed north on Highway One
toward Hue City at 0630 on 31 January. After several changes to the initial orders, the company
was directed to the Boat Ramp in southern Hue City, to investigate reports that the city was
under attack.[39]
As Alpha Company approached the city, reinforced by three Marine tanks they had
happened upon enroute, the company was engaged in a murderous cross fire. Upon receiving
reports from Alpha Company, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Gravel, Commanding Officer 1/1, asked
that he be permitted to reinforce his company.[40] His request approved, Gravel and his command
group departed, along with the only organized combat force available at Phu Bai, Golf Company
2/5. Meadows recalls that he received an order to mount up his company, head to Hue
City to relieve Alpha Company and the MACV Compound, and to escort the Commanding
General of the 1st ARVN Division out of the Citadel and back to Phu Bai. Higher headquarters
believed that no more than three hours would be needed to accomplish this mission. Based on
this guidance, Meadows directed that his Marines leave all non-essential combat gear at Phu Bai,
so packs were dropped as they moved out. With no intelligence on the situation, Meadows and
his Marines started their movement to contact under the command of a man Meadow's had met
just hours before.[41]
By 1445, the reinforcements had linked up with Alpha Company. Their casualties were
evacuated back to Phu Bai, and the remainder of the company, commanded by a gunnery
sergeant, joined the relief force and continued into the city.[42] Arriving at the MACV Compound
under enemy fire which had essentially shot his force out of their trucks and forced them to
proceed on foot, Gravel met with the senior Army advisor present , Colonel George Adkisson.
He advised Gravel that the situation in the Citadel was "fine."[43] On this point, some documents
and Meadows' recollection, relate differently and claim that Adkisson encouraged Gravel not to
attempt to enter the Citadel, but gave up his argument when Gravel was unable to persuade Task
Force X-Ray of the gravity of the situation.[44] The only map which offered the degree of detail
needed to navigate in the city had been taken off a gas station wall, when Meadows had noticed
it while taking cover in the building, trying to make his way to the MACV compound.[45] The
battalion commander, leaving Alpha Company to defend the compound, set out to locate and
evacuate the ARVN Commanding General.
With the tanks on the south side of the Perfume river providing direct support, Golf
Company 2/5 started across the bridge into the Citadel at approximately 1610. Despite a hail of
enemy fire, two platoons made it across the bridge only to be caught in a murderous crossfire.[46]
Private First Class Bill Tant caught in the fire, sought cover behind one of the trees lining the
streets. Pondering a move from the tree to aid his fallen comrades, he watch as small arms fire
from two directions literally chipped away his tree, threatening to drop it.[47]
Realizing his company's predicament, Meadows began the withdraw of his Marines back
to the south side of the river. Still under withering fire, the extraction proved as difficult as the
assault. They would be the last Americans within the walls of the Citadel until 11 February
1968.[48] After the refusal of MACV to provide vehicles to evacuate the casualties, Gravel, enroute
to the MACV Compound to find