A new Amphibious Brigade from the Mediterranean.
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: A new Amphibious Brigade from the Mediterranean.
AUTHOR: Cdr. Rosario Walter GUERRISI, Italian Navy.
THESIS: After an analysis of the development of the decision to form an Italian joint Army-Navy marine amphibious brigade to conduct operations in support of maritime interests, the unit's capability will be enlarged by it being a joint organization as opposed to single service.
DISCUSSION: This MMS paper analyzes the origin of the formation of an Italian Joint Amphibious Brigade (JAB). It provides a rationale for such expansion, and examines the issues associated with it. As part of the process, the experiences of the Britain's 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, and the U.S. Army-Marine Corps cooperation during World War II will be studied.
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS: The Italian amphibious force will be doubled by creating a light joint Army-Navy marine brigade. It will have the capability to operate in defense of Italian interests.
The process to form the JAB will start soon, for elements of the Army have already successfully operated with the naval marines.
The expansion process will require:
(1) The commitment of the Army elements to adopt amphibious doctrine and training.
(2) The commitment of the Italian Government to fund the construction related to the JAB shipborne sea-lift capability.
(3) The commitment of both the Italian Navy and Army to form a Joint Helicopter Group, to be assigned to the JAB, under the command of such a force.
PREFACE
Within the framework of the post Cold War geopolitical scenario, and with further reduction to defense expenditures, the Italian armed forces will establish an amphibious operational arm with greater capability than the existing one. Thus, a joint Army-Navy marine amphibious brigade will be formed. Later, cooperation with the Spanish amphibious forces will commence.
The most likely employment of such force will be in humanitarian and other military operations other than war, such as the one that will soon be established in Albania. In fact, to face the recent crisis in Albania, the United Nations Security Council in March 1997 authorized the creation of a multinational military force under European auspices to intervene in the strife-torn nation and to protect the distribution of humanitarian aid to victims of the anarchy sweeping Albania. The force will rely on troops from southern European countries, led by Italy.[1]
The author focused this MMS on the Joint Amphibious Brigade, particularly on its general configuration, and those considered critical requirements to the formation the of JAB. He has not focused, in detail, on such important issues such as air combat element, artillery, engineer combat support, which could be treated in future detailed studies. This is partially due to the lack of published works dedicated, or even related specifically, to either the expansion of the Italian amphibious force, or the cooperation with the Spanish amphibious forces.
For possible historical precedents from which lessons could be learned, the author has concentrated particularly on two joint experiences in the amphibious history: the British 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, and the U.S. Army-Marine Corps cooperation in World War II. The paper has been deliberately written at the unclassified level.
CONTENTS
Page
Preface..............................................................................................................................ii
Map.................................................................................................................................. 45
Chapter
1. Introduction 1
The Italian Defense Model.
Scope and Methodology of Research.
2. The Breakdown of Order.......................................................................................... 5 Chaos in the Littorals.
The Mediterranean.
Italy's National Areas of Interests.
NATO's Role in Peacekeeping. International Initiatives in
Mediterranean: Italian Contribution.
3. The Previous Experiences 13
General.
3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines Cooperation.
29 Commando Light Regiment, Royal Artillery.
59 Independent Commando Squadron, Royal Engineers.
Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines.
Training.
U.S. Army-Marine Corps Experience.
Amphibious Warfare in World War II.
Conclusion
4. The Joint Amphibious Brigade's Configuration...................................................24
Pure Amphibious Brigade.
Ground Oriented Brigade.
Unit's Configuration: The Pure Amphibious Brigade.
JAB's Formation Factors.
5. Critical Requirements..............................................................................................27
Training, Formation, and Doctrine.
Weapons, Logistics, and Materials.
Infrastructures.
Command and Control.
Conclusion.
6. Critical Points............................................................................................................31
Joint Helicopter's Group.
Amphibious Shipborne Sea-lift Capability.
7. Conclusion/Recommendations................................................................................ 42
Appendixes....................................................................................................................42
Bibliography..................................................................................................................56
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Italian Defense Model
The world's geopolitical scenario has been characterized by rapid change, with associated uncertainty and instability as two of the prevailing elements. Traditional tasks assigned to military forces have extended wherever new risks to international security appear. The role of multinational organizations has gained in importance and is now widely recognized.
These and other important elements led to the drafting by the Italian Defense General Staff (IDGS) of a policy paper titled The Defense Model (DM). It was then presented by the Minister of Defense to Parliament. As the Minister stated in a later interview:
Our goal is to achieve an integrated force structure which is technologically advanced and capable of external projection, in order to respond to new threats to international security and stability.[2]
The DM outlines a defense posture which calls for a reduced in number, high quality military forces capable of safeguarding Italian national security and the nation's interests wherever required, and to foster international order and stability in close association with the nation's allies.
Within this framework, Italian naval forces (maritime-amphibious) will be called upon to support three principal strategic functions:[3]
x Peacetime presence and surveillance in areas of strategic interest.
x Protection of national interests and contribution to international security in periods of tension and crisis.
x Integrated defense of national/allied territory in case of direct aggression.
These functions are also based on direct experience gained during the last two decades real-world employment of Italian military and naval forces. Examples are the Lebanon crisis of 1982, two Arabian Gulf crises, three peace-keeping operations in Somalia, naval embargo operations in the Adriatic, the Implementation Force (IFOR)/Supporting Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the evacuation of nationals from Rwanda and Albania.
The needs for upgrading the national amphibious force is receiving renewed attention and priority.[4] The San Marco battalion, which is based in Brindisi (see APPENDIX A), is the Italian navy's amphibious unit. Its landing operational group, until recently 300 strong, now numbers about 900 men. The marines who form part of the landing teams are long-term draftees who volunteer for service periods of two or three years (normally, service is for 12 months). They are well-trained professional troops who, although limited in numbers, have proved themselves in the international arena.[5] The Navy has recently established a helicopter detachment specifically fitted for supporting amphibious troops, improved its aircraft carrier's communication fit for amphibious operations, and is envisaging a greater amphibious capability with Command and Control and airlift via a second carrier. However, the Italian defense program intends to move further. Staff work is in progress with the Army to create a light Joint Amphibious Brigade (JAB) based on the existing Navy marine regiment.[6]
Scope and Methodology of Research
The purpose of this MMS is to provide a rationale for the expansion of the Italian amphibious force, specifically with regard to the formation of the light joint Army-Navy marine amphibious brigade. From this thesis, several key questions arise:
(1) Why is the existing Italian amphibious force to expand?
(2) What will be the most effective JAB's configuration?
(3) Are there any examples in other countries' amphibious forces which the Italian armed forces can draw upon when configuring the new force?
To achieve the objective of this MMS, search of available literature related to this topic has been conducted, and a series of interviews with officers who have previous experiences in Britain's 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines; the US Marine Corps; and U.S. Army. The initial search has been focused on books, articles, and Defense Technical Information Center (DITC) assets available at or through the Marine Corps University's Research Center. From this research, a suggestion for the most appropriate general configuration of the amphibious force is given. Conclusions and recommendations then follow. It is noted that all sources used in this paper are unclassified, hence this paper is unclassified.
CHAPTER 2
THE BREAKDOWN OF ORDER
Chaos in the Littorals
At the NATO Ministerial meeting of the Council in Athens in June 1993, and again at the January 1994 summit in Brussels, Alliance leaders reiterated their conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean.[7] Hence, as a Mediterranean country, Italy in the future is likely to face a number of very different risks to her security and interests.[8] Many of these risks will be associated with the littorals.
Littorals are defined in the U.S. Marine Corps doctrinal document Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) as "those areas characterized by great cities, well-populated coasts, and the intersections of trade routes."[9] While representing a relatively small portion of the world's surface, littorals provide homes to over three-quarters of the world's population, locations for over 80 percent of the world's capital cities, and nearly all the marketplaces for international trade.[10] Thus, littorals are also the places where most of the world's important conflicts are likely to occur.[11]
Also, with the end of the Cold War, governments are losing their monopoly on organized violence. The result, as seen in Somalia, Lebanon, and Los Angeles, will be chaotic, non-war situations in which ethnic groups, gangs, and other nonstate actors wage conflict or war of various types against various foes.[12] Armed forces have recently been tasked to face these situations by conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW focuses on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises.[13] On past experience, MOOTW will probably be conducted by coalitions of multinational naval forces, but not necessarily all the time. There may be need for a state to act unilaterally, or as the dominant force in a coalition of two or more countries.[14]
Naval forces, with their characteristics of flexibility and responsiveness, are the most appropriate to face the new range of risks from overcoming devastated infrastructure to assisting friendly people in need of disaster relief to countering other armed threats.[15] For a country like Italy, extended into the Mediterranean and dependent for her survivability on the maritime trades, her naval-amphibious force has a natural priority.
The Mediterranean
The Mediterranean constitutes a relevant economic and geo-political entity. It is a junction and bridge among three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. A complete evaluation of the strategic importance of this maritime area, however, should also take into account the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and their surrounding countries. Thus, the Middle East is included.[16]
The Mediterranean is intersected by the Italian Peninsula, which reduces it at its narrowest to a passage approximately 80 miles wide near Sicily. This constricted passage divides that 2,500 mile sea into almost two parts. Although these dimensions are relatively small compared with other sea areas of preeminent strategic importance in the world, this maritime area is known to exert a great influence on global political, economic and military relations.
From a political point of view, the importance of the Mediterranean is essentially based on the number of nations which border it: more than 300 million people belonging to 18 nationalities, with many different ethnic, historical, and religious heritage, and quite often with divergent economic and cultural interests. This situation embraces many potentials conflicting factors; its main features are instability and an uncertain dynamism of events and they call for a constant and flexible political and military commitment.
The economic importance extends well beyond the trade flow amongst bordering countries. It is in fact primarily linked to the traffic of goods and raw materials bound to western nations (but also for the former USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania in the Black Sea), most of which passes through this sea. While about 75% of Italian imports and about 60% of exports cross the Mediterranean,[17] the average daily presence of merchant vessels in it numbers 2,500. This makes the Mediterranean not only a vital area for Italy and for the other bordering countries, but also an extremely important sea line of communication for the whole world.
Italy's National Areas of Interests
Italy's national interests are extended well beyond its traditional regional geopolitical areas. Their management requires close linkage between defense, foreign, and economic policies. The Mediterranean is the centerpiece of the Italian strategic scenario, but national interests are encompassed in the so called "enlarged Mediterranean", a vast area extended beyond the traditional borders of the former mare nostrum.[18] Notwithstanding the broader European perspective, Italy's interests are projected along two major maritime directions. The first is eastbound, through the Adriatic Sea, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucases, while the second is southbound, consisting of the North African littoral, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf.[19]
NATO's Role in Peacekeeping.
The Alliance's strategic concept adopted at the Rome summit[20] in November 1991 recognized that the potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts. NATO heads of state and government announced that to this end they would support the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its institutions. They also recognized that other bodies, including the European Community and the Western European Union could have important roles to play.[21]
The political basis for the Alliance's role in peacekeeping in support of the CSCE was formalized at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, Norway, in June 1992. There, NATO Foreign Ministers announced their readiness to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE. This included making available Alliance resources and expertise for peacekeeping operations.[22]
International Initiatives in the Mediterranean: Italian Contribution
Recent international events have demonstrated that western nations are daily called to win or maintain the peace. Hence, at the military level, Europe needs military forces with extremely high levels of flexibility and mobility. This includes a relevant maritime component to ensure operational effectiveness and power-projection capabilities. Amphibious forces may be one of the instruments at the disposal of European countries when they confront a chaotic scenario, conduct a dissuasive or deterrent action, or proceed directly toward an intervention. These forces have a unique persuasive value in a crisis. They provide political authorities with a menu of suitable responses, without violating national boundaries. They can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, easily dispatched but just as easily withdrawn.[23]
Furthermore, frequent commitments of military forces have been required in the Mediterranean to ensure order, security, and international legitimacy. As seen in Bosnia and Albania, the southern basin is already very turbulent and the areas of crisis are multiplying.
The growing importance of amphibious forces in the Mediterranean is a reality.
As a result, Italy, Spain, France, and lately Portugal, have developed a quadripartite initiative called EUROMARFOR.[24] It will contribute to the development of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), especially in the Mediterranean Region,[25] while NATO has recently activated the Combined Amphibious Force for the Mediterranean (CAFMED).[26]
Within the structure of a balanced Navy (see APPENDIX B), the Italian amphibious force for decades had been undersized with respect to its commitments. With less than three hundred men in the landing team, the San Marco Battalion was able to conduct a limited amphibious raid, but little else. Recently, the situation has changed. According to the global scenario envisioned in the DM, the Italian Navy has already started a reorganization of its manpower. The basic concept has been a force reduction (from 49,000 personnel in 1988 to 43,000 in 1994, with a final strength figure of 40,000 personnel in 1999-2000), coupled with a marked increase in proficiency required by the Navy to deal with new missions. These new tasking can range from crisis management and peacekeeping operations, to humanitarian assistance and related activities. The final goal is a more flexible and capable structure in which people are required to reach higher levels of professionalism.
In this context of general reduction, the amphibious force has been the only growing component in the Italian military. "Our goal is to increase the landing component to 900 men."[27] This would mean an overall strength of 1,600 to 1,700 men for the San Marco Battalion, taking into account the training and logistic component. However, even with a full-strength landing battalion, the Italian amphibious component would have limited capabilities to face all the risks associated with the littorals and the role the nation has to play in the European security.
This is why Italian defense policy will approach the problem in a joint way. Discussions are under way with the Italian Army to build jointly an amphibious brigade. The Italian Ministry of Defense is thinking in terms of a light brigade of about 3,000 men, a target that, due to the actual general reduction, would not be realistic for the Navy itself but could be reached together with the Army.[28] The JAB will allow the nation to meet the requirements of the increasingly frequent out-of-area missions, and to participate fully in the European security structure. With the establishment of this organization, is there experience from other nations from which Italy can learn?
CHAPTER 3
PREVIOUS experiencES
General
For the purpose of this MMS paper, two joint Army-Marines experiences have been studied. The first is that represented by the British Army-Royal Marines relationship within 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines. The second is related to the U.S. Army-Marine Corps amphibious cooperation during World War II.
These examples have been carefully selected with regard to the role played by the Army component in each of these experiences, and other issues associated with such cooperations. Within 3 Commando Brigade, the British Army provides the unit with combat service support and fire support. The American experience has been different: the Army has provided the amphibious force with combat service support and fire support, but also as appropriate it has conducted amphibious assaults itself, both as part of a joint Navy-Marine Corps-Army force, and independent of an association with the Marine Corps, i.e., Europe and North Africa in World War II.
3 Commando Brigade. BRITISH Army-ROYAL Marines Cooperation
The Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade and British amphibious operations are supported by two significant attached elements from the British Army. Because of its size, the Corps cannot provide adequate manpower nor funding for artillery support and the many roles of combat engineers. To cover this, the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers have specialist units dedicated to the Commando Forces order of battle.[29] These combat support units provide 3 Commando Brigade with additional combat capability, which can be deployed to tie down or fix enemy forces while the Commando Units maneuver to strike them.
Logistic support, on the other hand, is provided by a dedicated joint logistic unit composed of both Royal Marines and British Army personnel.
29 Commando Light Regiment, Royal Artillery
British Army support for the Royal Marines includes a commando-trained artillery regiment which was the successor to a distinguished unit of Second World War fame.[30] During the post-War reorganization of the British military, 25 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, was redesigned 29 Field Regiment for service in such trouble spots as Palestine, Egypt and Cyprus, before being based permanently at Plymouth's Royal Citadel.
Since 1961, when the then War Office agreed to a request to provide supporting artillery for the Royal Marines Commandos, this Regiment has been closely associated with the Corps. After 29 Regiment was selected for the commando-support task, it was regrouped into detached batteries for actions in Kuwait and Aden.
Commando training followed during January and February 1962 and the coveted green berets were presented by the then Commandant General Royal Marines in May 1962. When conflict with rebels in Brunei and then Indonesia broke out, a battery was flown to Brunei to support commando operations with its 105mm pack howitzers; this was the first time that the Regiment had used its guns in anger in support of the Royal Marines. Later, elements of 29 Commando Regiment RA, were to support parachute regiment operations in Bahrain and Aden, the Royal Marines in Hong Kong, Sarawak and Malaya, and in the Falklands during the South Atlantic War in 1981.[31]
Today, 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, directly supports the force with three batteries of 105mm light guns. Each battery has six guns and reinforces each of the three Commando Units (40, 42, 45 Commandos). A further six guns are available from a Territorial Army Commando Battery.[32]
Also, part of 29 Regiment is 148 (Meiktila) Cdo Forward Observation Post Battery, whose role is to direct Naval Gunfire Support (NGS). The battery co-operates in this work with various other operational arms, including the Special Boat Squadron. This is necessary because much of the battery's work would be behind enemy lines.
Each of the operational gun batteries is equipped with six Royal Ordnance 105mm light guns, each with towing tractor, usually a 1 1/2 tonnes Land Rover, and other support vehicles. Each battery's equipment is air transportable by Sea King HC-4 helicopter, as an underslung load.[33]
Naval Gunfire Forward Observation (NGFO) spotting teams consist of an officer, a bombardier, a lance bombardier, a naval communications rating, and a driver/operator. To fulfill the various optical functions required, the team is trained in small boat insertion, and parachuting. In addition, for Advance Force Operations (behind enemy lines), two parties are diver trained to enable them to be inserted by submarine or other craft for covert operations alongside the Special Boat Squadron.
Every man in the 148 Cdo FO Bty has to be Commando and parachute trained, and must pass the pre-parachute selection course. Every officer is a qualified Forward Air Controller, and every soldier has successfully completed a 12-week Naval Gunfire Assistants (Basic) course which introduces him to all aspects of NGS. This includes the use of Morse code and other communications techniques.[34] After the basic course, soldiers are selected for the advanced course which includes completing the Signals Advanced course at the Royal School of Artillery, Larkhill. Naturally every officer and soldier is physically fit and training is undertaken every day.
Teams are deployed away from the base of 148 Commando Forward Battery at RM Poole (Dorset) on a regular basis, including the work-up of the Caribbean Guardship in NGS when the hand-over is completed between the respective ships at Belize. Work is also undertaken with the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (a multi-national NATO force) in Norway and Turkey.[35]
59 Independent Commando Squadron, Royal Engineers
Formed as 59 Field Company in 1900, 59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers, provides engineer support for 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines. It is responsible for all engineer work within the brigade area. In Royal Marines and Commando Forces terms, this work includes booby-traps, mine laying and clearance, route maintenance and denial, bridging, rafting, water supply, snow clearance and support to 29 Commando Light Regiment Royal Artillery.[36] The squadron is also responsible for setting up bulk fuel installations as part of the Beach Support Area (BSA); for this purpose, as well as for the reconnaissance of beaches, the squadron maintains a full diving team. Included in the Squadron strength of nine officers and 253 soldiers there is a workshop from the former Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME, now part of the Royal Logistic Corps, RLC).
The Squadron has a history of support to Commando Forces. This includes the period 1968-71, when as 59 Field Squadron RE, it was based in Singapore.[37] The Squadron reformed at Plymouth in April 1971 and became an integral part of the Royal Marines Commando Forces. During the Falklands conflict, the Squadron provided engineer support to all Commando units. In so doing, it fought in every major battle.[38]
59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers consists of a headquarters, three field troops, a reconnaissance troop and a support troop - the field troops providing combat engineer support. Mobility tasks include bridge building, route clearing, minefield clearance, and the preparation of beach landing sites. Counter-mobility tasks consist of the building of obstacles, the demolition of roads and bridges, and the laying of minefields to channel the enemy. Survivability tasks include assisting in the preparation of field defenses and fortifications.
Reconnaissance Troop of 59 Commando Squadron is trained to operate forward with the Brigade Patrol Troop (BPT). It may deploy with them in the pre-assault phase of an operation. The troop is trained in all BPT insertion methods, including parachuting.[39]
The Support Troop controls the Squadron's vehicles and the plant machinery, used in survivability tasks, and the boats and divers, who carry out underwater engineering tasks. These include welding and demolitions.
131 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers, a Territorial Army squadron, is responsible for general engineer support in the Brigade rear area. Its tasks include the provision of drinking water, the establishment of the bulk fuel installation, construction of field ablutions, and reinforcement of the close support squadron where necessary.
Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines
3 Commando Brigade has a dedicated logistic unit which provides all second line Combat Service Support to the force, supporting it with a constant re-supply chain from the initial assault through to the final phase of the operation.[40] It is unique in that its source of stores for the initial 60 days of operations is generated from amphibious ships offshore; this allows it to operate as a totally self-sufficient force, without requirement for a major airlifted re-supply. This forms, in effect, the formation's own limited third line support.[41]
The Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines, is Britain's sole amphibious logistic unit. It has demonstrated its operational role in combat re-supply during the Falklands War and in Northern Iraq on Operation HAVEN. The unit is based on five squadrons which provide specialist support to the Brigade. The Regiment is manned by 700 personnel drawn from the Royal Marines, the Army, and the Royal Navy.[42] The command of the unit alternates between British Army and Royal Marines. Its primary task of ensuring the resupply of combat supplies (ammunition, water, fuel and food) to forces on the ground is enhanced by its ability to provide specialist services to sustain the Brigade's operations.[43] In addition, the Commando Logistic Regiment can integrate its procedures with the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and execute a coordinated logistic plan with 3 (UK) Division (British Army), when operating with it.
Formed in 1971, today's Commando Logistic Regiment can deploy specifically-configured Logistic Task Groups (LTGs) to support any sized force from a company group to a full brigade anywhere in the world.[44] The Regiment is required to provide responsive support to the assault units from a sea base or, if necessary, develop a shore base for subsequent operations.
Training
The United Kingdom Secretary of Defense, in the White Paper on the lessons of the Falklands, identified the most important factor in the British task force as the "skill, stamina and resolution displayed by individual servicemen."[45] In the Royal Marines, all officers and men, from pilots through vehicle mechanics and signalers to swimmers canoeists, are all trained as infantrymen at the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, at Lympstone. This demanding course is 30 weeks for recruits and 15 months for young officers, including the Commando Course.[46] Furthermore, Royal Navy and Army officers and men assigned to 3 Commando Brigade must complete the Commando Course to earn the Green Beret, that they wear while serving with 3 Commando Brigade RM.[47]
3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines is a joint force in nature. The fundamental aspects of its jointness are the training of personnel and the colocation/integration of the Brigade HQ in Plymouth alongside the HQ of the Navy's Commodore Amphibious Warfare. A common standard of training produces a standard ethos, which binds the formation and promotes professionalism and high morale. The colocation and integration of the Brigade HQ in Plymouth, of British Army, Royal Navy and Air Force personnel, provide the Force with an integrated command and control organization that reflects the jointness inherent in the Force itself.
The U.S. Army-Marine Corps Experience
These two Services have fought in conjunction in numerous campaigns around the globe. This associate pre dates First World War, hence Marines and Army personnel served together in the Second Seminole War, the Boxer Rebellion in China, and the Philippines Insurrection, and then through World Wars I and II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and then in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Arabian Gulf. This cooperation, though, has not been limited to fighting alongside each other in land operations ashore.[48] It has also extended to the conduct of amphibious operations.[49] This emphasizes the importance of two aspects that played a fundamental role in the successful cooperation in such operations: amphibious doctrine and amphibious training.
Army units have constituted the planned follow-on forces since the development of the Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrine in the 1930s. In fact, the 1947 National Security Act that established the Department of Defense with four separate Services also set into law the amphibious nature of the Marine Corps and designation of Army forces as the follow-on forces in amphibious campaigns. It specifically noted that the Marine Corps was assigned "primary interest in the development of those landing force doctrine, tactics and equipment...of common interest to the Army and Marine Corps."[50]
The Army does have significant historical experience in conducting both unilateral and joint amphibious operations with and without the Marine Corps. Amphibious operations in the European theater were conducted solely by the U.S. Army, who received the benefit the Marine Corps development of amphibious doctrine in 1930, of early training with the Corps, and experience derived form the Marine Corps' (and Army's) experiences in assaulting heavily defended beachheads in the Pacific theater.[51]
Amphibious Warfare in World War II
Numerically, the majority of the Army's amphibious operations were conducted in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. The SWPA's Marine Corps forces, the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, participated in several joint Army-Marine Corps amphibious assaults in SWPA's portion of the Solomon Island campaign until they were transferred to Adm. Chester Nimitz' Central Pacific Area (CPA). The 2nd Marine Division fought at Guadalcanal, but was primarily in the Central Pacific in 1943 and 1944.
In Adm. Nimitz' Central Pacific Area (CPA), Marine Corps forces were the predominant ground forces. However, in every one of the Marine Corps' most celebrated CPA campaigns the Army provided ground combat, combat support, and combat service support elements which performed a variety of roles in fighting alongside and supporting the Marine Corps (and sometime Army) assault forces.
On Guadalcanal, the Army's 164th Infantry Regiment served under 1st Marine Division command during the darkest hours at Henderson Field.[52] Later, the Americal Division and 25th Infantry Division assumed the operations ashore when Marines were withdrawn from the island to prepare for future operations, and provide General McArthur with a division having amphibious training.[53]
In 1943, the Central Pacific drive commenced. In Operation GALVANIC, the 2d Marine Division assaulted Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll,[54] while a regimental combat team from the Army's 27th Infantry Division conducted a simultaneous supporting amphibious invasion of Makin Island of the atoll.[55] In the Marshall Islands, Kwajalein Atoll[56] was seized by a joint amphibious assault by the 4th Marine Division and Army 7th Division, while the elements of the 22d Marines and the Army 106th Infantry Regiment seized Eniwetok Atoll.[57]
This association continued as the war neared its end.
In the Palau Islands, the Army's 81st Division conducted a supporting amphibious assault on Angaur[58] while the 1st Marine Division assaulted Peleliu.[59] Later, infantry battalions from the 81st division were brought in to complete the destruction of Japanese forces on Peleliu when 1st Marine Division units became combat ineffective due to heavy casualties.[60] On Okinawa, the Army's XXIV Corps (7th and 96th Infantry Divisions) and Marine III Amphibious Corps (1st and 6th Marine Divisions) assaulted the beaches together, while the Army's 27th, the 77th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Marines Division waited in reserve.[61]
After World War II, the U.S. Army has participated in only one major combat amphibious warfare operation. In September 1950, a landing at Inchon was conducted by the X Corps. Units from the Marine Corps' 1st Division, the Army 7th Infantry Division and 187th (Regimental) Combat Team, and a South Korean Marine Corps Regiment comprised this Corps. The landing occurred on the Republic of Korea's extreme northwest coast, south of Seoul, with the purpose to outflank the North Korean Army. Ninety percent of the North Korean Army was in the far south near the small allied perimeter at Pusan. By outflanking the enemy, an offensive initiative was seized by United Nations Forces, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea repulse, operations north of 38th parallel commenced.[62]
Conclusion
Several important themes arise from the study of these experiences. Their analysis can help in defining the Army's role within the Italian JAB, the configuration of the major components, and thus a sound configuration of the entire force. Also they can help in identifying some important issues that must be taken into consideration in forming such a joint brigade. However, due to the dimension (brigade-size) of the future Italian joint amphibious unit, the author has focused more on the British experience to deduce important lessons for the formation of the JAB.
The British experience is a rich field from which much can be harvested. The most important aspect is that 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines is a joint force in nature. Clear examples of this are the colocation/integration of the Brigade HQ in Plymouth and the structure of the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines. Both factors provide the Force with a coherent jointness. However, maybe the fundamental quality of
3 Commando Brigade's jointness is the training of its personnel. All officers and men do their basic training as infantrymen at the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, at Lympstone. This common training is a fundamental requirement for developing the necessary cohesion amongst all personnel. A common standard of training produces a standard ethos and promotes professionalism. With such a strong common commitment the Army elements are able to be employed to fulfill support missions (artillery, engineer, and logistic support) within an amphibious force. Training is a recurring theme. U.S. Army-Marine Corps World War II cooperation demonstrated that with proper amphibious training and by adopting amphibious doctrine, the Army can indeed be employed in the landing assault role.
CHAPTER 4
THE Joint Amphibious Brigade's configuratioN
The JAB's most likely configurations could be essentially two: (1) a pure assault amphibious force of light brigade size (2,500-3,000 men), with the central element being two reinforced Marine battalions; or (2) a tactical combined arm configuration with one pure amphibious unit, and one or more conventional, mechanized and/or armored, units (5,000 men).[63]
Pure Amphibious Brigade
The first option assures the ability to execute the typical assault from the sea, and to accomplish the traditional difficult operations which require the commitment of more than a single battalion. In normal conditions the JAB may be deployed with one of its battalions, or at maximum, with an equivalent strength of one and a half battalions. Other personnel may not be combat ready and/or be committed to other taskings. In case of crisis the JAB may immediately make active a task force based on a reinforced battalion, which may be later augmented with the remaining personnel.[64] This also permits the deployment of the two battalions, simultaneously, into two different operational theaters.
Ground Oriented Brigade
The second option is based on the theoretical approach of a lean combined arms brigade, composed of one amphibious battalion, one or two mechanized/armored battalions, and one reduced logistic unit. It could accomplish a series of missions typical for an Army unit, with the added advantage of reaching the theater of operations by sea. The amphibious portion of the unit could secure the beachhead, thus allowing the follow-on force free entrance inland for the continuation of the conventional mission.
In reality, the single amphibious battalion would be insufficient to conduct effectively an amphibious assault to secure the beachhead. The weak point of such a structure, with a small amphibious unit and conventional Army units, is that if the former can not seize the beachhead then the latter are constrained to land in a benign site. Thus, there would be no need to constitute a permanent amphibious brigade.[65]
Unit's Configuration: The Pure Amphibious Brigade
The solution of a JAB, characterized by a reduced structure but with a full amphibious capability, with two identical, and robust full-strength units is more acceptable, feasible, and consistent with Italian strategic requirements. It also will constitute a better option in terms of defense expenditures, especially if one compares the budgetary implications of the shipborne sealift associated with the larger "ground oriented brigade" option. The pure amphibious brigade could be easily integrated into multinational amphibious forces - as demonstrated by the role that the San Marco Battalion played as theater reserve in the Bosnia-Herzegovina operations with the USMC MEU/SOC.[66] In addition, it can be used in response to the many MOOTW ranging from peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and non combatant evacuation up to peace-enforcing and local conflicts.
For transporting the personnel, the brigade will utilize fast naval craft and light Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs); the latter allow both a