The Ability of Aerial Tankers to
Support Global Engagement
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Aviation
The Ability of
Aerial Tankers to Support
Global Engagement
Colleen Dugan-Beatovich
Conference Group 6
1 April 1997
Executive Summary
The United
States Air Force’s new vision for the 21st Century includes the
doctrine of ‘Global Engagement’. This
doctrine is comprised of these six core competencies:
a. Air
and Space Superiority
b. Global
Attack
c. Rapid
Global Mobility
d. Precision
Engagement
e. Information
Superiority
f. Agile
Combat Support
Each of these
core competencies is in some way dependent on the Air Force’s tanker fleet of
KC-135’s and KC-10s. Since the Air
Force’s reorganization of 1992, several key issues have transpired that affect
the tanker fleet’s ability to support these six core competencies.
First is the age and modernization of the
KC-135. Brought into the inventory in
the late 50s and early 60s, this aircraft comprises 90% of the total aerial
refueling aircraft. Although most have
been re-engined, other modernization efforts have been shifted to the right due
to fiscal constraints. This forces
reliance on an airframe barely keeping up with Federal Aviation Administration
regulations.
With the shift of scheduling responsibilities
to Air Mobility Command, tanker aircraft mission focus has shifted from one of
primarily aerial refueling to one that equates aerial refueling with
airlift. This change in focus will no
doubt reduce the active service life of the KC-135 and force earlier retirement
and replacement of these aircraft.
The peacetime scheduling of these assets
through the Tactical Airlift Control Center (TACC) maximizes peacetime
utilization, but instills a false sense of strategic lift capabilities when
tanker assets are chopped to theater CINCs during contingency operations. Thereby, decreasing lift assets at the same
instant airlift requirements increase.
Lastly, the reorganization that placed over
50% of the tanker assets in the Guard and Reserve serves the peacetime Air
Force well. This may not be the case in
a contingency should the National Command Authority delay a Guard/Reserve call
up decision.
These three issues alone affect the tanker
forces ability to fulfill its responsibilities during contingency
operations. Ignoring these issues now,
may have far reaching ramifications during contingency operations now and in
the 21st century.
Core Competencies and the Tanker
Global
Power, Global Reach has been the overarching philosophy of the Air Force for
the last six years. It was defined by
six objectives: sustain deterrence,
provide versatile combat forces, supply rapid global air mobility, control the
high ground, ensure information dominance and build U.S. influence.[1] In October 1996, the senior leadership of
the Air Force refined this guiding doctrine with a new philosophy reflected in
the term Global Engagement. Embedded in
this term are six core competencies envisioned as the basic requirements of the
world’s best Air Force. Though these
core competencies are considered crucial to the future of the USAF, they are
not exclusive capabilities or missions of the U.S. Air Force. The six core competencies are:
a. Air and
Space Superiority -- control over what moves through air and space
b. Global
Attack -- ability to attack rapidly anywhere on the globe at any
time
c. Rapid Global
Mobility -- ability to move rapidly to any spot on the globe
d. Precision
Engagement -- ability to apply selective force against specific
targets and achieve discrete and discriminant effects
e. Information
Superiority -- power to gain, exploit, defend and attack information
f. Agile Combat
Support -- provision of strong combat support and fewer and leaner
logistics force[2]
Transitioning from Global Power, Global Reach
to the new vision of Global Engagement, more closely aligns the USAF’s
direction with the U.S. National Military Strategy. These newly refined core competencies are intended to better
focus the Air Force and guide future decisions.
The
intent of this paper is to provide an analysis of the ability of aerial tankers
to support the U.S. Air Force’s vision of the future and discuss several key
issues that impact this ability. As a
force multiplier, the tanker force does not directly fulfill any one core
competency. The tanker force supports
the core competencies by enhancing and extending the capabilities of other
major weapon systems.
The core competency of air and space superiority
focuses on the ability to control, and ultimately, target anything that moves
through air or space. Although information can be gathered through remote
equipment, the ability to place weapon systems in areas of interest or concern
will be required indefinitely. Physical
presence is still required to claim the area of operation; adversaries have not
yet been willing to surrender based on wargaming analysis. With reduced presence overseas, increased
commitments and instantaneous media focus, the military is expected to be
anywhere on the globe overnight. Few aircraft can deploy around the world
without aerial refueling or numerous time consuming enroute stops. In this rapid response environment, the
short-notice requirements to project power around the globe rests on aerial
tankers. For example, not only are tankers an integral part of deploying air
superiority assets to a theater, they enable assets such as the F-15s to remain
on station for Combat Air Patrol missions.
Consequently, the ability to successfully achieve this core competency
is inextricably linked to tankers. As
we move more and more toward a stand off, space-oriented, information-based
capable force, the demand for air refueling may diminish, but it will not
disappear.
The concept of global attack is also highly
dependent on air refueling assets to provide weapon systems the range to reach
world-wide targets. The ability to
range targets from CONUS-based assets provides the U.S. with a powerful
diplomatic tool when encouraging adversaries to acquiesce. For almost any
scenario, our combat aircraft require tanker assets to accomplish this
task. In addition to extended range,
tankers also provide additional loiter time and flexibility in mission timing. Orbiting tankers just outside enemy air
defense range provides for timing delays and additional fuel to allow senior
commanders and politicians mission delays and response options prior to enemy
engagement.
The extensive military drawdown and return to
CONUS basing has significantly reduced the permanently established U.S. forward
presence in many regions around the world.
“By 1999, eighty percent of U.S. forces will be CONUS based.”[3] This factor weighs heavily on the tanker
force. The reduction in forward bases
and troops increases the need for an extensive rapid global mobility capability. Although the strategic airlift community's
aircraft have extended range, host nation basing rights, airfield limitations
and overflight restrictions all lead to maximum use of tanker aircraft to
extend the air bridge and reduce the enroute factors that complicate the
scenarios. Every enroute stop along the
strategic air bridge increases the chance of delay for various reasons
including maintenance problems, weather factors, aircrew limitations or
diplomatic issues. Therefore, by
extending the air bridge, tankers play a key role in reducing the critical
in-theater timeline. Tankers also
provide limited mobility capability themselves. This can be a double edged sword because lift capacity is traded
pound for pound with fuel. Every
additional pound of cargo reduces the fuel available for receiver aircraft
during inflight refueling.
Although the core competency of precision
engagement may require fewer tanker assets as precision, standoff
weapons capabilities improve in the future, tankers assets are invaluable due
to the flexibility they grant mission planners. Increased reliability and improved accuracy may reduce the number
of required munitions and therefore sorties, but the continued use of tankers
will be required to ensure receiver aircraft have the increased flexibility
necessary during employment. Although
technological improvements have reduced the number of sorties to destroy a
target, the ever growing need for reduced collateral damage drives the
requirement for absolute accuracy. With
the emphasis on speed, accuracy and reduced aircraft signature, extended combat
radius is not the number one priority.
Since receiver aircraft rely on the tanker force for mission
versatility, the tanker fleet is a key enhancement to today’s need for
responsiveness, flexibility, and options for varying degrees of lethality.
The fifth core competency, information
superiority, is the power to gain, exploit, defend and attack
information. This competency is also
dependent on the tanker force. The
drive for complete, timely and accurate information demands tanker assets
contribute to this effort. Though
absolute information is not possible, timely receipt of critical information
regarding enemy positions, capabilities and the like is crucial. Tankers provide valuable inflight refueling
to many manned reconnaissance sorties engaged in collection of this critical
information. In addition, tankers also
support the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) and electronic warfare (EW)
missions invaluable to friendly force protection.
Agile combat support is
heavily dependent on airlift as well as tanker aircraft. Lean logistics, also known as “just in time
logistics”, is a natural result of closing depots and the reduction in on hand
inventories, both cost savings measures.[4]
From a USAF view, this logistics philosophy plays heavily on the airlift
community and the associated tankers necessary to support this
requirement. Light, lean lethal combat
capability is crucial to the future of military operations. However, the
increased aircraft ranges required by CONUS-based operations directly impacts
airlift and tanker capability.
Crucial to all six core competencies, it is
impossible to separate the tanker fleet from the Air Force’s guiding doctrine
of global engagement. It is quite
evident that the tanker fleet is a key ingredient to the successful achievement
of any future military endeavor. Is the
tanker fleet as a whole up to the task?
Several issues may actually effect the tankers fleet ability to meets its
responsibilities. First is the age of
the tanker fleet itself and its need for modernization. Second is the peacetime scheduling system
versus the realities of conflict utilization.
Finally, the reorganization has caused a large dependence on the reserve
force within the tanker community.
The Tanker Fleet
With
an overreaching doctrine that places such emphasis on the requirement for
aerial refueling, the tanker force will be a valuable weapon system for quite
some time. Much like the remainder of
the military force structure though, it is in need of major overhaul and
modernization. Re-engined KC-135s are
providing better fuel efficiency and increased offload capability, but these
airframes are beginning to show signs of corrosion. Avionics upgrades are barely keeping pace with the Federal
Aviation Administration's requirements.
KC-135s are the aging core of the tanker fleet; they represent 90% of
the tanker force. Procured between 1956
and 1965, tankers support deployment, employment, redeployment, special
operations and Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) needs. They are capable of refueling USAF boom
receptacle aircraft or allied and sister service aircraft through an attachable
drogue system, depending on which configuration is selected prior to launch.
The KC-135 tanker fleet is expected to last well into the 21st Century. Some estimates list 2025 and beyond with
phaseout beginning in the 2010 time frame.[5] The KC-135 operations tempo has increased
through increased strategic lift responsibilities in order to reduce the burden
on the C-141 force. The result is a
reduction in the life span of the KC-135 fleet, although the actual impact is
still under debate.
The
other tanker aircraft, the KC-10, was designed and built as a dual-role
aircraft and became operational in the early 1980s. Its missions are split between airlift and air refueling. KC-10s comprise 10% of the tanker fleet and
13% of the strategic airlift capacity.
The KC-10s greatest strength is its versatility; the airlift capability
combined with its ability to refuel both receptacle and probe-equipped aircraft
on the same mission makes it the choice of many deploying squadrons.[6]
Although the majority of the tanker fleet is
older than the aircrews that fly them, they are of value across the spectrum of
military engagement from conflict to peacekeeping and peacemaking
operations. Utilized in a variety of
missions, the challenge is to maximize the tanker fleet’s capabilities. This includes the need to balance the
KC-135’s limited airlift capability with fuel offload requirements. Utilization of KC-135s for airlift missions
takes the strain off the overworked C-141 airlift fleet, but places the KC-135
fleet in the position to be stressed much like the C-141s have been in the
past. The dual-use KC-10, on the other
hand, was designed for both missions: strategic lift and aerial refueling. In addition, the KC-10’s boom and drogue offload
systems do not require modification like the KC-135s; therefore, either
refueling method is available on any and all missions. However, the majority of
the tanker fleet is composed of KC-135 airframes designed for boom refueling on
a day to day basis. There are limited
drogue-capable airframes at any given time.
Tanker Utilization
For
day to day operations, tankers are used for aerial refueling as well as
airlift, but during hostilities, the airframes are typically chopped to the
CINC. This is unlike the strategic
airlift assets that continue to transit the globe on resupply missions. In peacetime, the tanker fleet is used more
in a strategic role, but during periods of conflict, its value as a force
multiplier overrides this and the aircraft are utilized almost exclusively
within the theater of operations. Once
there, tankers provide aerial refuelings that allow receiver aircraft extended
presence over a given area or additional on-station time for target
confirmation prior to engagement.
In peacetime, day to day managing of the
tanker fleet is done through Air Mobility Command (AMC). This allows maximum
airframe utilization. The Tactical Airlift Control Center (TACC) is a
twenty-four hour operation that schedules airlift and air refueling
requirements around the world. This
centralized control allows for a world-wide view of assets and the optimization
of airframes and aircrews. When the Air Force reorganized in 1992, the
integration of tankers into the airlift system changed the focus of the tanker
mission from almost exclusive aerial refueling to include a greater emphasis on
its cargo carrying capability. The
tanker has always been capable of transporting equipment, but in the past
airlift was a secondary mission. These
aircraft were not designed for efficient onload and offload of troops and/or
equipment. With relatively “low
mileage” for their age, KC-135 tankers have been an invaluable short-term
solution to the strategic airlift equation.
Their inefficiency in cargo movement has been overlooked to take
advantage of the extremely low flight-hour time on the airframes.
Tankers have filled the gap between the
flight restricted C-141s with their wing cracks and the C-17’s arrival. However, filling the gap may shorten the
tanker’s expected life as previously discussed. Utilization of tankers in this manner may also induce a false
sense of security in the strategic lift system because more aircraft are
available during peacetime to perform lift operations than during
hostilities. About the same instant the
requirement for strategic lift increases, the tankers are needed in theater and
chopped to the supported CINC. This
puts a heavy burden on Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to meet increasing
strategic lift requirements with fewer airframes than are utilized during day
to day operations.
The Guard/Reserve Component
As
there has been a shift in balance between aerial refueling and airlift missions
for the tanker, there has also been a shift in balance between active and
reserve structure in the tanker world.
With the force structure drawdown of the early 1990s, a large percentage
of Guard and Reserve units converted to the KC-135 tanker mission. Over fifty percent of the tanker fleet is
now in the Guard and Reserve force. On
a day to day, peacetime basis, this alignment of forces works well. The centralized scheduling of the TACC
manages the flow of sorties regardless of crew composition. When the standard routes and missions, known
as channel missions, are flown, the unit type (Active, Guard or Reserve) is
transparent to the scheduling process.
Complications arise when the trips are extended and rerouted. As professionals, most Guard and Reserve
crews are committed to accomplishing the mission, but their primary job is
outside the military and can not be ignored.
Stateside missions and routine channel missions better fit the Guard and
Reserve forces’ need for structure and consistency while allowing for maximum
airframe utilization. The realignment of
forces becomes more apparent when short-notice taskings arise. The initial limitation for Guard and Reserve
units is available aircrews. Once a
stable requirement is identified in a timely manner, the scheduling system can
again work the missions, indifferent to the unit type.
The
other area where Guard and Reserve forces impact the tankers ability to support
the core competencies is in contingency operations. Like short notice, unplanned sorties, these missions are
unpredictable and can be difficult for reservists to fill. If the bulk of requirement is for deployment
and redeployment sorties, Guard and Reserve crews are likely to provide a fair
portion of the required asset capability.
On the other hand, if the requirement is extended in-theater operations,
Guard and Reserve crews are not able to remain in theater without national call
up authority. Furthermore, the system’s
capability is stretched due to crew shortages and limitations before call up
authority is implemented. Each new
contingency or potential hostility will test, validate and highlight the
capabilities and limitations of this alignment of force on the tanker fleet’s
ability to fulfill the core competency needs.
This puts emphasis on the timely decisions by the National Command
Authority in order to maximize our leaner force’s potential.
Conclusion
In
conclusion, despite limitations or shortages, the tankers are a valuable force
multiplier. They are a crucial
requirement in the majority of contingency scenarios around the world. Though not state of the art in aviation,
they are integral to the accomplishment of the Air Force’s six core
competencies. With reduced basing and a
U.S. interest to maintain and or project presence around the globe, the tanker
fleet contributes significantly to this capability. It is an older force that will continue to provide a valuable
capability, but the fleet will need modifications and upgrades to maintain this
capability.
Today’s military emphasis is different from
that of the Cold War, SIOP mission and the tanker fleet has greater world-wide
impact at a time when power projection has become more critical. Assigned to AMC, the tankers were absorbed
into a highly centralized scheduling process aimed at maximizing its peacetime
use and relieving stress on an already stressed airlift system. This will indeed shorten the airframe life
of the KC-135 fleet. Also, over fifty
percent of the tanker fleet is assigned to Guard and Reserve units; this has
impact on short term flexibility.
Aerial refueling along with airlift are better missions to assign the
total force than front line combat missions.
Although the bulk of the Air Force’s refueling capability was retained
by transferring it into the Guard and Reserve, the age of fleet, and the
shortage of airframes and the associated refueling system limitations, combined
with the reduced flexibility of Guard and Reserve forces, impacts contingency
operations. This critical capability that tankers provide will be required for
the next conflict. Understanding the
key role tankers play in fulfilling the USAF concept of global engagement and
the issues affecting the tanker fleet is invaluable to assuring future crises
are supportable and sustainable.
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