Military

Cobra or Comanche?  Supporting Operational Maneuver From The Sea

CSC 1997

Subject Area - Operations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title:   Cobra or Comanche?  Supporting Operational Maneuver From The Sea

Author:       Major K. W. Danel, United States Marine Corps  

Thesis:       Though the Marine Corps is modernizing its fleet of AH-1W attack helicopters, serious consideration should be given to acquiring the RAH-66 Comanche to better support Operational Maneuver From The Sea.

Background:       Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) employs ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM) and information superiority to greatly expand the area of influence of a modest, forward afloat Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  STOM involves the distant movement of forces directly into the objective from amphibious ships positioned well over the horizon.  Within the OMFTS framework, the quest for information superiority and the use of numerous Hunter Warrior teams throughout a greatly expanded and non-contiguous battlespace will greatly increase reliance on the Marine attack helicopters for armed reconnaissance and security.  The Marine Corps attack helicopter of the future is currently planned to be a modernized variant of the AH-1W SuperCobra, referred to as the 4BW. 

       Ironically, though the requirement for the 4BW to conduct armed reconnaissance and security will increase, it is the armed reconnaissance and security mission for which the 4BW will be least suited.  Even though the RAH-66 Comanche is significantly more expensive, for reasons of survivability, responsiveness, and overall effectiveness, the Marine Corps should consider replacing the AH-1W with the RAH-66 Comanche, vice the 4BW.

Recommendation: That the Marine Corps make the investment now to acquire the RAH-66

Comanche to replace the AH-1W.

COBRA OR COMANCHE:

SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA

      In October of 1995, the Commandant of the Marine Corps established the Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory (CWL) and a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF).  The Commandant directed these organizations to evaluate advanced operational concepts and supporting technologies through a program of advanced war fighting experiments, called Sea Dragon.  One of the Commandant's goals for Sea Dragon was to, "jump start the acquisition process," to ensure that the Corps' war fighting systems keep pace with the advancement of operational concepts.^[1]  One such warfighting system in need of a jump start is the Marine Corps attack helicopter, the AH-1W SuperCobra.  Though the Marine Corps is modernizing its AH-lW fleet, the planned upgrades and modernization will not optimize the Cobra to support anticipated future operational concepts.  Therefore, serious consideration should be given to the acquisition of the advanced, heavily armed scout helicopter, the RAH-66 Comanche.

       Hunter Warrior was the first in the series of Sea Dragon Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE).  The Hunter Warrior concept of employment related directly to the Marine Corps operational concept, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS).  OMFTS, "Is a marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare.  It couples doctrine with technological advances in speed, mobility, fire support, communications, and navigation to identify and exploit enemy weaknesses across the entire spectrum of conflict."^[2]  The major principles of OMFTS include:  a focus on the operational objective vice establishing a force beachhead; use of the sea as maneuver space; generation of overwhelming tempo and momentum; employment of friendly strength against enemy weakness; emphasis on intelligence, deception operations, and flexibility; and integration of all organic, joint, and combined assets into the fight. ^[3]

      Some of the operational concepts that will enable OMFTS include ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), sea based logistics, and dispersion of forces ashore.  The intent is to mass the effects of the force, particularly the effects of supporting fires, without massing the force itself.  STOM is intended to leverage the mobility of the MV-22, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), and the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC) from well over the horizon; perhaps as far as 150 NM from the objective.  Sea based logistics is intended to reduce the logistics footprint ashore as much as possible to increase operational flexibility and facilitate force dispersion in the battlespace.  Battlespace dispersion of forces ashore is primarily intended to enhance force protection, but also facilitates the expansion of the area influenced by a modest forward afloat force; like a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).

      The key to the success of OMFTS is information superiority, or, "The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."^[4]  Information superiority will enable the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to effectively and efficiently execute the OMFTS concept.  Information superiority is not intended to be a panacea for removing the inevitable fog and friction of battle.  Nor will information superiority supplant the war fighter's artful intuition in decision making.  Perfect knowledge and checklist warfare are not the goals of information superiority.  However, a faster, more accurate battlespace picture gained through a system that provides information superiority will facilitate faster, better decision making.

      Information is the currency of future warfare and its collection is critical to the success of OMFTS.  In order for Marine forces to successfully employ OMFTS, they must be able to collect information on the enemy; almost with impunity.  Therefore, as the Marine Corps emphasizes the acquisition of technology to support future operational concepts, it must focus on reconnaissance systems. The importance of reconnaissance to OMFTS was evident during the recent Hunter Warrior AWE conducted in California at Marine Corps Bases Camp Pendleton and Twenty Nine Palms.  The command element (CE), air combat element (ACE), and combat service support element (CSSE) all operated from Camp Pendleton, while the combat service support detachment (CSSD) operated from Twenty Nine Palms.  By separating the CE, ACE, and CSSE by great distances (150 NM in this case) from the CSSD and GCE, the Hunter Warrior AWE aligned with the operational concepts of OMFTS.

      The Hunter Warrior SPMAGTF was representative of a reinforced Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  The GCE was organized into a number of Hunter Warrior teams consisting of six Marines each and an operational maneuver element (OME).  The OME consisted of a mechanized weapons company, a tank company, a light armored reconnaissance (LAR) company, and an artillery battery.  The mission of the Hunter Warrior SPMAGTF was to protect the flank of a larger Joint Task Force (JTF).

      The concepts of Hunter Warrior and OMFTS have several implications for the future employment of a forward afloat MAGTF.  Amphibious shipping will be positioned well over the horizon, perhaps 25-50 NM from the shore and maybe as much as 150 NM or more from the objective area.  Several independent teams or elements from the ground combat element (GCE) will be inserted clandestinely into a greatly dispersed battlespace.  The depth and breadth of the battlespace for which the MAGTF is responsible will increase exponentially, creating a greatly dispersed and non-contiguous lay down of MAGTF forces in the battlespace.  The mission of the Hunter Warrior teams will be to observe and report the presence and activities of enemy forces and coordinate their destruction through supporting fires.

      The direction in which the Marine Corps is moving with OMFTS generates serious questions about the future effectiveness of the AH-lW SuperCobra to support the MAGTF.  Though the mission and tasks of the SuperCobra will remain predominantly the same, the relative importance among the tasks will change.  Currently, the mission of the AH-lW is,  "To provide combat attack helicopter fire support and fire support coordination during amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore."^[5]  Specific tasks of the AH-lW include close air/antiarmor fire support, supporting arms coordination, escort of transport helicopter flights and ground convoys, and armed reconnaissance.

      The predominant tasks conducted by the AH-lW today are close air/antiarmor fire support (CAS), airborne supporting arms coordination (SAC(A)), and escort of transport helicopters.  The CAS and SAC(A) tasks will certainly remain important to the MAGTF commander, while escort of transport aircraft (i.e. the MV-22) will wane.  However, the most significant future potential mission change for the AH-lW is an increased emphasis on armed reconnaissance and security.        The quest for information superiority will increase the MAGTF commander's reliance on the AH-1W for armed reconnaissance and security.  Additionally, a greatly expanded, non-contiguous battlespace will also increase demands on the AH-lW for armed reconnaissance and security.  Non-contiguous ground operations implies that ground forces will not control the terrain that is between them.  Rather, they will influence terrain through smaller, well dispersed forces employing coordinated, massed fire support.  Another problem with greatly dispersed forces operating non-contiguously is that they will not be capable of direct, mutual support of each other.  This is another reason that the importance and relevance reconnaissance and security increases for the AH-1W.

      Ironically, even as the importance and relevance of armed reconnaissance and security increases for the AH-lW, it is armed reconnaissance and security for which the AH-lW is least suited.  Even in the future, when the AH-1W is modernized into the 4BW variant, it will not be optimized to provide responsive, survivable, and effective armed reconnaissance and security support to MAGTF commanders conducting OMFTS operations.^[6]

      Of course the 4BW is not the only system capable of reconnaissance and security within the MAGTF.  In most scenarios, light armored reconnaissance (LAR) is the MAGTF commander's primary reconnaissance and security force.  However, LAR will have its own problems supporting OMFTS.  For starters, consider that LAR units will incur a ship-to-shore mobility disparity relative to units transported by the MV-22.  An LAR company consists of approximately twenty five vehicles.  East coast Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) typically deploy with a platoon of approximately six Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), while the West coast MEUs typically deploy with a company (minus) of approximately 14 vehicles. These LAVs are capable of being externally transported by CH-53E, but are typically moved ashore by LCAC. The primary reason for this is that the few CH-53E aircraft deployed with the MEU (four) are heavily engaged lifting artillery, fuel, ordnance, and other supplies.

      The problem with transporting LAR units via LCAC is that it ties this essential reconnaissance and security asset to ship-to-shore mobility, vice ship-to-objective mobility.  Therefore, the MAGTF commander's primary ground reconnaissance and security force is relegated to crossing the beach in the same manner used by Marines since the 1930s, albeit at about 30 knots.

      Even if greater numbers of CH-53E aircraft could be deployed with the MEU and used to lift LAR from ship-to-objective, the greatly expanded MAGTF area of influence would still require significant supplementary support by the 4BW.  The LAR ship-to-shore mobility problem is mitigated somewhat by the tremendous mobility of the LAV once its wheels hit the ground.  Nevertheless, future MAGTF commanders will have little choice but to rely more heavily on the 4BW to conduct reconnaissance and security.

      Other reconnaissance assets organic to the MEU include Marine reconnaissance teams, to include radio reconnaissance, the Hunter Warrior teams, and AV-8B Harriers.   Reconnaissance teams and Hunter Warrior teams are important for the reconnaissance, surveillance, and supporting arms coordination they provide to the MAGTF commander.  However, as these teams will be foot mobile for the most part, their inability to traverse the vast distances associated with future OMFTS battlespace will again force the MAGTF commander to use the 4BW for armed reconnaissance and security.

      The AV-8B enjoys a mobility advantage over other MAGTF reconnaissance assets, in that it is capable of traversing the entire MEU area of influence in minutes.  However, high airspeed becomes a disadvantage when conducting armed reconnaissance in certain types of terrain.  While the AV-8B might prove satisfactory for armed reconnaissance in a wide open, desert scenario, it would likely prove unsatisfactory in a jungle environment.

      For all of these reasons, the armed reconnaissance and security task will take on greater priority for the 4BW in the future.  However, conducting this task involves significant risk to the 4BW and, in turn, the MAGTF commander.  The effectiveness and survivability of a helicopter in the armed reconnaissance and security role depends greatly upon the helicopter's ability to remain undetected by the enemy.  Night operations and sound tactics provide only limited protection against the myriad systems to which a helicopter is vulnerable.  To succeed at the armed reconnaissance and security within the OMFTS construct, a helicopter must be survivable, mobile, and possess a sophisticated suite of missions systems.  Plans for modernizing the survivability, mobility, and mission systems of the 4BW will enhance its mission effectiveness and survivability, but the modernization will not keep pace with the anticipated requirements being born of OMFTS and Sea Dragon.

      In terms of survivability, the 4BW will be at a disadvantage because its relatively large radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures.  Therefore, the 4BW will be somewhat easy to detect.   In a non-contiguous battlespace, there will be a great deal of terrain that is not under the control of the MAGTF.  Similarities might be drawn to Viet Nam where the enemy could be positioned anywhere in a 360° circle around a friendly position.  In OMFTS operations, there might not be a clearly delineated forward line of troops.  Barring perfect knowledge of the intelligence situation, which is unlikely even in the future age of information superiority, the helicopter force will have greater difficulty picking routes and attack positions that are not threatened by enemy observation and fires.

      Of course, these challenges can be mitigated somewhat through the employment of sound tactics, but the survivability systems and engineering built into the helicopter is critical, as well.  The survivability enhancements planned for the 4BW include engine infrared suppressers to reduce the threat of observation by night imaging systems and infrared (IR) seeking missiles.  Other passive 4BW survivability systems include radar, laser, and missile launch warning systems.  Active survivability systems include an IR jammer and an automatic chaff and flare dispensing system.^[7]  The problem is that the 4BW is intended to meet the USMC attack helicopter requirements through the year 2020.^[8]  Currently, each of the survivability systems discussed above are fielded or have been tested and are in some stage of being fielded.  They are each designed against current threat systems.  Will these systems retain their relevancy and effectiveness into the year 2020?  They would if the operational and tactical concepts in the year 2020 were similar to those of today.  However, OMFTS operations are significantly different and will place the 4BW well within range of enemy weapon systems with much greater regularity.  Unfortunately, there is very little that can be done to improve the stealthiness of the 4BW, or reduce its detectability.     In contrast, the survivability features incorporated in the RAH-66 Comanche include extremely low radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures and radar, laser, and chemical munitions detection systems.  Plus, the Comanche cockpit and the avionics bay are over-pressurized for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense.  The Comanche is not currently scheduled to possess active countermeasures equipment, like chaff and flare dispensers, since no currently known or anticipated system is considered enough of a threat to merit the investment.^[9]  The survivability enhancements resident in Comanche give it increased freedom of movement in the midst of enemy air defenses, which greatly enhances mission effectiveness and flexibility.  

      In terms of mobility, the 4BW, like LAR, will suffer a decrement in ship-to-objective mobility, relative to the MV-22.  The performance improvements anticipated for the 4BW fall well short of those gained by transitioning from the CH-46 to the MV-22.  The 4BW cruise airspeed, at mid gross weight, will increase by 17 knots; from 129 knots to 146 knots.  However, the MV-22 will cruise at about 250-280 knots.  The disparity of airspeed and range between the MV-22 and the 4BW precludes attached escort of the MV-22 by the 4BW.

      The speed and range of the MV-22 enable the MAGTF to move forces from ship-to-objective over great distances; as much as 150 NM, or more.  The problem for the 4BW at these distances is that it will take over an hour for the 4BW to get to the objective.  The 4BW will fly faster and remain on-station longer than the AH-lW without refueling, but at the distances anticipated for OMFTS, response time of the 4BW is greatly degraded.  Vigilance and training notwithstanding, responsiveness to a call for CAS is a function of aircraft speed and distance from the target.  If the 4BW is kept feet wet, on deck alert, 50 miles from the beach and 150 miles from the objective, responsiveness will obviously suffer.

      The relative mobility disadvantage incurred in OMFTS operations by the 4BW could be offset somewhat through mission planning.  The tradeoff is to establish forward area arming and refueling points (FAARP) ashore.  However, establishing FAARPs goes against the grain of the OMFTS concept.  Many of the benefits of OMFTS, such as surprise, flexibility, and force protection through dispersion and standoff, will be degraded by the establishment of FAARPs ashore.  The forward positioning of the 4BW will greatly increase its potential exposure to enemy weapons systems and observation.  Exposure to enemy observation and fire presents serious survivability challenges as helicopters are conspicuously vulnerable to everything from small arms to precision guided munitions.  Yet the performance characteristics of the 4BW will make this tradeoff necessary for ensuring timely 4BW support.  Yes, the 4BW will support ship-to-objective maneuver from 150 NM away, but it will not do so without significant mission tradeoffs and increased risk. 

      The alternative to the 4BW and the associated tradeoffs necessary to ensure it can support the OMFTS concept, is again, the RAH-66 Comanche.  In terms of performance, the Comanche is being designed to self deploy for distances up to 1260 NM without refueling. The Comanche's cruise airspeed will top 210 knots and its endurance, while carrying a mission payload, is on the order of 3 1/2 hours.  The Comanche will be able to launch from the ship, 150 NM from the objective, could arrive on-station in about 30 minutes, and could stay on-station for about 2 hours.  The Comanche will also be able to do all of this in nearly any weather.^[10]  At a speed of 210 knots the Comanche still will not keep up with the MV-22, but the combination of higher airspeed and longer on-station time gains back much of what the 4BW gives up in terms of mobility and flexibility.

      In terms of mission systems, the 4BW will be satisfactory, but not ideal.  For starters, the sensors and ordnance systems planned for the 4BW are the same ones that are flying on the AH-1W today.  In terms of communications, the upgrades planned for the 4BW include two voice and data capable ARC-210 radios.  The ARC-210 will have the capability of communicating in the UHF or VHF/FM bands employing HAVEQUICK II or SINCGARS frequency hopping capability.  The 4BW will also be equipped with a SATCOM radio, an Automatic Target Handover System (ATHS), and a Data Modem.^[11]  Unfortunately, there are no plans to incorporate a video link capability in the 4BW.  A video link would enable the 4BW crew to communicate with UAVs, other aircraft, and ground stations to transmit or receive FLIR and camera imagery of targets, routes, or anything else of tactical interest; all in near real time. 

      In sharp contrast to the evolutionary nature of the missions systems modernization planned for the 4BW, is the revolutionary technology planned for the RAH-66 Comanche.  According to General Gordon R. Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the Army, "Comanche will be the eyes and ears of the commander on the lethal future battlefield."^[12]  Comanche is a heavily armed scout helicopter designed to fulfill the armed reconnaissance and security mission for the U.S. Army.  However, the sophisticated sensors, weapons, and communications equipment planned for the Comanche give it tremendous potential as an all-round attack helicopter for the Marine Corps--one that will be tremendously well suited to support OMFTS operations.

      Comanche sensors include the Longbow millimeter wave fire control radar, an electro-optical target acquisition system, a second generation FLIR integrated with image intensification sensors for night vision pilotage, and a helmet mounted heads-up-display (HUD).  Target and mission data processing will be accomplished via two very high speed integrated circuit computers capable of processing data at pentium speeds.^[13]  Comanche weapons will include six internal weapons pylons and eight external fuel/armament management stations capable of carrying external fuel cells or weapons; for a total of fourteen universal wing stations.  The wing stations will be capable of carrying the laser and radio frequency (RF) guided Hellfire precision guided missile; the family of Hydra 70, 2.75" folding fin aerial rockets; and the Stinger air to air missile.  The Comanche will also be equipped with a 20 mm machine gun.^[14]        Comanche communications equipment is geared toward efficiency and inter-operability.  The Comanche will be equipped with two VHF/FM frequency hopping radios, one VHF/AM, one UHF/AM, and one HF radio.  The Comanche will also have an improved data modem with four protocols including Variable Message Format, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), and the Marine Tactical System (MTS).^[15]

      It is obvious that the Comanche will incorporate the technology that will enable it to acquire, target, and destroy enemy targets in nearly any weather with unparalleled precision and efficiency.  Unfortunately, the cyber technology resident in Comanche comes with a cyber technology price tag.  The average fly away cost for the Comanche is estimated to be 14.2 million dollars per airframe.^[16]  In contrast, the average fly away cost for the 4BW is estimated to be 1.892 million dollars per airframe.^[17]  When the fiscal realities of the Marine Corps are superimposed on the operational advantages of the Comanche, the argument nearly becomes moot.

      Nevertheless, the Comanche arguably fulfills the future needs of the Marine Corps better than the 4BW.  The Comanche's ability to survive while effectively supporting OMFTS in the digital and joint battlespace of the future, far exceeds the capability of the 4BW.  It must also be recognized that the price of doing business within the construct of OMFTS is going to be expensive.  The level of technologic advancement required to support the operational concepts of the next century require significant investment.  This is particularly true with respect to aviation systems as,  "Aerospace has outrun much of its engineering knowledge base and faces dramatically increasing costs for the next generation of innovative products."^[18]

      The conceptual and technological advancements the Marine Corps is pursuing will go a long way toward giving the Marine Corps the advantage in the battlespace of the future.  However, the concepts and the technology must remain in balance to ensure that the MAGTF commander is supported.  The RAH-66 Comanche is a significant force multiplier, as it is optimized to support the Marine Air Ground Task Force and Operational Maneuver From the Sea.  As such, the Comanche is well worth the investment.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory (CWL).  Hunter Warrior AWE, Detailed Experiment Plan.  MCB Quantico, VA:  Marine Corps Combat Developmant Command, 6 January 1997.

Drucker, Daniel C. "Opportunities and Resources." VERTIFLITE, Vol-42, September/October 1996, 12.

Everett, Kelly.  Financial Manager at PMA-276, Naval Air Systems Command.  Interview by author, 18 March 1997.

Headquarters Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System, Vol XI, Combat Support Elements, MCO 3501.4A.  Washington D.C.:  19 June 1991.

Johnson, Maj E.S.  "RAH-66 Comanche-Eyes and Ears for the 21st Century." Field Artillery, May-June 1996, 22.

Lange, Carol.  Operations Research Analyst at Design to Cost and Procurement Cost Estimating Branch, Comanche Program Management Office, U.S. Army Aviation Program Executive Office.  Interview by author, 17 March 1997.

Marine Corps Association (MCA).  Operational Maneuver From the Sea, A Concept for  the Projection of Naval Power Ashore.  MCB Quantico, VA:  June 1996.

Sexton, Col (USMC, Ret).  "USMC H-1 Upgrade Program Brief, 4BN/4BW." Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., Briefing, Presented at USMC Command and Staff College H-1 Professional Military Education.  MCB Quantico, VA, November 1996.