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Force Protection A Comparison

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Strategic Issues

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Proposal: Compare the Beirut Bombing of the Marine Barracks of 1983 with the Bombing Khobar Towers in Dharhan, Saudi Arabia in 1996. The purpose of the comparison is determined lessons learned about force protection between the two bombing incidents. The comparison examined the environment, mission, chain of command, and intelligence support.

 

Main Findings:

 

a. Environment. The U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) was sent in to a combat zone in Beirut, although it was assumed to be benevolent to U.S. forces. Similarly Dhahran was assumed to be a non hostile environment for the 4404 Wing. In both situations there were signs of an ever increasing non-conventional threat to U.S. forces. Each truck bombing was preceded by events that presented evidence of increased hostilities. The environment turned hostile but no one recognized the change.

 

b. Mission. The goal of what the two units were designed to accomplish was similar. Both were required to participate in peacekeeping type missions. However, the USMNF was deployed to a war zone during a period of temporary cessation of hostilities. Their mission statement did not accurately reflect the purpose of their presence. In contrast, the 4404 Wing received a clearly defined mission. The mission comparison shows no parallel.

 

c. Chain of Command. In both instances the chain of command did not support deployed forces. Confusion generated by multiple and ambiguous lines of vertical command diluted responsibility for support and force protection. Since those in the chain of command did not feel responsible, they did not seek clarification of mission, rules of engagement, or improved intelligence support.

 

d. Intelligence. Timely, accurate and focused intelligence information was lacking in both situations. The 4404 Wing was not granted access to pertinent intelligence information due to classification restrictions. Nor were its organic staff sections adequately staffed to perform the essential duties required. The USMNF suffered from a large volume of unfocused information. Neither unit had the benefit of Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

Conclusion:

 

a. The poorly defined chain of command was evident in both situations. This is surprising considering the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This was supposed to have aided combatant CINCs by providing the authority and responsibility to organize, support, and command organizations under their command. The chain of command had the responsibility to change the mission, rules of engagement, and improve intelligence support. But the chain of command problems experienced in Beirut were repeated at Dhahran.

 

b. The requirement to provide good intelligence support was overlooked in both Beirut and Dhahran. Good intelligence support should have included: the availability of good HUMINT; focused information for the region of deployment; and access to information utilized only at the highest levels of command. Commanders must receive timely intelligence, focused on the units immediate and non-conventional threat, and trained staff personnel to receive and process information. Intelligence information was uncoordinated and was overlooked as the key to knowing the most imminent threat.


 

FORCE PROTECTION: A COMPARISON

 

 

On the 23rd of October 1983 a Mercedes truck filled with

 

explosive penetrated the defensive perimeter of a U.S. Marine

 

Peacekeeping Unit. The vehicle came to a halt in the lobby of a

 

building housing military personnel. Within seconds of stopping

 

the driver detonated a bomb which killed 241 military personnel.

 

It was an act of terrorism and of war which shocked the United

 

States and delivered a great insult upon a proud institution:

 

The U. S. Marine Corps. Specific events, perceptions of senior

 

leadership, and misguided goodwill led to the disaster.

 

Certainly such a tragedy would teach a powerful nation a lesson

 

regarding the projection of military force and its limitations.

 

Why would any country allow such a disaster to reoccur?

 

On the 25 of June 1996 a truck filled with explosives backed

 

into the fence line outside the housing area of a U. S. Air Force

 

Unit in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The occupants of the truck

 

quickly fled the area and shortly there after the truck exploded.

The blast destroyed building #131 housing U.S. military

 

personnel. The building, one of the Khobar Towers, was severely

 

damaged killing 19 and wounding 500. Almost 12 years after

 

Beirut an act of terrorism struck a second time. Did the

 

United States not learn a lesson the first time?

 

There were smaller incidents before each attack that should

 

have awakened the U.S. to foresee these disastrous events and

 

prevent them. It is important to compare the Beirut bombing of

 

1983 and the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi

 

Arabia. An examination of the mission, the chain of command,

 

tactical environment, and intelligence support, will provide some

 

insight on why impending disaster was imminent.

 

BEIRUT: ENVIRONMENT AND MISSION

 

 

Lebanon is a country beset with problems at all social,

 

political, and religious levels. It is a country affected by

 

almost all unresolved disputes regarding the inhabitants of the

 

Middle East. The country has been turned into a battleground by

 

armed factions which manipulate and in turn are manipulated by

 

forces of foreign countries surrounding them. Syrians, Iranians,

 

Israelis, and Palestinians all may choose to fight each other in

 

Lebanon. This is a place where terrorist have a place to live,

 

train, and plan their next attack.[1]

 

The majority of citizens can not be united with a sense of

 

national identity. Sunni Muslims, Marinite Christians, Greek

 

Orthodox Christians, Druze, and Shiite Muslim will all provide a

 

different definition of what it means to be Lebanese. Government

 

leadership is split among the factions. If one factions ascends

 

to a powerful position, the other factions unite to limit the

 

potential influence. Whatever occurs at the national level, does

 

not in any way control the political activities at the local

 

 

 

 

2

 

level. Local leaders obtain their power from clan relationships

 

as well as religious organizations. The central government is

 

never allowed to make inroads in these local organization. If

 

local powers disagree on issues and fight each other, the

 

government simply comes to a halt.[2]

In June of 1982, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) invaded

 

southern Lebanon, primarily to rid the area of the Palestine

 

Liberation Organization (PLO). By July of 1982 the IDF had

 

surrounded Beirut with a military blockade and PLO and Syrian

 

forces were evacuated. Following the assassination of President

 

Elect Gemeyal in September 1982, a Multinational Peacekeeping

 

force consisting of U.S. Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), Italian,

 

and French forces were inserted into Beirut.[3]

The mission of the U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) was

 

passed down to CINCEUR by the JCS on 22 Sept 82. Three days

 

later the JCS amended the mission statement to read:

 

...land U.S. Marine Landing Force in Port of Beirut and/or vicinity of Beirut Airport(BIA). U.S. Forces will move to occupy positions along ans assigned section of a line extending from south of Beirut Airport to vicinity of the Presidential Palace Provide security posts at intersections of assigned section of line and major avenues of approach into the city of Beirut from south/southeast to deny passage of hostile armed elements in order to provide an environment which will permit Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to carry out their responsibilities in the city of Beirut. Commander U.S. Forces will establish and maintain continuous coordination with other MNF units, EUCOM, liaison team and LAW. Commander U.S. Forces will provide air/naval gunfire support as required. [4]

 

This mission statement was passed down to the MAU commander

 

 

3

with no changes. The mission statement was ambiguous as to the

 

real task and purpose to be accomplished. The chain of command

 

could have provided additional guidance as to its exact meaning.

 

Therefore, each member of the chain of command had a different

 

interpretation of purpose of the Marines presence in Beirut.

 

Although the word "peacekeeping" was not put in the order, it was

 

emphasized by U.S. political leaders. It was estimated the

 

Marine force was entering a benign environment. The government

 

of Lebanon and the LAF were to guarantee the safety of the

 

USMNF.[5]

The environment in which the USMNF was inserted was unstable

 

but hostility was low. But over the next 13 months the Lebanese

 

government and LAFs ability to control hostilities broke down.

 

Hostile actions indicate a change to a hostile environment:

 

March 1983 USMNF patrol suffered a grenade attack, wounding 5

 

Marines; April, destruction of the U.S. Embassy by a truck bomb

 

that, killed 17 Americans and destroyed the building; August,

 

Marines received mortar fire at the Airport, patrols were

 

attacked by RPG and sniper fire; September, BIA was shelled with

 

artillery fire killing 2 and wounding 2 Marines; and 19 October

 

1983 four Marines were wounded by a car bomb parked near a convoy

 

route. Although the environment of USMNF had become very hostile

 

(war status) the mission and its supporting guidance had not

 

changed. The peacekeeping view of U.S. political leaders was

 

 

4

unchanged. Military leaders at all levels did not change nor

 

request to change the mission. The change would have been

 

necessary to reflect the escalation of hostilities equivalent

 

to that of a war zone. This would have allowed the MAU commander

 

to take more aggressive measures to protect USMNF forces. The

 

tactical environment was not in synch with the peaceful nature of

 

mission.[6]

 

 

BEIRUT: CHAIN OF COMMAND

 

 

The chain of command for the USMNF (see TAB A) did little to

 

assist the Battalion Landing Team (BLT). The various levels of

 

the chain of command were aware and concerned about the

 

increasingly hostile environment. But little was done to provide

 

critical guidance regarding a change in the defensive measures

 

required for protection of the Marines in Beirut. The critical

 

assistance required should have been taken in at least three

 

different steps. First, change the mission to allow more

 

aggressive actions in regarding defense of the BLT and BIA

 

locations. Second, update or change the Rules of Engagement

 

(ROE) to reflect the need for decisive action if attacked.

 

Third, insist on a withdrawal of Marines as their safety could

 

not be guaranteed. Step two would be necessary to provide for

 

the safety of the USMNF pending their withdrawal. [7]

 

 

 

 

5

The ROE for the USMNF was established in September 1982.

 

Initially it was considered to be adequate for the "nonhostile"

peacekeeping mission. It was also considered appropriate for the

 

assumed benign environment. The previously issued ROE was

 

revised May 1983 after the bombing of the American Embassy. But

 

the revised ROE guidelines were created only for those guarding

 

the new temporary embassy.

 

The two separate sets of guidelines were known as blue card

 

(For Embassy security) and white card (for BIA USMNF use) (see

 

TAB B). The blue card guidelines were less definitive and more

 

restrictive. When confronted with a potentially dangerous

 

situation, how could a sentry determine friendly versus hostile,

 

civilian protection versus civilian appearance with hostile

 

intention? Judgement of a situation is difficult when a sentry

 

must determine whether or not to contact a commissioned officer

 

to evaluate a rapidly developing situation. Use of force should

 

be defined by a clear set of guidelines for quick application in

 

any situation. The white card was what those securing the

 

perimeter were required to use as a guideline. Confusion is

 

created when a sentry must decide to fire and risk a court

 

martial (and a potential international incident) or not fire and

 

risk death.

 

The ROE for the USMNF presented another point of confusion

 

for the for effective conduct of their mission. The ROE must be

 

 

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clear so as to establish and communicate to troops the boundaries

 

upon which force may be applied. [8]

BEIRUT: INTELLIGENCE

 

 

Intelligence was available to the MAU commander. But it

 

was in a large unsorted volume. Intelligence required for weapon

 

firing, such as naval gunfire was adequate. But information

 

regarding the terrorist threat was nonspecific and lacked detail.

Apparently no staff section in the chain of command was

 

designated to receive, sort, and provide timely information

 

tailored to the intelligence needs of the MAU commander. A

 

designated and dedicated staff section could have functioned as

 

an all source fusion center. The center could request, receive,

 

and process information from all intelligence sources. The need

 

for human intelligence (HUMINT) was critical to the success of

 

the survival of the USMNF. HUMINT would have been able to

 

provide more specific information regarding terrorist locations

 

and activities. [9]

BEIRUT: CONCLUSION

 

 

At the time of the attack the truck carrying the bomb

 

penetrated the defensive perimeter between two guard posts. The

 

guards did not have the magazines in their weapons. The truck

 

flattened a third guard post on its way to the BLT headquarters

 

 

7

and subsequent detonation. The MAU commander had what appeared

 

to be lax security measures. On the surface it would be easy to

 

condemn the unit commander for the entire disaster. But an

 

examination of all that influenced the MAU commander provides

 

evidence for a different conclusion.

Painting a clear picture of the USMNF situation is to expose

 

a mission programmed for failure. First, a military unit was

 

deployed into a hostile and unstable environment. The area of

 

insertion was estimated to be benign. But Lebanon was a nation

 

at war with itself, a place of continuous conflict. To describe

 

Beirut as a benign environment is to be unaware of its history.

 

Second, the mission of the USMNF was not completely clear.

 

The peacekeeping mission was given verbally by political leaders

 

and assumed by all levels of the chain of command. The use of

 

peacekeeping concept without definition became a distraction.

 

It caused the MAU commander to be to cautions so as not to risk

 

an international incident.

Third, the chain of command failed to provide support. It

 

is the chain of command that has the inherent responsibility of

 

ensuring subordinates are given what is required to carry out

 

their mission. But when changes were required those in a

 

position to change or insist on changes did not take action. The

 

changing environment demanded revisions in mission, ROE, and

 

intelligence support. The MAU commander had little influence to

 

 

8

alter these elements which were critical to the MAU's survival.

 

Fourth, the intelligence support was inadequate. The MAU

 

had insufficient knowledge of the terrorist elements arrayed

 

against them. Information provided to was nonspecific and

 

unsorted.

 

Fifth, the ROE was inadequate to address the hostile

 

environment within which the USMNF was located. Leaders and

 

subordinates were given ambiguous guidelines in which to operate.

There was more concern about not creating an international

 

incident than protecting friendly forces.

 

KHOBAR TOWERS: ENVIRONMENT AND MISSION

 

In September of 1994 the terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia

 

was considered benign. Only three isolated attacks against

 

military targets had taken place. These occurred during the

 

early part of 1991 during Operation Desert Storm: 3 February,

 

1991, unknown individuals doused a U.S. transport bus with

 

kerosene; 3 February, 1991, shots were fired at a military bus,

 

injuring three U.S. soldiers; 28 March 1991, U.S. Marine vehicle

 

was fired upon injuring three Marines.[10]

 

In late 1994 the internal security situation in Saudi Arabia

 

began to change. Reports of potential terrorist attacks and

 

activities increased in volume. But it was theorized that most

 

of these activities were in response to state-sponsored politics.

 

 

 

9

On 13 November, 1995 a car bomb exploded in a parking lot

adjacent to an office building housing the office of the project

 

manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard in Riyadh, causing five

 

U.S. fatalities. It was this event that should have alerted the

 

4404 Wing staff of an increase in terrorist activity.[11]

 

The 4404 Wing was established on 13 March, 1991 at Al Karhj

 

Air Base. The unit later moved to Dhahran on 23 January, 1992.

 

The 4404 Wing was assigned to participate in Operation

 

Southern Watch as part of a Combined Joint Task force (CJTF).

 

The purpose of which was to enforce United Nations Security

 

Council Resolutions in the Gulf Region. The stated mission of

 

the 4404 Wing was to:

 

...serve as the front line defense against possible Iraqi aggression. To enforce United Nations Security Council solutions 687, 688, and 949 and protect U.S. forces stationed in Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.[12]

 

Members of 4404 Wing rotated frequently. The commander of

 

the wing and squadron along with the key parts of the staff

 

rotated every 12 months. Other elements of the staff and

 

security force rotated every 30, 60, and 90 days. Up to 10% of

 

the enlisted force was turning over every week. The advantages

 

of a permanently established organization were not present.[13]

 

KHOBAR TOWERS: CHAIN OF COMMAND

 

 

The chain of command for the 4404 Wing was divided between

 

 

10

two categories of control. This division did not lend itself to

 

a clear delineation of which command was responsible for force

 

protection. The commander of the CJTF had tactical control over

 

the 4404 Wing, but this did not include authority over logistical

 

matters, unit billeting locations.

 

Operational control was exercised by the Air Component

 

Commander located at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, over 7,000 miles

 

away. After the bombing of the National Guard Office the CJTF

 

was assigned force protection oversight for combatant forces

 

operating in Saudi Arabia. But the authority to accomplish this

 

responsibility was not provided.

 

MG Anderson, U.S. Air Force was recently assigned as CJTF

 

Commander on 22 April 1996. He was not apprised of any force

 

protection concerns by Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

 

(CENTCOM) prior to assuming command. The new commander did not

 

understand his authority to be directive in nature. The new

 

commander had the power to enforce force protection measures

 

but did not have operational control. [14]

KHOBAR TOWERS: INTELLIGENCE

 

 

Intelligence support to the Wing commander was a mixed bag

 

of support. The unit was not well served by the intelligence

 

structure assigned. The Wing intelligence staff section was

 

predominantly used to support the conduct of air missions for

 

 

 

11

Operation Southern Watch. The base police force did not have a

 

dedicated intelligence section, which meant the security force

 

commander acted as his own intelligence officer. Various upper

 

levels of the chain of command had access to intelligence

 

information which would have been of importance to the air wing.

 

But classification restrictions prevented their dissemination.

 

On the other hand, pertinent information was made available

 

to the Wing Commander. Reports of potential terrorist attacks

 

and physical security assessments were passed on to the air wing.

Unfortunately, HUMINT was not available to provide more accurate

 

data regarding terrorist activities and locations of attacks.[15]

 

KHOBAR TOWERS: CONCLUSIONS

 

 

The Wing Commander must accept the majority of blame for

 

being vulnerable to attack. But other elements must share blame

 

for creating an environment of vulnerability. First, the chain

 

of command relationships did not promote force protection

 

concepts. There were no established theater standards for force

 

protection for Gulf units to use a guide. Nor were any training

 

programs established for those deploying to the region. CENTCOM

 

personnel did inspect force protection measures employed by units

 

of the CJTF. Although made responsible for force protection, the

CJTF was never given authority to carry out these assigned

 

duties.

 

 

 

 

12

Second, intelligence support was incomplete and nonspecific.

The 4404 Wing was understaffed to perform the intelligence

 

functions required to collect and process the information.

 

Third, Saudi local authorities had responsibility for security

 

outside the compound at Dhahran. The authorities did increase

 

patrols around the compound, but, requests to move the fence

 

line father away from the towers were denied. Moving the fence

 

would have increased the standoff distance and prevented access

 

via the street.

 

However there were elements under control of the wing

 

commander. First, personnel did not have to be billeted in

 

Khobar Towers. The change would have caused two or three

 

personnel to share a room and would have been unpopular.

 

Second, no alert drills were ever conducted for residents of

 

the towers. Given turnover rate of personnel, perhaps these

 

should have been conducted weekly or monthly.

 

Third, the installation of an easy to use alarm system for

 

early warning of an impending attack. The system in place in

 

June 1996, was insufficient and the steps required for its

 

activation too laborious. Fourth, the rotation policies were a

 

negative influence on the continuity of operations. Although

 

this was a service component policy, there is no record of the

 

wing commanders' protest. Security personnel rotated without

 

test firing or zeroing their weapons. Rotation of staff

 

 

 

13

personnel every 90 days prohibited familiarity with the

 

peculiarities of the local environment.

 

COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION

 

 

Environment. Beirut was a more hostile area than that of

 

Dhahran. The USMNF was sent into a combat zone, although it was

 

not viewed as such, it was assumed benevolent to U.S. forces.

 

Similarly Dhahran was assumed to be benign. The absence of open

 

hostilities to U.S., provided a false sense of security. In both

 

situations there were signs of an increasing non-conventional

 

threat to U.S. forces. Each truck bombing was preceded by events

 

that presented evidence of increased hostilities. The

 

environment turned hostile but no one recognized the change.

Mission. The goal of what the two units were intended to

 

accomplish was very similar. Both were required to participate

 

in operations to bring stability to unstable regions of the

 

world. However, the USMNF was deployed to a war zone during a

 

period of temporary cessation of hostilities. Their mission

 

statement did not accurately reflect the purpose of their

 

presence. In contrast, the 4404 Wing received a clearly defined

 

mission. In the case of mission there is no direct parallel.

 

Chain of Command. In both instances the chain of command

 

did not support deployed forces. Confusion generated by

 

multiple and ambiguous lines of vertical command diluted

 

 

14

responsibility for support and force protection. Since those in

 

the chain of command did not feel responsible, they did not

 

seek clarification of mission, a change in ROE, or seek improved

 

intelligence support.

 

Intelligence. The requirement for timely, accurate and

 

focused intelligence information could have served both units.

 

4404 was not granted access to pertinent information due to

 

classification restrictions. Nor were its organic staff sections

 

adequately staffed to perform all the duties required. The USMNF

 

suffered from a large volume of unfocused information. Neither

 

had the benefit of HUMINT information.

 

Conclusion. The most glaring and astonishing error that

 

occurred in both instances is a poorly defined or unclear chain

 

of command. This is most surprising, given the passage of the

 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which gave combatant CINCs the

 

authority and responsibility to organize, command, and support

 

the organizations under their command. The chain of command had

 

the responsibility to change the mission, ROE, and intelligence

 

support. But despite thirteen years and increased force

 

protection awareness, there was not a clearly defined chain

 

of command established for the 4404 Wing.

Secondly, the need to provide good intelligence support was

 

overlooked. This especially includes: the availability of

 

HUMINT; focused information for the region of deployment; and

 

 

15

access to information utilized only at highest levels of command.

Commanders must receive timely intelligence, focused on the units

 

immediate threat, and trained staff personnel to receive and

 

process the information. Intelligence information was

 

uncoordinated and was overlooked as the key to knowing the most

 

imminent threat.



APPENDIX B

Guidelines of Rules of Engagement

 

1.       When on the post, mobile or foot patrol, keep loaded magazine in weapon, bolt closed,

weapon on safe, no round in the chamber.

  1. Do not chamber a round unless told to do so by a commissioned offiecer miles you must

act in immediate self‑defense where deadly force is authorized.

  1. Keep ammo for crew served weapons readily available but not loaded. Weapons on safe.
  2. Call local forces to assist in self‑defense effort. Notify headquarters.
  3. Use only minimum degree of force to accomplish any mission.
  4. Stop the use of force when it is no longer needed to accomplish the mission.

7.       If you receive effective hostile fire, direct your fire at the source. If possible, use friendly

snipers.

8. Respect civilian property; do not attack it unless absolutely necessary to protect friendly forces.

9. Protect innocent civilians from harm.

10. Respect and protect recognized medical agencies such as Red Cross and Red Crescent, etc.

 

Figure 1. Beirut White Card ROE: September 1982 ‑ October 1983

 

Rules of Engagement for American and British Embassy External Security Forces

 

  1. Loaded magazines will be in weapons at all times when on post. bolt closed, weapon on

safe. No round will be in the chamber,

  1. Round will be chambered only when intending to fire.

3. Weapon will be fired only under the following circumstances

a. A hostile act has been committed

(1) A hostile act is defined as rounds fired at the embassy, embassy personnel, embassy vehicle, or Marine sentries.

(2) The response will be proportional.

(3 )The response will cease when attack ceases.

(4) There will be no pursuit by fire.

(5) A hostile act from a vehicle is when it crosses the established

barricade. First fire to diable the vehicle and apprehend occupants. If the

vehicle cannot be stopped. fire on the occupants.

(6) A hostile act from an individual or group of individuals is present

when they cross the barricade and will not stop after warnings in Arabic

and French. If they do not stop fire at them.

4. Well aimed fire will be used; weapons will not be placed on automatic.

5. Care will be taken to avoid civilian casualties.

 

Figure 2. Beirut Blue Card ROE: May 1983 ‑ October 1983

 

Benis M. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982‑1984, (Washington DC : History and Museums Division, Headquarter, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987), 24 and 64.


 


BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

1. Department of Defense Report, Commission on The Beirut International Airport Act, October 23, 1983. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983.

 

2. Department of Defense Report, Force Protection Assessment of CENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers: Report of The Downing Assessment Task Force, 30 August 1996. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.

 

3. Perry, William J., "Force Protection: Hardening The Target, "Defense 96, Issue 6, American Forced Information Services 1996. 1-16.

 

4. Hillen, John, "Peacekeeping in Our Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager," Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, VOL 3, Autumn 1996, 17-33.


 



[1]Department of Defense Report, Commission on The Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. U.S. Government Printing Office 1984, Background.

 

[2]DOD Report, Background.

 

[3]DOD Report, Background.

 

[4]DOD Report, 17.

 

[5]DOD Report, 37-38.

 

[6]DOD Report, 29.

 

[7]DOD Report, 53-56.

 

[8]DOD Report, 46-50.

 

[9]DOD Report, 59-65.

 

[10]Department of Defense Report, Force Protection Assessment of CENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers: Report of the Downing Assessment Task Force, 30 August 1996. U.S. Government P.O. 1996. 29-30.

 

[11]DOD Report, Downing Task Force, 29.

 

[12]DOD Report, Downing Task Force,17.

 

[13]DOD Report, Downing Task Force, 17-19.

 

[14]DOD Report, Downing Task Force, 23.

 

[15]DOD Report, Downing Task Force, vii, 45-46.



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