Military

Fires And Weapons Systems Required For Riverine Operations

CSC 1997

Subject Area – Operations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title:  Fires and Weapons System required for Riverine Operations

 

Author:  Major R.J. Abblitt, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis:  To successfully conduct Riverine operations, the combined power of all supporting arms assets must be brought to the fight in order to support the potentially dispursed manuever elements of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF).  The capability to conduct brigade size MAGTF riverine operations should be developed based upon the growing likelihood of warfare in the littorals during this next century.

 

Background:  The current issue facing the Marine Corps' ability to provide fire support in riverine operations with a task organized MRF relates to key fire support capabilities: accuracy, fire support C2, flexibility, lethality, mobility, responsiveness, and sustainability.  This paper shows the requirement for each of these listed capabilities and concludes with a discussion on why we have a lack of capability in fire support assets for riverine operations.

 

      As an example, the lack of current riverine mobility assets for fire support is a result of decisions made during the post Vietnam period.  During this time, the Navy placed their Riverine Craft into their Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM).  The decision to do this technically resulted in removing these assets from the traditional training relationships associated with the Navy-Marine Corps team that would otherwise have enabled use of these assets by Marine Corps units other than special forces e.g., SEALs.  Additionally, with the establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), NSWC became a subordinate command to USSOCOM and therefore  riverine craft belonging to NSWC are no longer Navy assets, but rather are USSOCOM assets.

 

Recommendation:  Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the renewed interest in riverine operations today and in the foreseeable future is clearly delineating each of the services role in the conduct of these type operations.  Without this, it is much more difficult to plan, support, and ensure the integration and synchronization of fires in this environment. The Marine Corps and Navy should define required capabilites to conduct riverine operations and determine the feasibility of supporting a brigade size MAGTF as the principle base unit for the mobile riverine force.

 

FIRES AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR RIVERINE OPERATIONS

 

_______________________________________________________________________

A Summary of Concepts for Fires in Support of  Riverine Operations in the Littorals

   

Purpose

     This paper addresses fire support in riverine operations.  It relies on historical lessons learned from the experiences of U.S. forces in Vietnam.  Throughout this paper, the application of the basic tenants of fire support considerations are addressed and are still considered relevant for meeting the required demands of Riverine Operations in the littorals.  This fire support paper links proven Marine Corps, Army, Navy and Joint fire support doctrine to the renewed interests of fighting in the littorals, and in particular, the conduct of fire support in riverine operations.  To discuss fire support, certain background information is provided in order to define the context in which fire support for riverine operations is intended to lend its weight to the battlefield.  Fire support is measurable in terms of the size of force it must support; therefore, the force size and its structure are critical to understanding the demands expected of the fire support assets and the combined nature of supporting arms.  This paper  is intended to add specificity to the current joint doctrine on riverine operations which is designated Joint Test Pub 3-06, Appendix "D" U.S. Marine Corps Riverine / Warfare Assets.

Force Structure

     This paper proposes a force that is structured around the "old term" Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) with a Regimental Landing Team (RLT) as the Ground Combat Element (GCE), a Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) as the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) as the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).  The requirement for this size MAGTF is due to the desired command & control, combat power, and sustainment capabilities to meet unique demands and potential mission assignments of a riverine force employed in the littoral regions of the world.  For this paper, the MEB size MAGTF will be referred to as the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) with the understanding that a MRF is also an integrated Navy /Marine riverine force.  By integrated, this means that the Navy provides a River Assault Group, composed of a River Support Squadron, Naval Special Warfare Task Unit, and River Assault Squadron.  The naval river assault group brings to the mobile riverine force tremendous capabilities, but this will not be addressed in this paper.  The MEB commander for this paper will be the MRF commander because he will have the perponderance of the forces, however, some situations could dictate that the MRF be commanded by a naval officer.^[1] 

     The justification for a MEB size force is based on lessons learned from Vietnam in which battalion size maneuver elements were generally the smallest conventional size units employed in riverine operations. The battalion in turn would decentralize its execution to company and even platoon size units.   The selection of the battalion size unit was based upon the required capability to reasonably handle the size of the  potential assigned Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), and the average duration time of each riverine mission.  By virtue of having a regimental landing team size GCE, the MRF contains substantial combat power as well as flexibility to rotate battalions between riverine operations.  The time between missions requires a mandatory relief-in-place operation in order to rest the previously engaged battalion.  The third battalion fulfills the essential reserve and security force mission for shore and sea-basing requirements designated by the MRF commander.

The Mission

     Operations classified as "riverine" fall under two classifications.  The first is Assault operations. In this classification, the following mission objectives could be assigned^[2]:

     []  Establish control of the waterways in an assigned geographic area.

     []  Establish control of geographic areas, population, and resources.

     []  Locate and destroy hostile forces, enemy installations, and enemy supply sites.

     []  Establish and secure an area for a combat support base or mobile support base. 

     The second classification is Waterway Interdiction, Surveillance, Barrier, and Security Operations.  In this classification, the following mission objectives could be assigned^[3]: 

     []  Protect friendly LOCs

     []  Deny enemy forces the use of waterways

     []  Collect enemy intelligence information

     []  Perform landward and seaward security missions

     []  Enforce or assist with population and resource control

 

Battlespace Area Evaluation

     In the littoral regions, fire support assets will be stretched to the limits of their capabilities. In order to effectively cover the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), fires must be planned to support the commander's area of interest as well as the area of influence.  Both of these will likely reside deep within the MRF commander's area of responsibility.  By definition, the area of interest includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.  Thus, it is because of the unique nature of riverine operations and the potential threat that exists in this environment that more clearly defines the nature of these two areas as well as the term deep.

     When riverine operations are discussed, deep can imply a potential distance of 100 miles or more inland from where the MRF maneuver elements infiltrate, with the infiltration point starting where the ocean meets the shoreline.  The MRF commander's area of influence therefore will also be affected primarily due to the inherent challenges associated with providing adequate fire support in this area.  Conducting operations within the riverine environment specifically, will require fire support assets to be dispersed in order to cover the wide spectrum of military activities conducted in and around the rivers as well as on the surrounding terrain of the valley or basin.^[4]  As a part of the historical background, in the Republic of Vietnam, it was not unusual to employ forces in widely dispersed locations.  Riverine operations typically supported fragmented infantry battalions and artillery batteries which were spread out to provide a degree of security throughout populated areas along the major land and water lines of communications.^[5]

Environment

     Population densities in many of the littoral regions of the world are projected to experience large growth in two distinct areas within the next two decades as the demographic trend of population migration toward urban and rural areas continues.^[6]  A concept for fire support in riverine operations must consider the impact of both these areas located throughout the littorals. However, the urban areas of the littorals will be marked by the intersection of converging trade routes that are further characterized by huge cities, and  well-populated coasts.^[7] The dynamics in this environment will make coordination of fires very difficult.  A methodology for controlling the fires of dispersed fire support assets is imperative.  As a dichotomy to the large population densities; in other littoral regions of the world, the rural areas will be less dramatic and populations may be spread throughout areas along the rivers, such as hamlets or villages, like those encountered during Vietnam.  The rivers in these littoral regions may be bounded by large standing vegetation that will impede or limit the capability of a Mobile Riverine Force (MRF)  to observe areas directly adjacent to the river.  At the same time, there are riverine environments where there will be no limiting vegetation and the MRF elements will have unimpeded observation.^[8]

The Threat   

    According to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in his concept paper Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), the greatest and most potentially dangerous threat that the MRF commander will face today is an unconventional force.  The OMFTS concept paper states, "most of the fighting is done by people...there seems to be no shortage of men who are willing to pick up a weapon and defend the cause of their ethnic group, religion, clan, or tribe..."   This threat will seek cover in both the urban areas of the littorals as well as the rural areas.  The threat's battlefield is where it lives and it will take all precautions to blend in.  The threat will await the right time, and select the right place to attack elements of the MRF.  The threat will attack by ambush in order to maximize the killing power of its weapon systems against MRF maneuver elements.  Today, the existing weapons belonging to the catagory of unconventional threat forces likely to fight with guerrilla tactics are capable of rendering the MRF maneuver elements combat ineffective.  Modernization of weapons is not a prerequisite for the enemy being capable of affecting MRF maneuver and fire support operations in the riverine environment.  The threat will most likely avoid collateral damage and casualties to the local populous in order to first try and gain their support and then only as a last recourse do any harm because of its inability to influence the locality.  As in past military operations such as those conducted in Vietnam, the riverine environment will enable the enemy to vary his profile and exploit the principle of surprise.  And as in the past, the enemy of the not too distant future will exploit the natural and man-made features of this environment in order to enhance his efforts to blend in.  He will use the generally restrictive military aspects of terrain in the riverine environment (excluding cultivated areas) created by heavy vegetation, terrain masking and fog to deny the MRF maneuver and fire support elements from observation of his actions.  The enemy will seek to be unpredictable and attempt to hamper all MRF efforts to coordinate attacks and fires against him.^[9]  The enemy will effectively use small, medium and heavy caliber weapons in classical ambush fashion.  Time will be on the enemy's side and the enemy will do all he can to protract and prevent the decisive military engagement.  In Vietnam, the enemy Viet Cong adopted the basic tactical code of  the famous guerrilla fighter and leader Mao Tse- Tung : "When an enemy advances, withdraw; when he defends, harass; when he is tired, attack; when he withdraws, pursue".^[10]  As in Vietnam, it is likely that the next enemy U.S. forces fight in the riverine environment will adopt the same code of tactical fighting.   The fires in support of the MRF will clearly provide an advantage if they can be coordinated and observed.

Fires in Support of Littoral Riverine Operations 

     A significant amount of heavy fires will have to be sea-based during the initial stages of riverine operations.  While sea-basing fire support assets provide some advantages, it also creates a dilemma for the MRF commander, who must ensure that his riverine operations can be appropriately covered by responsive and accurate fires which may be at the very limit of their range.  Fire support systems must provide the MRF commander with fires appropriate to the tactical situation.  At times, precise, low volume fires will be required which inflict the necessary effect on the threat but also limit collateral damage.  Precision guided munitions (PGMs) can be used for this purpose.  At other times, the MRF commander will be provided massed, lethal fires such as missiles, rockets and Naval Guns, that enable maneuver, provide force protection, and shape the battlespace.^[11]  The fire support components for conducting riverine operations include target acquisition, fire support C2, type weapons, and type munitions.  All of these fire support components must support engagement options, such as lethal or nonlethal fires, or varied munitions effects, that will allow the MRF commander to capitalize on his MRF maneuver element's ability to engage the enemy.  This type of fire support planning and execution will make it difficult for the enemy to counter MRF actions, thereby placing him in a tactical dilemma.^[12]  Throughout planning, fire support coordination procedures must be streamlined to improve responsiveness.  Throughout execution, fire support command and control must provide all elements of the MRF with a common battlespace picture as well as the means to effectively and efficiently employ the right fires for the appropriate target.^[13] 

     Initially, the MRF will be extremely dependent on Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) and aviation to provide the long range, accurate fires in support of the initial phases of the MRF maneuver elements movement.  In the initial phases of the riverine operation, the Navy must position its ships in such a manner as to enable target engagement while also providing stand-off for force protection.  As important as force protection is, naval surface fire support assets must be positioned within their systems capability to cover objectives ashore during the riverine operation.^[14]  Other considerations such as hydrography will significantly impact the positioning of ships, creating possible limitations on providing the necessary support for the deep fight. In order to fight operations deep in the riverine area, the MRF commander will require the augmentation of aviation to cover gaps due to range limitations.

     The MRF Aviation Combat Element (ACE) will provide close and deep air support against enemy targets to facilitate the MRF commander's efforts to shape the battlespace.  Future sea-basing of MRF aviation, can take advantage of the logistical support available afloat while also reducing the need to defend large area air bases ashore.  However, because of the possible need for establishing various types of support bases ashore due to assigned missions, expanding tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR), and the potential limitations with sea-basing  capability, the MRF aviation combat element must also be capable of operating from shore based sites.^[15]  The capabilities provided by aviation assets are essential to the overall fire support effort.  These assets are critical to providing the substantial fire support required by the MRF.  Improved capabilities for the ACE must include an organic firing platform similar to the AC-130U gunship used to support the special operations forces.  Its capabilities are significant with respect to target acquisition, navigation during adverse weather, lethality of fires, stand-off from the target area, and pinpoint firing accuracy to reduce collateral damage.^[16] Aviation is also critical for providing rotary wing fire support C2, observation and troop mobility.  Riverine operations should include planning for dedicated direct support helicopter assets to the battalion level MRF maneuver elements.  The capabilities to provide fire support C2 with assetts such as the UH-1, and armed assault with such as the AH-1 for CAS, aerial observation spotting, fires adjustment or coordinating supporting arms are critical.  

     The ability to bring aviation supporting arms close to the MRF maneuver elements for direct support and immediate response was never done better than in Vietnam.  Here innovation contributed to the invention of the first helicopter barge.  The barge was delivered to the Mobile Riverine Base which enabled quicker response time in support of the MRF maneuver elements.^[17] Another innovation was the building of helicopter landing platforms on armored troop carriers.  This too served as an integral part to the MRF response capability.^[18]

Shore Based Fires

     As mentioned earlier, the advantages gained from sea basing do not however preclude the requirement to provide fire support from shore based locations.  This added dimension of fire support, coupled with support from medium range indirect fire support assets, increases the fire power available to the MRF commander while also ensuring that responsive, day and night, all weather, suppressive fires are available.  The amount of fire support which is brought ashore will be the MRF commander's decision, based upon the tactical situation and expected effects of the environment on other available fire support systems.^[19]  Those fire support assets that are shore-based will require tactical mobility equal to the ground maneuver force.  Selected sites for  small shore-based logistics will be determined by the Navy's capability to provide sea based logistics.  The combat service support that is required to sustain the MRF will also be determined based on the same criteria.  The capability to position a mix of complementary fire support assets at different locations ashore or at sea, is a critical aspect in providing tactical flexibility for the MRF commander, but this also makes command and control more difficult as well. 

      By virtue of properly positioning MRF fire support assets, the commander reduces the vulnerability of each fire support asset.  If the location of MRF fire support assets can be exploited by the threat, they will be.  Should the fire support asset be hit, the loss of that asset must not cripple the entire fire support effort.^[20] Dispersion of assets through site location and redundancy through a variety of different type fire support assets is critical to providing flexibility to the MRF commander in riverine operations. 

     As mentioned earlier, the majority of fire support in riverine operations is provided by a combination of NSFS and aviation fires.  Naval fires will provide direct fire and indirect fire support during the pre-assault and assault phase of the MRF operation.  Naval fires will provide general support fires against selected high payoff / high value targets.  Simultaneously, fires from aviation will continue to provide close and deep air support against targets to facilitate the MRF commander's efforts to shape the battlespace. 

     In addition to sea-based fires, ground-based fires should be positioned for employment to enhance responsiveness and fill fire support gaps.  Any potential gaps must be identified early on in the planning phase in order to reduce risk during periods of vulnerability.  Mutually supporting fire support weapons provide fires during all phases of the assault.  During the initial stages of MRF operations, a short range ground-based weapon asset must accompany the MRF maneuver elements to provide responsive support for conducting the close fight.  These type weapons are most likely the current organic mortars resident to the infantry battalions such as the 60 mm mortar and 81 mm mortar.  The employment of higher range mortars such as the 107 mm (although not organic to Marine forces) should be considered as well. 

     In Vietnam, two powerful mobile and versatile army systems were employed to augment ground support fires and air defense fires:  the twin 40 mm carriage-mounted cannon capable of firing 200 rds/minute, and the Quad .50 caliber machine-gun, normally  mounted on a wheeled vehicle or in a turret, and capable of firing 2000 rds/minute.^[21]  As the situation develops, and if required, a larger ground-based weapon system like these should be introduced in order to support the close fight and protect those assets that shape the deep fight.^[22]  The most likely ground-based fire support artillery weapon that can meet the immediate "calls for fire" will be the medium range (light weight) 155 mm howitzer.

     In Vietnam, the lack of shore based positions suitable for placing artillery, prompted the development of fire support bases for artillery.  It was not uncommon to have as many as three artillery batteries employed at the same time from different locations due to this positioning issue.  The great distances involved with the assignment of TOAR's produced large zones in which the enemy was not subject to friendly fires.  These zones were also in most cases sparsely populated, with friendly civilians concentrated in a few widely dispersed villages.^[23]  The fire support situation faced by the MRF commander was complex  due to many associated considerations, but none were more significant than being able to support the MRF elements by fires through well developed plans.  The challenges of not only protecting MRF rear area elements, but also being able to support maneuver elements in zone without fratricide to friendly and collateral damage to civilians were huge. 

     An example from Vietnam describes efforts to provide for shore base defense.  In this example, one rifle company, under the base commander, was responsible for shore defense of the Mobile Riverine Base.  Since anchorage space was 2000 to 2500 meters in length, it was impossible to conduct a closely knit defense with the relatively small number of troops committed.  The security troops were reinforced as needed by elements of the company defending the fire support base.  Artillery, 4.2 inch mortar and 81 mm mortar fire, as well as fire from offshore boats was planned in support of the defense of the base.  The flat trajectory of naval gun fire required careful planning for both shore and waterborne defense.^[24]  The overarching theme in shore base defense is mastering the principle of economy of force.  Old lessons learned that are still relevant today speak clearly on the employment of artillery.

     In riverine operations, artillery should still not be employed in less than battery-size units, since the effectiveness of artillery fire will decrease in proportion to the number of reduced firing elements.  The large size of the TAORs within the littoral areas requiring artillery support will reduce the number of firing units which can be massed on a single target.  Artillery units must be arrayed to provide support for all deploying MRF maneuver elements at all times.  Once emplaced, artillery units must be prepared to fire in any direction from their firing position. And finally, artillery units must be prepared for rapid movement to different zones within the MRF commander's TAOR by boats, riverine craft, helicopters, transport aircraft or conventional vehicles.  Movement of artillery units by helicopter has the advantage of increasing the number of accessible firing positions while not requiring secure ground routes but at a cost also.^[25]

Fires Synchronization

     All fire support assets must be fully capable of supporting the MRF commander during possible sustained riverine operations inland.^[26]  During Vietnam, operations that exceeded 60 days in the riverine environment were not unusual.  Due to the environment, and time, many challenges faced the MRF commander in bringing the full integration of fire support to bear in riverine operations. 

     At the center of this challenge is the ability to deliver both massed and precision fires, depending on the target and the tactical situation.  Targets can include anything from bunkers, ambush sites, communication installations to guerrilla supply bases.  Riverine operations require responsive, long-range, high-volume, all-weather, and day/night fires.  To reduce the enemy's ability to conduct a deliberate ambush or hasty attack during the initial stages of the riverine assault, the MRF commander must have massed supporting fires to suppress the threat.  While MRF maneuver elements assault and become engaged with lead elements of the enemy, precision fires must be used to deny the enemy the ability to conduct an orderly withdrawal while also preventing fratricide.   The combination of precision fires with massed suppressive fires will place the enemy in a dilemma.  If the enemy attempts to withdraw, he will subject himself to  death by precision fires.  If the threat defends in order to counterattack, he will subject himself to massed suppressive fires that will make it improbable for him gaining the initiative and therefore cause him to be over run and killed by MRF direct fire weapons.  The enemy through MRF fires will be denied the ability to maneuver by being isolated and fixed in position.  If allowed to, the enemy will most likely attempt to continue to engage the MRF maneuver elements through a combination of hasty ambushes and attacks.  With MRF long-range firepower, the MRF commander can possibly preempt the enemy's ability execute a deliberate ambush.  Regardless of enemy action, the MRF commander still reinforces the principle of freedom of action for his MRF maneuver elements through fires.  By maintaining this type of initiative, fires will support the MRF commander's ability to gain tactical surprise over the enemy.^[27] 

     Successful riverine operations are characterized by complementary, overlapping, and redundant fire support systems.  The MRF commander cannot allow his battlespace to be divided among the various fire support agencies.  Fire support must be planned throughout the depth of the battlespace to include the use of a combination of mutually supporting weapons.  Fires must be responsive, long-range, capable of high volume, functional in all weather conditions, and available day or night to support fast moving and far ranging MRF maneuver elements.  This includes the unique challenge of providing fires used in support of maneuver elements engaged in urban areas.  Again, effective fire support will depend on the combined synchronization of ground, air, and naval fire support assets to provide the flexibility that MRF maneuver elements  require under all conditions.^[28] 

Key Fire Support Capabilities

     Fire support for riverine operations is dependent on overcoming significant challenges in accuracy, fire support C2, flexibility, lethality, mobility, range, responsiveness, and  sustainability.^[29]   The defining challenge is to provide continuous, responsive fires to the MRF maneuver elements that will be capable of moving to significantly greater depth due to increased speed.  The hallmark of all fire support is in the ability of each weapon to deliver timely, accurate fires that have the desired effects.  Eight specific capabilities are outlined below.^[30]

     Accuracy.  Accurate fire support requires the MRF commander to possess the ability to observe his battlespace.  In order to overcome limited observation due to the most likely environment in which riverine operations will be conducted, the MRF commander should possess in addition to his Forward and Aerial observers, an airborne observation platform which can be launched and recovered by organic MRF assets.^[31]  Triple canopy jungle makes observation beyond 25 to 50 meters very difficult.  Excluding the use of a Global Positioning System (GPS); target location, self-location, and friendly unit location is difficult.  Three key The UAV is the ideal asset for fulfilling this requirement when properly linked to the appropriate fire support coordination link.  Precision fires will contribute to the successful outcome of riverine operations by allowing the MRF commander to efficiently engage targets while shaping the MRF battlespace.  Precise target engagement is one element of accuracy, while less precise, but still accurate, fires in support of MRF maneuver elements in contact with the enemy is another.  Precision/guided munitions (PGM) should be planned, but not to the exclusion of inexpensive, high volume munitions.  Both precise and less precise munitions are a significant aspect of providing the MRF commander effective close supporting fires.   Fire support must offer the MRF commander a wide variety of effects; from non-precision, wide-area target attack for suppression missions, to precision guided point target strikes for destruction or neutralization missions on critical/high value targets, especially in the urban environments of the littorals.^[32]

       Continuous, flexible fire support is invaluable in riverine operations.  However, several things make it difficult to provide this support.  They include:  inadequate survey control, poor maps, lack of meteorological data, curtailed ability to mass fires when fire direction is necessarily decentralized and most significantly from a ground perspective, insufficient dry land for positioning artillery assets.^[33]          

     Command and Control.  Riverine operations require a single fire support command and control system that incorporates and provides a common picture of all MRF battlespace functions, while linking all MRF elements and supporting units together.  The commander's IPB analysis is a critical part of ensuring responsive fire support.  In line with this analysis, the MRF commander must rely on a fire support command and control system like the Marine Corps Fire Support System (MCFSS).  This system automates fire support C2 functions by using digital devices and data communications, to collect, process, and distribute information quickly and accurately.  If not this system, then a system like this one must be available to provide all firing agencies with the ability to share the tactical battlespace picture of the MRF riverine operation as well as enable the MRF commander to monitor and influence events within his battlespace as necessary.^[34] 

     The MCFSS significantly increases fire support command and control through accuracy and speed.  These computers automate the technical and tactical fire direction as well as process and disseminate: conventional fire plans, target information, fire support coordination measures (FSCM), firing unit and ammunition information, meteorological /survey information, fire missions generated by incoming target intelligence and other battlefield geometry measures.^[35] The challenge of fighting in the riverine environment requires long range, reliable, high capacity, fire support communication systems.  A fire support command and control architecture that supports fluid operations in the littorals over great distances is essential.  Communications must be reliable, flexible and continuous to provide an efficient, effective flow of information.^[36] 

     One of the most important features of the fire support command and control system is its link to a target acquisition capability.  The target acquisition system must be linked into the fire support command and control system.  This gives the MRF commander an ability to aquire enemy targets and engage these targets with his fire support assets.  Although MRF maneuver elements will employ the AN/TPQ 36 Fire-Finder Counter Mortar Radar, these assets may not be readily available to assist in locating targets in the initial phases of the riverine operation due to mobility restrictions.  The Navy will have to fill this gap by providing one of their long range, sea-based target acquisition assets to enhance the MRF commander's capability to engage the enemy.^[37]

     The TPQ ground-based system is a superior asset.  This system enhances the MRF commander's fire support capabilities by allowing for smaller scale independent operations while still maintaining the capability to mass fires.  The current capability of these systems allow for self-location, self-orientation and independent fire direction.^[38] Fire support command and control must be fully incorporated into the entire MRF fire support picture; in effect, providing the centralized coordination that synchronizes all aspects of the fire support plan for successfully conducting riverine operations.^[39]

     Flexibility.  Historically,  riverine forces in Vietnam would have been much less formidable without the flexibility of fire support options provided by the sustained firepower of field artillery barges and the versatility of assault support assets.  The spoon bowed barge called the Monitor was considered the "battleship" of the MRF.  It was used as a close fire support craft.  Its span was sixty feet.  The Monitor displaced 75 tons due to being so heavily armed.  It could travel at a maximum speed of 8 knots.  The turret was mounted with a 40 mm cannon along with a .50 caliber machine gun.  Two other riverine craft similiar to the Monitor were also used; one model mounted a 105 mm cannon while the other model called "Zippo", had flame throwers mounted on its fore deck.  Other armaments on similiar barge type craft included an 81 mm mortar in the hybrid mount with a .50 caliber machine gun, one 20 mm cannon, four .30 caliber machine guns, and two grenade launchers.^[40]

     Flexibility is achieved by providing the MRF commander with fire support options such as those listed above.  But fire support options are more importantly found in the MAGTF elements of the MRF or the assets available by the elements of a Joint Riverine Force. 

     Effective fire support is dependent on flexibility, and flexibility is maximized through the integration of ground, air, and naval fires.  The sequential reliance on any one of these arms is a result of phasing the MRF operation with the end state being the synchronized, combined power of all three arms.   Examples of this type of coordinated fire support effort occurred numerous times in Vietnam during riverine operations. 

     In one incident as part of an encirclement operation against a Viet Cong unit, artillery delivered white phosphorus rounds which exploded 200 feet above the ground  just in advance of lead maneuver elements.  These marking rounds were constantly re-adjusted to ensure that rapid and accurate artillery fire could be placed on the ground in front of U.S. troops when they were engaged with the enemy.  As artillery fires remained registered, the Navy moved up close to the infantry positions to place the fire of the Monitor's 40mm guns and 81 mm mortars to reduce Viet Cong bunkers and machine gun emplacements.  While this coordinated fire was being employed, the artillery and Air Force also synchronized their fires to simultaneously deliver both indirect fires and air strikes while the Navy "Monitors" continued to engage the enemy with direct fire weapons.  Because of this coordinated effort, (which included positioning a U.S. ground force), a helicopterborne assault company was able to land in a secure zone within the battle area thus speeding the encirclement of the enemy.  Throughout this engagement, the pressure of artillery and small arms fire was sustained.  At night, U.S. troops maintained observation over the area using illumination from artillery assets.^[41] 

     This example of a coordinated riverine engagement in Vietnam captures the important contribution that coordinated ground, air and sea-based fire support make as critical elements to successfully being able to fight in the littorals.  Coordinated fire support should mean combined arms due to the magnified combat power gained by using multiple arms.  Superior fire support is dependent on availability of other fire support assets.  Successful employment of these fire support assets is measured by the way they collectively  provide continuous support to the deep, close and counterfire engagements.  The effectiveness of the combined arms approach to fires in riverine operations can always be reduced because of the threat capability, asset unavailability or severe weather.^[42]

      Uncertainty compounded with the unique characteristics of unconventional tactics will make fighting in the riverine environment a significant challenge for the MRF commander .  The MRF commander will have to place flexibility as a premier attribute to his fire support plans due to the nature of the most likely enemy, environment, and the wide variety of supporting arms capabilities that have both strengths and limitations.  The MRF commander's fire support systems must have the flexibility to meet this potentially rapidly changing riverine environment.^[43]  Too much dependence on any one type of fire support asset for too long will create a potential gap in the overall fire support plan, making the MRF maneuver elements vulnerable.^[44]

     Lethality.  Lethality covers the spectrum from massed suppressive fires to precision munitions used against high payoff / value targets.  Throughout a riverine operation, long-range, high-volume suppressive fires must be available.  The ability to deliver precision fires against point targets is important, however, the MRF maneuver elements will continue to require immediate, all weather, high-volume suppressive fires to defeat the enemy.^[45] 

     The riverine environment will require special consideration in how munitions are employed.  Most contact with the enemy will be at extremely close ranges.  Knowledge of the type munitions best suited for the terrain and how to employ them is critical.  In a triple canopy jungle, effects on munitions (although not all inclusive) include the following: High explosive (HE) / delay munitions will penetrate the treetops and splinter the trees creating additional fragmentation.  The use of smoke has limited effectiveness in the jungles adjacent to the waterways.  When and if used, smoke could be considered for use as a deception screen away from the actual assault landing areas or placed in the vicinity of the landing areas.  Judgement in its employment and whether the smoke makes a contribution to assisting the MRF maneuver elements assault or creates more confusion for the assaulting MRF maneuver elements is difficult to predict.  White Phosphorous (WP) on the other hand is significantly different.  Its use is highly effective as a marking round and in initial adjustments.  Its use in riverine operations is therefore strongly recommended.^[46]

     Nonlethal fires offer increased fire support options.  The options available cover the spectrum from psychological warfare leaflet drops to electronic attack.  Nonlethal fires become increasingly important, and may be the optimum choice, in an urban littoral environment complicated by the presence of many non-combatants.^[47] 

     In Vietnam, during lulls in contact with the enemy, psychological warfare as part of non-lethal fires was effectively employed by using aircraft for broadcasts and leaflet dissemination.  However, in the jungle terrain, the enemy often found it easy to detach himself from these appeals due to the aircraft being hidden from view by the foliage and clarity of the message being masked by the aircraft engine and atmospheric conditions^[48].   

     Mobility For Fires.   With any concept involving the employment of fire support assets, there exists a valid requirement to consider the platforms beyond those available by aviation, i.e.. "Riverine Craft"   that allow the employment of direct fire and indirect fire weapon assets to move and engage targets in the littorals. Employment of fire support assets in this environment are inextricably linked to the availability of riverine craft which can accommodate a variety of fire support weapons. 

      The mobility dilemma for employing infantry fire support assets associated with these units is further complicated by the role of the NSWC.  The role of the NSWC is to specialize in maritime and riverine operations, and provide maritime mobility for SOF from other services.^[49] This does not however include transporting the infantry battalions or similar type units and their associated organic fire support assets tailored as part of a Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). 

     Riverine operations require rapid movement.  Successful execution of riverine operations necessitates an increase in the tactical mobility of fire support assets.  Mobility is a major issue for ground-based fire support assets, a lesser issue for naval and aviation fires.  Naval assets are the most mobile and least restricted of all means of fire support although mobility can certainly be restricted by obstacles, very shallow water mines, enemy naval surface craft, or subsurface, and the operational environment e.g., weather, hydrography.^[50]

     Ground-based fire support assets must have the same mobility as the MRF maneuver elements due to their supporting role.  With increased mobility and a greater level of protection, the ground-based fire support assets should be positioned with the MRF maneuver elements thus maximizing range to the supported units.  Rapid emplacement, and displacement after firing, is a required capability of all ground-based assets.^[51]  Ground-based fire support assets (weapons) and all required support must be capable of being moved ashore by air and riverine craft platforms.  The movement inland must be accomplished in an efficient manner to provide a rapid buildup of the MRF maneuver elements  without using a disproportionate share of available surface or assault support lift.^[52] 

     Fire support is dependent on tactical mobility and the MRF commander must exploit all means of available lift in order to gain mobility.  The requirement for aviation assault support to move fire support assets is never more critical.  Aviation will continue to be vital to the MRF commander's fire support employment concept because troops and artillery will still require the flexibility to be inserted outside the immediate waterway.  Aviation will continue to be a key player to ensuring fire support coverage is available. Nearly all objectives in a riverine operation and throughout the littoral regions can be within striking distance of the MRF due to aviation's capability to deliver both forces and fires.^[53] 

     In Vietnam, the MRF possessed significant water mobility to complement air and ground movement.  The mobility and fire power provided by assets such as barge-mounted artillery enabled the MRF commander to provide effective artillery coverage to his maneuver elements.^[54]  In other cases, howitzer batteries of 155 mm self-propelled artillery were moved by LCU, further proving the ingenuity of MRF mobility to get fire support where it was needed.  The artillery battery's munitions supply was transported by Army LCM-8's.  The barge-mounted artillery received its ammunition support from LST shipping in the anchorage of the Mobile Riverine Base.^[55]

     In additon to the Monitor as mentioned earlier, other armored riverine craft were also successfully used in riverine warfare in the Vietnam conflict and were of great value.  The MRF included numerous types of armored craft (troop carriers [ATC]. patrol support boats [ASPB], and armored command and control craft.  These riverine craft employed light armor capable of stopping small arms fire and stand-off bar armor designed to detonate rockets and grenades before they reached the light armor of the craft.^[56]  Armored riverine craft provded greater protection to the crew and therefore allowed direct and indirect fire support weapons to deliver fires with less interruption.  Through armored protection, the primary mission of fires to support the MRF maneuver elements continued.^[57] 

     With the mobility advantages gained through the innovation of assets like the barge, there were also fire support limitations imposed by the characteristics of the river. Small riverine patrol craft are inherently unstable platforms for both direct fire and indirect fire weapons employment. Factors such as: wave levels, current, obstacles in the waterway, motion created by the action of other craft, and speed of the firing platform (riverine craft), make it difficult to maintain the stability necessary to achieve a high level of accuracy with the riverine craft weapon assets.  These factors must be considered by the on-scene MRF maneuver element commander when assaulting during an engagement.^[58] 

     Range.  The distance which fire support assets may have to support MRF maneuver elements within a TAOR are great.  Vietnam offers a potential model for the future.  In the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) which is a large mangrove swamp area located astride the main shipping lines of communication between Saigon and the South China Sea, planned fire support for a Vietnamese Marine Battalion had to consider coverage for its assigned TAOR of approximately 200 square miles.^[59]  This size of an area will certainly exceed the range capability of current ground based fire support assets.  This means that the fire support assets available to the MRF must complement and mutually support each other.  With the depth and width of riverine operations, the MRF commander must capitalize on the range of each fire support weapon to fight the deep battle and shape the entire battlespace.  Ground based weapon ranges are limited but should be pushed to the farthest depth of the MRF battlespace.  Based on the maximum range of even the new 155 lightweight howitzer, firing standard unassisted munitions, this will probably not exceed twenty-four kilometers of depth per weapon system.  

     The ranges of most aircraft are adequate to meet the fire support requirements of riverine operations throughout the depth of this type of TAOR battlespace.  As the mobility of maneuver forces continue to increase, the range of the close battle will also increase.  This increase will further challenge the fire support capabilities of our current assets.  Regardless of the challenge, fire support assets must be positioned or emplaced to provide effective fires to cover these greater ranges.^[60]  The availability and range of sea-based and aviation assets may at times be limited by the operational environment, such as the threat or severe weather.  Additionally, these assets may at times be diverted to higher priority missions.  For these reasons, the employment of  ground-based fire support  assets must have the tactical positional advantage when delivered inland to increase the MRF commander's ability to range in support of the close battle as well as provide him with additional battlespace shaping capability.^[61] 

     The Naval Gun Fire support provided by the 5" 54 caliber gun is the primary weapon of support for the Navy.  Naval gunfire ships are equipped with automated fire control equipment for firing data calculation.  Firing NGF accuracy is dependent on the ship's ability to fix its position.  The high muzzle velocity and flat trajectory make the naval gun effective against material targets presenting a vertical face to the gun-target line.  Such targets may be engaged at short ranges by direct fire using the ship's optical and electronic equipment.^[62] 

     Due to the changing of the ship's positions and the relatively large range probable error, the MRF commander must consider the effectiveness of NGF.  Accuracy decreases when attacking small targets at long ranges using indirect fire techniques.  As an example, for a 5-inch gun, rounds can impact up to 150 meters over or short, and 50 meters left or right of the point of aim at 21,000 meters.  This means that although NGF is a force multiplier, the MRF commander must understand the limitations associated with it.  The Navy must seek to maneuver their ships to areas that maximize their capabilities.^[63]

     Planning for the employment of Naval gunfire may be restricted to the coastal areas due to the military aspects of terrain and hydrographic conditions.  The range and trajectory limitations therefore may have marginal impact on operations that are conducted much further inland.^[64] 

     Responsiveness.  Conducting riverine operations places increasing demands on the responsiveness of fire support assets.  The MRF commander and his maneuver elements must be able to acquire fixed and mobile targets and quickly and effectively engage them with precision and area fires.  Being able to quickly engage the enemy once detected is the key to responsiveness.   Once ashore, the MRF maneuver elements will continue to rely on air and NSFS, while also augmenting  these fires through their own organic short range direct fire and indirect fire support assets, especially during the critical, early entry phase of a riverine operation.^[65]

     Fire support in particular during this phase must be responsive due to the vulnerability of the MRF maneuver elements transiting towards or within the riverine surroundings.  Long-range surface fires will initially be range restricted due to lack of mobility, requiring other assets to support fast-moving and far-ranging MRF elements.  Effective fire support will depend on the combination of direct and indirect ground, air, and naval fire support to provide flexibility. Organic MRF aviation is perhaps the best choice for providing high volume precision fires in a timely manner without the same restrictions imposed by distance, and the geographic/military aspects of terrain that effect artillery and naval surface fire support.

     While aviation and naval surface fires provide substantial fire support to MRF maneuver elements operating in the riverine environment, the capability to provide fire support from bases established ashore is essential to the overall fire support effort.  Naval surface fires must be ready to augment aviation by initially providing the long-range fires of rockets or missiles to influence events ashore in support of the MRF maneuver elements operating deep in the littorals. Requests for fires must be worked with sufficient speed and accuracy to support the MRF maneuver elements.^[66]

     One category of responsiveness, are those fires used to support the MRF battlespace shaping effort.  Targets in this category are fixed and/or do not project an immediate danger to the MRF.  Range of the weapon and its accuracy are the dominant characteristics of the MRF battlespace shaping fires.^[67]  Another category of responsiveness are those fires in support of the MRF maneuver elements in contact with the enemy.  The best weapon of choice is the asset that delivers its munitions with reduced time of flight while possessing the capability for increasing its volume of fire.  These capabilities are critical considerations for weapons responsiveness.^[68]

     In Vietnam, the mortar boat provided just this type of quick response.  It consisted of two 81 mm mortars which were installed in the forward portion of an LCM.  The mortar boat was used both day and night throughout the riverine operation, and provided flexible, mobile, and responsive fire support for all types of maneuver.^[69] 

     A subset category of fires in support of MRF maneuver elements, are those fires delivered against enemy indirect fire systems: Counterfire.  Reducing target engagement time, especially for sea-based fires, is critical since it will provide the majority of support during the initial phases of the riverine operation.^[70] 

     In Vietnam, just as the huge distances and areas covered by the MRF created difficulty through range shortfalls, it also created coordination problems in terms of response. Covering this large of an area with responsive fires was made even more difficult due to host nation control of land that fell within the MRF commander's assigned TAOR.  This situation with the Vietnamese government created clearance problems for MRF fires due to the potential location of MRF maneuver elements patrolling some areas of the TAOR that fell under the control of host nation authority.  To deal with this problem of getting responsive fires to the right area, a zonal clearance system was used that streamlined the fire request procedures by dividing the TAOR zone into smaller subzones. This system circumvented a lengthy zonal clearance request network and allowed artillery and mortar fire to respond to the zone or zones where it was urgently needed while withholding fires from contested areas that although important, could afford more time to be worked.^[71] 

     In line with responsiveness, fire support assets must also be available to cover any rear areas inclusive of the fire support bases.  These areas for the most part do not involve the close fight, although the tactics of the enemy can certainly change the depth of the battlespace in the MRF  commander's TAOR to a close fight engagement.  Responsiveness means that these rear areas are always considered vulnerable to Level I, & II threats and possibly Level III threats and therefore will receive the same detailed fire support planning effort as given to the close battle.  When there is a plan and it has been rehearsed and studied, then the MRF commander has taken the most appropriate action to increase responsiveness this critically important area.   In these MRF rear areas, precision fires as well as responsiveness is vital.^[72]

     Sustainability.  The future of sea based fire support will increase the sea-basing of logistics.  Riverine operations will be conducted during a time of transition when the "logistics push" system still remains a strong viable player and yet in many regards it can not accomplish what the flexible and responsive "logistics pull" system is capable of doing.  It is difficult to see the full impact of sea basing other than recognize that during Vietnam, riverine operations were probably at the cutting edge of the "logistics pull" concept when we look at how the Mobile Riverine Base concept was used.  Sea basing will reduce transportation requirements during the initial phases of the riverine operation.^[73]  As in the past, this will require the MRF maneuver elements to communicate "real time" requirements for munitions and associated supplies efficiently in order to manage the timely delivery of supplies.^[74]    

     All fire support assets will be impacted by the sustainability issue, but ground-based fire support assets are the most vulnerable due to their high volume resupply requirements.  Easing sustainment requirements is accomplished by increasing the accuracy of all fire support weapons.  Accurate, well aimed, coordinated ground, air, and naval fires will reduce ammunition consumption.  More is not necessarily better.  Improvements in mobility will also enhance logistics resupply.^[75]  In Vietnam, the mobility of the Mobile Riverine Base enabled the MRF commander to bring substantial combat and combat service support to operations immediately adjacent to the base area.  This same type of support should not be discounted even as we move closer to sea-based logistics.^[76]

ISSUES FOR THE CONDUCT OF FIRE SUPPORT

     The current issue facing the Marine Corps' ability to provide fire support in riverine operations with non-MEU(SOC) battalion size units relates to fire support mobility assets.  Without fire support mobility, forces and fires cannot be employed.  The lack of mobility for fire support assets in riverine operations is a result of decisions made during the post Vietnam period.  During this time, the Navy placed their Riverine Craft into their Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM).  The decision to do this technically resulted in removing these assets from the traditional training relationships associated with the Navy-Marine Corps team that would otherwise have enabled use of these assets by Marine Corps units other than special forces e.g., SEALs.  Additionally, with the establishment of U.S. Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM), NSWC became a subordinate command to USSOCOM and therefore these riverine craft belonging to NSWC were no longer Navy assets but rather became USSOCOM assets.^[77] 

CONCLUSIONS

      Although the Navy and Marine Corps have key roles to play in riverine operations, significant riverine fire support mobility assets have been given to other services.  This means that the resources for non-Special Operations Forces (SOF) are not immediately available for riverine training now.  This is the point at which the Navy and Marine Corps may be on divergent paths for ensuring that riverine operations are as much a part of each others service culture as has been  traditionally the case with Amphibious Operations.  Without the Navy's assets for fire support platforms, troop mobility and fire support integration, riverine operations will remain an evolving capability in transition. This makes the concept for fire support in the riverine environment a particularly challenging undertaking.  Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the renewed interest in riverine operations today and in the foreseeable future is clearly delineating each of the services role in the conduct of these operations.  Without this, it is much more difficult to plan, support, and ensure the integration and synchronization of fires in this environment.

     To ensure the MRF commander has sufficient fire support, the combination of air, ground, and sea-based fires are critical.   Since no single fire support asset can meet all required missions due to limited capabilities, each fire support asset must be planned to mutually support the other.  In addition to bringing a unique capability to the fight, each fire support asset must therefore cover deficiencies or capability gaps of other fire support assets.  Furthermore, the MRF commander must guard against depending on any one single fire support asset in the event that with the loss of that weapon, it would possibly prevent the MRF maneuver elements from receiving the necessary fire support they require.  A balanced approach which combines all elements of the Mobile Riverine Force is required to provide effective, continuous fire support to the MRF commander.^[78]

      To successfully conduct riverine operations, all future fire support assets  must share a common battlespace picture.  Future fire support assets must provide the MRF commander with sufficient responsiveness, accuracy, mobility, and range to support his MRF maneuver elements.^[79]

      The Navy-Marine Corps team must continue efforts to improve the range, accuracy, mobility and lethality of fires in order to support riverine operations.  Fire support must remain integrated with all other forms of combat power to successfully execute missions in the riverine environment.  Aviation, ground, and naval fire support assets are complementary parts of the fire support team.  All of these components must be employed as a whole in order for the MRF to fight decisively.^[80]  According to the Naval Special Warfare Center in San Diego, California, the United States Navy and Marine Corps riverine assets no longer include some of the specific weapons capabilities that were discussed in this paper as highlighted from historical examples during Vietnam.  However, the knowledge to prepare this type of Riverine capability again is resident in the archives at the Navy Washington shipyard.^[81]

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

Clegg, Robert H., Concept Paper (Draft),  Riverine Operations,  Command and Staff             College, Marine Corps University, April 1997

 

Collins, John M., Special Operations Forces; An Assessment 1986-1993, National                 Defense University Press Publications, April 1994

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 6-18-1 MCFSS Techniques and Procedures,                  MCCDC, 5 October, 1994.

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFMRP) 6-8 Supporting Arms Observer,          Spotter and Controller, MCCDC, 1991

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFMRP) 21-41, Professional Knowledge          Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1967, Department of the Navy,              Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Aug 8, 1989

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFMRP) 2-7 (Coordinating Draft), Fire             Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations, August 1990

 

Fulton, Willaim B., Vietnam Studies Riverine Operations 1966-1969, Department of the       Army, Washington, D.C., 1973

 

NSW / USMC Riverine Operations Handbook, XL-00080-01-93, San Diego, California,        JAN 1, 1993

 

U.S. Marine Corps Concept Paper, (Draft), A Concept For Operations in The Riverine          Environment,  26 February 1997. USMC

 

U.S. Marine Corps Concept Paper, (Draft by Majors D. Guzik & P. O'Leary USMC),              Advanced Expeditionary Fire Support--The System After Next (A Concept for fires          in Support of Operational Maneuver From the Sea Beyond 2020 and any Foreseeable        Weapon System) 25 February 1997 .