1996 Reports
- Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance By Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, with L.A. "Bud" Edney, Fred M. Franks, Charles A. Horner, Jonathan T. Howe, and Keith Brendley NDU Press Book December 1996 -- The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future U. S. military forces might be configured. (...) The goal of Rapid Dominance will be to destroy or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid Dominance must control the operational environment and through that dominance, control what the adversary perceives, understands, and knows, as well as control or regulate what is not perceived, understood, or known.
- Operation Restore Democracy US Atlantic Command 1996 -- "Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S.-led, multinational effort to create a safe and secure environment and support the return of exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti, was conducted from September 1994 through March 1996."
- Chinese Challenges in Absorbing and Producing New Technology A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing December 1996
- China's S&T Policy: A View From Within A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing December 1996
- Science and Education for a Prosperous China: Lessons From Abroad A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing November 1996
- PRC State Council "Decision on Accelerating S&T Development" A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing November 1996
- China's Science and Technology Policy for the Twenty-First Century -- A View From the Top A Report from U.S. Embassy Beijing November 1996
- "Science and Education for a Prosperous China" -- A Brutal and Frank Assessment A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing November 1996
- The Gulf War -- Lessons for Chinese Military S&T A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing November 1996 -- Science and Education for a Prosperous China addresses questions about the impact of science and technology on the combat readiness of the Chinese military. The report, summarized here, claims that the rapid and overwhelming victory of the U.S. - led forces in the Gulf War demonstrates how high technology has revolutionized modern warfare. Nations throughout the world are modernizing their military to gain political and economic advantages through intimidation. The new technology dictates new military strategies. Military forces of the future will be smaller and flatter in their command structure. Tanks and aircraft carriers, now highly vulnerable to missile attack, are becoming less important.
- The Electromagnetic Bomb - a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction By Carlo Kopp Aerospace Power Chronicles -- High Power Electromagnetic Pulse generation techniques and High Power Microwave technology have matured to the point where practical E-bombs (Electromagnetic bombs) are becoming technically feasible, with new applications in both Strategic and Tactical Information Warfare. The development of conventional E-bomb devices allows their use in non-nuclear confrontations. This paper discusses aspects of the technology base, weapon delivery techniques and proposes a doctrinal foundation for the use of such devices in warhead and bomb applications.
- Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya By MAJ Raymond C. Finch, III. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. -- In the recent Russian military involvement in Chechnya (October 1994-September 1996), we saw a sloppy mixture of these two approaches. Russian tanks crossed into Chechnya in December 1994 to "establish constitutional order in Chechnya and to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia."3 This drastic step was the last in a series of increasingly forceful and largely unsuccessful attempts to remove Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev from power, crush the Chechen claims of independence and impose the Russian Federation's political and economic control of this region. Tens of thousands of casualties later, with much of Chechnya in ruins, Russian forces were withdrawn from this region, having been largely humiliated in nearly two years of vicious fighting. This paper will examine some of the reasons behind the Russian decision to employ conventional military force against the Chechens and why their security establishment suffered a defeat.
- Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya By MAJ Gregory J. Celestan U.S. Army August 1996 -- On December 11, 1994, units from the Russian Ground Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered Chechnya to restore Russian sovereignty and to thwart the proclaimed independence of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. A year and a half later, despite their combat experience and numerical superiority, the Russian Armed Forces still have not crushed the Chechen fighters. The Russian military experience in Chechnya, however, is not unique. During the Cold War, the Soviet Army fought for nine years in Afghanistan without achieving military victory over the Mujahideen resistance. With the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts are becoming more common and other armies are finding themselves fighting local conflicts under similar circumstances. The Russian experience should serve as a lesson for all military organizations on the folly of committing inadequately-trained and equipped troops to battle. While this type of operation would have been difficult for any army, the Russian performance has been especially poor.1 Learning from the problems and mistakes of the Russian Armed Forces can help other militaries avoid these same pitfalls on a future battlefield.
- Directory of Russian Defense Enterprises in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblasts - Part 1 US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, July 1996
- Directory of Russian Defense Enterprises in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblasts - Part 2 US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, July 1996
- Decree No 802 About the List of Enterprises and Organizations of the Defense Complex, Privatization of Which Is Prohibited Russian Federation Government - 12 July 1996, Moscow
- REFORM, CONFLICT, AND SECURITY IN ZAIRE Steven Metz Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks June 5, 1996
- Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAARI) Conference Report U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute May 1996 -- The Bosnia Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I) was held at Carlisle Barracks, 20 23 May 1996, as the first of two AAR conferences to examine the strategic implications of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) for the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The first conference, the essence of this report, examines the planning, preparation, deployment, and early entry operations of OJE from a US perspective. [MSWord 179 Kb]
- CHINA AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS Bates Gill & Lonnie Henley US Army Strategic Studies Institute May 20, 1996
- CHINA'S STRATEGIC VIEW: THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY June Teufel Dreyer -- April 25, 1996
- Fiscal Year 1996 Class Average Report Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC)
- NIGERIA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY Dr. Robert D'A. Henderson COMMENTARY No. 66 Canadian Security Intelligence Service February 1996
- Army Digitization Master Plan '96 Army Digitization Office -- The Army Digitization Master Plan (ADMP) provides the roadmap for the introduction of digital information technologies as the Army transforms itself via the Force XXI process into a 21st Century force. The ADMP addresses strategies, responsibilities, requirements, architectures, acquisition, experimentation methodology, management processes, and coordination of digital battlespace issues in the Army, with the other Services, and within future coalition forces. This annual update of the ADMP establishes the overall strategy for achieving battlespace digitization and defines the migration plans of individual battlespace systems to the Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII COE). The Plan also describes how the Army is working toward achieving interoperability with joint and combined forces.
