Can The Mobilization Support Battalion Meet The Challenge Of Future Selected Marine Corps Reserve Mobilization? CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Can the Mobilization Support Battalion Meet the Challenge of Future Selected Marine Corps Reserve Mobilizations? Author: Major A. L. Saunders, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps Reserve cannot accomplish its mission of rapid reinforcement and augmentation of the Active component without a responsive mobilization and training process administered by the Mobilization Support Battalion. Background: During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized for the first time since the Korean Conflict. While this mobilization was not conducted under harsh time constraints, it enabled the Marine Corps to evaluate its mobilization policies and procedures and implement improvements for future mobilizations. The Mobilization Support Battalion of today serves as the linchpin in the Marine Corps' efforts to meet the challenge of future Selected Reserve mobilizations. Recommendations: (1) Continue to vigorously test and evaluate the mobilization processes through the annual MOBEX program. (2) Have Headquarters, Marine Corps, continue to host annual mobilization conferences with participation by the key facilitators of the Marine Corps mobilization policies and processes. (3) Actively integrate training pertaining to Reserve capabilities and mobilization procedures into the professional military education arena. CAN THE MOBILIZATION SUPPORT BATTALION MEET THE CHALLENGE OF FUTURE SELECTED MARINE CORPS RESERVE UNIT MOBILIZATIONS? Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 262 states that the mission of Americas' Reserve forces is to: provide trained and qualified units and individuals to be available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, and at such times as national security may require. The Presidential Selected Recall of August 1990, that led to Reserve participation in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm served as a double-edged sword, notable for two major accomplishments. The first accomplishment and "cutting edge" of the sword was the confirmation of America's commitment to the "Total Force Policy" established in the 1970s. The second major accomplishment and "dull edge" of the sword was the highlighting of deficiencies in our mobilization process. The Marine Corps Reserve cannot accomplish its mission of rapid reinforcement and augmentation of the Active component without a responsive mobilization and training process administered by the Mobilization Support Battalion. In this study, the term "Mobilization Support Battalion" refers to the organization responsible for the processing and training of Selected Marine Corps Reserve Units at the Station of Initial Assignment. This distinction is necessary because Camp Pendleton used the term "Warrior Training Command" while Camp Lejeune used the term "Mobilization Processing Center" for their respective mobilization support organizations during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm mobilizations. The Presidential Selective Recall of August 1990 marked the first time that the Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized since the Korean Conflict (July 1950). The hiatus in the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve can be directly attributed to the national security and national military strategies that existed during those time periods and not a state of unpreparedness on the part of the Reserve forces. A general review of the strategic role of the Reserves is necessary to understand why they were mobilized for Desert Shield/Desert Storm and how they might be utilized in the future. The only probable means of preventing hostility for any length of time and from being exempted from the consequent calamities of War, is to put the National Militia in such a condition that they may appear truly respectable in the eyes of our Friends and formidable to those who would otherwise become our enemies.1 In a paper, entitled "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," General George Washington made direct reference to the necessity of maintaining a national military force in readiness. At the time of his statement (1783), the military force of young America was comprised of citizen- soldiers and known as the National Militia. Today, while the United States maintains a full-time Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the idea of the citizen-soldier lives on in our Reserve and National Guard forces. A national security strategy has historically set the tone for the role of the Reserves in matters pertaining to war and national emergencies. The Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized and played key roles in both World War II and Korea. Their credible performances during these periods of conflict are legacies that can be found in history books and in the spirit of today's Marines. During World War II and Korea, the Marine Corps Reserve was used primarily to fill the shortfalls of the Active components tables of organi- zation and as a manpower source for the expansion of the Marine Corps' overall structure. In addition, the Marine Corps Reserve was also seen as a manpower pool for the forming of cadres that would be responsible for providing training to younger, inexperienced Marines. Of particular importance is the fact that except for some aviation units, Organized Marine Corps Reserve units were disbanded upon mobilization and integrated with Active component units.2 Post-World War II saw the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as world powers. Both nations possessed nuclear weapons capability and vastly different political philosophies (democracy versus communism). The spread of communism and the Soviet nuclear capability was of vital concern to the United States and reflected in the national strategy of containment and massive retaliation towards communist aggression. While conventional war with the Soviet Union was viewed as unlikely, emphasis was placed on deterrence through existing forces with a rapid-response role for the Reserves.3 The Korean Conflict introduced new concepts into national security planning that exist today, namely, limited war and partial mobilization. In July 1961, President Kennedy addressed the nation and stressed the necessity for America to "have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear war." In addition, he outlined his proposal for a request to "call elements of the Ready Reserve to active duty if necessary."4 Kennedy further displayed his willingness to utilize the Reserves in pursuit of national objectives by mobilizing 150,000 National Guard and Ready Reserve personnel in support of the Berlin Airlift in October 1961. While Kennedy saw using the Reserves as a political tool, his successor would view not using the Reserves as a political tool. President Johnson was the Chief Executive during the period of America's greatest involvement in Vietnam. In a 1965 speech, he stated: Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack... We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.5 The reference to doing "only what is absolutely necessary" to achieve his objectives in Vietnam was not taken lightly by President Johnson. By personally managing the Rolling Thunder Campaign, President Johnson attempted to persuade the North Vietnamese Government to cease their aggression and to prevent a Chinese military response. Johnson's deliberate decision not to mobilize the Reserves was partly made to demonstrate his intent/resolve to limit U.S. involvement in that conflict and pursue a diplomatic settlement.6 In 1971, a landmark change in our National Security Strategy occurred that set the tone for America's future military forces. By abolishing the draft, America committed itself not only to an all volunteer force, but also to a "Total Force." The Department of Defense adopted a "Total Force Policy" which made reservists, rather than draftees, the initial and primary source of personnel to augment the active forces--particularly the early deploying forces--in a military emergency.7 Perhaps the greatest impact of the "Total Force Policy" was that the Reserve components were to be "equal partners with their active force counterparts in peacetime as well as wartime and as ready as their active force counterpart."8 Training with the same equipment as the Active component has enabled the Marine Corps Reserve to become a more effective member of the "total" Marine Corps Team. The mobilization of specific Reserve units, National Guard units, and Individual Ready Reserve members in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were clear examples of American commitment to the Total Force Policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the next major event that would drastically affect our National Security Strategy. Recognizing that the global balance of power had shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar world, the United States remained committed to: maintaining the strength necessary to influence world events, deter would-be aggressors, guarantee free access to global markets, and encourage continued democratic and economic progress in an atmosphere of enhanced stability.9 The National Military Strategy of 1992 acknowledges that while the changing world order and domestic fiscal constraints have resulted in the reduction in the size of our military forces, those forces must never become "hollow forces that are under-manned, undertrained, and not prepared for immediate deployment.10 Deterrence and crisis response missions will be handled by forces comprised of an appropriate mix of active and reserve personnel. Forces for regional crises will be drawn in large part from the Active components with essential support from the Reserve components. As a crisis become larger or more protracted, the Reserve components would be increasingly relied upon.11 Through national maturation, economic necessity, or a combination thereof, the Total Force has become a formidable tool of American policy. The expeditious response required by America's Total Force in meeting the crises of today and the future underscores the need for a responsive mobili- zation process. The most essential elements required for the Marine Corps to maintain a rapid response reserve force are available, trained personnel and an effective mobilization process. For future mobilizations, the bulk of the personnel required to augment/reinforce the Active component will come from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. The Mobilization Support Battalion will serve as the facilitator for the augmentation/reinforcement and training of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve units and personnel. The Mobilization Support Battalion is an organization that exists on series "W" tables of organization. The command nucleus of the organization is the Reserve Support Unit (RSU) of bases/air stations that are designated as Stations of Initial Assignment. The Commanding Officer of the RSU has a dual mission that makes him the linchpin in all matters pertaining to the Reserves at his specific installation. The mission statement of the Camp Lejeune RSU best describes these responsibilities. The Reserve Support Unit conducts planning for, and provides administrative and logistic support to Reserve units and Individual Ready Reservists from all Reserve components to accomplish monthly, annual, and other Reserve training duty aboard the Base. Upon mobilization, the RSU becomes the command nucleus for the Camp Lejeune Mobilization Support Battalion, responsible for the processing, training and staging of those individuals for whom Camp Lejeune is the Station of Initial Assignment.12 The RSU Commander works under the administrative and operational control of the Commanding General of his particular base/air station and receives technical direction from the Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve. As appropriate, The RSU Commander coordinates with: Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Support Command (MCRSC), and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Manpower, Marine Corps Base (or Air Station) for the activation, recall, assignment, and reporting instructions of Individual Manpower Augmentees, preassigned Individual Ready Reservists, and retired personnel for the timely fill of "W" series table of organization billets.13 The W-series table of organization designates the personnel required to fill specific billets within the Mobilization Support Battalion. The Individual Manpower Augmentee (IMA) is the backbone of the Mobilization Support Battalion. The IMA is defined as "selected reservists who fill mobilization billets on active component W-series tables of organization for which an early fill has been identified."14 These reservists are trained specifically to perform the processing functions required of the Mobilization Support Battalion. Within the Mobilization Support Battalion are two elements known as the Mobilization Processing Center (MPC) and the Mobilization Training Coordination Center (MTCC). The MPC is responsible for the actual processing of Reservists and the MTCC is responsible for training Reservists. It is at the MPC and MTCC that the "rubber meets the road" regarding reserve mobilization and training. Mobilization processing of the Selected Marine Crops Reserve is a complex procedure. The Mobilization Processing Center consists of various stations designed to expedite the integration of the Selected Marine Corps Reservists into the Active component. The In-Processing Station is responsible for ensuring the documented reception and control of arriving mobilized personnel. The Legal Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that legal briefs and services are provided to the mobilized personnel. Examples of legal services provided include powers of attorney preparation, wills preparation, and provision of general legal assistance. The Service Record Book Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that all mobilized personnel have Service Record Books/officer Qualification Records on file. In addition, the record books will be screened to ensure that the following forms are present and properly completed: Serviceman Group Life Insurance (SGLI) Record of Emergency Data (RED) Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) Dependent Eligibility Enrollment System (DEERS) Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) Family Separation Allowance (FSA) Privacy Act Statement Chronological Record (page 3) correct home of record The Orders Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that the original orders of all mobilized personnel are properly endorsed and that sufficient copies are available as required by regulation. The Unit Diary Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that mobilized personnel are transferred from the Reserve Manpower Management System (REMMPS) to the Active component's Joint Uniform Military Pay System. In addition, all source documents are verified for completeness and are certified as appropriate. The Pay Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that mobilized personnel receive an initial payment of eighty percent of thirty days base pay if it was not drawn at the Home Training Center. Travel claims assistance will be provided and class "D" allotments and Direct Deposit requests will be processed. The Identification Station is responsible for ensuring that all mobilized personnel possess valid active duty identification cards and tags. The Medical Processing Station is responsible for providing medical examination, immunizations, and creating/updating military health records for all mobilized personnel. The Dental Processing Station is responsible for providing type two examinations and creating/updating military dental records for all mobilized personnel. In addition, this station will schedule required treatment in accordance with the services available and the training schedules of the reservists. The Clothing Issue/Inventory Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that all mobilized personnel meet the minimum uniform requirements and are issued any clothing identified as missing or unserviceable. The Out- Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that each individual has completed the processing chain of events and is forward to the appropriate gaining command.15 While the Mobilization Processing Center of the Mobilization Support Battalion has a myriad of duties to perform in order to expedite the mobilization process, it must be stated that they do not shoulder the entire burden of the process. The mission to maintain mobilization readiness of Selected Marine Corps Reserve Units falls upon the Inspector-Instructor Staffs.16 Their collective abilities to achieve a high mobilization readiness posture coupled with the time available between activation and departure from their Home Training Centers will have a dramatic impact on the degree of services provided by the Mobilization Support Battalion. One of the chief ways that the Selected Marine Corps Reserve monitors its mobilization readiness posture is with a unique tool known as the Mobilization and Operational Readiness deployment Test (MORDT). The MORDT is a demanding, "surprise" inspection (held every two years) that provides an indication of mobilization readiness by evaluating unit participation by means of a short notice muster; evaluating unit administrative readiness by a thorough review of service record books/officer qualification records; evaluating the ability of a unit to conduct on-site mobilization processing; and evaluating the embarkation plans of personnel and equipment. A MORDT-and-Stay inspection is conducted at the Home Training Center of the Reserve Unit and greater emphasis is placed upon administrative processing and readiness and equipment embarkation readiness. A MORDT-and-Go inspection, involves a partial mobilization processing and the actual departure of the unit from the Home Training Center to a Station of Initial Assignment (for training). After Desert Shield/Desert Storm, many Reservists pointed to the MORDT as a crucial element in preparing their units for actual mobilization.11 Administrative processing of the reservists represents only half of the mobilization process. The second half of the process is ensuring that the reservists receive training that will enable them to successfully accomplish their mission of augmentation and reinforcement of the Active component. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, all Selected Marine Corps Reservists were required to attend Individual Refresher Training. This was a seven-day, Southwest Asia oriented, training package designed to "provide intensive combat refresher training in those weapons skills necessary to produce combat ready Marines. ,18 This course of instruction, conducted at Camp Lejeune and the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California, focused on the following weapon systems: a. .45 caliber pistol b. M16A2 rifle c. M203 grenade launcher d. M249 SMAW e. M2 .50 caliber machinegun (familiarization) f. MK 19 machinegun (familiarization) g. M60E machinegun (familiarization) h. AT4 (familiarization) The need for this refresher training is by no means a condemnation of the Reserve component. We simply cannot afford to overlook the fact that the limited training time available during regularly scheduled drill periods and the complexity of today's equipment does have an effect on the MOS proficiency of the Reserve component.19 From a processing and training standpoint, the Mobilization Support Battalion must be viewed as an absolute necessity. Major General Livingston, Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve, and Colonel Chase, Commanding Officer, 4th Civil Affairs Group, warn that: the successful activation of 31,000 Marine reservists and their noteworthy performance during Desert Shield/Desert Storm did not truly test or prove the Reserve's ability to deploy into harm's way on short notice....it would be dangerous business--even folly-- to measure the quality of Reserve readiness by the response to that war.20 The basis for this assertion lies in the fact that "the United States, alone or with allies, may never again enjoy a luxury comparable to the 5-month, uncontested buildup of forces, in-theater, prior to hostilities."21 While the above statement is basically true, the fact remains that the mobilization process was tested and shortfalls were identified. It was not dangerous business or folly for the Marine Corps to analyze the problems encountered and to implement procedures that will result in an improved mobilization and training process for future mobilizations. By reviewing some of the problems identified during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm mobilizations and the actions taken to resolve them, we can better speculate how well the Mobilization Support Battalion will meet the challenge of future mobilizations. The Marine Corps has participated in Joint mobilization exercises, the last being held in 1989. Excluding the MORDT-and-Go Inspections, prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Marine Corps did not conduct exercises that would test the mobilization process at the designated Stations of Initial Assignment. During August 1994, the Marine Corps conducted its first (Service type) mobilization exercise. The purpose of this exercise was to: Validate portions of the recently revised Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan which reflects post-Desert Storm mobilization plans. Educate personnel and provide practical experience in mobilization manpower and training processes and requirements.21 A key feature of this exercise was incorporating IMA annual training requirements with the "mobilization" of Individual Ready Reserve Marines. Participating bases and stations activated all of their mobilization agencies; the Commanding Generals Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve Support Command also exercised their mobilization operations centers. If Headquarter, Marine Corps continues to conduct the MOBEX annually (as intended), it will become an invaluable tool for improving the mobilization processes and proficiencies of our Corps. An additional benefit would be that a base of knowledge pertaining to Reserve mobilization requirements will be continuously expanded at the Station of Initial Assignment's installation support level. Since Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Headquarters, Marine Corps, has hosted four Marine Corps Mobilization Conferences. The most recent conference was held earlier this month and one of the main purposes of the conference was to review the 1995 draft of the Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan. Some of the participants in this conference were the RSU Commanders; representatives from Marine Forces Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve Support Command; and the Training and Education Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. These conferences, and the participants attending represent high levels of Marine Corps leadership actively focusing on the importance of maintaining an the effective mobilization program for our Reserve component. It is essential that these conferences continue to be held annually if the Marine Corps to keep the mobilization of its Reserve component as a priority issue. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it was discovered that there was not a joint Navy/USMC program that synchronized reserve mobilization of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve Unit and its attached Navy Corpsmen. In numerous instances the Reserve corpsman would arrive at the Station of Initial Assignment after the unit they were attached to. In addition, there are certain billets at the naval hospitals aboard Marine Corps Bases that rely upon the Navy Reserve for the backfill of billets during mobili- zation. This situation continues to be a concern of the RSU Commander/Mobilization Process Battalion Commander at Camp Lejeune.22 If not resolved, these shortfalls of medical personnel will adversely affect the medical processing portion of future Selected Marine Corps Reserve mobilizations and the support provided to the installations' community. Since Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Navy has decided to augment its Personnel Support Detachments at the Stations of Initial Assignment with Personnel Mobilization Teams (Naval Reservists) to assist with our mobilization process. Colonel Siegel, Commanding Officer, Mobilization Support Battalion, Camp Lejeune, has looked forward and identified an essential requirement that must be met if the Mobilization Support Battalion is to efficiently meet the challenge of future mobilizations. Simply put, the IMA billets identified on the W-series table of organization must receive priority fill during peacetime. If the Selected Marine Corps Reserve is needed during future crises, the Mobilization Support Battalion must be ready to process a larger number of Selected Reservists in a shorter amount of time than that which occurred during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Training throughout the Marine Corps in matters pertaining to Reserve capabilities and mobilization processing is woefully inadequate. If the Selected Marine Corps Reserve is to augment or reinforce the Active component, it seems only natural that their abilities and limitations be understood by the Active component. One way to foster this knowledge is through education at our professional military education institutions. In 1991, it is interesting to note that no curriculum at any Marine Corps school includes detailed courses of instruction about the Marine Corps Reserve.23 In 1994, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College held a series of courses pertaining to the capabilities of the Marine Corps Reserve. Hopefully, the classes presented will be expanded, and the total mobilization process will be addressed. Leaders of tomorrow must learn their lessons today. Throughout the course of this research, it was evident that the Marine Corps did not waste the opportunity to improve its mobilization policies and processes. Interviews with the Commanding Office, RSU Camp Lejeune and the Executive Officer, RSU Camp Pendleton, prove that the commitment to improving the mobilization process at their respective bases is ongoing and the confidence in their organizations was readily apparent. The professionalism and dedication of the Marines at Headquarters, Marine Corps (MPP-60 and PP&O), who were working with ideas that would provide for the most efficient means of mobilizing our Reserve component was equally impressive. With all of the dedication and effort the Marine Corps is now placing towards improved mobilization, there can be no doubt that the Mobilization Support Battalion will successfully meet the challenge of future Selected Marine Corps Reserve mobilizations. NOTES 1. George F. Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy, The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1962, 3 2. Candace G. Quinlan, "Employment of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve Forces as Units: A Needed Commitment," Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 1990, 3-4 3. Martin Binkin, U. S. Reserve Forces--The Problem of the Weekend Warrior, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1974, 20 4. Eliot, 2 5. Depart of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965, as quoted in Kahin and Lewis, "A Threat to the Peace: North Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam," 495 6. Binkin, 21 7. Roles of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy, Statement of Richard A. Davis before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 23 February 1989, 2 8. Ibid, 2 9. Colin Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., July 1994, 2 10. Ibid, 8 11. Ibid, 8, 19 12. Marine Corps Base Organization and Functions Manual, Camp Lejeune, NC 1994 13. Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, Mobilization Manual, Camp Lejeune, NC, June 1994 14. Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN), Volume II, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Arlington, VA, March 1993 15. Station of Initial Assignment, Standard Operating Procedures, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton 16. Statement of LtGen M. T. Cooper, USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, House Armed Services Committee, concerning "The Inspector-Instructor Program" 21 April 1993 17. Mark F. Cancian, LtCol, USMCR, "Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, September 1991 18. Warrior Training Battalion, Standard Operating Procedures, Camp Pendleton, CA, 1991, 4 19. This assertion is based upon my personal experience as an Inspector-Instructor in the 6th Engineer Support Battalion from August 1985 to July 1988. 20. James E. Livingston, MajGen, USMC and Eric L. Chase, Col, USMC, "Marine Reserve Force: Critical-Back-UP Muscle for America's Post-Cold War Force-In-Readiness" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, March 1994, 21. MPP-60 Information Paper on MOBEX-94, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Arlington, VA August 1994 22. James R. Siegel, Col, USMCR, Commanding Officer, Reserve Support Unit, Camp Lejeune, NC, Interview of 3 February 1995 23. Rex Williams, Col, USMCR, "If It Aint Broke, Can It BE Improved?" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, September, 1991, 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. A. L. Ambrosi Jr., Captain, USMCR, "Plan to Improve the Marine Corps Reserve Mobilization Capability," Marine Corps Junior School, Quantico, VA, November 1962 2. Martin Binkin, U.S. Reserve Forces--The Problem of the Weekend Warrior, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1974 3. Robert D. Brown, LtCol, USMCR, "Mobilizing the Individual Ready Reserve" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, September 1991 4. Mark F. Cancian, LtCol, USMCR, "Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, September 1991 5. D. R. Chevallier, Major, USMCR, "The Marine Corps Reserve and Its Future" Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA 1991 6. Statement of LtGen M. T. Cooper, USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, House Armed Services Committee, concerning "The Inspector-Instructor Program" 21 April 1993 7. Richard A. Davis, "Role of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy" Statement before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. 23 February 1989 8. Joseph F. Donahoe Jr., Col, USMC, "Mobilization and the Marines" Part 1, Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, December, 1967 9. George F. Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy, The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1962 10. William Y. Elliott, Mobilization Planning and the National Security (1950-1960), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1950 11. Robert L. Goldrich et al, Strategic Study, The U.S. Reserve System: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Realities, The National War College, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. 24 May 1982 12. Ernest H. Guisti, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950-1951, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 1951 13. K. Kirkman, Major, USMCR, Executive Officer, Reserve Support Unit, Camp Pendleton, CA interview of 17 January 1995 14. William F. Levantrosser, National Security Management-- DEFENSE MANPOWER: Management of the Reserve Components, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C. October 1967 15. James E. Livingston, MajGen, USMC and Eric L. Chase, Col, USMC, "Marine Reserve Force: Critical Back-Up Muscle for America's Post-Cold War Force-In-Readiness" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, March, 1994 16. Mobilization and the National Defense, edited by Hardy L. Merritt and Luther F. Carter, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C. 1985 17. Candace G. Quinlan, "Employment of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve Forces as Units: A Needed Commitment" Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 1990 18. Karim Shihata, LtCol, USMCR, "United States Marine Corps Reserve Structure" Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 1992-1993 19. Karim Shihata, LtCol, USMCR, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Interview of 14 March 1995, Arlington, VA 20. James R. Siegel, Col, USMCR, Commanding Officer, Reserve Support Unit, Camp Lejeune, NC, Interview of 3 February 1995 21. Guy A. Stratton, Major, USMCR, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Interview of 3 March 1995, Arlington, VA 22. James B. Whisker, The Citizen Solder and the United States Military Policy, North River Press, Inc. November 1979 23. Rex Williams, Col, USMCR, "If It Aint Broke, Can It BE Improved?" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, September, 1991 24. The Marine Crops Reserve--A History, by Reserve Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1966 25. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM Use of Navy and Marine Corps Reserves, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. June 1991 26. RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS-Fiscal Year 1991, Report to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. February 1992 27. RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS-Fiscal Year 1992, Report to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office of the Secretary, of Defense, Washington, D.C. January 1993 28. Reserve Component Categories of the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C. October 1967 29. National Military Strategy of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. January 1992 30. Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN), Volume II, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Arlington, VA, March 1993 31. (Draft) Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN), Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Arlington, VA, 1995 32. Warrior Training Battalion, Standard Operating Procedures, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA, September 1991 33. Station of Initial Assignment, Standard Operating Procedures, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton 34. Desert Shield/Desert Storm--Mobilization/Demobilization MCLLS Items Binder, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Arlington, VA. 1991
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
