Military

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation: The Use Of Integrated and

Combined Combat Arms in Maneuver Warfare

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

 

 

 

United States Marine Corps

Command and Staff College

Marine Corps University

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

 

Master of Military Studies

AY 1994-1995

 

Title: Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation:

The Use of Integrated and Combined Combat

Arms in Maneuver Warfare

 

1st Mentor: Dr. H. W. Gholson

 

2d Mentor: LtCol D. A. Driscoll, USMC

 

3d Reader: LtCol T. V. Wolf, USMC

 

 

 

Author: Major R. M. Rayfield, USMC

CG 10

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation: The Use of Integrated and Combined

 

Combat Arms in Maneuver Warfare

 

 

 

Author: Major Richard M. Rayfield, United States Marine Corps

 

 

 

Thesis: To analyze the evolution of Marine aviation from a supporting arm to an

 

integrated combined arm supporting the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in

 

order to identify its use as a combat arm applying maneuver warfare.

 

 

 

Background: The Marine Corps officially adopted maneuver warfare as its warfighting

 

philosophy with the publication of FMFM 1, Warfighting, in March 1989. FMFM 1

 

generated much discussion as to the merits of maneuver warfare, including its application

 

to the aviation combat element (ACE) of the MAGTF. Numerous papers, books, and

 

articles expounded on the idea of the ACE as a maneuver element, many appearing in the

 

Marine Corps Gazette. A notable proponent of maneuver warfare was William S. Lind.

 

Official Marine Corps documents and doctrinal publications began to emerge highlighting

 

this view of Marine aviation as a player in maneuver warfare.

 

 

 

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the discussion of the ACE as a maneuver element

 

expanded to that of the ACE as a combat arm, supporting the entire MAGTF. This

 

concept contradicted the traditional view of Marine aviation as a supporting arm of the

 

ground combat element. The concept of the ACE supporting the entire MAGTF was

 

furthered by the acceptance of the MAGTF, specifically the Marine expeditionary force

 

(MEF), as the warfighting organization of the Marine Corps. The MEF's focus was

 

directed toward the operational level of war, with the ACE constituting but one combat

 

arm in the MEF commander's "toolbox." Again, numerous papers and articles put forth

 

the idea of the ACE as a combat arm supporting the MAGTF. Official Marine Corps

 

documents and doctrinal publications adhering to this concept appeared as early as 1989.

 

 

 

Despite much of the recent discussion of maneuver warfare and the role of Marine

 

aviation within this warfighting philosophy, Marines have practiced much of it for years.

 

Many of the tenets of maneuver warfare can be identified as long ago as the 1920s, in

 

Nicaragua. Official Marine Corps publications, such as the Tentative Manual for Landing

 

Operations (1935); Marine Aviation: General, 1940; and NAVMC 2890, Small Wars

 

Manual, outline the same principles espoused by our current maneuver warfare doctrine.

 

A brief study of historical applications, from World War I to Somalia, highlights successful

 

and unsuccessful use of aviation that the Marine Corps can learn from and build upon.

 

 

 

Literature Review: Initial research centered on a review of existing and emerging joint

 

and Marine Corps doctrinal manuals. Joint doctrine review focused primarily on Joint Pub

 

3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 3-07 (Draft), Joint Doctrine for

 

Military Operations Other Than War. The review of Marine doctrine encompassed both

 

Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFMs) and Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications

 

(FMFRPs). Many historical accounts of Marine Corps operations have been republished

 

as FMFRPs. Key publications included FMFM 1; FMFM 1-1, Campaigning; the FMFM

 

5 series of Marine aviation publications; FMFM 6 (Final Draft), Ground Combat

 

Operations; FMFRP 12-26, Marine Aviation: General, 1940; and FMFRP 12-34, History

 

of the Marine Corps Operations in World War II.

 

 

Other Marine Corps sources proved invaluable. The written documents included the

 

Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) (July 1989), the MAGTF Master Plan (MMP)

 

(July 1991 and July 1993), and a report submitted by Major General James M. Myatt,

 

USMC to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. A telephone

 

interview with Colonel Michael M. Kurth, USMC provided great insight into the use of

 

Marine aviation in the Persian Gulf war.

 

 

 

A search of Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) holdings identified many

 

sources. These sources primarily were monographs, papers and theses submitted by

 

students at other US armed forces schools. They proved especially useful in the

 

discussion of operations other than war.

 

 

 

Published books provided an excellent source of material, particularly in the areas

 

of maneuver warfare application and historical example. Notable sources on maneuver

 

warfare application included William S. Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook and Martin

 

van Creveld's Air Power and Maneuver Warfare. Some superb historical examples were

 

provided by Robert Sherrod's History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, Peter

 

Mersky's US. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present, and the accounts of Allied

 

operations in Italy in 1944.

 

 

 

Analysis: This analysis revealed an abundance of information regarding the use of Marine

 

aviation, past and present, and its applicability to maneuver warfare. It highlighted

 

numerous examples of aviation's successful and unsuccessful use on the battlefield.

 

Research identified numerous articles and papers dealing with the ACE and maneuver

 

warfare. Nothing existed to tie these concepts into a meaningful document for practical

 

use.

 

 

 

Analysis further highlighted the void in Marine Corps doctrine dealing with Marine

 

aviation and maneuver warfare. Since the publication of FMFM 1, officially tying the

 

Marine Corps to maneuver warfare, no corresponding discussion of the ACE has been

 

published. Doctrine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico,

 

Virginia, has as one of its tasks to develop FMFM 5, Marine Air-Ground Task Force

 

Aviation. The focus of this masters paper and the desired focus of FMFM 5 were closely

 

related.

 

 

 

Three proposed courses of action presented themselves: produce a standard masters

 

thesis, do nothing, or produce a draft doctrinal manual.

 

 

            1.            Do Nothing. Doing nothing obviously does not benefit anyone.

 

 

            2.            Standard Masters Thesis. A standard masters thesis, although valuable,

 

                            would be limited in its practical use. Its availability to users would be

 

                           limited, and it would bear no official Marine Corps sanction.

 

 

            3.            Draft Doctrinal Manual. A doctrine manual provides prescriptive

 

                        information on warfighting and is distributed throughout the Marine

                       

                        Corps. It is an official Marine Corps publication, governed by

                       

                        MCO 5600.20M and MCBul 5600. This order and bulletin also outline

                       

                        the specific procedures for development, publication, and review of

                       

                        Marine Corps doctrinal manuals. The integration of the research required

                       

                        for this paper into the development of the capstone manual for Marine

                       

                        Aviation, FMFM 5, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation, would

                       

                        provide immediate benefit to the operating forces of the Marine Corps.

                       

                        (See attached Director, Doctrine Division ltr 5600/C42 of 26 Oct 94.)

 

 

 

Recommendation: The recommended course of action was the integration of masters

 

research with the development of a draft doctrine manual. Input during the developmental

 

stage and review of the initial draft was provided by a ground combat arms officer student,

 

adding to the integrated combined arms focus of this book. It is recommended that this

 

book be approved by Command and Staff College and forwarded to Doctrine Division,

 

MCCDC. Doctrine Division can then prepare the draft for approval by CG, MCCDC and

 

distribution to the Marine Corps as FMFM 5 (Draft), Marine Air-Ground Task Force

 

Aviation.

 

 

 

FMFM 5 (Draft), Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation, discusses how to think about

 

Marine aviation--as a combat arm supporting the MAGTF, applying integrated combined

 

arms concepts to maneuver warfare. The FMFM 5 (Draft) is the capstone manual for

 

Marine Aviation, and is written in a style and format similar to that of FMFM 1.

 

 

 

Special Note.  I am especially indebted to the personnel of Doctrine Division, Marine

 

Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. The Director of Doctrine

 

Division, the Aviation Doctrine Branch, the Ground Doctrine Branch, and the Doctrine

 

Division Terminologist were particularly helpful and supportive. Their guidance and

 

assistance in the source material, format, compatibility with existing and emerging

 

doctrine, and content of this draft doctrine manual was invaluable.

 

 

 

                                                UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

                                                  Doctrine Division C 42

                                    Marine Corps Combat Development Command

                                        2042 Broadway Street, Suite 2 10

                                                Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021

 

                                                                                                                                                5600

                                                                                                                                                C 42

                                                                                                                                                26 Oct 94

 

From:            Director, Doctrine Division

To:            Director, Marine Corps Command and Staff College (Attn: Dr H. W. Gholson

            and LtCol D. A. Driscoll, USMC)

 

Subj:            BENEFIT OF STUDENT RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINAL

            MANUAL

 

Ref:  (a) Master of Military Studies Paper Proposal submitted by Maj R. M. Rayfield,

                USMC to Command and Staff College, AY 94-95

      (b) MCO 5600.20M

      (c) MCBul 5600

 

1. Reference (a) is a Master of Military Studies (MMS) Paper Proposal by Maj Rayfield.

The proposed topic concerns the evolution of Marine Aviation from a supporting arm to

a combat arm. The topic further includes the application of Marine Aviation in

maneuver warfare as the aviation combat element (ACE) of the Marine air-ground task

force (MAGTF). Maj Rayfield lists his 1st Mentor as Dr H. W. Gholson and his 2d

Mentor as LtCol D. A- Driscoll, USMC.

 

2. Doctrine Division is responsible for doctrine development for the Marine Corps. The

development approval, publication, and review process for this doctrine is outlined in

references (b) and (c). Reference (c) also includes specific manuals under development.

Because of Maj Rayfield's prior assignment to Doctrine Division, he is thoroughly

familiar with the doctrine development process and procedures.

 

3. Per reference (c), one of the manuals to be developed is Fleet Marine Force Manual

(FMFM) 5, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation. FMFM 5 will be the capstone

manual for Marine Aviation that will parallel and complement FMFM 1, Warfighting.

The desired focus of FMFM 5 and Maj Rayfield's MMS proposal are closely related. His

efforts would speed the doctrine development and approval process for FMFM 5.

 

4. Maj Rayfield's research and assistance in development of FMFM 5, while

simultaneously satisfying the MMS requirements of Command and Staff College, would

be of great benefit to Doctrine Division and the Marine Corps.

 

 

                                       D. R. MIRRA

                                       LtCol USMC

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                                                                                                FMFM 5

                                                                                                                                                DRAFT

 

 

                                                            Marine Air-Ground Task Force

 

                                                                             Aviation

 

 

 

                                                                            ***(TIF)***

 

 

 

                                                                        U.S. Marine Corps

 

                                                                                                                                                PCN 139 000150 00

 

 

 

 

                                                  DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

                                    Headquarters United States Marine Corps

                                                Washington, D.C. 20380-0001

 

                                                                                                                                    18 April 1995

 

 

 

                                                                        FOREWORD

 

"Marine aviation units are an integral element of an air-ground combat system. They

 

are not merely joined at the top when the time comes to fight. They are fully integrated

 

from top to bottom, and they train that way full-time."1

 

 

 

                                                                                                -- General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC

 

 

"It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different

 

arms which will ensure victory."2

 

 

                                                                                                                                    -- Henri Jomini

 

 

This book describes the Marine Corps doctrine for using aviation. It provides a common

 

ground for understanding aviation and how the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

 

operationally and tactically exploits aviation's capabilities within the battlespace.

 

 

 

We direct every phrase in these pages towards one goal--success in war. To achieve

 

victory, the MAGTF must focus all efforts to this end. This requires a common

 

understanding of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Maneuver warfare provides the

 

basis for the Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine. Aviation forces, like the other elements

 

of the MAGTF, conduct operations using this doctrine. This book applies maneuver

 

warfare to MAGTF aviation.

 

 

 

The inescapable lesson of history--and the theme of this book--demands the integration

 

of aviation with other combat arms. The Marine Corps uses aviation as an integral part of

 

our naval expeditionary air-ground team. As part of this combined-arms team, aviation

 

extends and expands the MAGTF's warfighting power. This unique combined-arms

 

capability remains the strength and hallmark of the MAGTF.

 

 

 

This book is descriptive rather than prescriptive in nature; it requires judgment in

 

application. It does not discuss aircraft tactics, the organization of Marine aviation, how

 

to conduct a helicopterborne operation, or how to attack a target. This book focuses on

 

how to think about MAGTF aviation--as a combat arm, supporting the MAGTF, applying

 

maneuver warfare.

 

 

 

Recommendations for improving this publication are encouraged from commands as well

 

as from individuals. Forward suggestions using the User Suggestion Form format to--

 

            Commanding General

            Doctrine Division (C 423)

            Marine Corps Combat Development Command

            2042 Broadway Street, Suite 205

            Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021

 

  BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

 

 

 

                                                                                                                        C. E. WILHELM

                                                                                                   Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

                                                                                                                Commanding General

                                                                                                 Marine Corps Combat Development Command

                                                                                                                        Quantico, Virginia

 

DISTRIBUTION: PCN 139 000150 00

 

 

 

 

                    MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE AVIATION

 

                              Table of Contents

 

 

Chapter 1.             Aviation and the Marine Corps

 

Forged in Combat--Combined Arms--The Marine Air-Ground Task Force

 

Chapter 2.             Aviation and Maneuver Warfare

 

To Achieve a Decision--Aviation at the Operational Level-

Tactical-Operational Interaction--Focus and Speed--Surprise, Unpredictability, and

Boldness--Lethality and Effectiveness

 

Chapter 3.             Combat Operations

 

To Provide Firepower--To Provide Mobility--To Create Conditions for Success--To

Exploit Enemy Vulnerabilities--For Exploitation and Pursuit--As a Reserve

 

Chapter 4.             Operations Other Than War

 

Humanitarian Assistance--Peacekeeping--The Combat Link

 

Conclusion

 

Notes

 

Appendix A.            Policy for Command and Control of USMC TACAIR

                        in Sustained Operations Ashore

 

Appendix B.            Glossary

 

 

 

                                                                        Chapter 1

 

 

                                                  Aviation and the Marine Corps

 

 

 

"Today [aviation] is the dominant factor in war. It may not win a war by itself alone,

 

but without it no major war can be won."1

 

 

 

                                                          --Admiral Arthur Radford, USN

 

 

"That [aviation] cannot win a war without major efforts of ground troops is perfectly

 

apparent, since, in spite of our vast air superiority, the enemy was able to move a sizable

 

force and launch and support a serious counter-offensive well towards the end of the

 

war."2

 

 

                                                          -- Major General Raymond S. McLain, USA

 

To achieve success, the Marine Corps integrates aviation with all forms of combat power.

  

Aviation is a powerful combat force in modem warfare.

 

Its evolution as a viable instrument of war begins in the early 20th century. Marine

 

aviation traces its origin and purpose to 22 May 1912, when First Lieutenant Alfred A.

 

Cunningham reported to the naval aviation training camp at Annapolis, Maryland.3 The

 

purpose of Marine aviation today parallels that envisioned in 1912. We continue to

 

maintain Marine aviation's focus on one goal--to achieve success. We achieve this

 

success by integrating aviation with all other forms of combat power. The first

 

demonstration of this integration occurs in January 1914.4

 

 

 

We operate under the concept that aviation is a complementary part of the larger whole.

 

In World War II, aviation plays a major role in helping Marines maintain our tenuous hold

 

on Guadalcanal. Marine aviation provides air cover, flank protection, and reconnaissance

 

to the Army forces (known as the "flying column") that liberate Manila in the Philippines.

 

In Korea, Marine aviation prevents the collapse of the Pusan Perimeter and supports the

 

Inchon landing. The concept of aviation as a complementary part of the larger whole

 

continues to serve us well, evidenced by Desert Storm and continuing operations in

 

southwest Asia.

 

 

 

FORGED IN COMBAT

 

 

 

Marines quickly grasp the great benefit that aviation might provide in combat. Terrain,

 

vegetation, or man-made structures fail to affect an airplane's mobility as they affect

 

ground-surface movement. Aircraft allow rapid movement above these obstacles that

 

impede forces on the ground. World War I provides the first opportunity to employ

 

Marine aviation in combat, but participation proves limited.5 Marine aircraft provide

 

support to Marine forces operating in Haiti and Santo Domingo beginning in 1919, to

 

include beginning to practice dive bombing, with less than decisive results.6 It is not until

 

1927, in Nicaragua, that the full potential of the Marine Corps' air arm begins to emerge.7

 

 

 

On 15 July 1927, a force of around 500 Sandinistas, led by Agosto Sandino, attack the

 

Marine garrison at Ocotal, Nicaragua. The 38 Marines and 49 Nicaraguan National

 

Guardsmen repulse the initial attack. At dawn the beleaguered garrison refuses to

 

surrender and Sandino's men resume their assault. During the attack on 16 July, two

 

aircraft from Major Ross "Rusty" Rowell's VO-7M arrive over Ocotal by chance. One

 

pilot lands to get a report on the situation while the other strafes the rebels. After

 

expending their ammunition, the pilots fly 125 miles to Managua, Nicaragua to report to

 

Major Rowell. Major Rowell responds to the crisis by leading his five available DH-4B

 

and 02B-1 aircraft to the besieged garrison's defense. Forming in a column, the flight

 

dive bombs and strafes the attacking rebels. This first organized dive bombing attack and

 

first low-altitude attack in support of ground troops8 breaks up the rebel attack, causing

 

an estimated 200 Sandinista casualties.

 

 

On 30 December 1927, Sandinistas ambush two Marine columns. Although aircraft

 

twice drop medicine to aid the wounded Marines, it becomes necessary to fly the wounded

 

to safety to save their lives. Ten times from 6 to 8 January 1928 Lieutenant Christian

 

Schilt lands on a hand-made landing strip (the early use of an expeditionary airfield or

 

forward operating base), under fire, to evacuate the 18 wounded Marines. Lieutenant

 

Schilt earns the Medal of Honor for what the citation calls his "almost superhuman skill."

 

 

 

Marine experimentation with aviation in Nicaragua does not stop with close air support

 

and air evacuation. On 10 January 1928, three Fokker trimotor aircraft make military

 

history by transporting 9,564 pounds of cargo. With the addition of more and larger

 

aircraft, Marine aviation's contribution to logistical support continues to increase. During

 

one week, Marine aviators haul over 68,000 pounds of cargo.

 

 

 

In January 1928, Marines provide air reconnaissance and preliminary bombing and strafing

 

attacks prior to a major Marine-National Guard attack on Sandino's mountain-top

 

stronghold of El Chipote. On 14 January 1928, Major Rowell leads a four plane flight on

 

a strike in advance of a major ground attack against San Albino, Nicaragua. These

 

missions essentially qualify as deep air support.

 

 

Thus in Nicaragua, Marines begin to employ many concepts of Marine aviation, including

 

air reconnaissance, close air support, deep air support, air logistical support, and air

 

evacuation. Marine aviation's functions and expeditionary nature start to emerge, forged

 

in combat. Even while exploring its complete possibilities, Marines understand that

 

aviation is useless if employed alone. We cannot use aviation or think of it as an end unto

 

itself.  To do so invites failure. Aviation succeeds when it is part of the combat power the

 

commander uses to achieve a decision. Integration of aviation with all other forms of

 

combat power provides the most effective use of aviation.

 

 

 

COMBINED ARMS

 

 

Combined arms put the enemy in a dilemma—any action he takes to counteract one threat makes

 

him vulnerable to another.

 

Combined arms is a method of fighting.  Maneuver warfare employs fire support systems not as

 

just supporting arms, but as combined arms.9 Combined arms strikes the enemy with two or more

 

arms simultaneously in such a way that whatever course he takes means devastation. We use

 

combined arms to create a dilemma for the enemy--to place him in a situation where whatever

 

action he takes to avoid one "arm" opens him up to another. Any action we take likely provokes an

 

enemy reaction. We design our actions so that any enemy reaction proves equally

 

disastrous. The "arms" we use to create a dilemma go beyond use of the firepower means

 

of aviation, artillery, and infantry. We create combined arms effects using movement of

 

forces, sustainment capability, deception, electronic warfare, and psychological operations.

 

 

 

Law provides the basis for the Marine Corps' use of combined arms. United States Code,

 

1988, Volume III, Title 10 - Armed Forces, Chapter 507, Section 5063 states:

 

 

            The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide

 

            fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air

 

            components, for service with the fleet.10

 

 

 

The Marine Corps uses combined arms at the tactical and operational level of war. Major

 

Rowell and his fellow aviators' air attacks against the rebels at Ocotal, Nicaragua on 16

 

July 1927 likely provide the first example of the use of Marine air-ground combined

 

arms.11 Aviation allows the commander to present the enemy with tactical and operational

 

dilemmas. The commander combines many tactical dilemmas to produce an operational

 

dilemma for the enemy force as a whole.

 

 

 

Tactically, a commander pins down the enemy with direct and indirect fire weapons,

 

making him vulnerable to close air support. If the enemy moves to escape the air attacks,

 

he comes under direct and indirect fire. We link the combined arms effects of individual

 

units to produce a larger MAGTF combined arms effect.

 

 

 

Operationally, a commander uses aviation to isolate an enemy force from reinforcements

 

or supplies. He can accomplish this by interdicting enemy lines of communications. The

 

commander then strikes the isolated enemy force to shape the battlespace for future

 

operations. The enemy must either fight and face irreplaceable losses or abandon the field

 

and come under aviation and artillery attack.

 

 

 

THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

 

The separate elements of the MAGTF are not viable combat forces.  As an integrated air-ground-

 

logistics force, the MAGTF provides a combined arms team capable of accomplishing assigned

 

tasks with little to no external support. 

 

 

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the Marine Corps' way to organize for combat.

 

The Marine expeditionary force serves as the Marine Corps' primary warfighting organization.

 

Marine Corps Forces Atlantic and Pacific provide MAGTFs, as part of the Marine component, to

 

theater and joint force commanders. The MAGTF commander task-organizes his MAGTF based on

 

his assigned mission and the theater, joint force, or naval expeditionary force commander's

 

operational requirement or task and intent. The size and composition of the MAGTF varies

 

depending on the mission. All MAGTFs, regardless of size, contain a command element, a ground

 

combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element.12 The

 

separate elements of a MAGTF by themselves are not viable combat forces. The MAGTF provides

 

the theater, joint force, or naval expeditionary force commander with a self-sustaining,

 

integrated air-ground combined-arms team capable of accomplishing assigned tasks.

 

 

 

The MAGTF offers unique capabilities, limitations, and organizational requirements.

 

Using maneuver warfare, the MAGTF achieves decisive results with forces of moderate

 

size. These decisive results reflect the distinct nature of the aviation combat element and

 

the combat power it brings as part of the MAGTF. This aviation combat power must

 

remain part of the MAGTF, whether the MAGTF functions as part of a naval

 

expeditionary force or a larger joint/combined force. The MAGTF commander advises

 

higher headquarters on the effective use of the MAGTF. Without the MAGTF

 

commander's participation and input, the risk of improper strategic, operational, and

 

tactical employment of the force exists.

 

 

 

            The Aviation Combat Element

 

The ACE is specifically organized, trained, and equipped to support the MAGTF.

 

 

The size and composition of the aviation  combat element (ACE) reflects the MAGTF commander's

 

mission. The ACE commander task-organizes the aviation assets of the MAGTF based on the tasks

 

assigned to the MAGTF and the ACE and the MAGTF commander's intent. The MAGTF

 

commander ensures that the task organization of the ACE supports his vision for success.

 

The mission of Marine aviation traditionally focuses on support of the Fleet Marine Force

 

in landing operations. The creation of the Fleet Marine Force on 8 December 1933

 

incorporates Marine aviation, and subsequent publications and boards outline the concept

 

of employment for Marine aviation. Marine aviation roles become solidified with the

 

approval of the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations on 9 July 193 5 and the General

 

Board of the Navy in January 1939.13 These two occurrences serve to restate Marine

 

aviation's mission and highlight its tasks in support of the Fleet Marine Force. These tasks

 

include air superiority, air reconnaissance, reduction of hostile defenses, protection of the

 

landing forces, artillery spotting, and close air support. Over the years this concept

 

translates to support of the infantry, the division, or the ground combat element (GCE).

 

 

 

The adoption of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy signals a

 

reevaluation of Marine aviation. The emergence of the Marine expeditionary force as the

 

warfighting MAGTF, focusing on the operational level of war, contributes to this

 

reexamination of the ACE.14 The MAGTF commander retains the option of using the

 

ACE to support the GCE's decisive close operations, but other possibilities exist. For

 

example, he may task the ACE to conduct deep shaping operations that isolate the

 

battlespace for future operations. The MAGTF commander can also direct the ACE to

 

support the combat service support element's force sustainment operations.

 

 

 

The ACE provides a newly realized dimension of flexibility, firepower, and mobility to add

 

to the MAGTF commander's tools for victory. The traditional concept of the ACE as

 

solely a supporting arm of the GCE expands to that of a combat arm in support of the

 

entire MAGTF. The ACE, as part of the integrated combined-arms team, "...is specifically

 

organized, trained, and equipped to function in support of the MAGTF mission."15

 

 

 

            Within a Naval Expeditionary Force

 

 

In operational maneuver from the sea, the sea and land viewed as one maneuver space for a single,

 

seamless operation.

 

 

A naval expeditionary force specializes in operational maneuver from the sea.  Operational

 

maneuver from the sea includes the capability to conduct amphibious operations. Operational

 

maneuver from the sea integrates the maneuver of both land and naval forces, to include

 

the actions of organic aviation assets.16 A naval expeditionary force always includes a

 

MAGTF. As part of this force, the MAGTF gains additional operational mobility,

 

flexibility, and firepower. Operational maneuver from the sea requires four key

 

operational capabilities:  battlespace dominance; power projection; force sustainment;

 

and command, control, and surveillance.17 Aviation, both Navy and Marine Corps, plays

 

a major role in all four operational capabilities.

 

 

 

Battlespace dominance provides the focus of naval expeditionary warfare, allowing control

 

over the area of concern to the commander. This degree of control enhances friendly and

 

denies enemy freedom of action. It includes all actions against enemy capabilities to

 

influence future operations, allowing sustainment of the force and projection of power

 

from the sea. MAGTF aviation participates in battlespace dominance by isolating and

 

shaping the battlespace.

 

Power projection enables the naval expeditionary force to mass forces rapidly. The ability

 

to mass allows the force to generate high intensity, precise offensive power at the decisive

 

place and time of the commander's choosing. It uses maneuver and combined arms

 

against enemy forces to achieve a decision. MAGTF aviation and the MAGTF GCE work

 

together as an integrated combined arms team to project decisive power ashore.

 

 

 

Force sustainment from the sea gives the naval expeditionary force its staying power. It

 

allows the force to remain at sea, safely on station as long as necessary, ensuring

 

continuity and freedom of action. It provides logistics support and maintains lines of communication for the force. The ACE assists the combat service support element in

 

providing sustainment for the MAGTF.

 

 

 

Command, control, and surveillance provides a flexible, responsive, and integrated system

 

through which the naval expeditionary force gathers, processes, and distributes

 

information vital to plan and conduct operations. Command, control, and surveillance

 

links the operational capabilities to allow the naval expeditionary force commander to

 

exercise decentralized leadership and make decisions more rapidly than the enemy. The

 

Marine air command and control system of the ACE enables the ACE commander to

 

exercise centralized command and decentralized control of MAGTF aviation in support of

 

the MAGTF.

 

 

 

Marine aviation participates as part of a naval expeditionary force under two separate

 

forces. Marine aviation always remains a part of the MAGTF and under the command of

 

the MAGTF commander. Separate Marine aviation units not part of the MAGTF may be

 

part of the Navy's carrier forces. The MAGTF commander possesses no command

 

authority over these Marine aviation assets. Augmenting Navy carrier forces must not be

 

at the expense of the MAGTF's aviation requirement.

 

 

 

            Within a Joint and Combined Force

 

Joint/combined operations provide a means to an end, not the end in itself.

 

 

Joint and combined operations provide a means to an end, not the end in itself.

 

These operations prove essential when a strategic task requires the capabilities of more

 

than one Service or nation. However, joint and combined operations possess limits to

 

their utility. Their utility reflects the direct proportion between the size of the forces

 

necessary and the time available for preparation.

 

 

 

The planning, execution, and sustainment of joint and combined operations occurs as an

 

act of compromise. A joint or combined force exists as an ad hoc assembly of military

 

units joined at the highest command level. The separate Services and nations bring

 

individual, and at times, incompatible procedures, training, and logistics arrangements.

 

Whenever possible, theater commanders make use of existing Service and nation combat

 

capabilities. When a single Service or nation possesses the capability to accomplish the

 

task, the need to form a joint or combined force proves unnecessary.

 

 

 

The MAGTF commander normally makes Marine aviation sorties available to the joint

 

force to support the joint force as a whole or another component of the joint force. These

 

sorties are previously agreed to between the MAGTF commander and the joint force

 

commander. They normally include sorties for air defense, long range [air]

 

reconnaissance, and long range [air] interdiction. The MAGTF commander additionally

 

provides to the joint force any MAGTF aviation sorties beyond those required for direct

 

support of the MAGTF. The MAGTF commander can request aviation support from the

 

joint force in those instances where organic MAGTF aviation assets are not sufficient to

 

meet MAGTF requirements.

 

 

 

MAGTF aviation best supports the joint and combined force when it functions as

 

designed, as an inseparable part of the MAGTF. Rather than fragment the tactical and

 

operational integrity of the MAGTF, the joint force commander maintains the unity of

 

effort of the joint force using support relationships.18 If the joint force commander

 

separates MAGTF aviation from the MAGTF, major reductions in the MAGTF's

 

contribution to joint force combat effectiveness offset any minor gains in joint force

 

aviation combat capability. When MAGTF aviation functions as part of the MAGTF to

 

achieve a decision, it increases the successes achieved by the supported force.

 

 

 

                                    Chapter 2

 

 

 

                          Aviation and Maneuver Warfare

 

 

 

"In brief, the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment of mobile

 

armies, relatively small but of high quality, and renedered distinctly more effective by the

 

addition of aircraft."1

 

 

 

                                                                                                                        --General von Seeckt

 

 

"Battle should no longer resemble a bludgeon fight, but should be a test of skill, a

 

maneuver combat, in which is fulfilled the great principle of surprise by striking from an unexpected direction against an unguarded spot'."2

 

 

 

                                                               --B. H. Liddell Hart

 

 

Maneuver warfare seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and

 

unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he

 

cannot cope.

 

Aviation provides a key element in the MAGTF's ability to conduct maneuver warfare. Maneuver

 

warfare requires opportunistic maneuver in time and space to gain a positional advantage over the

 

enemy.3 Maneuver warfare concentrates on those actions which present the enemy with a hopeless

 

situation--a dilemma. Maneuver warfare capitalizes on use of the main effort; focus and speed;

 

surprise, unpredictability, and boldness; and lethality and effectiveness.4 Aviation expands

 

the MAGTF commander's ability to gain a decisive advantage and create a dilemma for

 

the enemy. The MAGTF commander uses aviation to aid and reinforce his maneuver by

 

attacking the enemy's ability to maneuver. If the enemy moves rapidly to counter ground

 

actions, he exposes himself to aviation actions. If the enemy defends against aviation

 

actions, he cannot move fast enough to counter ground actions. Whichever course the

 

enemy takes, he faces disaster.

 

 

 

Marine aviation, task-organized into the ACE, operates in direct support of ground

 

maneuver forces or provides a separate maneuver force within the MAGTF.5 These

 

employment options for Marine aviation give the MAGTF commander added combat

 

power and flexibility to shatter the enemy's will to fight. Our use of mission-type orders,

 

vision and intent, and ability to focus on the enemy play a major role in the conduct of

 

maneuver warfare. They apply equally for ground and aviation forces.

 

 

 

Mission

 

 

 

MAGTF aviation conducts air operations using mission tactics. Mission tactics focus on

 

the assignment of a subordinate mission--including a clearly stated purpose--without

 

specifying how the mission must be accomplished. Mission tactics begin with mission-

 

type orders. Mission tactics allow subordinates the freedom to take whatever steps

 

necessary based on the situation. This freedom for initiative proves vital for the high

 

tempo of operations required in maneuver warfare. However, initiative without unity or

 

focus squanders the MAGTF's strength. We achieve unity, not through imposed control,

 

but through the commander's vision.

 

 

 

Vision and Intent

 

 

Commander’s intent gives subordinates a standard by which to judge their own decisions, a

 

constant reminder of what the larger organization is trying to accomplish.

 

 

The commander expresses his vision through his intent. A mission consists of two parts:

 

the task to accomplish and the reason, or intent. Of the two, the intent is the critical

 

element.6 The intent clearly defines the commander's vision of success and his

 

desired end state. When the ACE commander receives his mission, he conducts an

 

analysis based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time

 

available (METT-T). The ACE commander considers the MAGTF commander's intent

 

and the intent of the MAGTF commander's superior to develop his own desired end state.

 

The ACE commander reflects his end state when he formulates his commander's intent.

 

The ACE commander task organizes his forces and tasks subordinates to achieve the

 

desired end state. The commander's intent also provides guidance for achieving the

 

conditions necessary for decisive maneuver. While a situation may change, altering or

 

abolishing a mission, the intent continues to guide our actions. The commander's intent

 

must not inhibit initiative. A clear understanding of commander's intent provides the

 

essential ingredient to ensure unity of effort.

 

 

 

            Main Effort

 

Another method for providing unity is the main effort. A commander assigns one specific

 

subordinate unit to achieve the decision. That unit represents his main effort, focused on

 

the enemy. The main effort may be associated with battlespace dominance, power

 

projection, or force sustainment. We direct the main effort where it will cause the most

 

damage to the enemy and where we have the best opportunity for success. The main

 

effort represents our bid for victory. The MAGTF commander designates any element of

 

the MAGTF--including aviation--as the main effort.7 Because it is his bid for success, the

 

commander augments his main effort with every means available. The commander stakes

 

the success of each specific phase of the operation on the performance of his main effort.

 

With this action we -achieve a decision; everything else remains secondary.

 

 

The success of the main effort can only be achieved by the responsive and unselfish actions of

 

supporting units.

 

 

We focus the main effort on an enemy critical vulnerability while exercising economy of force

 

elsewhere. At the tactical and operational levels of war, commanders seek to identify and attack

 

critical vulnerabilities. Enemy critical vulnerabilities are enemy capabilities that prove both

 

susceptible to attack and crucial to the enemy's success. These vulnerabilities lead to the enemy's

 

center of gravity. The center of gravity includes whatever characteristics, capabilities, or localities

 

that provide the source of a military force's freedom of action, strength, or will to fight. The

 

enemy's center of gravity may be his leadership, command and control, or mechanized forces.

 

Mission analysis and higher commanders' intent help identify the enemy's center of

 

gravity. The destruction of the center of gravity achieves the objective of defeating the

 

enemy forces or shattering their will to fight.

 

 

All units not part of the main effort assume a supporting role. The needs of the main

 

effort outweigh the needs of supporting units. Supporting units contribute to the overall

 

success by economizing on resources--fires, mobility means, supplies--that the main effort

 

may require. Similarly, unless specifically ordered to do otherwise, units give priority of

 

support to the main effort. Supporting commanders must anticipate the main effort's

 

direction and requirements. The main effort succeeds only through the immediate,

 

unselfish, and voluntary actions of the supporting units. Supporting units

 

ensure that their actions either directly assist the main effort or provide the main effort as

 

much freedom as possible.

 

 

 

A commander may need to refocus his actions and combat power to achieve success--the

 

main effort may change. Deliberate planning or changing battlespace conditions

 

contribute to this decision to change. A commander designates his main effort for a

 

particular phase of an operation. He then may shift the main effort to another unit in

 

accordance with his plan or the developing situation.

 

 

 

The MAGTF commander normally designates the ACE as the main effort in the initial

 

phase of an operation or campaign to gain and maintain the air superiority necessary for

 

the MAGTF to conduct operations. The ACE may be designated the main effort to

 

conduct deep operations to shape and isolate the battlespace. To conduct forcible entry

 

and secure the initial lodgement, the MAGTF commander switches the main effort to the

 

GCE. After securing the lodgement, the main effort may then shift to the combat service

 

support element for force sustaintnent operations. Next, the MAGTF commander may

 

designate the GCE as the main effort to conduct decisive close operations. The focus may

 

shift back to the ACE to quickly exploit an opportunity or pursue a fleeing enemy.

 

 

 

The goal remains to exploit success, not reinforce failure. Like the commander's intent,

 

the main effort harmonizes the various actions of the force. It allows all the parts to act as

 

a whole. The MAGTF commander uses aviation at the tactical and operational level to

 

achieve a decision that realizes strategic results. Marine aviation capitalizes on its inherent

 

speed, surprise, and unpredictability, focusing its lethality and effectiveness on a critical

 

enemy vulnerability to achieve a decision.

 

 

 

TO ACHIEVE A DECISION

 

MAGTF aviation focuses on but one goal:  to achieve a decisive effect on the outcome of the battle

 

and campaign.

 

 

To be effective within the battlespace, the MAGTF commander uses aviation to achieve a decision.

 

The MAGTF commander  does not attempt to achieve an aviation decision. He attempts to achieve

 

an air-ground decision applying combined arms and maneuver warfare. Ten years after the first

 

combat use of aircraft, the Italian air power theorist, Guilio Douhet, recognizes the need to direct

 

all combat forces toward the ultimate goal:

 

 

 

            The use of military [ground], naval, and aerial forces in war should be

 

            directed toward a single end, to win. To attain maximum effectiveness

 

            these forces must be coordinated and in harmony with one another. The

 

            three forces should function as ingredients--or factors--of a single product

 

            in which the best results can be obtained only by a proper apportioning of

 

            the ingredients used.8

 

 

 

The MAGTF commander may designate the ACE as the main effort. The MAGTF

 

commander may use the ACE in direct support of ground maneuver forces or may employ

 

the ACE itself (or any elements thereof) as a maneuver force. MAGTF aviation

 

contributes significantly to all forms of maneuver--in support of, or as part of--a frontal

 

assault, flanking attack, envelopment, or turning movement.9 If the ACE does not provide

 

the main effort, it functions in a supporting role or provides the reserve. MAGTF aviation

 

can function to support the offense, the defense, and security operations. The ACE is a

 

combat arm of the MAGTF--not a supporting arm of the GCE. With two combat arms,

 

the MAGTF commander possesses the ability to shift the main effort and keep the enemy

 

off balance. To achieve an air-ground decision, the MAGTF commander uses aviation

 

to--

 

• Fix the enemy while another force destroys him.

 

• Destroy the enemy after another force fixes him.

 

• Fix and destroy the enemy.

 

 

The MAGTF commander uses aviation to see and shape his battlespace; extend the range of his

 

ground forces; and discover, delay, degrade, and manipulate the enemy.

 

 

The MAGTF commander uses his organic aviation to see and shape his battlespace

 

in time and space in advance of close combat. He uses aviation's inherent reach not only for the

 

direct application of firepower, but also to extend the range

 

of his ground forces. The MAGTF commander uses aviation to discover the enemy's

 

operational intentions; to delay enemy reinforcements; to degrade critical enemy functions

 

or capabilities, such as command and control or logistics; and to manipulate the enemy's

 

perceptions.

 

 

 

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD: THE ACE AS A MANEUVER FORCE10

 

 

 

            On 2 August 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's forces invade Kuwait. The

 

            United States is asked to provide military assistance to the Kingdom of Saudi

 

            Arabia to prevent any further southward aggression by Iraqi forces. Later, the

 

            United Nations forms a military coalition to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

 

            The phase to deter the Iraqis from invading Saudi Arabia and defend the

 

            Kingdom becomes known as Operation DESERT SHIELD. The offensive to

 

            drive the Iraqis from Kuwait will be called Operation DESERT STORM.

 

 

 

            The first Marine forces to arrive in Saudi Arabia comprise the 7th Marine

 

            Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), commanded by Major General Hopkins. Arriving

 

            with these forces is the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) ACE commander,

 

            Major General Moore, and HMLA 369, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kurth.

 

            HMLA 369 consists of eighteen AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters and six UH-1N

           

            Iroquois ("Huey") utility helicopters. HMLA 369 constitutes the initial ACE

 

            striking power and a considerable portion of 7th MEB's.

 

 

 

            Around 18 August, at a meeting among Major Generals Hopkins and Moore and

 

            Lieutenant Colonel Kurth, concern arises over how to prevent an Iraqi attack into

 

            Saudi Arabia. Lieutenant Colonel Kurth is given a verbal mission-type order to

 

            deploy his squadron along with 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion to fight a

 

            covering action to delay any Iraqi attack. HMLA 369 is placed in direct support

 

            of 7th Marines. Kurth integrates with assets of the Army's 82d Airborne Division.

 

 

 

            In early September 1990, Kurth meets with the Commanding General of the 1st

 

            Marine Division, Major General Myatt, at Manifah, Saudi Arabia. The division

 

            comprises the GCE of I MEF. The use of firepower to stop an Iraqi attack is a

 

            concern. Kurth is given a mission-type order to act as a screening force

 

            designed to fight a delaying action should the Iraqis attack along the Tap Line

 

            Road or the coastal road. Kurth remains in direct support of 7th Marines,

 

            supporting the overall division plan. Initially this is strictly an attack helicopter

 

            force, with UH-1Ns providing airborne command and control. Major General

 

            Myatt desires the largest number of attack helicopters in history to be used at the

 

            decisive time and place. Task Force Cunningham is thus born.

 

 

 

            With the arrival of the entire ACE of I MEF, it is decided that all aviation assets

 

            will contribute to Task Force Cunningham. Assets include (in addition to the

 

            helicopters) AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft, F/A-18 Hornet fighter attack aircraft,

 

            and EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft. Forward air controllers (airborne)

 

            (FAC[A]) will provide airborne command and control. Information obtained by

 

            remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) will be displayed on a remote receiving station

 

            mounted in a UH-1N. Task Force Cunningham is to be employed in the defense

 

            to handle any Iraqi armored attack. If the Iraqis cross the border, the task force

 

            will attrite them as they move south, pushing them west, away from Jubayl

 

            towards fire-sacks established by the division. General maneuver positions and

 

            engagement areas are established. The plan calls for fixed-wing aircraft to

 

            attack along the long axis of the Iraqi formation to disrupt and destroy, killing as

 

            many as possible. As the Iraqi armor starts to deploy their formation, the attack

 

            helicopters then will strike their flank.

 

 

Aviation can prove decisive by providing key information on the enemy. It gives us data

 

on the position of vital enemy assets that expedite targeting them for destruction. Air

 

reconnaissance lets us know what the enemy plans to do while leaving him blind about

 

our movements and intentions.

 

Aviation can delay or prevent intervention of the enemy's operational and tactical

 

reserves. We achieve these results through direct attack on the enemy units. We also

 

achieve these results through attack on enemy infrastructure (logistics capabilities and

 

lines of communication).

 

 

 

Aviation can provide firepower to augment the organic fire support of ground forces.

 

With suitable air support, a ground force will be lighter, more mobile, and more lethal.

 

This reduces internal and external transportation requirements.

 

 

 

Aviation can provide mobility to the ground forces through movement of troops,

 

equipment, and supplies. This often translates into increasing the time or distance the

 

MAGTF can operate before reaching its culminating point.

 

 

 

Aviation can deny the enemy the ability to mass or control his forces. By preventing the

 

enemy from massing, we can achieve local combat superiority with an overall small force.

 

We can then defeat the enemy in detail. The MAGTF commander uses aviation to create

 

a window of opportunity for decisive action.

 

 

 

 

While aviation can be decisive, it is a limited, exhaustible resource which requires time and

 

effort to replace. This holds true of men and material, both within the battlespace and on

 

the production line. Limited numbers exist of aircraft, aircrews, ground-based radars, air

 

control agencies, air control personnel, maintenance personnel, ordnance, fuel, and spare

 

parts. To prevent exhausting aviation assets needlessly, we use aviation to perform

 

actions that infantry, artillery, tanks, mortars, naval surface fire support, or trucks cannot

 

accomplish.

 

 

Commanders must use aviation on necessary actions to achieve a decision; this avoids missing a

 

window of opportunity for decisive action.

 

 

A level of activity exists which aviation can sustain virtually forever. When a

 

commander exceeds this sustained  level of activity, he reduces the length of

 

time that aviation can maintain the heightened pace. Aviation will exhaust one of its resources or

 

outpace its replacements.

 

 

 

After a period of increased activity, aviation requires a recovery period. During this

 

recovery period, aviation will not even be able to deliver its normal sustained level of

 

activity. The longer the period of increased activity or the greater the increase in activity,

 

the longer the recovery required and the lower the "sustained" level will be during that

 

period. Commanders must not squander aviation on unnecessary actions which cannot

 

achieve a decision only to discover that they have missed a window of opportunity for

 

decisive action.

 

 

A Comparative Case Study:  OPERATIONS STRANGLE AND OPERATION DIADEM

 

Operations STRANGLE and DIADEM provide ideal examples to illustrate the difference in effectiveness of aviation acting alone and as part of a combined arms operation.  Operation STRANGLE is planned as an independent air operation to drive the Germans from central Italy.  The air planners intend to make a ground offensive unnecessary.  Operation DIADEM is a combined arms operation.  Coordinated air and ground actions deny the Germans their critical requirement- - tactical mobility.  A study of these tow operations provides important insight into the effective use of aviation.

 

BACKGROUND

 

By the middle of January 1944, after four months of bitter fighting, the Allied advance up the Italian peninsula grinds to a halt.  The Germans have been conducting a skillful withdrawal, stopping the Allies in front of the formidable Gustav Line in central Italy.  Three times the Allies try to break the German defenses.  Three times they fail.  By the middle of March 1944 a stalemate sets in.  Six months of intensive combat exhaust both sides.  Allied ground forces rest and regroup as they wait for reinforcements and better weather.  The allies schedule the ground offensive to resume in May 1944.

 

OPERATION STRANGLE

 

As the Allied ground forces prepare for the upcoming assault against the entrenched German, Allied air officers have their change to prove that air power alone can win on the battlefield.  Having achieved air superiority and free from providing air support for the Allied armies, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) officers concentrate on an independent air interdiction campaign—Operation STRANGLE.

 

Operation STRANGLE begins with the MAAF directive of 19 March 1944.  The objective of this independent air campaign aims “To reduce the enemy’s flow of supplies to a level which will make it impractical for him to maintain and operate his forces in central Italy.”11

 

The German forces in Italy depend almost entirely on the Italian rail network to bring supplies to the south.  The MAAF officers plan to “strangle” the Germans by severing their vulnerable supply line.  The MAAF plans to wreck the rail network by placing an air interdiction belt across all of Italy north of Rome.  The Allies cut every railroad and reduce rail capacity from 80,000 tons per day to 4,000 tons per day.  The destruction by air power proves extensive, but despite the damage German front line troops do not fall short of supplies or prepare to withdraw.

 

Operation STRANGLE occurs while no major ground action takes place along the front.  MAAF officers plan the operation without completely considering the ground situation.  While the lull in the action frees all MAAF aircraft to conduct the independent air campaign, the Germans are not forced to use their supplies in combat against Allied ground forces.  In fact, during the conduct of Operation STRANGLE, the Germans actually increase their supply stockpiles at the front line.

 

After nearly a month and a half, it becomes apparent to MAAF officers that the original objective appears unrealistic and overly optimistic.  On 28 April 1944, with less than two weeks left before the beginning of the renewed Allied ground offensive, a new directive provides reorientation.  The new directive contains careful words to redefine “…the objective of the air operations as being to make it impossible for the enemy to maintain his forces on their present line in Italy in the face of a combined Allied offensive.  A change in emphasis will be noted here which reflects our growing recognition that we had been unduly optimistic in our original hopes for STRANGLE in the directive of 19 March.”12  This change to the objective admits that air power alone cannot drive the Germans from Central Italy.

 

OPERATION DIADEM

 

On 11 May 1944, the rested and reequipped Allied forces launch Operation DIADEM.  The Allies commence the ground assault on the Gustav Line.  MAAF air attacks shift from the air interdiction belt north of Rome to areas immediately behind the German lines.  Three weeks after beginning their combined ground and air assault, the Allies drive 80 miles and link up with the forces stranded on the beaches at Anzio.  The Allies then begin their drive to Rome.  The commander of the XIV Panzer Corps, General von Senger, describes the effectiveness of aviation.

 

The enemy’s mastery of the air space immediately behind the front under attack was a major source of worry to the defender, for it prevented all daylight movements, especially the bringing up of the reserves.  We were accustomed to making all necessary movements by night, but in the event of a real breakthrough this was not good enough.  This was what actually occurred in the May breakthrough.  In a battle of movement a commander who can only make the tactically essential moves by night resemble a chess player who for three of his opponent’s moves has the right to only one.13

 

The Germans require tactical mobility to defend the Gustav Line.  During Operation DIADEM, aviation  cripples the Germans’ tactical mobility.  With not tactical reserves near the front, the Germans are forced to shift forces from one threatened sector to another.  Without tactical mobility, they cannot laterally move forces to strengthen weak areas or prevent penetrations form becoming breakthroughs.  When the Germans finally release strategic reserves in northern Italy, air attacks savage them en route.  These reserves fail to arrive in time and prove too decimated to affect the battle.

 

The combined use of Allied ground and air operations creates a vicious cycle for the Germans.  If Allied ground operations force the Germans to  rapidly reposition combat forces or supplies, they must travel on roads.  When they travel they become vulnerable to Allied air attacks.  Even if Allied air fails to destroy the German reinforcements and supplies, they usually arrive too late to be of use.

 

LESSONS

 

Aviation alone does not prove to be effective in central Italy.  As a self-contained air operation, Operation STRANGLE fails because it does not accomplish its intended objective.  Without the pressure of concurrent ground operations, the Germans do not have to use supplies or reposition forces.  While Operation STRANGLE cannot deny the Germans critical supplies, aviation in Operation DIADEM does deny the Germans tactical mobility.  When the Allied ground offensive forces the Germans to move, aviation produces a devastating effect.  Without continuous and significant pressure from ground forces, aviation proves ineffective.

 

Time also plays a critical role in aviation’s effectiveness.  For Operation STRANGLE, MAAF planners neglect to ensure Allied air attacks become time-critical events linked to ground operations.  The Germans have time to repair roads and bridges or reroute supplies.  During Operation DIADEM, Allies ground and air operations force the Germans to react immediately.  Air attacks make it impossible for the Germans to match the Allies’ operational speed.  By the time the Germans can react, the situation has changed.

 

When the MAAF air officers realize that air power alone cannot successfully achieve the objective, they change the objective.  This change make Operation STRANGLE appear successful.  The MAAF air officers fail to recognize that Operation STRANGLE owes its “success” to the timely resumption of the Allied ground offensive—Operation DIADEM.  MAAF planners intend to make Operation DIADEM unnecessary; however, their plan fails.  Ironically, the failure to recognize what makes the original Operation STRANGLE successful gives rise to another Operation STRANGLE, this time during the Korean conflict.  Like the original , this Operation STRANGLE (actually two) focuses on destroying the rail system, forcing the enemy to retire northward to shorten his supply lines.  Planners seek to conduct this operation possibly without the pressure of a United Nations ground offensive.  The United Nations never launches a ground offensive, the Chinese and North Koreans never retreat conflict.  Like the original, this Operation STRANGLE (actually two) focuses on destroying the rail system, forcing the enemy to retire northward to shorten his supply, and Operation STRANGLE is viewed as a failure.14

 

AVIATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

 

 

At the operational level, the MAGTF commander uses aviation to shape his batttlespace, to

 

accept—or  refuse—combat on his own terms.

 

We fight war simultaneously at three strategic, operational, and tactical.  Strategy is the art of

 

winning wars; tactics is the art of winning battles and engagements.  The operational level links

 

tactical results to strategic aims. At the operational level, the MAGTF commander uses aviation to

 

create conditions for success. Aviation allows the MAGTF commander to shape his battlespace,

 

to accept--or refuse--combat on his own terms.

 

 

 

The strategic use of aviation falls beyond the scope of this book. The tactical use of

 

aviation is well understood by Marines and is covered indepth in current doctrine. The

 

operational level of war deals with the discipline of campaigning.15 At the operational

 

level, we focus aviation on achieving the decisive elements of the commander's

 

intent against targets and capabilities of operational significance.

 

 

 

The MAGTF commander must possess an operational outlook; he must think in a broader

 

dimension of time and space. He aims to elevate the effect of tactical success to a higher

 

level. He wants to achieve strategically meaningful results through tactics. The

 

operational level provides the framework for tactical actions. It defines the battlespace

 

and provides the assets to fight; it sets the goal. Without this framework, tactical battles

 

remain a series of disconnected and, unrelated actions. The operational level decides

 

when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy.

 

 

 

The operational use of aviation during the initial Normandy landing (Operation

 

OVERLORD) in World War II offers an example of this ability to decide. The

 

operational role of aviation seeks "...to ensure that the enemy forces attacking the

 

bridgehead did not increase at a more rapid rate than the Allied forces defending and

 

extending it."16 Allied aviation successfully delays the movement of German reserves that

 

can counter the Allied landing. Operationally, the German army remains paralyzed. Field

 

Marshal Erwin Rommel reports in his 10 June 1944 dispatch:

 

 

 

            During the day, practically our entire traffic--on roads, tracks, and in open

 

            country--is pinned down by powerful fighter-bomber and bomber

 

            formations, with the result that the movement of our troops on the

 

            battlefield is almost completely paralyzed, while the enemy can maneuver

 

            freely.17

 

 

 

Commanders must include aviation in campaign planning from the start. Aviation

 

personnel who think operationally and understand aviation's operational capabilities and

 

limitations must be part of the planning staff. Aviation's roles for each campaign differ.

 

No preset formula exists for using aviation. Aviation planners ensure that commanders

 

and staffs understand what aviation can contribute to achieve a decision.

 

 

 

TACTICAL-OPERATIONAL INTERACTION

 

The MAGTF commander can use aviation to provide a tactical victory or an operational decision.

 

 

Actions at one level of war do not remain confined to just that level. The results at one

 

level dictate the results at another. During planning and execution, we must consider

 

every action for its effects on other levels.  While the natural flow of influence goes       

 

from the top down, the flow works in reverse as well. Success at the operational

 

level can promote success at the tactical level. Success at the tactical level can foster

 

success at the operational level. Success at the tactical level proves meaningless without

 

coherent operational and strategic goals and plans. The Vietnam conflict illustrates this

 

point--we win at the tactical level, but no clear operational or strategic guidance ties the

 

tactical actions together. Aviation proves uniquely suited to effect and expand success

 

from one level to another. We realize that aviation provides the operational framework to

 

create conditions for tactical success. Aviation can also play a significant role in turning a

 

tactical success into an operational decision.

 

 

 

Marine aviation makes significant contributions to the defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific

 

during World War II. Beginning in the Solomon Islands with Guadalcanal in 1942,

 

Marine aviation plays a major role in the destruction of the best elements of the Japanese

 

naval air forces, considered superior in quality to the Japanese army air forces. In

 

response to the threat to their major base at Rabaul on the island of New Britain, the

 

Japanese commit and lose all of their fully trained naval air units, including those that

 

survive Midway. They additionally commit and lose a portion of their best trained army

 

air units. The Japanese never fully recover from these losses, the results of which

 

influence all further campaigns.18 The onslaught against Rabaul by Allied aircraft, over

 

half of them flown by Marine aviation,19 prevents Japanese aircraft from prohibitively

 

interfering with American landings in the Solomons area, most notably at Cape

 

Glouchester. The continued pressure of Marine aviation against Rabaul eventually causes

 

the withdrawal of Japanese aircraft from the island fortress. The combined result of these

 

continuous tactical actions neutralizes Rabaul's offensive power, permiting the Allies to

 

execute an operational maneuver and bypass Rabaul, isolating around 100,000 Japanese.

 

 

 

The outcome of a single battle at the tactical level can determine the outcome at the

 

operational level. The German campaign in France during May 1940 provides an ideal

 

example of aviation helping a ground tactical victory achieve an operational decision.20

 

At the crossing of the Meuse River, the Luftwaffe helps Guderians's tactical victory of

 

crossing the river become the operational decision. The ability of aviation to mass

 

firepower quickly where the enemy proves weakest makes this decision possible. As at

 

the Meuse crossing, this often translates to close air support and air reconnaissance for the

 

ground forces making the breakthrough.

 

 

 

We can also use ground operations to guarantee aviation's success. During the 1973 Yom

 

Kippur War, Israeli General Sharon leads a ground attack against four Egyptian surface-

 

to-air missile sites along the Suez Canal (Operation GAZELLE, 17 October 1973). The

 

resulting gap in the surface-to-air missile screen allows the Israeli air force to destroy the

 

Egyptian surface-to-air missile belt and regain control of the air. Once the Israelis destroy

 

the Egyptian surface-to-air missiles, the Israeli air and ground forces quickly drive the

 

Egyptians from the Sinai.

 

 

 

FOCUS AND SPEED

 

Focus allows us to achieve a decision.  Speed allows us to shift our focus rapidly.

 

 

Aviation adds dimension to two of the central concepts of maneuver warfare,  focus and speed.

 

Focus remains central to the goal of warfare, achieving a decision. Speed permits us to set the

 

tactical and operational pace. The faster we operate, the less time the enemy has to react. Speed

 

allows the MAGTF to catch the enemy off guard. Speed proves essential, especially in

 

response to changes in the situation. The key is not actual speed but relative speed to

 

the enemy. We strive to operate faster than the enemy in time and space.

 

 

 

Speed allows aviation to shift its focus rapidly. Enemy critical vulnerabilities shift over

 

time, or new ones emerge. Aviation's ability to concentrate rapidly over large distances

 

allows the MAGTF to attack these vulnerabilities. Speed proves important because the

 

"window of opportunity" may be fleeting. Aviation can quickly shift its focus over large

 

distances. Aircraft from dispersed locations can come together in a single effort in a very

 

short time. They can travel hundreds of miles in a matter of minutes. Aviation can assist

 

ground forces shift their focus rapidly. A similar, unaided shift of ground forces could

 

take hours or days.

 

 

 

Aviation's ability to shift its focus rapidly is not only important tactically, but also

 

operationally. A shift of the operational focus often entails a move of several hundred

 

miles. This may mean days of repositioning for ground forces. Aviation can reposition in

 

hours or even minutes. This ability to shift focus rapidly can be operationally decisive

 

even without engaging in combat.

 

 

 

Again the German campaign in France during 1940 provides an excellent example. The

 

Germans stress the importance of the Allies not recognizing their main effort until it

 

proves too late. They also stress the use of overwhelming firepower when the main effort

 

smashes into the Allies. By using its ability to shift operational focus rapidly, the

 

Luftwaffe plays a pivotal part in solving this problem. At the start of the German

 

campaign, the Luftwaffe concentrates its support for Army Group A, coming through the

 

Netherlands and Belgium. This helps convince the Allies that Army Group A constitutes

 

the Germans' main effort. Once it becomes evident that the real main effort lies with

 

Army Group B, slashing through the Ardennes, the Luftwaffe swiftly shifts its support in

 

favor of Army Group B.

 

 

Aviation's ability to focus its effort over large distances may prove critically important in

 

the defense. If the enemy achieves a breakthrough, little time may exist to stop or delay

 

him except through use of aviation. Repositioning of ground forces to block the enemy

 

takes time. Aviation can provide that time by quickly massing firepower on the enemy to

 

delay, disrupt, or destroy him until ground forces seal the breach.

 

 

 

SURPRISE, UNPREDICTABILITY, AND BOLDNESS

 

 

 

To achieve surprise in aviation operations, we use imagination, unpredictability, and

 

boldness. These qualities remain as important in the operational and tactical planning of

 

air operations as on individual missions. We must not reduce air operations to a formula

 

by repeating the same actions in predictable patterns. The air attacks on North Vietnam

 

occurring at the same time of day and on the same axis provide a clear example of

 

predictability. The subsequent loss in aircraft and pilots is high.

 

 

 

Air attacks against an alert, prepared opponent will likely accomplish little and prove too

 

costly to the attackers. The first attack most enemies expect comes from aviation.

 

Strategic surprise remains hard to achieve. History does show how imagination achieves

 

tactical surprise, reduces losses, and makes air attacks extremely effective.

 

 

The Japanese air attack on the U. S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941

 

illustrates a bold action. The attack aims at removing the only threat to Japanese

 

domination of the western Pacific Ocean. The Japanese attack achieves both strategic and

 

tactical surprise. The Japanese realize that surprise plays an essential role in the success of

 

the attack. Surprise proves essential to offset American naval superiority because of the

 

great strength of the U. S. fleet. Aviation provides the only force available to the Japanese

 

possessing the capability to carry out this attack. The fact that it takes the U. S, Navy

 

over two years to recover and regain its strength demonstrates the scope of the Japanese

 

success.

 

 

 

LETHALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

 

Lethality provides the means—effectiveness provides the end.

 

 

Destruction is not an end in itself, but merely a means to a larger end--effectiveness. We

 

define effectiveness by results. We must not   confuse lethality with effectiveness. Lethality only

 

assures that we can destroy a target. A direct relationship between lethality and effectiveness does

 

not exist. While bomb (battle) damage assessment measures lethality, it proves more difficult to

 

measure effectiveness. If aviation fails to kill a dug-in enemy (often the case), it is not lethal.

 

However, if aviation keeps the enemy under cover or prevents him from manning his weapons

 

systems while the ground force attacks, then aviation is effective. Aviation is not effective if the

 

time between the air and ground attacks is long enough to allow the enemy to recover.

 

 

 

During the Vietnam conflict, aviation fails to effectively stop the movement of supplies

 

from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. The tactical objective of Operation ROLLING

 

THUNDER aims to reduce the level of supplies reaching the enemy, causing his fighting

 

capability to suffer. At the height of their power in 1967, North Vietnamese forces only

 

require 100 tons of supplies a day to sustain military operations. This amounts to less than

 

50 truckloads. Although aviation destroys hundreds of truckloads a day, at least 50 truck

 

loads of supplies safely make it to the south.21 Lethality is high, but effectiveness is low.

 

The failure of air power in Vietnam does not lessen the lethality of aviation. It does warn

 

that aviation may not achieve its political and military goals even when lethal. Lethality

 

does not automatically equate to effectiveness.

 

 

 

The effectiveness of an air attack is fleeting in time and space. A basic difference exists

 

between air attacks and ground attacks. In ground operations, a successful attack causes

 

a penetration or results in a flanking of the enemy. We bypass or encircle him. Time

 

works against the enemy. He must break out or surrender. In contrast, time works for

 

the enemy under air attack. He protects his combat power during the air attack and waits

 

for the aircraft to leave. When they leave, the enemy resumes his activities.

 

 

 

Ways exist that aviation can extend the duration or effectiveness of the attack. They

 

include a continuous flow of aircraft into a target area or the use of cluster munitions,

 

mines, or delayed-fuze ordnance. Most importantly, we can counter aviation's time

 

disadvantage by integrating air and ground actions to apply combined arms effects on the

 

enemy. An air attack creates a temporary effect on the enemy; coordinated ground actions

 

exploit and increase this effect. Subsequent air attacks can pursue and devastate the

 

fleeing enemy. If we fail to integrate air and ground actions, little benefit results from

 

either action.

 

 

 

 

                                                                Chapter 3

 

                              Combat Operations

 

"On our drive to Manila, I depended solely on [Marine Aircraft Groups 24 and 32] to

 

protect my left flank against possible counterattack...I can say without reservation that

 

the Marine dive bombers are one of the most flexible outfits that I have seen in this war.

 

They will try anything once, and from my experience with them, I have found that

 

anything they try usually pans out in their favor. The Marine dive bombers of the First

 

Wing have kept the enemy on the run. They have kept him underground and have

 

enabled troops to move up with fewer casualties and greater speed I cannot say enough

 

in praise of these men of the dive bombers...for the job they have done in giving my men

 

close ground support in this operation.

 

                                                                                                --Major General Verne D. Mudge, USA

 

 

 

"Previously, Marine commanders in attacking an enemy have been limited to a two

 

dimension plane of action attack frontally or from the flank. The ability of the helicopter

 

has made possible a third dimension of action which will permit a commander to bypass

 

a position by going over it...Thus, the helicopter enables the attacker to choose the point

 

of contact to hit the defender where it will hurt him Most."2

 

 

                                                                                                            -- Major Archie I Clapp, USMC

 

 

 

Aviation is offensive by nature. As part of naval expeditionary power projection, its

 

purpose is to carry the battle to the enemy. Offensive action allows us to seize and

 

retain the initiative. When we use aviation for defense, it does not put pressure on the

 

enemy. The Marine Corps clearly expresses this attitude over fifty years ago in Marine

 

Corps Aviation: General, 1940:

 

 

 

            Combat aviation is designed, equipped, and trained for offensive

 

            employment as a striking force against hostile air and surface targets. It is

 

            purely an offensive weapon, regardless of whether the commander

 

            employing it is operating his surface forces offensively of defensively.

 

            Combat aviation has no passive defensive value.3

 

The MAGTF gains victory through the decisive offense; the MAGTF uses the defense to avoid

 

defeat and await opportunity for the offense.

 

 

The MAGTF achieves a decision--victory--through decisive offensive operations characterized by

 

integrated combined arms and maneuver warfare. The MAGTF

 

conducts defensive operations to avoid defeat, waiting for the opportune moment to seize

 

the initiative and go on the offense. Aviation supports MAGTF offensive and defensive

 

operations as the main effort, supporting effort, or reserve. Aviation can provide

 

firepower, mobility, surprise, and speed to create conditions for success in a movement to

 

contact or attack. It makes great use of the same characteristics during exploitation and

 

pursuit operations. Aviation can create a faster tempo of operations than the enemy,

 

allowing the MAGTF to attack or counterattack to exploit a vulnerability. With its range,