The Survival Of The Fourth Air Force: Challenges To Marine Fighter/Attack

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SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Survival of the Fourth Air Force: Challenges to Marine Fighter/Attack Aviation

Author: Major John E. Ostrom, United States Marine Corps

Research Question: This paper examines the historical precedence and

contemporary justification for maintaining Marine fighter/attack aviation in this era

of budgetary austerity.

Discussion: Throughout its history, Marine aviation has had to confront repeated

allegations that Marine aviation in general, and Marine fighter/attack aviation in

particular, is a profitless redundancy within the American military. The "Fourth

Air Force" is a term which refers to the perception that the United States maintains

four separate, and therefore redundant, air forces. Marine fighter/attack aviation

usually receives the dubious distinction of being labeled the fourth air force. This

paper examines Marine fighter/attack aviation, specifically with reference to the challenges it has had to face. It traces the history of Marine aviation as a whole, from its beginnings with the intent of establishing Marine fighter/attack aviation's purpose and utility to the Marine Corps mission and the nation. Ultimately, it examines the credibility of maintaining Marine aviation. The survival of Marine fighter/attack aviation, past, present, and future, is then the specific issue that this paper discusses, and broader perspectives are explored as they relate to that survival.

Thesis: This paper argues that there are not four separate air forces within the U.S.

military, that Marine fighter/attack aviation is integral to the mission of the Marine Corps,

and that Marine fighter/attack aviation is not redundant, but instead is a unique and vital

element of American air power.

Introduction

Whenever America has been at war, questions about redundancy and

duplication within our military services have dissipated in the wake of a desire to be

victorious with a minimum loss of American life. In peacetime, however, when it is

always easier to imagine that the next war may never happen, the financial and moral

price tag of a large, standing military is an undesirable burden. The American people's

desire to realize a "peace dividend" after our major wars has often caused mutilation of

our military, but it has always caused us to raise the budget ax and go in search of

redundancy.

The "Fourth Air Force" is a term which refers to the perception that the United

States maintains four separate air forces. The term implies redundancy and waste, so is

most often used in the rhetoric surrounding excessive force structure costs. The four air

forces referred to are represented by the U.S. Air Force, the Army rotary wing force,

Navy aviation, and Marine Corps aviation. Of these four, the Marine Corps normally

receives the dubious distinction as the "Fourth Air Force", for two reasons. First, the

Marine Corps is the smallest of the four. Second, Marine aviation is itself a subset of

Naval aviation, which looks suspiciously redundant even within the Department of the

Navy. Upon closer examination, one would find that it is specifically the fighter/attack

assets within Marine aviation that are the real target of the Fourth Air Force arguments,

and it is these assets the Marine Corps is called upon most frequently to justify.

In order to avoid confusion, it is useful to distinguish among Naval aviation, Navy

aviation, and Marine aviation. Naval aviation is the overarching aviation organization of

the Department of the Navy, under which both Navy and Marine aviation reside as

independent entities. Marine aviation is not subordinate to Navy aviation, but rather is

an equal partner in Naval aviation. This distinction is important in examining the development of Marine aviation. For example, there is a common mis-perception that all of Marine aircraft are purchased by the Navy. The truth is that all Navy and Marine aircraft are purchased by the department of the Navy, and each service chief must independently justify his aviation requirements to the Secretary and Congress. This is not to suggest that there is not a deep and abiding relationship between Marine and Navy aviation, only that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) does not own Marine aviation.

This paper intends to examine Marine fighter/attack aviation, specifically with

reference to the challenges it has had to face. Due to the emerging and divergent aviation technologies of the time, Marine fighter/attack aviation became a specialization within Marine aviation prior to World War II. To accomplish this examination, this paper will trace the history of Marine aviation as a whole, from its beginnings, with the intent of

establishing Marine fighter/attack aviation's purpose and utility to the Marine Corps mission and the nation. Ultimately, it will examine the credibility of maintaining Marine aviation. The survival of Marine fighter/attack aviation, past, present, and future, is then the specific issue that this paper intends to discuss, and broader perspectives will be explored as they relate to that survival. Lastly, this paper argues that there are not four separate air forces within the U.S. military, that Marine fighter/attack aviation is integral to the mission of the Marine Corps, and that Marine fighter/attack aviation is not redundant, but instead is a unique and vital element of American air power.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ii-iii

Table of Contents iv

Chapter 1: The Beginnings and World War I, 1912-1918 1 Chapter 2: The Inter-War Years and World War II, 1919-1945 11

Chapter 3: Post World War II and Korea, 1945-1953 25

Chapter 4: The Troubled Coexistence and Vietnam, 1953-1970 35

Chapter 5: Post Vietnam and The Gulf War, 1970-1991 43

Chapter 6: 1991-1995 and Into The Future 57

Chapter 7: The Differences of Marine Aviation 65

Chapter 8: The Unending Battle For Marine Fighter/Attack Aviation 76

Bibliography 84

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CHAPTER 1

The Beginnings

The traditional mission of the Marine Corps, until the late 19th century, was to provide shipboard security and light infantry for landing or boarding parties. In 1881, the Navy began to benefit from the forward thinkers who were causing a renaissance in Naval doctrine, weaponry, and organization. Among these forward thinkers was Alfred Thayer Mahan, who advanced the thesis that national power and prosperity required expansion of foreign commerce. Since American psychology chaffed at the idea of achieving this through colonization, Mahan's approach was to advocate the creation of a large merchant fleet protected by an equally large and technologically advanced Naval fleet. The Navy embraced the idea of these new ships, but with the recognition that the current "riffraff” which made up the Navy enlisted force was unsuitable (Navy practice for crewing its vessels had been to simply scour the docks for able-bodied seamen prior to sailing). What was now required was that the sailors be highly educated, selfreliant and American citizens. To most senior Navy officers, the new type of sailor not only precluded the requirement for Marine guards to oversee the crews, but also suggested that the Marine presence actually had a negative impact on morale and development of the new Navy. This popular opinion posed a significant threat to the Marine's shipboard mission, and therefore to the very survival of the Corps. Congress might have eventually dissolved the Marine Corps if it hadn't been for a fortuitous misstep by then President Theodore Roosevelt.1

Sympathetic to the insistence by a group of senior naval officers that

Marines should be removed from Navy ships, Roosevelt issued an Executive Order removing the Marines in 1908. Congress, who arguably hadn't given the Marine

Corps a second thought in recent years, disdained the president's right to infringe

on what they considered to be Congressional prerogative. Congress challenged the Executive Order, eventually won, and Marines were placed back aboard ship. The unintentional result was that the Marine Corps and its relationship to the Navy

were bought back into the public and Congressional eyes. The Marine Corps

needed a mission that supported the recent changes in the Navy mission.

Ironically, the new Navy ships that threatened the traditional roles and missions of

the Marine Corps provided the answer. The new Navy ships were fast and

powerful, but they were also fuel hungry. It became apparrent that advance naval

bases” became a likely Marine mission. As the requirement to perform this

mission began to emerge, some began to see the potential benefit of the emerging

technology known as aviation.2

1912-1918

The official birth of Marine aviation is 22 May 1912. It was on this date

that the first Marine Aviator, 1st Lieutenant Alfred Austell Cunningham reported

to the Aviation Training Camp at Annapolis, Maryland. Lt. Cunningham was

ordered to Annapolis for “duty in connection with Aviation”, by Major General

Commandant William P. Biddle.3

By the time Cunningham received his orders to Annapolis, he had already

established himself as an avid proponent of Marine Aviation, and his force of

personality would continue to positively impact the growth and survival of Marine

air until well after World War I (WW I). Cunningham began his Marine career as

an infantry officer. In 1911, he was assigned to the Advance Base School at the

Philadelphia Navy Yard, and organization that was charged with developing the

doctrinal, logistical, and tactical solutions too problems associated with the new

Advance Base mission. Philadelphia was also the hub of civilian aviation

experimentation. Cunningham, who had always had a keen interest in the subject,

began to see the potential aviation offered to the Advance Base Mission.4

Cunningham joined the civilian Aero Club in Philadelphia. As his

enthusiasm for aviation grew, he deliberately developed close associations within

the city’s social and political elite. These associations provide a forum for him to

suggest the advantages to the community of locating a Marine air base there.

Whether Cunningham’s efforts directly affected the Commandant’s decision to

develop aviation for the advance base mission cannot be determined. However,

Cunningham was twice called into the Commandant’s presence to explain his part

in the political pressures the Commandant was receiving from Philadelphia

favoring Marine aaviation.5 Regardless, Commandant Biddle (possibly to get rid of

him) assigned Cunningham to flight training with Navy at Annapolis which

established him as the first Marine aviator, and more importantly, established

Marine aviation’s close association with Naval aviation. This relationship has

remained an integral aspect of Marine aviation’s personality and flexibility ever

since. By the end of 1912 Commandant Biddle reported:

“In view of the great benefit to the Advance Base Force

that might result from trained aviators, two officers

and one man of the Marine Corps have been under

instruction in aviation at the United States Naval

Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, and it is hoped that

during the coming year this number may be

considerably increased.”6

As Marine aviator number one, Cunningham acted as the de facto head of

Marine aviation throughout its early years. In 1913, he participated as the only

Marine on the “Chambers Board”, which the Navy convened to draw up “a

comprehensive plan for the organization of a Naval aeronautical service”.7 In

addition to Navy recommendation, the Chambers Board supported the creation of

a Marine section of six aircraft as an advance bases group, shore-based.

Additionally the board recommended that a Marine officer be appointed as a

member of the staff of the new Director of Naval Aviation.8 The implementation

of the board’s recommendations was slow, but had the effect of permanently

establishing Marine aviation’s part in Naval Aviation as well as its distinctly unique

mission characteristic (i.e., shore based Naval aviation).

From 1913 to 1917, all three services (Army, Navy, and Marines), were

investigating the tactical possibilities of aviation. The Marines contributed

significantly with their enthusiasm and innovative approach to aviation, and by

finding opportunities to experiment in fleet exercises. In January 1914, the Marine section of the Naval Flying School embarked aboard the USS Hancock for

transport to Puerto Rico, where it would join the newly created Advance Base

Brigade in the annual Atlantic Fleet exercises. The exercise was designed to test

the Marine Corps ability to occupy an advance base and hold it against hostile

attack. The aviators operated with the brigade throughout the exercise, flying

primarily scout and reconnaissance missions. During the exercise, a Marine

aircraft flown by 1st Lt. B. L. Smith (Marine aviator number 2) conducted

simulated attack runs on two Navy Battleships from above 5000 feet. This altitude placed the aircraft above the ship's defensive guns. 1st Lt. Smith declared that this demonstrated the possibility of using airplanes, armed with high explosive bombs,

for advance base defense. Smith also recommended in the exercise after action

report that the new Marine troop transport, then under construction, be equipped

to carry and launch at least one aircraft, thus foreshadowing the later evolution of

the Marine air-ground team.9

Despite these accomplishments, the Marine aviation section was disbanded

upon its return from Puerto Rico, its assets and personnel integrated with the

Navy. Apparently, there was still considerable pessimism concerning aviation

among the military leadership. In fact, aviation in general did not enjoy the

popular support of the upper leadership prior to WW I, due in part to the frailty

and unreliability of the early aircraft. It was only the undying enthusiasm of those

directly connected to aviation that kept the community moving forward.

Between 1915 and 1916, Marines practiced and experimented with the Navy,

developing tactics for anti-submarine patrolling, bombing, and artillery spotting.

Marines participated in the first catapult launches from Naval ships. In August

1915, an agreement between Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and the

Army Signal Corps allowed Marine aviators to begin training in land planes at the

Signal Corps aviation school (Navy/Marine aircraft to this point being seaplanes).

Daniels had made this arrangement in the belief that the defense of advance bases,

and in the case of Marines, possible joint operations with the Army, required an

aviation force able to operate from either land or water.10 This had the effect of

establishing Marine Aviation as the service which would cover the seam between

the Navy's over-water aviation and the Army's over-land aviation. Most

significantly, this special status was apparently agreeable to both the Navy and the Army.

The Congress played a curiously uncharacteristic role in the development of

aviation during this period. They did not involve themselves in the inter service

discussion on aviation roles and missions. Perhaps aviation was so new that they

had insufficient information to anticipate the potential impact. By late 1916,

President Woodrow Wilson called for a large scale expansion of the Army and

Navy, anticipating the possibility of war with Germany. In the Naval

Appropriations Act of 29 August 1916, Congress provided $3,500,000 for aircraft

and equipment, and authorized a permanent Naval Flying Corps of 150 officers and

350 enlisted above the previous legal personnel strengths. The Act also provided

for the creation of Naval and Marine Corps Reserve, including an aviation reserve.

For unknown reasons, the Naval Bureau opposed a permanent flying corps, and

prevented its creation. The reserves, however, grew rapidly.11

By the end of 1916, U.S. participation in WW I seemed inevitable. By

sending Marines to aviation training since 1912, the Commandant made it clear that

he intended to include aviation as an element of his Advance Base Force. With war

approaching, the Commandant announced his intention to establish a "Marine

Aviation Company for duty with the Advance Base Force," at "as early a date as

practical." He further envisioned the company would incorporate both land and

seaplanes.12 On 26 February 1917, Capt. Alfred Cunningham received orders to

begin organizing an aviation company for the Advance Base Force.

WORLD WAR I

Upon the U.S. declaration of war with Germany in April 1917, Cunningham

became the driving force behind an effort to build and deploy a Marine aviation

contingent to fight in France. The Army staked out bombing and ground attack for

itself, making it clear that it did not want Navy interference in over land aviation.

In response, the Navy pursued anti-submarine warfare as a mission for its aviation.

Cunningham saw the anti-submarine mission as a method to gain support for a

rapid build-up and deployment, but at the same time his reports to the

Commandant expressed concern that Marine aviators should fly in support of their

fellow Marines on the ground. This caused Commandant Barnett to successfully

seek authorization to develop a second Marine aviation unit (with land planes) to

fly reconnaissance and artillery spotting missions for the Marine Brigade bound for

France.13 Cunningham aggressively pursued the manning and equipping of this

second unit. Marine aviation became the first American flying unit to deploy to

combat when on January 9,1918 the First Marine Aviation Company deployed to

the Azores to conduct anti-submarine patrols.

Cunningham's deployment of the Second Marine Aviation Company (the

land plane squadron) to France met with significant difficulty, and once again Cunningham's force of personality played a major role in the ultimately successful deployment of the unit to combat. The first hurdle was the Army's refusal to

allow the Marines an over land mission. On his own, Cunningham proposed to the General Board of the Navy a plan which called for the Second Aviation Company's deployment to bomb the German submarine pens in France. The Board approved

the formation of the "Northern Bombing Group" for that purpose in February

1918, and authorized the formation of four Marine Aviation squadrons. Continually dodging Army challenges to the deployment of the Marines, and responding to

multiple variations from the Navy as to the specific missions of his unit,

Cunningham was finally able to deploy the four aviation squadrons to France as

the 1st Marine Aviation Force on July 30, 1918.14

The successful arrival in France did not end the difficulties for the 1st

Marine Aviation Force, for the Marine's aircraft were mis-directed in shipping and

did not arrive with them in France. Cunningham again demonstrated his

innovative zeal by bargaining with the British. The British had a pilot shortage,

and the Marines had an aircraft shortage. While the solution was easy, gaining

approval was not, but Cunningham persisted until Marines were flying British

aircraft. Additionally, Cunningham was able to trade extra aircraft engines (which

had arrived from America) for engine-less British aircraft and procured enough

aircraft to begin the first U.S. flight operations.15

The First Aviation Force didn't begin operating as a unit until September of

1918, and the armistice was signed on November 11th of that year. In this short

period of time, they flew primarily strategic and direct support bombing missions

for French and British troops. The Marines flew the first aerial re-supply mission

in history, delivering 2,600 pounds of food and supplies to a surrounded French

regiment. During their portion of the conflict, the Marines had confirmed 4

German aircraft shot down, with an additional 8 claimed. Two Congressional

Medals of Honor were awarded to Marine aviators in WW I. Through no fault of

their own, the 1st Marine Aviation Force was never allowed the opportunity to fly

support mission with the U.S. Marine Brigade on the ground.16

Summary

Marine aviation developed because of the potential it offered to the newly

acquired Marine Corps expeditionary mission. Additionally, Marine aviation was established from the outset as an extension of Naval aviation, in much the same

way that the Marine Corps itself was an extension of the Navy. The important

distinction was that the Department of the Navy had not created two independent

air forces, but one air force with a portion designated to cover the seam between

over water and over land operations. Throughout this early period, Marines were

at the forefront of aviation development, despite the fact that Marine aviation was constantly confronted by challenges to its survival. In combat, Marine aviation had proven its utility to the national interest. However, not being allowed to directly

support ground Marines would have a lasting effect on the ultimate acceptance of aviation as part of the Marine Corps.

Chapter I

Notes

1 Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History Of The United States Marine Corps, 1900-1970,

(Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1973), p. 1-5

2 Clifford, p. 1-24

3 Commandant William P. Biddle to Alfred Austell Cunningham, 16 May 1912, Cunningham Papers (PC-49) Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps

Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

4 Graham A. Cosmas and Edward C, Johnson, Marine Aviation: The Early Years 1912-1940 (Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Headquarters, 1977) p. 1-2

5 Cosmas, p. 3-4

6 Annual Report of the Major General Commandant to SecNav for Fiscal Year 1912, (Marine Corps Historical Center, Aviation File) p. 12

7 C. L. Lord, The History of Naval Aviation, 1898-1939, (Marine Corps Historical Center, Aviation File) p. 101

8 Peter B. Mersky, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation 1912 to the Present (Baltimore Maryland: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983),

p. 4

9 Cosmas, p. 7

10 Cosmas, p. 9

11 Cosmas, p. 9

12 Cosmas, p. 10. From the Major General Commandant's Annual Report to the

SecNav for Fiscal Year 1916.

13 Mersky, p. 7

14 Mersky, p. 9

15 Mersky, p. 10

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1919-1940

The end of the first World War (the "War to end all wars") brought about a

massive demobilization in America. During 1919, all the services were engaged in

a desperate struggle to persuade Congress to maintain at least their pre-war

strengths. Still under the leadership of Alfred Cunningham, Marine aviation

found itself confronted with the possibility that they may not survive at all.

Cunningham fought for permanent status for Marine aviation, but labored under

the disadvantage that he had neither permanent bases nor facilities nor precedent

for peacetime strength and organization.1

In addition to Cunningham's struggle for Congressional acceptance, he was confronted by a challenge which has complicated Marine aviation's survival

throughout its history, namely, acceptance within the Marine Corps. In September

1920, Cunningham published an article in the Marine Corps Gazette. His words

will sound familiar even to present day Marine aviators.

"One of the greatest handicaps which Marine Corps

Aviation must now overcome is a combination of

doubt as to usefulness, lack of sympathy, and a feeling

on the part of some line officers that aviators and

aviation enlisted men are not real Marines. We look

upon the first two criticisms complacently, knowing

that we can abundantly prove our usefulness even to

the most skeptical, and that when we have done so, we

will receive the sympathy and hearty support of all

Marine Officers. The last criticism we resent

vehemently as an injustice, so far as applies to

loyalty, supreme pride in the Corps, and desire to do

what is assigned to us as quickly and as well as it can

be done."2

Cunningham went on in his article, as he did whenever the opportunity

speak on Marine aviation arose, to express his view that the only purpose of

aviation in any service was in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully

carry out their operations. He spoke of aviation as a tool to increase the

probability of success on the ground, and to materially shorten campaigns. He

judged that the Marine ground officer's unfamiliarity with the advantages offered

by aviation was a woeful failure on the part of aviation to advertise its capability.

As stated in chapter one, WW I did not provide an opportunity for Marine aviation

to support Marine ground troops. Cunningham saw this as the source of the

perception that aviation was of no use, and also the general lack of support for the continuance of Marine aviation within the Corps. As the head of Marine aviation,

he dedicated himself to correcting this perception.3

Cunningham actively lobbied for Marine aviation wherever he found

skeptics. In an appearance before the General Board of the Navy in April of 1919,

he proposed the development of what would eventually become the modern air-

ground team. He specified that the role of Marine aviation was providing support

for the ground element's advance base mission, and for expeditionary forces in

Military