Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence Russian Military Perceptions of the Gulf War Air Campaign Dr D Marshall-Hasdell pard introduction There seems to be little doubt that the experiences of the Multi National Forces (MNF) in the air campaign during the Gulf War were examined in detail by military experts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). After all, the Soviets had provided much of the Iraqi military hardware and, therefore, there was at the very least an obvious interest in examining its performance. But the analysis of the Gulf War, as a purely Soviet military theoretical exercise, was in many ways interrupted and even taken over by events surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union. The need to discuss and develop new military doctrines and the myriad of other problems facing the new armed forces of the FSU placed a heavy demand on overstretched military theorists. It was to be hoped that the lessons of the Gulf War, and in particular those related to the use of air power, would be incorporated into the plans for the future of the armed forces in the new states of the FSU. The Russian Federation Armed Forces, as the dominant player in the new order of Eastern Europe, should have been the one most likely to take advantage of the experiences of the MNF in the Gulf War. The aim of this paper is to identify the extent to which the Russian Federation Air Force (RuFAF), as the predominant successor to the Air Forces of the FSU, analysed the air war in the Gulf and also to examine their interpretation of the experience in relation to the importance it has for the future of air warfare. The paper begins with an examination of the main influences of the Gulf War on the future use of air power. In particular, Russian interpretation of the changing nature of air warfare and its influence on the whole military strategic situation is analysed, along with the main factors that dominated the debate about the changing strategic scenario. The second part of the paper is devoted to a detailed appraisal of Russian views relating to the main lessons they felt could be learnt from the air campaign. This includes a study of the impact of advanced technologies used in the air campaign that were so much in evidence throughout the Gulf War. Other areas of interest to the Russian analysts are also covered: the training of MNF crews; the importance of Electronic Warfare (EW); and finally an appraisal of the role of Command, Control and Communications (C ) systems. STRATEGIC CONCERNS In March 1992, an article published in Voyennaya Mysl' by Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason stressed the importance of air power in future warfare and introduced the idea to his Russian audience that "air force capabilities are of great importance as an additional tool for achieving national interests".1 He used the Gulf War to illustrate his arguments and highlighted many of the factors influencing strategic stability of which Russian analysts appear to have taken heed.2 Indeed, the common line, in both Western and Russian military assessments of the impact of the Gulf War air campaign, seemed to stress the need for a complete reappraisal of the role and purpose of air forces in contemporary warfare. Although the Russians had the Afghanistan experience to help them evaluate the influence of air power, it was recognised that the future development of the RuFAF could not rely on that experience alone.3 The need for in-depth studies of the Gulf War was identified by a number of prominent military people in Russia, many of whom argued that the growing role of air power would be a key player in future warfare; not least because the air campaign had so obviously reduced the likelihood of massive casualties during land operations. The value of air forces was seen to have been increased to the extent that, in certain conditions, an enemy's defeat could be achieved without the need for ground forces to invade enemy territory.4 Moreover, it was appreciated that there was a direct link between the development of advanced weapon systems and force levels required to maintain strategic stability. This was particularly the case with air forces because it was argued that any lowering of force levels could be more than compensated for by the increased utilisation and deployment of high-tech weapons (HTW). Although this applies to virtually all elements of the armed forces, the Gulf War demonstrated to the Russians that the use of HTW and other advanced technologies (e.g. in electronic warfare (EW), reconnaissance, C , etc.) significantly altered the balance of forces.5 Additionally, it was recognised that cruise missiles in particular could have strategic, as well as operational, mission capabilities. Military strategists then pointed out the implications for any military doctrine - based on the principles of defensive defence - that was developed against an enemy with advanced weapon systems. It was argued that the Gulf War demonstrated that "a defence incapable of creating necessary conditions for launching a decisive offensive will not fulfil its mission".6 Certainly passivity in defence spelled disaster and would undoubtedly end in defeat.7 Therefore, the only satisfactory defensive strategy had to be based on the ability to mount not only limited counter-offensive operations but also major offensive operations in order to counter the effect of HTWs. The notion of active defence had once more gained the upper hand and the failure of the Iraqis to adapt their operational defensive procedures to mobility and manoeuvre was seen to have been a major contributory factor in their defeat.8 Analysts were especially impressed by the relatively easy attainment of air supremacy and the influence of space-based technology, both of which it was felt deserved considerable attention and in-depth analysis.9 The ability of the MNF's air campaign to paralyse Iraqi C and to achieve air supremacy with relative ease was considered to be the main factor in the MNF's seizure of the strategic initiative. In effect, some commentators suggested that the Iraqis had conceded strategic and operational initiative to the MNF in advance even of the main air campaign. The consequence of this action was to allow the Allied Forces to have the advantage of complete air superiority while conducting their combat operations.10 In particular, it was widely appreciated that operational goals could be achieved without the necessity of ground force engagements on enemy territory; as a result the need for large numbers of ground troops as part of an offensive force could now be re-evaluated.11 Some observers even went so far as to suggest that the crushing defeat of the Iraqi Army made it quite clear that Soviet military doctrine and the entire model for military development was obsolete.12 The need for a complete reappraisal of the whole strategic stability issue was being called for at even the highest levels. As a result of the impact of air campaign during the Gulf War, air power was now considered to be a key factor in the preservation of a military balance and thus to ensure strategic stability across the whole globe.13 Not all analysts agreed, however, that the employment of air power had been the decisive contributor to victory. Some argued that the air campaign alone could not have destroyed the Iraqi Army or its military and nuclear potential.14 In developing this argument it was considered that the Iraqis by adopting a static, positional defence had contributed to their own destruction by merely providing targets for precision guided weapons (PGW). Only units with a mobile capability showed any relative survivability in the face of an enemy with overwhelming air superiority. Notwithstanding the reservations about the totality of air power, it was generally accepted that wars in the future would not begin with an invasion by ground forces, but instead with a pre-emptive air/electronic warfare (EW) campaign.15 LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR There is much evidence to show that the Russians have learned a great deal from the Gulf War experiences of the MNF. Much of this has, of course, been gained from the Western analysis of the military operations conducted by the armed forces of the allies making up the MNF. Russian interpretations are, therefore, in the main part directly taken from second-hand sources. It has to be accepted that the quality of the information they have used will have been somewhat diluted from that which the main participants in the Gulf War have utilised to formulate their own lessons. As a consequence, some of the aspects that the Russians have highlighted and discussed in detail would appear, perhaps, to be rather obvious to the Western observer. Indeed to the Western analyst, many of the operations during the Gulf War merely served to confirm many already widely accepted principles: for example, the value of PGWs or the use of force multipliers. For the purposes of this paper it is the intention to examine those areas of Gulf War air operations which seem to have had the greatest impression on the Russian analysts and military theorists. This section will, therefore, start by looking at the impact of advanced technologies, with particular emphasis on the air campaign. This will be followed by a close look at the training aspects of MNF military personnel - this is important not least because the Russian Armed Forces have been deeply engrossed in a detailed study of their own force structure and training. Finally the importance of EW is considered along with the role of C . THE IMPACT OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES The Gulf War was in many ways the proving ground, and in some cases the testing ground, for a multitude of advanced weapon systems that the armed forces of the West had been incorporating into their inventories for the previous decade. The impact of these new technologies has been largely identified with the air campaign. On television screens across the world, pictures of the new technological battlefield were constantly on parade: ranging from the cruise missile flying low and fast down the streets of Baghdad to the bombs eye' view of a PGW dropping down the ventilator shaft of a hardened aircraft shelter. The Russians were exposed to this imagery in much the same way as their Western counterparts. Moreover, because the air campaign lasted for so long - from the initial air response in August 1990 to the final sortie in February 1991 - virtually all aspects of air operations were given the closest scrutiny by the ever-hungry Western media. Therefore, as never before, the Russians were able to observe at first hand and from readily available sources NATO forces at war. The men, systems, procedures and machinery of the main players in the armed forces of the Western world could now be analysed from the comfort of an armchair using the fast forward, play and pause buttons on a video recorder. As a result the Russian military press devoted considerable time and space to what their analysts considered to be the main lessons of the Gulf War. There seems little doubt that the Russians now see the future of warfare being intricately and irrevocably linked to the use of advanced technology and HTWs. Commentators stress the domination of such weapons on the battlefields of the future and argue that few, if any, areas will not be affected by the impact of such weapons and systems.16 In particular, the air campaign was considered to represent the classic example of offensive air operations, made more effective by Iraqi passivity and operational errors. However, there was a degree of guarded scepticism about the all pervasive influence of the Gulf War air campaign. For example, it was argued that the Gulf War was almost a unique military operation and that, for example, smart' weapons would be less effective in battles between more evenly matched opponents. The views of Lt. General of Aviation A. Malyukov would seem to represent this sceptical view which, whilst accepting and applauding the achievements of the MNF, implies that although there is much for the Russians to learn from the Gulf War, future wars are not always going to be such a one-sided affair.17 For example, senior Russian commanders were quick to point out that the advanced technology on display with the MNF was not available to the Iraqis and that "no more than 10-15% of Iraqi hardware was modern - the rest, including Soviet equipment, was only of first or second generation models".18 There is an implicit suggestion in much of what the Russian generals were saying, that one of the main lessons learnt by the Russian military is that they must ensure that the resources are available for the continuation of their own HTW programmes. These are powerful arguments when consideration is given to the constant fight between Russian politicians, economists, industrialists and servicemen over resource allocation. The problems facing air defence systems in the era of advanced technologies was one of the areas which generated considerable debate. This is perhaps not surprising when consideration is given to the fact that Iraq's integrated air defences used Soviet hardware. More significantly, the Iraqis used Soviet procedural models, which themselves had been subject to internal scrutiny following public shows of incompetence - the shooting down of a Korean airliner and the Rust affair' are but two examples. Many explanations for the failure of Iraq's air defences were suggested in the pages of Russian military journals, most of which highlighted the obvious: for example, the detailed intelligence available to the MNF as a result of many years of study into Soviet AD systems (especially the SAM 2, SAM 3 and SAM 6 systems which formed the basis of Iraq's air defence network); the pre-emptive destruction of Iraq's C system and the neutralisation or grounding of Iraq's air interceptor forces.19 Other factors seemed to have a much more far reaching impact, notably the absence of any air defence weapons or detection systems capable of an effective counter to the most advanced of the new technologies on display in the Gulf War. In particular, concern was generated about the operational effectiveness of systems such as the F-117 Stealth bomber, cruise missiles (CM) and PGWs (anti-radar missiles and laser/optical guided bombs).20 Interestingly, articles then began to appear which described in a fair amount of detail the research which was being conducted into detection systems to counter stealth' technology.21 Additionally, there was the expected pleading from the commanders of various arms of the Armed Forces: in particular, the Head of Coastal Forces argued his case for extensive modernisation of his forces based on the need to counter the threat of CMs.22 It is quite noticeable that articles like this also tended to be linked to the general notion of trying to give an overall impression of the intention to develop the Armed Forces on defensive lines. This, of course, was at the height of the debate about defensive military strategies following Gorbachev's public pronouncements on defensive defence' and reasonable sufficiency'. Therefore, it was an obvious ploy for any senior commander wishing to get a larger slice of the military budget to show how requests for modernisation would enhance the defensive posture of the forces under his command.23 Whether these statements were mere posturing for the sake of cash or an indication of a more pragmatic approach to the general defence debate remains open to question. Russian military analysts argued that the extensive deployment of new, unproved HTW systems during the Gulf War, in particular by the Americans, meant that there was much to study in relation to this war experience and it would require examination over a prolonged period.24 A wide range of systems were identified for future examination in addition to the number one', high-profile Stealth bomber: the guidance, control and navigation systems of CMs and PGWs; the Patriot anti-missile system (which demonstrated the ability to destroy ballistic missiles in flight), and the integrated intelligence and control techniques using both space, air and ground based systems are but a few examples highlighted by Russian analysts. Another important consideration for future planning was a need to link the technological advancement of HTWs with any calculation of an enemy's combat potential.25 In other words, some kind of numerical factor, which would account for the enhanced performance of such weapon systems, would have to be incorporated in any future assessments. This of course was not an uncommon practice in the Soviet military strategists' and theorists' analytical programmes. Referring back to previous discussion about a general strategic rethink, it is interesting to note that some commentators recognised a linkage between PGWs and nuclear weapons. For example, it was suggested that in many cases the use of PGWs could achieve a similar effect to that of a nuclear device.26 It was argued that the Gulf War highlighted the need to control the use and future development of PGWs in the same way as nuclear weapons had to be brought under greater control. The rationale behind this argument was based on the potentially disastrous environmental consequences of conventional weapon attacks on targets such as chemical plants, oil wells, nuclear power stations, etc. However, these fears were not simply generated by the Gulf War experience as they had been under consideration for many years. It would seem that this type of linkage, which suggested the control of PGWs, was perhaps more the consequence of perceived - in many cases real - shortcomings in the Soviet development of this type of weapon. The logic of the argument really centred on Shaposhnikov's stated view that as force levels are decreased the relative importance of HTWs on strategic stability is increased.27 Not surprisingly, Shaposhnikov and others argued that this fomenter of strategic imbalance was particularly true of air forces; this had clear implications for the future development of the Soviet Air Forces.28 The Gulf War had shown that the West had a specific advantage in this area; most notably, Shaposhnikov was impressed by the high percentage of sorties which were flown at night. He emphasised the high degree of mission effectiveness resulting from the advanced technologies incorporated in many of NATO's military aircraft. In addition, he commended the expertise of Western aircrew, thus giving tacit recognition of the general criticisms which could be laid at the training system within the Soviet Air Forces. However, in line with the pronouncements of most senior commanders, Shaposhnikov's main theme was directed at the defence sufficiency' debate and the fear of a large gap opening up between the world's two largest air forces. He drew attention to the fact that comparative analysis between the two would have to be based on "expert evaluations and analytical calculations" of the Gulf War air campaign: here again we see the significance of the Soviet numerate methodological approach.29 THE TRAINING DILEMMA At the forefront of concerns for Russian analysts of the Gulf War must be the dramatic impact of the superlative performance of not just the aviation hardware but perhaps more importantly the men in the flying machines. Moreover, this perception of excellence was not restricted to aircrew but extended to those engineers, air controllers, technicians, etc. in support at first, second and third line. The reason for this was clearly seen by the Russians to be the consequence of a very effective and highly advanced training system; something that the Soviet Air Forces, in particular, singularly lacked and which was to become the legacy for the RuFAF. As already mentioned, the high quality of MNF aircrew and support staff was best displayed in the ability to conduct complex missions at night. Although the Russians have recognised other enabling factors, not least the co-ordination of airspace management and the use of advanced technologies, it was the high degree of training that was seen as a major factor in the proficient conduct of the air campaign. Therefore, although Russian air commanders and theorists accepted and indeed demanded improvements in aviation hardware, it was in the area of training that the greatest effort was required. It was argued that even with the incorporation of advanced technologies and the deployment of a new generation of aircraft, the growing gap in combat efficiency with the West would continue to increase unless the question of training was addressed. Shaposhnikov argued that "the current military educational system has become outdated"; he proclaimed the need for a new training programme which would have a qualitative edge rather than the traditional emphasis which had pursued the route to excellence by falsification, fudging and formalism.30 Throughout the Gorbachev era it had been argued that the military establishment had been able to put off any major review of the military educational apparatus. As a result, the Russians inherited a multitude of problems: the same system with the same people running it and, perhaps of greatest significance, the same mind-set. And so despite the efforts of reform-minded critics and the multitudinous number of demands for the reform of the training system it remained virtually intact and ready for the hand-over to its Russian beneficiaries. It can be argued that the Gulf War merely rekindled an existing debate, but it did so with a far greater impact on the military establishment - no longer could the military leadership devalue the need for reform nor hide the desperately poor functioning of the training system. There was of course much criticism in the Soviet and then Russian military press about the poor performance of the Iraqis during the war.31 Important dynamics such as morale, practical skills and professionalism were all identified as being poorly addressed by the Iraqi Armed Forces. It was stressed that basic knowledge of weapon systems and procedures did not allow the Iraqis to take advantage of the equipment they captured following their invasion if Kuwait. For example, they were unable to operate the Hawk SAM systems let alone incorporate them into their own air defence network.32 This level of criticism was to be expected, particularly as the Soviets' client state had performed so ineffectively using Soviet supplied material. Of more concern must have been the realisation that many of these procedural and educational inadequacies could be linked to the Soviets' own training practices. After all the Iraqis had relied heavily upon the Soviet military not only for the materials of war but also for guidance on how to utilise the weapon systems they had been supplied with. Notwithstanding considerations of the poor Iraqi performance, the Russians appreciated that it would not be possible to ignore the quite obviously superior efficiency of MNF personnel: even a cursory examination of the air campaign alone was enough to demonstrate the importance of advanced training being able to work in parallel with advanced technology. Therefore, attention had to be turned towards the evaluation of what distinguished the military training practices of the Western nations from those of Russia. The flexibility of training procedures was considered to be the fundamental difference between the two systems. The Russians were impressed by the ability of MNF aircrew and groundcrew to re-deploy quickly from their normal training environment and rapidly to establish a work-up programme for desert operations. This alone was impressive, but it has to be remembered that many units were actually re-deployed from out-of-theatre locations. The case of VMA-542 - a Harrier AV-8B squadron of the United States Marine Corps - would not be considered in any sense the extreme example but it is one which demonstrates the inherent flexibility to be found in the air forces of NATO. It is worth spending some time examining this particular case by considering the words of the commanding officer Lt. Colonel Ted Herman. By mid-1990, we had just completed a six and a half month tour in the Western Pacific which was part of our normal deployment programme. During that deployment we went to Japan, Korea, Okinawa and the Philippines in support of our treaties and requirements over in the West Pacific (WestPac). In doing so we had to take a squadron of relatively new pilots: roughly three-quarters of them had less than 200 hours in the AV-8B.33 But after six months of WestPac flying they were up to a rather high state of combat readiness and currency. Coming home in June we went through the normal post-deployment rotational woes of losing people to change of station orders, going to the training squadron or going to schools; so the squadron was down to two-thirds of the size we had overseas... Our aeroplanes of mixed configuration were being re-worked at the squadron level - being brought back up to normal peacetime standards. About half of the people were on leave and we were moving into new spaces.34 And yet by 19 August 1990, VMA-542 had re-deployed from USMC Cherry Point to Bahrain, with a full strength of aircrew and groundcrew, having taken-over twenty aircraft from other squadrons in order to operate with like configuration. A true testimony to the basic flexibility of air power which has not been lost on the Russians. It is worth returning to Ted Herman to illustrate another point which must have made a great impression on Russian analysts of the Gulf War. The trust that Western commanders at all levels place in their men's ability to do the job', is based to a large degree on the trust they have in the training system. Ted Herman put it this way: So I'm the father to a Marine Harrier squadron with 20 aeroplanes, and a grand total of around 200 people consisting of pilots and maintenance men. All you can do is hope all of the training you have provided is enough.35 The performance of units such as VMA-542 supports the argument that the training their personnel had undergone was more than enough to produce the required standard, which allowed for almost total flexibility to be employed in the air campaign. The essence then, is in the capability of the air force to provide effective, efficient and flexible training programmes, which at a moment's notice may have to be changed or modified to cope with a different operating environment. Without inherent flexibility this cannot be achieved, except perhaps with a complete reorganisation, which would of course take an unacceptably long time. The Gulf War demonstrated in explicit detail to the Russians that their existing training system was not capable of providing this kind of service. Indeed, they had just come through nearly ten years of warfare in Afghanistan; ten years of combat experience which had for the most part not been assimilated into normal training practices.36 Apart from the basic elements of Western military training procedures, the Russians also identified some specific features of MNF operations which clearly emphasised the importance of training and flexibility. The ability to conduct air operations at night from low level and in all weathers has already been mentioned in this paper, but it is worth returning to this to illustrate how necessary it is to have a good normal' training programme in order to be able to adapt procedures to accommodate a different environment. The Russians appreciated the effectiveness of the MNF air forces' training programmes which gave aircrew the additional skills required to operate in the hostile conditions encountered over Iraq and Kuwait. Whether these considerations will influence the review of training currently in progress in the Russian Federation Armed Forces remains a moot question. Based on the experiences of Afghanistan and the dominance of traditional thinking about military education, it fair to suggest that even given a certain degree of willing intent any change will be slow to arrive and slow to implement. The inadequacies of the old Soviet training system in the provision of out-of-theatre operational requirements can be illustrated not only by the Afghan experience but also by other examples. There is evidence to suggest that at the height of Soviet military support for Egypt preparation for combat in the desert environment was less than satisfactory.37 Although some pre-deployment training was conducted in the Central Asian republics there is criticism of the overall purpose of the training programme. For example, Soviet pilots had to conduct all air traffic control using English in an attempt to conceal their presence in the theatre from the Israelis and Americans.38 It was reported that this deception was easily recognised by the Israelis and, therefore, the valuable time spent on excessive secrecy was wasted at the expense of training for a likely combat situation. Critics argued that time would have been better spent on developing concepts such as the use of aggressor squadrons' - on the same lines as those formed by the United States Air Force - so as to accustom pilots to the realistic combat conditions of the Middle East. When discussing the merits of the Soviet military education system and the product that it produced, the question of the Human Factor' had increasingly come to the fore during the 1980s. With the introduction of glasnost' the level of criticism from the grassroots of the Soviet Armed Forces had created a new atmosphere in which the demands for reform of the system would be debated. Unfortunately for the quality of the debate, the military establishment reacted to criticism by gradually introducing the idea that the Human Factor' could explain all the problems that the critics identified. However, the term Human Factor' began to mean everything but nothing. The critical situation relating to aircrew training epitomises this notion in that the reason for poor combat performance was shifted away from the responsibility of the individual to a broader, but no less individualistic, concept based on the dynamics of the Human Factor'.39 Some observers of the Gulf War perhaps developed the notion beyond its rather limited scope of the past by identifying the Human Factor' with the qualitative superiority of MNF personnel.40 The vital link was made between the increasing importance of new technologies and the quality of military personnel who had to operate the associated weapon systems. Both the catalyst and main ingredient to ensure the marrying of these two concepts was considered to be the quality of training. The Western allies making up the MNF had been able to capitalise on their technological advantage because of and not in spite of the qualitative superiority of its personnel. Interestingly, senior Russian commanders commenting on these points did so by linking their observations to the debate of the day'. Although virtually all aspects of the armed forces have been under almost constant discussion over the last few years, the qualitative debate in relation to the Human Factor' has been dominated by professionalisation. What Gulf War analysis had proven was the direct link between the high quality training received by the mostly volunteer, professional armed forces of the MNF and the combat effectiveness of HTW systems of all kinds. It is also of interest to note that the financial implications of this situation were being addressed by the Russian military establishment, which now had to face the economic realities of its emerging democratic, free-market condition. Important consideration was given to the observation that a volunteer army had been able to deliver high combat efficiency at a relatively cheap price in terms of men and materials: in contrast that is, to the generally accepted Russian view that the Soviet experience in Afghanistan had demonstrated the exact opposite - that a conscript army had only been able to deliver a poor combat efficiency at a very high price. ELECTRONIC WARFARE The massive employment of EW by the MNF during the Gulf War has made a deep impression on Russian military analysts to the extent that its use has given rise to what is considered to be a new conception of the purpose and structure of attacks launched from the air. The use of EW suppression capabilities was not a new phenomenon in the conduct of air operations but the extensive nature of its utilisation in support of all aspects of the air campaign has generated considerable debate within the Russian military community. It was suggested that the implementation of EW in the early phases of the air campaign demonstrated how influential it was in overcoming air defences and thus being pivotal in the ability of the MNF air forces to gain air superiority. This of course had a precedent in the history of air warfare which Russian analysts have been quick to point out. They often identify the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967 a prime example of the use of massive air suppression effort to disorganise the Egyptian air defences and C3 system. However, they point out that only a relatively small amount of EW equipment took part in that campaign, whereas during the Gulf War it was an on-going EW effort on an enormous scale. Various aspects have been identified by the Russians which made the Gulf War so different from previous conflicts studied by the Soviets. Firstly, the duration of what is called the electronic-fire' phase (a total of 38 days according to Russian analysts) was well in excess of anything seen before and was supported throughout by EW assets. Secondly, large quantities of the latest new equipment (e.g. those classified as belonging to the EW suite) were utilised during the air campaign, thus helping to ensure that a degree of surprise was achieved. For example, AEW/AWACS and JSTARS were considered by the Russians to have been crucial to the success of the air campaign because of their contribution to airborne early warning, control, co-ordination and target reconnaissance. Thirdly, it was the ability to conduct close co-ordination of EW with air attacks on a wide variety of targets that impressed the Russians. In other words for the first time it was appreciated that EW had become an independent type of combat operation rather than offering just a support role.41 Analysis in depth of this aspect of the air campaign revealed to the Russians the many innovations and improvements which had enhanced the whole system of control and co-ordination of the air forces. They identify the co-ordination of sea-launched CMs with the deployment of EW assets or the strikes against SAM sites and radar locations as good examples of this new improved look for EW.42 These Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) sorties effectively paralysed the Iraqi air defences and thus enabled the waves of strike aircraft to destroy the facilities with a far reduced risk of being shot down. In the course of the initial phases of the air campaign Russian analysts accept that the complete gamut of targets was successfully engaged including SAM systems, radars, airfields, command and control facilities, and air defence weapons. Following the initial phases and to complete the spectrum of targets for the total destruction of Iraq's air and ground defence network, aircraft at airfields, tactical missiles and their launchers, administrative and industrial installations, and Iraqi ground force groupings were relentlessly attacked. One estimate of the overall importance of EW in all this air activity suggests that a minimum of 50% aircraft losses could have been sustained but for its effective employment.43 The fact that the intensity of the air campaign was so high - in some phases Russian analysts conclude that up to 2,000 or 3,000 sorties were flown per day - backed up the opinion that the significance of EW was paramount. One of the main problems for Russian military theorists and generals is that much of their study of the EW aspects of the Gulf War is based on supposition and then built on sand. Of all the elements of the air campaign it is the EW component that remains the most highly classified, thus ensuring that details are hard to find in any of the Western analyses of the Gulf War. As Air Marshal Mason has observed, While not dominated by stealth technology to the point where high speed and manoeuvrability are sacrificed, the permanence and impact of EW is such that stealth characteristics must be incorporated.44 The influence of stealth technology is an integral part of the development of EW capabilities and although the Russians perceive themselves to be at the cutting edge of this technological field, there remains considerable doubt as to the practical application. The problem is compounded for the Russians because they have to judge the results of the Gulf War air campaign without access to the secret audits conducted by the Americans and their allies. The frustration is made worse by the fact that the armed forces of the Russian Federation are going through the agonies of reorganisation at a time of great political, social and economic instability, not only at home but also in its Near Abroad'. Considering the enormity of the problems facing the armed forces of Western nations in their attempts to rationalise their future roles and structure in the post-Cold War era, it is only to be expected that the Russian situation is much more complex: many would argue that it is insurmountable. Therefore, it is unlikely that the important question of the future development of EW capabilities for the RuFAF will be given anything other than a high academic' priority. The same of course is true for any of the suggested improvements to the Russian Armed Forces arising from examination of the Gulf War: the final section of this paper will consider one such expensive facet of air warfare which the Russians have identified as essential elements to be incorporated into their military inventory. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C ) The air campaign during the Gulf War demonstrated the importance of good C in two dramatically different ways. Firstly, the complete neutralisation of the Iraqi C network by the allied air offensive was a direct result of the incapacity of that network to operate in a massive EW/strike suppression environment. Secondly, the neutralisation of that network was in effect achieved through the total capacity of the MNF's C system. It would seem to follow from this that the modern battlefield has become almost totally dependent on the performance of each side's C facilities; in fact it could be argued that this was indeed the key to the success of the allied forces during the Gulf War. Certainly, there are those in the Russian military who feel that this was one of the major factors which ultimately led to the allied victory: for without command there can be no control, and both rely on good communication. Initial reactions in the Russian military press talked a great deal about the failures of the Iraqi C system by identifying inadequate equipment and poor channels of communication as the main reasons for the loss of command and control.45 In the light of their observations of the Iraqi performance the Russians considered that the need to maintain reliable C , while at the same time being able to operate under decentralised conditions, was the immediate remedy. Notwithstanding this notion, it was pointed out that the Iraqi Air Defence Command (IADC) did not take appropriate action to ensure the survivability of its assets and it singularly failed to adapt its methods of combat employment. In other words, as far as the Russians were concerned it was the fact that the IADC just sat back and watched its own destruction, whilst making no attempt to change from a centralised system or to vary its defence postures, that was the crucial issue.46 Whilst we can again identify this criticism with an obvious desire of the Russian military to see the failures of Soviet supplied equipment and procedures to be as a direct result of Iraqi inefficiency, it does give an indication of an underlying acceptance that something was fundamentally wrong with the C system. Perhaps one of the most illuminating aspects of the Gulf War which impressed the Russians most in the field of C was the successful demonstration of space-based assets. Although nothing new to the Russian observer, the use of the space-based component in land/air operations was shown to be a crucial factor in the MNF victory. In particular, the use of satellites, space-based communications and Navstar in support of recce, navigation and communications was seen to have been not only impressive but also essential on the modern battlefield.47 This was particularly important in the achievement of surprise, which remains one of the prime considerations for the development of Russian military art. Space systems ensured that the quantity and quality of recce and intelligence information was of the highest order, thus enabling the MNF to have exhaustive information on the disposition of Iraqi forces. MNF commanders were able to capitalise of this because of the advanced C capabilities they had deployed; as a result they were able to "stun them [the Iraqis] with surprise and paralyse any action they took".48 The air campaign also highlighted the importance of good C because without it the complexity of air operations could not have been achieved. Airspace management would have presented an almost insurmountable problem without the sophisticated C systems made available during the Gulf War. The Russians have certainly identified this as an important lesson and appear to have placed much emphasis on the role of AWACS: in particular, the co-ordination of various air assets - air-to-air refuelling tankers, air defence aircraft, ground attack aircraft, etc. - was judged to have been best served by AWACS. It has been suggested that AWACS took on the basic load of airspace control and management so that the complex nature of the integrated air strikes would run smoothly.49 However, the majority of observations appear to be concentrated on technological considerations, but whilst this is undoubtedly a crucial element there are other equally and mutually important aspects which have not received so much critical attention. For example, little mention is made of the vital role that planning played during the air campaign; neither is much time devoted to examination of the structural and procedural elements of the MNF airspace management process. Whilst the fundamentals of airspace management such as vertical and lateral separation of aircraft were given consideration, the success of the air campaign relied equally upon the planning of available airspace. It was here perhaps that the sophistication of MNF C came into its own because it created a management system that was able to analyse, assess, resolve and disseminate information efficiently and to great effect. However, a vital component of this system was the high quality of the personnel operating the systems and in particular, the flexibility that was required in order to work closely within a multi-force environment. For the Russians this will be a major problem because despite their undoubted desire to develop an advanced C capability, there are fundamental structural and procedural failings inherent in their existing system which would not necessarily be resolved simply by the introduction of technology. Moreover, it is arguable that the quality of training in the Russian Armed Forces is well below the level that would be necessary to operate such an advanced management system. Evidence from the Russian military press would seem to suggest that the Russians believe that all their C problems can be resolved by throwing technology at them'. CONCLUSION In general it can be concluded that Russian observers have drawn many of the same lessons from the Gulf War as their Western counterparts. However, it must be pointed out that the Russians have not had the benefit of first hand experience or had access to detailed analysis of the Gulf War. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is fair to say that Russian military analysts have reached some important conclusions about the future of warfare based on their studies of MNF operations in the Middle East. Many of these conclusions are directly related to the air campaign and, therefore, should have a great impact on the future development of the RuFAF. The use of the auxiliary verb should' is a deliberate act in order to highlight the fundamental paradox encountered in studying the Russian military, particularly in relation to their appreciation and perceptions concerning the future of warfare. The main problem is that there is a huge difference between their objectives for the future and the means with which to accomplish those objectives. The reality of modern day Russia, with all its social, political and economic problems, means that the dreams of military analysts may never be realised. However, it must not be forgotten that current defence budget constraints could easily be reversed should the political climate dramatically change in favour of the military. Given the extreme instability in Russia today it is feasible to suggest there is a possibility that the Armed Forces will be able to demand, and get, the economic resources necessary to develop a new generation of weapon systems; thereby being in a position to implement the lessons they have learnt from their observations of the Gulf War. In summary, the first point that needs reiterating is the impact that advanced technology has had on the military strategic balance. The Russians appreciate that the balance of force has been significantly altered by the emergence of HTWs and other technological advances; for example, as seen in EW, C and recce/intelligence complexes. In particular, they have identified the Gulf War air campaign with the need for a complete reappraisal of the role and purpose of their own air forces. There is a general acceptance that in the future air power will be a key factor in the preservation of the military balance and hence strategic stability. This will give commanders of the RuFAF considerable clout when it comes to bargaining for limited resources. Indeed, there is every likelihood that unless the RuFAF is able to refurbish with fifth generation weapon systems it will find itself playing in a different ball-game to the one that the Western powers will be playing. A second consideration, which is central to the air power debate, is directly linked to the notion that active defence has regained the upper-hand: this is alongside a realisation that operational goals can now be achieved without ground forces engaging on enemy territory until victory is virtually guaranteed. This image of future warfare has significant implications for ground force structuring because large numbers of ground troops are not a necessity for successful offensive operations. That is not to say that the Russians do not have some reservations about these ideas because, as they have pointed out, the MNF encountered a unique set of circumstances which, it is argued, are unlikely to be repeated in many future conflicts. However, despite these reservations it is accepted that in future wars any invasion is likely to be prefaced by a pre-emptive air/electronic (EW) campaign. This scepticism about Gulf War lessons and the impact of technology is found in the evaluations of some prominent Russian military commentators. It is significant that some senior Russian commanders consider the Gulf War to have been a one-off' experience and that future conflicts will not be such one-sided affairs. Again it is possible to argue that these opinions are expressed with the deliberate purpose of identifying the Russian Armed Forces as being on a par with their Western counterparts. The importance of engaging in a HTW programme, with its associated demands for resources, is inextricably linked to the lessons of the Gulf War. By arguing that the Iraqis were outclassed in the technological aspects of the conflict it is clear that the Russians wish to ensure that they are not placed in the same humble category. More importantly, they argue that because the uniqueness of the Gulf War is directly linked to the technological imbalance, they must ensure that their own armed forces are equipped with fifth generation weapon systems: otherwise it follows that the Russian Armed Forces would be unable to guarantee the security of the homeland. An alternative to pursuing qualitative parity, which would almost certainly be at a greater cost than the Russian economy could endure, would be to ensure that some form of international restriction was placed on the development and deployment of HTWs. The fact that Russian military commentators have suggested the need to put HTWs under the same sort of controls as nuclear weapons indicates an acceptance that they may never achieve the qualitative edge enjoyed by the Gulf War partners. There is logic in the argument that the Russians may gain as much by encouraging arms control and limitation as they can from trying to compete in the technological arms race. This would be a course of action not unfamililiar to that encountered in the Gorbachev era. It is in the area of training that perhaps the Russians have learned the most from the Gulf War. The efficient, highly-motivated, professional military personnel of the MNF greatly impressed the Russians, who regard the superior training of the Western allies as one of the main dynamics of their success. Of more concern to the Russians is the perception of a growing gap in combat efficiency with the West; made wider by the increasing demands on training that are the consequence of introducing HTWs into the inventory. The inadequacies of the Russian military training system have been highlighted and the way forward is obvious to even the most blinkered Russian general, but the question remains whether or not they are able to make the changes that are necessary. Apart from the traditional resentment that has always been generated when changes to established training routines are suggested, there lingers in the background the extra burden of cost that would be necessary if the training system were to be up-dated. To put this in perspective, it is apparent that the Western powers are finding it hard enough to re-organise the training environment, and they are doing so from a sound foundation and a tradition of excellence in this field. The Russians have no such framework from which to develop the type of training system which will be required in order to compete with the West in the 21st century. Indeed, it is not just a question of being able to compete, because without efficient training procedures it will be pointless even to acquire fifth generation weapon systems. The bond between high quality training and new technology is well recognised by the Russians but the instruments of change may be not only beyond their grasp but also beyond their capacity to exploit. In their examination of EW and C the Russians have identified other areas of warfare which have been brought to prominence by the Gulf War; the air campaign, in particular, exemplified these areas. The emergence of EW as a distinctive aspect of warfare, which should now be considered as an independent combat operation, will have significant impact on the future structure of the RuFAF. Again, the dominance of high technology in this area must be a matter of concern to the Russians, because without advanced EW capabilities the operational effectiveness of air forces is severely reduced: in their own assessments, the Russians considered that the EW resources of the MNF reduced aircraft losses by 50%. In similar vein, the importance of good C was exemplified by the Iraqi experiences during the air campaign. It has not been lost on Russian commentators that much of the Iraqi C equipment, and the procedures for operating it, had come from the Soviet Union. Therefore, the need to advance C into the space domain in order to provide better recce, navigation and communications is well understood. Furthermore, the air campaign demonstrated to the Russians how important it is to have systems such as AWACS to provide control during the likely intensive air operations of the future. One aspect which they are perhaps not so aware of is the importance of sophisticated air management procedures, which are so vital for planning complex air operations. This is another area of future warfare that will require huge investment in both men and materials if the Russians are to achieve the level of expertise that they so obviously desire. At this point and by way of conclusion, it is perhaps worth observing that for a number of Russian military analysts the answer to many, if not all, of their problems - not least C - is to simply throw technology at them. Whilst this resolution has many laudable qualities it is by no means the ultimate solution to the problems facing the Russian Armed Forces as they prepare for the 21st century. For this is to underestimate the complexity of the problem and to overestimate the importance of the technological lessons of the Gulf War without appreciating enabling factors such as, for example, the quality of personnel. Indeed, this highlights the main problem which the Russians face when attempting to interpret and subsequently implement the lessons they have gleaned from the Gulf War: that is the problem of overcoming the dominant mindset which drove the Soviet Armed Forces and which has been inherited by the Russians. Although there is evidence of an appreciation of the need for a genuine shift towards improving the training system, it remains unclear whether the Russians really understand the fundamental link between technological advance and training. Finally, of course, there remains the largest and potentially most crippling problem for the Russians to overcome: before they are able even to consider the future developments that they have identified from their observations of the Gulf War, there is the question of resources. The high-tech modern battlefield comes at an enormous cost - a cost that to many Russians outside the military will be viewed as an unacceptable burden on an already devastated economy. ENDNOTES 1 Air Vice Marshal R. A. Mason, "Air Forces and European Security", Voyennaya Mysl', March 1992, p.6. 2 Mason explores these points in greater detail in the excellent introduction to John Godden's Shield and Storm, (London: Brassey's, 1994), pp.1-13. 3 Lt. General of Aviation A. F. Borsuk, "Combat Training: Prospects for the Future", Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, July 1991, p.2. 4 Major General I. N. Vorob'yev, "Lessons of the Persian Gulf War", Voyennaya Mysl', May 1992, p.67. 5I nterview with Colonel General Shaposhnikov by Colonel V.P. Chigak, "The Air Force and National Security", Voyennaya Mysl', June 1991, pp.8-14. Also, Colonel V. Krysanov, "Features of the Development of Forms of Military Action", Voyennaya Mysl', February 1992, p.42. 6 Major General Yu V. Lebedev, Lt.General I.S. Lyutov and Colonel V.A. Nazarenko, "The Persian Gulf War: Lessons and Conclusions", Voyennaya Mysl', November/December 1991, p.110. 7 Vorob'yev, p.74. See also, Shaposhnikov, p.8. 8See, Major General A.V. Zlubin and Lt. General A.N. Chernikov, "Activeness in Operational Level Defence", Voyennaya Mysl, March 1992, pp.19-25. 9 Interview with Lt. General S. Bogdanov by Lt. Colonel A. Dokuchayev, "Lessons From Desert Storm", Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 May 1991, p.2. 10 Lt. Colonel A.Ya Manachinskiy, Lt. Colonel V.N. Chumak and Colonel Ye K. Pronkin, "Operation Desert Storm: Results and Consequences", Voyennaya Mysl', January 1992, pp.89-93. 11 Vorob'yev, p.68. 12 See, Colonel A. Tsalko, "Soviet Military on Gulf War Lessons", Novosti, 5 March 1991, p.18. 13 Colonel General A.I. Malyukov, "Great Changes - Severe Tests", Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, August 1991, pp.2-3. 14 Lebedev, et al, p.110. 15 See, for example, Colonel V.L. Yerokhin, "On Developing a Concept for Military Reform", Voyennaya Mysl', November 1991, p.36. 16 See, for example, Colonel V. Krysanov, "Features of the Development of Forms of Military Action", Voyennaya Mysl, February 1992, pp.42-44 or L. Malyshev, "Precision Weapons - One Alternative to Nuclear weapons?", Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, March 1992, pp.10-11. 17 Interview with Lt. General of Aviation A. Malyukov by Captain S. Sidorov, "Airpower Determined the Outcome", Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 March 1991, p.3. 18 Dokuchayev, p.2. 19 Manachinsky et al, p.94. 20 Ibid. 21 Lt. Colonel Yu Radkovets and Major L. Mel'nik, "Innovations in Radar Locating", Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony, April 1992, pp.33-34 and also in the same journal January 1992. 22 Lt. General I. Skuratov, "Tomahawk: The Threat From The Sea", Morskoy sbornik, June 1991, p.33. Although this author is at times stating the obvious and placing far too much emphasis on the Navy's responsibility to combat these weapon systems (only to be expected in times when fighting one's own corner for the limited resources available), his general points about modernisation to counter HTWs are worthy of note. 23 The importance of the significant influence of Soviet numerate methodology for planning combat operations cannot be overestimated. For a detailed examination of this crucially important subject the excellent work of C.W. Blandy is strongly recommended; C.W. Blandy, Calculating Combat Outcomes, Soviet Studies Research Centre Research Paper no.AA24, ( RMA Sandhurst: SSRC, February 1993). 24 Manachinskiy et al, p.93. 25 Vorob'yev, p.69. 26 See, L. Malyshev, "Precision Guided Weapons - One Alternative to Nuclear Weapons?", Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, March 1992, pp.10-11. 27 Interview with Colonel General Shaposhnikov by Colonel V.P. Chigak, "The Air Force and National Security", Voyennaya Mysl', June 1991, pp.8-14. 28 Ibid., but see also, Zlubin and Chernikov, p.23. 29 Ibid., p.11. These concerns were raised by many others; see for example, Vorob'yev, p.68; Manachinsky et al. 30 For a detailed study of the Soviet training system see for example, D.J. Marshall-Hasdell, Soviet Military Reform: The Training System, Conflict Studies Research Centre Research Paper no.C85, (RMA Sandhurst: CSRC, June 1984). 31 Manachinskiy et al, p.91. 32 Ibid. Interestingly, parallels can be drawn with other armed forces that have a less than effective training system. A similar situation arose during the Falklands War with Argentinian military personnel not having the ability to integrate newly acquired weapons into the AD system defending Port Stanley. 33 By way of comparison, the number of hours flown annually by Soviet pilots has been variously described. Notwithstanding the different figures it is clear that Soviet aviators, in particular fast-jet pilots, fly on average only a quarter the number of hours flown by their American counterparts. Even Soviet analysts gave the conservative estimate that the hours flown were less than 50% of the amount necessary for the safe conduct of flying operations. See for example, Borsuk, p.2. 34 Lt. Colonel Ted Herman quoted in John Godden, Shield and Storm, (Brassey's: London, 1994), p.21. 35 Ibid. 36 For a detailed examination of the Afghan War experience and training in the Soviet Armed Forces see, D.J. Marshall-Hasdell, Soviet Military Reform and the Afghan Experience - Military Lessons, Soviet Studies Research Centre Research Paper no.P12, (SSRC: RMA Sandhurst, 1993). 37 The reminisces of Major V. Kolesov, a Soviet fighter pilot who served in Egypt during the 1970s, can be found in Major B. Kononenko, "Ready to Fight But Ready for Battle?", Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, November 1990, p.4. 38 Ibid. 39 For a detailed examination of this theory see, D.J. Marshall-Hasdell, The Reform of Flight Safety in the Soviet Air Force, Soviet Studies Research Centre Research Paper no.B.50, (RMA Sandhurst: SSRC, February 1993), pp. 15-33. 40 Lebedev, Lyutov and Nazarenko, p.109. 41 Manachinskiy et al., p.91. Also the views of Lt. General V.G. Reznichenko, "Preparation and Conduct of Army Operations", Voyennaya Mysl', January 1991, p.19. 42 See, for example, Vorob'yev, p.70-72. 43 M. Alexsandrov and S. Vladimirov, "Could the Air Defence of Iraq Have Survived?", Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony, April 1992, pp.49-51. 44 Godden, p.12. 45 Chigak, p.8. 46 Manachinskiy, et al., p.92. 47 Colonel V V Krysanov, "Features of the Development of Forms of Military Actions", Voyennaya Mysl', February 1992, p.42. 48 Vorob'yev, p.72. 49 Chigak, pp.8-10. .
