Military

For nearly two decades the United States Air Force oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter-German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well-rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. In a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF would face a different foe employing a different military doctrine, in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast-paced land offensive, the combat wings of United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well-fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF’s mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. This requirement for change leads to the question: how effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guards to the changing realities of combat?

The answer to this question resides in the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria for evaluating innovations.

Although CENTAF conducted operations against a variety of Iraqi organizations, all requiring some degree of adaptation, the operations against the Republican Guard are the subject of this study for three reasons. First, the Republican Guard was the most important element of the Iraqi Army; because its defeat guaranteed the defeat of the remainder, it captured much of CENTAF’s efforts and attention. Second, changes to operations against the RGFC provide a significant case for analyzing wartime adaptation. USAF doctrine that outlined operations against a land force was based on assumptions different than those encountered in the Persian Gulf. As a result, air operations against the Guard units underwent several changes during the war, validating the need to adapt preconceived tactics and procedures during war. Third, operations against the Republican Guard reflect the limits to a study of this scope.

This study will examine the extent to which existing USAF doctrine prepared CENTAF for its mission against the Republican Guards. How closely Air Force doctrine "fit" the situation at hand will provide a baseline for the amount of adaptation required. Examination of CENTAF’s adaptation will also attempt to identify the main elements of adaptive process, those factors that helped and hindered the process, and the sources of CENTAF’s innovations.

This study is confined to Air Force operations against the Republican Guard within the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO). The CENTAF commander, Lt Gen Charles Horner, directed USAF, Navy, Marine, and Allied air units, but the main weight of the air effort against the RGFC was generated by the United States Air Force.

Most documentary evidence used in this study was obtained from the USAF Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Its extensive collection of documents and briefing slides is only partially usable due to the secret classification assigned to most of the Gulf War materials. Some declassified excerpts are reproduced in the Gulf War Air Power Survey, which also provides important Gulf War statistical data. Personal accounts in professional military journals were useful additional sources. Much business during the war was conducted over the phone, with little documentation. Personal interviews, therefore, were an important source of information. Because this study deals with ideas and their origins, some uncertainty exists four years after the fact.

The discussion that follows examines the theoretical basis for adaptation during war, definitions, and criteria to evaluate innovations. The theory is followed by a description of the combatants, their doctrines, and the USAF’s plan for defeating the Republican Guard. The ensuing narrative of the first ten days of air attacks on the RGFC suggests CENTAF saw the need to adapt. The section that follows describes several major innovations that were incorporated into the air campaign. A relatively static period followed, culminating in the ground war that subjected USAF efforts against the Republican Guards to a final audit.

Conclusions of this study, springing from one specific set of conditions, may not apply to all situations in the future. One other significant limitation of this study is that a true measurement of effectiveness on Guard units cannot be known without Iraqi assistance and, even with that, Iraqi knowledge of the status of their own forces is questionable. Iraqi defector and POW debriefings would help, but these reports are classified and cannot be cited.

Innovations bridge the gaps that separate doctrines developed in peacetime from the realities of war. They range from minor modifications of existing procedures to fundamental changes that establish entirely new methods. They should be evaluated in terms of timeliness and effectiveness.

Military doctrines and practices established in peacetime are designed to meet the anticipated challenges of war. Based on past experiences and a vision of how future conflict should be fought, a military organization’s doctrine is "a codified and sanctioned body of propositions related to war and conflict" that link theory and practice. Serving as a point of departure for all of a service’s activities, doctrine defines how that service intends to fight, how it will be organized, and with what weapons it will fight.

A military organization’s practices are equal in importance to its doctrine because methods exercised in peacetime result in the formulation of common perceptions of how war should and will be waged in the future by those who will do the fighting. Peacetime training forms patterns and establishes standard operating procedures. Doctrine and practices have an interactive relationship, each taking the lead at times and producing change in the other.

The reality of war will differ from that which is anticipated in peacetime. This stems from an inability adequately to predict the continuing multitudinous changes that influence the conduct of war. Technological changes are especially problematic, as those who formulate doctrine may not recognize technical opportunities or imperatives until it is too late. Doctrines based on experience may fail due to altered circumstances, while those based on theory may fail due to lack of feedback. American military doctrine is especially vulnerable to being undermined by invalidated assumptions because we are hard-pressed to identify accurately our next opponent.

Doctrine and practices must change to meet the demands of the new realities encountered on the field of battle. Military adaptation during war is the process by which a military institution modifies its methods to meet the changing requirements of the wartime environment. This process of military adaptation involves a form of organizational learning through which military institutions change in response to experience and find more effective or efficient methods of waging war. Success may be possible without adaptation, but will come at an increased cost in terms of time, treasure, or blood. Conversely, useful adaptation does not guarantee success. The German Army, for example, adapted well to the realities of the First and Second World War battlefields, yet Germany lost both wars. "First-rate operational and tactical performance is a virtue to be sought by those responsible for military forces," stated Lt Gen John H. Cushman. Adaptation is required to achieve "first-rate" performance.

One product of adaptation in war is military innovation: a change that deviates from doctrine or practices established in peacetime. Stephen P. Rosen distinguishes between peacetime, wartime, and technological innovations and the unique challenges of each. Acknowledging the importance of each, this study concentrates on tactical innovation during war.

The amount of innovation required is dependent on how closely established doctrine and procedures match battlefield realities. A wing trained and equipped to wage intercontinental nuclear war sent to fight guerrillas is likely to require more extensive innovations to succeed than a unit trained to perform close air support. Wartime innovations can be categorized as minor, major, or fundamental; and are easily thought of in terms of modified methods. Rosen, however, emphasizes the possibility of adopting altered military objectives as an innovation. Blending the two criteria, I consider a minor innovation to be a modification of existing methods towards an anticipated objective. Improving tactical formations to maximize visual search within the context of an existing mission is an example of a tactical innovation. A major innovation is the substitution of existing or modified methods in unexpected combinations towards an anticipated or modified objective. The use of U.S. Army Apache and USAF special operations helicopters to attack the Iraqi early warning system the first night of Desert Storm is one such unexpected combination. A fundamental innovation is the replacement of existing methods with unprecedented methods or the replacement of an existing objective with an entirely new objective. The change in the objective of Eighth Air Force’s long range fighters from protecting the bombers to seeking out and attacking Luftwaffe fighters as a means to enable strategic bombing attacks is one such replacement of objective.

Innovations are judged in terms of effectiveness and timeliness. An innovation is effective if it improves operational progress towards the objective, while saving time, manpower, or materiel, or if it produces enhanced results with an equal expenditure of resources. An innovation that yields little change in effectiveness is of limited value. An innovation is timely if it takes effect within the planned campaign schedule. Subjective consideration, however, must be given to unnecessary losses of material, manpower or time during the interval required to implement the innovation. Because an adversary’s adaptive process will attempt to negate one’s actions, there are advantages of one’s own adaptive process being faster than the enemy’s.

There appears to be a tension, however, between the breadth and timeliness of an innovation. In order to limit enemy ability to react to an innovation, delayed, but widespread implementation may be more beneficial than a very rapid piecemeal change. One example of a premature innovation was the first British tank attack at the Somme, which allowed the Germans time to develop countermeasures and sacrificed the potential surprise of a mass tank attack. Attacks against command and control nodes may relieve some of this scale-timeliness tension by decreasing the enemy capability to detect, analyze, and react to innovations.

Because innovations are the offspring of unique circumstances they are unlikely to be of permanent value. The process of adaptation, however, may yield insights that could facilitate the formulation of future innovations. Cushman divides military responses (adaptation) into "insight" and "execution"; it appears beneficial to disaggregate the process further in order to better identify the elements necessary for successful adaptation.

An operable system of command and control (C²) is assumed to be a necessary element of the adaptation process, otherwise adaptation takes place randomly. There are several alternative models of command and control, but the observe-orient-decide-act cycle (or OODA loop), identified by Colonel John Boyd is one of the most widely recognized, and it does a credible job approximating reality. The OODA loop, which divides C² into separate functions of observe, orient, decide, act, appears to be useful for identifying elements of adaptation. All four functions are normally required for effective C² and appear to be required for effective adaptation. No function, however, is easily accomplished in wartime. Each step of the process must surmount formidable obstacles. If a step is obstructed, innovation is unlikely. Likewise, a series of impediments could have a cumulative effect on the entire system and prevent adaptation.

"Observation" describes the gathering of data regarding the status of enemy and friendly forces, the battlefield, or other significant areas of interest. Observation must be continuous. Before battle is joined, it is needed for the formulation of plans; once fighting begins, it is needed to detect the new reality that results from the initial battle and enemy reactions. It may include surveillance by a variety of sensors, subordinate units or individuals; it has often included direct observation of the battle by the commander. Observation is a necessary element of adaptation because it is required to detect changed or unanticipated realities of the battlefield. It is an indispensable precondition of accurate orientation, the next step in the OODA process. Recognizing the need for observation von Moltke decreed: "the most precise possible knowledge of the situation is an absolute prerequisite for giving correct and appropriate orders."

There are considerable obstacles to effective observation and, therefore, to adaptation. Labeling many intelligence reports in war "contradictory," "false," or "uncertain," Clausewitz adopts a pessimistic view of the commander’s ability of the to penetrate the uncertainties of war. Limitations of intelligence collection systems can be compounded by active measures employed by a thinking adversary to confound accurate observation. If the enemy is successful, adaptation is unlikely because the need to change is unlikely to be perceived. Addressing fundamental innovations, Stephen Rosen shares Clausewitz’s pessimism on the ability to gather needed information: "intelligence relevant to innovation very likely will not be available in wartime, and wartime innovation is likely to be limited in its impact."

"Orientation" describes the translation of data into useful information; its product is the organization’s perception of reality. Boyd considered orientation the most important part of the OODA loop: "orientation is the schwerpunkt. It shapes the way we interact with the environment--hence orientation shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act." Analysis and synthesis of an organization’s observations should contribute to the formulation of insights into difficulties experienced on the battlefield. With the formulation of these vital insights, the need to adapt can be perceived. Orientation is a necessary element of adaptation and must result in the perception that a need or opportunity exists to improve performance. Adaptation can be expected as a response to the challenges of war, but it may also spring from the realization that an opportunity to achieve enhanced results exists. Chance events that improve performance may be observed, and if perceived as favorable, the decision to incorporate them can be made.

The synthesis of imperfect reports from a variety of sources is difficult from both the organizational and the personal perspectives. Martin van Creveld clearly illustrated the many organizational obstacles faced by military staffs in handling the increased information available (and required) to wage war, labeling them "information pathologies." Affirming Van Creveld’s findings, a recent article on Desert Storm noted organizational "blind spots" due to information overload and undue attention given to particular forms of information. Personal obstacles to accurate orientation are equally formidable, including "superficial thinking. . .self-satisfaction, complacency, and arrogance." Emotions that spring from war can cloud the mind in what Clausewitz referred to as a "psychological fog" obstructing "clear and complete insights"

"Decision" describes the formulation of courses of action and their selection. At this point alternative solutions are evaluated and optimal solutions selected. The formulation of new solutions is contingent on the participant’s ability to imagine and articulate new options. It is the role of the organization to cultivate, encourage, and recognize valuable solutions. It then falls on the commander to decide whether or not to implement new solutions, or to delegate sufficient freedom of action to make such decisions at lower levels. The cultivation of ideas and the decisions to implement them are necessary for adaptation. Intuition, creativity, and imagination are all individual characteristics of the commander, his staff, and subordinates that can lead to the initiation of an innovation. For a proposed innovation to have an effect it must be implemented, which hinges on the decision of someone in a position of authority.

Obstacles to formulating or selecting appropriate courses of action include a lack of flexibility in the mind of the commander, lack of flexibility in doctrine (dogma), or lack of organizational flexibility. Commanders who believe they have all the answers can be a tremendous obstacle to innovation: Sir Douglas Haig is widely viewed as the epitome of inflexible thinking. As one biographer notes: "before the war, Haig was quite sure he had uncovered all the rules of war. He was equally certain that these rules had to be accepted as dogma and not weakened by debate." Rigid military hierarchies or organizations can restrict the flow of ideas either through many levels of command, or restricted means of communication. For organizations with the requisite flexibility, anticipated costs of implementation may give sufficient cause for rejection of a potential innovation. All aspects of a potential innovation may not be beneficial; a gain in one area may penalize another.

"Action" describes the implementation of plans, i.e. combat operations, although it may also entail changes to organizations, procedures, or equipment. Although it may be easy to concentrate attention to only the actions of one’s military forces and the effects of their activities on the enemy, there is another important dimension of action. Every decision must be transmitted through the organization in order for it to be implemented. Planning, coordination, training and, execution are all part of the process.

The difficulties encountered while carrying out plans during war constitute a considerable impediment to adaptation. These difficulties include poor communications, inadequate understanding of orders, inflexible attitudes, or imperfect execution. Labeled "friction" by Clausewitz, these myriad difficulties combine to turn war into "a medium that impedes activity" which must be overcome by "iron will-power." There is also the danger that an innovation may exceed the unit’s ability to carry it out. Timothy Lupfer’s examination of the German tactical adaptation in the First World War noted the Germans were attentive to their Army’s ability to perform because "an army that adopts tactical doctrine that it cannot apply will greatly multiply its misfortune." Excessive caution, on the other hand can be equally costly. Overly concerned with the ability of its crews to execute complex tactics, SAC headquarters dictated predictable tactics during the first days of Operation Linebacker II, increasing risk to the bomber crews and perhaps suffering unnecessary losses.

In a large military organization, numerous individuals and sub-units accomplish part or all of the functions described. Discrete functions or the entire process may be accomplished at more than one echelon simultaneously, leading to the question: at what level are innovations developed? Since observation and action responsibilities are normally clearly defined, a more specific question is: at what level does the orientation and decision take place?

There are three potential hypotheses: top-down, bottom-up, or a combination of the two. A top-down process involves a headquarters staff (at the theater or possibly national level) that analyzes reports from the field, develops innovations (possibly by refining suggestions from sub-units) and disseminates them to the command. This process was used by the German Army to adapt tactical doctrine to realities of the Western Front in World War I, and the Red Army to find a suitable operational doctrine against the Wehrmacht during World War II. Both involved orderly, centralized processes that disseminated changes uniformly across the theater. The drawbacks to centralized change are that it is potentially less responsive to immediate requirements, nor is it well suited for handling unique local conditions.

Bottom-up adaptation starts at the tactical unit level. Innovations are developed quickly in response to immediate problems and tactical units then advise headquarters. Headquarters then advises other units of ideas and lessons learned. During World War II, the U.S. Army used bottom-up adaptation to adjust tactics to conditions encountered in the campaigns for France and Germany, capitalizing on "Yankee ingenuity. . . a hallmark of U.S. commercial production and manufacturing . . . that also accompanies [American] soldiers to the battlefield." Bottom up adaptations, it is argued, are more responsive to local conditions and better suited where incremental changes are desirable. The decentralized approach, however, is not well suited when fundamental changes are required or situations are beyond unit capabilities to handle.

There is the possibility of a third option, which is that innovations originate from both sources and flow both directions. Theoretically, this arrangement could permit fundamental or widespread adaptations to be directed from above, yet permit tactical units the flexibility to quickly adapt to immediate needs. This possibility would require organizational flexibility of the headquarters as it would be required to perform both advisory and directive functions. A means to resolve conflicting guidance might also be required.

To recapitulate, issues to consider in examining the attack on the Republican Guards are: what was USAF prewar doctrine; how much adaptation was required to cope with the realities of war; how effective and timely were CENTAF’s innovations, what facilitated or hindered adaptation, and from where did changes originate? Because Operation Desert Storm pitted the USAF directly against the Republican Guard, it is important to describe these opposing forces.

On August 3, 1990, the Iraqi armed forces conducted an overwhelming combined arms assault on Kuwait. Iraqi ground units penetrated deep into Kuwait, reaching Kuwait City in less than five hours. The Kuwaiti armed forces collapsed, the government fled to Saudi Arabia, and the country was completely overrun within two days.

The Iraqi units that conducted the assault were divisions of Iraq’s Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). The ground attack was spearheaded by Iraq’s most capable combat formations: the Hammurabi and Medinah armored divisions and the Tawakalna mechanized infantry division. Three heliborne brigades of the RGFC Special Forces division supported the armored onslaught with a vertical envelopment south of Kuwait City. Behind the lead divisions, four Republican Guard infantry divisions were committed to mop-up remaining Kuwaiti resistance.

The Republican Guard’s utility as a military force is evident in its origins, equipment, functions, and doctrine. The RGFC began as a brigade-sized praetorian guard formed shortly after Saddam Hussein’s 1968 coup. The unit was formed by combining the most loyal Baathists serving in the Iraqi Army and was sustained by recruits from Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit. Although not used in the September 1980 invasion of Iran, the Republican Guard was committed to the bloody battle for Khorramshahr in October and thereafter saw intermittent action as a "fire brigade" along the southern front. By 1986, the Republican Guards had expanded to five brigades, the bulk of which were committed to an ill-fated counterattack on the Al-Faw peninsula. This Iraqi defeat has been convincingly described as the turning point of the Iran-Iraq war, the catalyst for a shift from the static defensive strategy to an offensive strategy that would ultimately end the war. Guard recruiting was expanded to include previously-deferred university students, and Guard formations soon grew to twenty-five brigades. These units were extensively trained in offensive combined arms tactics, signifying a major departure from the static-defensive mindset gripping the rest of the Iraqi army. Committed to a series of well-planned, set-piece offensives from April to August of 1988, these Republican Guard formations quickly swept away depleted Iranian formations, helping to bring decision to long-stalemated battlefields and a brief peace to the northern Persian Gulf.

The Republican Guard formations were equipped with Iraq’s best and most modern equipment. While regular heavy divisions were primarily equipped with obsolescent T-55, type 59, and T-62 tanks, Guard heavy divisions were equipped with the "well-known and very capable" T-72. Reflecting their offensive and mobile orientation, RGFC heavy divisions were equipped with modern Soviet built self-propelled artillery in addition to towed weapons that equipped the remainder of the Iraqi Army. Air defense artillery units assigned to Guard divisions were more robust than regular army units, as some operated radar-guided SA-6 batteries in addition to the normal infrared-guided SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery systems. Additionally, the RGFC maintained an independent supply system and enjoyed priority for all supplies.

Western impressions of the Republican Guard were shaped by its offensive role in 1988, its elevated reputation, and robust tables of organization and equipment. Rightly acknowledged as Iraq’s best troops, many writers have found it easy to overestimate the abilities of the Republican Guard. Analogies have been made in U.S. military writings between the RGFC and Napoleon’s Old Guard, or Hitler’s politico-military elite, the Waffen SS. Oft-touted as an elite force hardened by years of battle, proud of the "fire brigade" role, "possessing excellent reactive abilities," and "the world’s most seasoned [troops] in carrying out assaults preceded by chemical attack," Guard formations gained a fearsome reputation. Indeed, when compared to the armed forces of Iraq’s neighbors, the Republican Guard was the most powerful military organization in the Persian Gulf region.

An evaluation of the Republican Guard must be balanced by an examination of Iraqi military doctrine, which reveals major shortcomings. Despite the Guard’s offensive successes of 1988 and 1990, some important limitations have been illuminated by several authors. Republican Guard tactical successes were largely set-piece affairs, hinging on extensive planning, logistics stockpiling, and rehearsals. After 1987, all Guard offensives were conducted against vastly weaker forces: Iranian formations encountered in 1988 were debilitated by the failed Karballa offensives of 1987 and collapsing civilian morale. Kuwaiti armed forces were taken by surprise in 1990, only one brigade of which opposed the RGFC as the bulk of the Kuwaiti forces were over-run in garrison. Republican Guard tactical doctrine was probably strongly shaped by (if not identical to) regular army tactical doctrine. The only significant tank battle the Iraqis fought was a static defense against a grossly mis-handled Iranian armored division in January 1981. The Iranian division blundered into an Iraqi anti-tank kill zone piecemeal (over the period of three days) and was obliterated. An excellent analysis by Colonel Wallace Franz (USA, Ret.) further emphasized the likelihood of a static Iraqi strategy because the army had been molded by its eight years of fighting a "war of position, tied to fortifications, communications nets, against a low-tech enemy." Iraqi officers were inexperienced at handling large mechanized formations in mobile operations and would be unable to "think rapidly" or "improvise in the heat of battle" due to Iraqi political preferences for loyalty over independent thought or initiative.

Despite doctrinal shortcomings, Republican Guards were the most potent and best equipped units in the Iraqi Army, marking them as an important operational center of gravity in the campaign to liberate Kuwait. As the offensive arm of the Iraqi Army and the most potent military force in the region, the Republican Guards were also a strategic center of gravity, a powerful military instrument of coercion or decision. The Republican Guards also played an important political role. Guard units were the most overt element of the Baath Party’s control over the country. The superior equipment operated by the Republican Guard units ensured that they would be well equipped to defeat potentially rebellious Regular Army units. An RGFC mechanized division was stationed in Baghdad throughout the Gulf War, a visible and powerful deterrent to potential mutineers. Additionally, four RGFC infantry divisions, not committed to the KTO, were formed during the war to provide internal security. Guard units were believed to have been involved in the suppression of dissent before the Gulf War, and surviving elements were reported to have participated in the suppression of the Shia and Kurdish revolts after the war. Top U.S. military commanders, Powell and Schwarzkopf correctly perceived the Republican Guards as operational and strategic centers of gravity, forming perceptions that profoundly affected U.S. planning.

Although there were seven Republican Guard divisions deployed in the KTO, the three Guard heavy divisions that spearheaded the Kuwait invasion captured the interest of the theater CINC. These three divisions were emplaced along the Kuwait-Iraq border as a theater reserve. The remaining four divisions were infantry formations entrenched in an east-west line between the heavy units and the Euphrates River.

The Guard divisions used the five-month lull between the invasion of Kuwait and the coalition counteroffensive to prepare vast defensive positions. The units were widely dispersed and deeply entrenched. Engineers prepared thousands of horseshoe-shaped berms to protect individual vehicles. Personnel were protected by shallow five- to ten-man bunkers. Units were stocked with up to thirty days of provisions, and the Guard Corps straddled a huge fortified corps-sized depot and logistics area.

Iraqi intentions for the use of the RGFC were unclear to Coalition commanders. Once the threat of an invasion of Saudi Arabia subsided, it was widely believed the Republican Guard divisions would be held in reserve and then committed to repulse Coalition ground units depleted by battles with the first and second Iraqi echelons. This mission--counterattack--would be similar to much of the Guard’s experience in the Iran-Iraq War; heavy air attack, however, would be a new experience for a force that had always enjoyed air superiority.

The USAF waged an intense air-to-ground battle against the Republican Guards for forty-three days; its ability to conduct this battle was shaped by pre-war doctrine, training, and equipment. Doctrine provided the basis for many USAF weapons system acquisitions and, within the context of the European NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario, shaped Air Force tactics throughout the 1980s.

"The [U.S.] Air Force has articulated aerospace doctrine at different levels and depths of detail in the forms of basic, operational, and tactical doctrine." Basic USAF doctrine, as established in AF Manual 1-1, anticipated the attack on the Republican Guard in the broadest sense. Air operations to "attack the enemy in depth" were considered an "imperative of effectively employing aerospace forces" by the authors of the 1984 version of Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. More explicitly, air commanders were urged to exploit airpower’s "devastating firepower" to disrupt enemy momentum and "place his surface forces at risk" with attacks on enemy forces in "reserve or rear echelons." Such attacks fell under the category of air interdiction (AI), which was intended to "delay, disrupt, divert, or destroy an enemy’s military potential before it [could] be brought to bear broadly against friendly forces." Although attacks on distant ground units have always been a subset of interdiction, they are considered to be best accomplished along lines of communication when ground units are moving and vulnerable to air attack.

Official operational-level doctrine was completely unsuitable for preparing USAF units for the attack on the Republican Guards because it focused entirely on enemy lines of communication. Prescribing attacks to disrupt the flow of "personnel, supplies, and equipment . . . required to sustain the enemy’s war effort," AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations was written in 1969 and reflected contemporary interdiction efforts being used in Southeast Asia. Elusive enemy forces were not considered to be a suitable target for interdiction. Instead, interdiction efforts were directed against lines of communication, enemy concentration points, supply stockpiles, and reconstitution facilities. AFM 2-1 described the protracted interdiction battle waged over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. After Vietnam, however, the possibility of a rapid Soviet blitzkrieg across Western Europe threatened to render this mode of interdiction less than optimal.

"Semi-official" operational doctrine developed in the early 1980s had a much more profound effect in shaping the Air Force that would counter the Republican Guards in 1991. Developed in response to political requirements for increased conventional capability against growing Warsaw Pact conventional capability, the USAF’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) and the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed the joint operational concept of joint attack of the second echelon (J-SAK). Published in 1982, J-SAK was an important adjunct to the U.S. Army’s airland battle doctrine. J-SAK was "semi-official" doctrine because its approving official, General W. L. Creech, (TAC commander), could not speak for the entire USAF, nor was TAC a warfighting command: its role was to provide forces for the theater commanders-in-chief. Tactical Air Command Pamphlet 50-26 (J-SAK) described a deep battle against second echelon units that was intended to provide time and space for ground commanders to win the close battle being waged with the first echelon.

J-SAK was designed against the specific threat of echeloned attack posed by Soviet tactical doctrine. Echeloned attacks would "attempt to retain the initiative by maintaining momentum and rapidly exploiting the success of . . . first echelon forces." Although 50-26 briefly noted the possibility of countering a "U.S.-type reserve" force vice a Soviet-style second echelon, virtually all other discussion focuses on defeating the Soviet model. Key elements of the Soviet doctrine included a fast-paced attack by a numerically superior enemy, continuous operations to sustain initiative and momentum, and the reinforcement of success until the enemy is defeated. Second echelon targets included "combat forces, their support elements, as well as lines of communication."

Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA) was a similar doctrine approved by NATO’s Defense Planning Committee in November, 1984. Beginning in late 1979, the SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) staff developed FOFA to bolster the alliance’s conventional capability against Soviet offensive doctrine and a "continuing massive Soviet conventional forces build-up." Closely related to J-SAK, FOFA was more authoritative and prescriptive, but geographically limited to NATO’s theater of operations. FOFA was designed to attack enemy forces "from just behind the troops in contact to as far into the enemy’s rear as our target acquisition and conventional weapons systems will permit."

The aim of J-SAK and FOFA (hereafter combined and referred to as "deep air attack") was to delay, disrupt, or destroy second echelon mechanized units. This operational concept optimized airpower’s ability to impose an "intractable dilemma" on the enemy commander: if the second echelon attempted to advance rapidly (as Soviet doctrine prescribed), it would be vulnerable to air attack. If advancing forces took defensive precautions against the air threat (through dispersal and camouflage), they would be unable to maintain a rapid rate of movement. Maximizing the advantages of synchronized air and ground efforts, deep air attack principles resonated with many airmen.

Despite J-SAK’s authoritative limitation and FOFA’s geographical limitation, the combination of the two had a powerful impact on USAF equipment and tactics. Based in part on emerging weapon and sensor technologies, deep air attack generated the requirement to develop several weapons systems that would eventually be used against the Republican Guard. The most pressing need was to develop sensors capable of looking deep behind enemy lines and detecting advancing second echelon forces. Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) was the Army/USAF solution; its powerful radar was capable of tracking moving vehicles over wide areas of the battlefield or examining selected fixed sites in a narrower mapping mode. Another capable radar, Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar II (ASARS II), was fielded on the TR-1 aircraft, and dedicated down-link and command and control systems were deployed to take advantage of the real-time imagery available.

The USAF and U.S. Army fielded several air-to-ground delivery systems that enabled deep air attack, including the F-15E long-range interdiction aircraft, F-16C fighter-bombers equipped with radar capable of tracking moving vehicles, and night navigation and targeting systems (Low Altitude Navigation Targeting and Infrared for Night--LANTIRN). Advanced anti-armor weapons developed and deployed during the 1980s included the imaging infrared (IIR) AGM-65D Maverick Missile, an advanced cluster bomb--the CBU-87 combined effects munition (CEM), and an air scattered anti-tank and anti-personnel mine--the CBU-89 Gator. Army systems included the multiple launcher rocket system (MLRS), Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), and Apache attack helicopter.

Employment of these weapons systems is described in USAF tactical doctrine. Tactical doctrine outlines a broad range of tactical considerations in the 3- series multi-command manuals (MCM). There are separate volumes for each type of combat aircraft, a general planning volume, and an enemy threat volume. Standardized volume outlines and chapter headings result in the consideration of a wide variety of potential missions. Tactical considerations described in these volumes are not prescriptive, but are intended to "stimulate thinking." MCM manuals "consolidate tactical considerations learned from past armed conflicts, operational evaluations, training exercises, tactics development programs, and analyses of the threat." Updated on a twenty-four month cycle, MCM 3-1 is a living document reflecting tactical thoughts of the combat air forces. Each volume encourages "personal initiative and innovative thinking. . . to improve our combat capability" and challenges "all echelons of the combat air forces" to "build and expand on these tactics."

MCM 3-1 discusses the best available thoughts on a variety of potential missions. Its scope, however, is too wide to guide Air Force training and preparations; finite training resources and time limitations force tactical units to make choices and establish training priorities within 3-1’s repertoire. Although headquarters staffs determine minimum semi-annual training events for combat crews, the real tactical emphasis is determined within a flying squadron by the combined efforts of the commander, operations officer, flight commanders, and weapons officer. Normally following general guidance provided by the squadron commander, flight leaders conceive hypothetical scenarios, determine tactics, and evaluate performance during routine training missions. Although Pacific-based squadrons had a Korean orientation, most other TAC and USAFE squadrons were focused on the European scenario and prepared for it throughout the 1980s. All but one of the USAF wings that participated in Operation Desert Storm had formal tasking for the European theater in the event of war.

The bulk of TAC’s tactical training was geared towards executing deep air attack in the European environment. The Air Force’s premier training program, Red Flag, emphasized deep interdiction in large "gorilla formations" to counter high threat environment. The exception was USAF close air support (CAS) training, for A-10 wings, which concentrated attention on high threat, low-altitude employment along the front lines to support an Army pressured by large enemy mechanized units. Many crews were exposed to flying in Europe during overseas assignments or frequent training deployments to European bases (called "Checkered Flag" deployments). TAC’s only fighter wing free from European tasking, the 363d TFW, shared the remainder of TAC’s tactical vision. Wing training focused on low-altitude deep attacks against a a Soviet mechanized thrust into north Iran. Virtually all air-to-ground training throughout the tactical air forces (TAF) involved low-level navigation and weapons deliveries, which were required for survival on the high-threat battlefields of central Europe, and for target acquisition which could be impaired by low European ceilings.

Realistic and demanding training allowed USAF crews to accomplish unanticipated tasks in unexpected situations. Day-to-day training of aircrews emphasized tactical employment in realistic scenarios developed by flight leaders. Frequent multi-unit exercises and composite force training with dissimilar aircraft (such as that done at Red Flag) built familiarity with other systems and enabled crews to solve different tactical problems. Nellis AFB NV, home of the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center (TFWC), played a key role in the training of these combat aircrews. Red Flag is a recurring training exercise conducted at Nellis to expose crews to the most realistic combat environment possible; it provides an opportunity to solve difficult tactical problems in a controlled environment. Adversaries for Red Flag exercises were often provided by the Aggressor Squadrons, two specialized units that simulated Soviet tactics. The Fighter Weapon School (FWS), also located at Nellis, is a graduate-level tactics school that cultivates aggressive problem-solving in a select group of USAF crews. FWS students are required to solve a wide variety of demanding tactical problems throughout the course. Once back in their squadrons, FWS graduates (called "patch wearers" or "target arms" due to the distinctive patches awarded at graduation) provide a foundation of tactical know-how and problem solving within the unit. The thinking, teaching, and flying conducted at this center would have a powerful influence on USAF conduct in the Gulf War.

Both forces were products of their times and experiences: the Iraqi Army was a product of the static war of attrition with Iran, U.S. forces were products of the Cold War. Neither had tactical doctrines that adequately anticipated the Gulf War. USAF training, flexible weapons systems, and a core belief that "flexibility is the key to airpower" provided a sizable margin for errors in USAF doctrine.

The Plan: 3 August 1990 - 15 January 1991

In the early stages of planning there was no explicit statement of phase III objectives. This void resulted in confusion and varying expectations of what phase III would accomplish. Draft briefing slides from late August list the objectives as: "reduce Iraqi ground force capability, soften ground forces to assure successful penetration and exploitation. . .destroy Republican Guard capability to reinforce into Kuwait." Two months later, the objective of phase III was listed in briefings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President as simply "attrit [sic] enemy ground forces." The following month, on November 14, phase III was briefed by General Schwarzkopf to his senior commanders as "battlefield preparation." The groups that planned the phase III operations appear to have focused their thoughts on rendering the Republican Guards "combat ineffective" through attacks on several systems (infrastructure, logistics, C²) and direct attrition of maneuver units. Encouraging calculations regarding airpower’s potential to attrite the Iraqi Army led some planners to adopt "destroy" the Republican Guard as a goal of phase III. This goal appears to have been overly ambitious and did not serve airpower in the long run because other positive aspects of airpower’s effects on ground forces were eclipsed.

Air Staff planners developed early plans to destroy the entire Iraqi Army in the KTO. Analysts studied the Iraqi Army and planned to exploit the vulnerabilities of an army arrayed in the desert. Operations would begin with attacks against key systems that would affect all Iraqi forces in the theater (command and control, logistics, air defense), continue with attrition of the Republican Guards, then shift to the rest of the Iraqi Army. A great deal of the planning was quantitative in nature, using computer models and spreadsheets. The Checkmate calculations consideration multiple quantitative and qualitative factors. Quantifications included including munitions available in the theater, aircraft numbers, sortie rates, target types, objectives, and expected success per sortie (based on Saber Selector, an advanced computer program modeling weapons deliveries). The product of these calculations was a graph that predicted an impressive and rapid attrition of the Iraqi forces in the KTO when subjected to concentrated air attacks. These calculations reportedly led Checkmate to conclude that the attack on the Iraqi army could negate the 15,000+ anticipated U.S. casualties of a ground war, particularly if the requirement for the ground war could be obviated by air action.

Major Roy Y. Sikes, a checkmate analyst, considered the probability of Iraqi adaptation to an air attack and devised means to minimize the effects of Iraqi countermeasures. He emphasized concentration and massive attacks on specific ground units until the desired level of destruction was achieved (estimated to be between 20% and 40% of full strength). Under continuous attack and constant scrutiny from airborne forward air controllers (FACs), units would be unable to survive long enough to benefit from a "learning curve." Air attacks would then rapidly shift to another unit, destroying it in turn. Coalition learning opportunities could be maximized through the FAC, who would become familiar with an area and ground units in that area until the objectives were achieved. Sikes was in frequent contact with planners in the theater, and suggested the desirability to concentrate effort against units in turn, noting some success as other individuals in the planning effort began to advocate similar positions.

Major Mark "Buck" Rogers, a key Black Hole planner, shared some of Sikes’ concepts. In November, Rogers and Brig Gen Buster Glosson, chief of the special plans group, fleshed out a concept of operations for attacking the Iraqi Army. Their plan called for attacks on Iraqi air defenses, field headquarters, mechanized units and artillery, and logistics infrastructure. The Republican Guard units held a prominent place in their plans. Although command and control attacks were designed to minimize Iraqi ability to react to air or ground attack, Iraqi reactions were anticipated. Continuous presence by FACs would be needed to identify targets as Iraqi units began to "thin and displace." FACs would maintain "continuity" over designated sectors, maximizing Coalition learning by "precluding [attacks on] previously destroyed targets," and compensating for anticipated intelligence limitations against transitory targets. Rogers also advocated maintaining continuity between USAF combat wings and specific Iraqi ground units to boost effectiveness. USAF wings would enhance their learning by gaining experience with the terrain, unit layout, and capitalize on awareness of previous wing progress through attacks on the same division for an extended period.

CENTAF planners in Riyadh, led by Glosson, eagerly used the Checkmate analyses. Glosson adjusted some of the assumptions reducing, for example, the probability of locating targets from the recommended value of 95% to 75%. He also adjusted the figures for increased aircraft availability as forces flowed into the theater. The USAF’s quantitative analysis led to the adoption of a sub-objective that quickly captured the attention of the CINC, ground commanders, air commanders, and their staffs. The Air Force agreed to destroy at least 50% of the Iraqi Army’s tanks and artillery. This prospect was so riveting it nearly became the only goal of concern in the minds of some. Several possible attrition figures had been discussed during the planning. General Glosson and CENTCOM planner, LTC Joe Purvis, agreed on 50% as an average point a ground unit could be considered combat ineffective. Although the projections changed frequently, Glosson briefed the CENTAF wing commanders on 18 December that the Republican Guards would require 600 sorties per day for four days to reach the 50% goal, and that 90% could be achieved in nine days. This figure represented an unprecedented operational task for an air force, and the USAF’s progress towards it would be subjected to close scrutiny from many quarters during and after Desert Storm.

Even though the Air Force’s planning was detailed and well-thought-out, the numerical calculations of complex operations are heavily dependent on many assumptions. These initial assumptions are delicate and can be quickly altered by the fog and friction of war. Unexpected and unanticipated events are unavoidable in war and their cumulative effects can have significant impact on the most scientific calculations. In spite of its fragility, the quantitative approach to war has an almost irresistible appeal. With a number to strive for, the goal assumes a crystal clarity. The innate uncertainty of war, however, inhibits the planner’s ability to know if and when such seemingly clear goals have in fact been obtained.

CENTAF’s combat plans staff led by Lt Col Sam Baptiste simultaneously developed a plan to counter an Iraqi thrust into Saudi Arabia. Emphasizing continuous close air support and interdiction, the "D-day plan" was built on the assumption that out-numbered coalition forces would be under heavy ground attack requiring substantial amounts of close air support to survive. The D-day plan also had some characteristics of deep air attack, including interdiction of the Iraqi second echelon. "Kill boxes" (based on a Saudi grid system) were established along likely axes of Iraqi advance to direct coalition sorties against the Iraqi army. These boxes were eventually extended to cover the entire KTO and would exercise a significant influence over the entire course of the battle with the Iraqi Army.

The plans merged when the CENTAF Combat Plans staff and the Black Hole were combined in a December staff reorganization. General Glosson assumed responsibility for all CENTAF planning functions, leading a group called the guidance apportionment and targeting (GAT) cell. Lt Col Baptiste assumed responsibility for planning against the KTO, while the former Black Hole staff planned operations in Iraq. At this late stage of the planning process several ideas key posed by Checkmate and the Black Hole (concentration, sequential attacks on ground units, and FACs) appear to have faded away.

Glosson was also given operational control of all CENTAF fighter wings in December. A command reorganization established separate air divisions (AD) to control electronic warfare, command and control, and reconnaissance assets (15th AD, commanded by Brig Gen Proffit) and fighters (14th AD, Brig Gen Glosson) to match the air division controlling SAC assets (16th AD, Brig Gen Caruana). Assuming planning and command responsibilities, Glosson would play a pivotal role in the subsequent conduct of the campaign.

Republican Guard attacks were supported by operations against lines of communication into the KTO. These operations were called for by all three planning groups and were seen as a means to affect the entire Iraqi Army. Destruction of the bridges across the Euphrates appeared to be an ideal means of restricting the army’s logistics flow. The Euphrates bridges were doubly significant, however, as their destruction could block an army withdrawal from the KTO. For a counter-logistics effort to succeed, the considerable supply depots south of the Euphrates would also have to be neutralized, and B-52 raids were identified as an ideal means of reducing Iraqi stockpiles. Historically, counter-logistics operations conducted by air have been most effective if synchronized with ground action to cause increased consumption of supplies. Large Iraqi unit-level stockpiles would be problematic, requiring considerable effort to destroy. Iraq’s defensive doctrine posed additional problems because static units consume fewer supplies.

In addition to direct attack and interdiction the plan against the Iraqi Army included a significant moral dimension. Psychological operations were integrated in the plans early when CENTCOM psyops experts established liaisons with CENTAF’s planners. General Schwarzkopf appears to have taken an early interest in psyops and displayed a constant interest in using B-52s against the Republican Guards, even though the B-52 was a poor system for destroying dispersed and entrenched armored formations. Leaflets, B-52 strikes, and around-the-clock operations were intended to break down the Iraqi Army’s morale.

Republican Guard corps and division headquarters figured prominently in Coalition air plans. Part of a broader counter-command and control effort, planners anticipated that the attacks on headquarters would reduce Iraqi capability to react. CENTAF attempted to capitalize on the potential weaknesses of Iraq’s highly centralized command structure by attacking key communications and leadership nodes. Communications with units in the field would be restricted (if not severed), hindering Iraqi control.

As the execution date for Desert Storm approached, the nature of the plans against the Republican Guards shifted as they solidified. The separate phases of the air campaign blended together, as targets from all phases were included in the first three days’ air tasking orders (ATOs) at the same time. General Schwarzkopf, for example, demanded the Republican Guards be hit on the very first day. Small F-16 and B-52 raids against the RGFC were therefore blended into the master attack plan for the first day of the campaign. This gradual effort negated the potential advantages of Checkmate’s concentrated operations, and gave the Iraqis a chance to adjust to early attacks before the main effort could shift to the KTO. A gradual approach also sacrificed potential psychological benefits by gradually conditioning the Iraqi Army to air attack. Two other concepts, the use of airborne FACs throughout the KTO, and the matching up of wings to ground units appear to have fallen by the wayside. The friction inherent in pushing a complex plan through a large diverse organization consumed some its more significant features.

Clash of Arms: 17 - 26 January 1991

The air offensive began on the night of 17 January with attacks that struck across the depth and breadth of Iraq and Kuwait. The main weight of effort was initially aimed at disabling Iraq’s integrated air defenses, weakening its national command and control, and eliminating its Scud missile force. CENTAF missions struck the Republican Guards within the first twenty-four hours, and would continue for the next forty-three days. Small F-16 and B-52 raids struck at Republican Guard field headquarters the first day; follow-up missions over the next two days attacked other preplanned RGFC targets. With the physical and intellectual energies of the air campaign focused deep inside Iraq, the Iraqi Army felt only slight pressure from the air. Air strikes (minus A-10 sorties which were concentrated on the border) hovered at approximately one hundred sorties per day against all Iraqi ground units until January 23. During the first six days of the air campaign (17 to 23 Jan) approximately ninety-two F-16, thirty-nine B-52, and six F-18 strikes hit the Republican Guards. On the 23d, strikes against all ground forces increased to 200-300 per day, indicating a shift of effort to the KTO. At the end of the tenth day (26 January), cumulative counts of Republican Guard strikes had jumped to five hundred and sixty-nine F-16, eighty-nine B-52, forty-eight F-15E, and twenty-two F-18 strikes. Even with an emphasis on the KTO, daily sortie counts fell well short of the 600 missions called for in prewar plans.

After January 19th, KTO targeting became more decentralized. Instead of assigning specific point targets and designating desired mean point of impact (DMPI--specific aim points), CENTAF sent missions against large, area-targets (an armored battalion, for example) that contained hundreds of discrete DMPIs often spread over a square mile or more. Some strikes received even less guidance, sent against generic target categories ("armor," for example) within specified kill boxes that covered nine hundred square miles. Targeting shifted to decentralized methods because the GAT cell and flying wings did not have the detailed targeting materials typically used for controlling and planning attacks against fixed targets. USAF crews preparing for missions against fixed facilities (airfields, bridges, and other permanent structures) used numerous planning aids including precise target graphics and overhead imagery. Target photos are critical to mission success for visual weapons deliveries, as they compensate for navigational or imprecise target coordinates by improving chances of accurate target acquisition. Non-visual deliveries also benefit from precise target graphics to identify desired aimpoints. Without accurate target acquisition, mission success is jeopardized. Only a few, critical KTO targets such as corps headquarters were identified, photographed, and targeted before the war. Precision graphics were unavailable for the bulk of the Iraqi Army, perhaps because the potential mobility of a ground unit was assumed to render precision graphics irrelevant.

Little information was available at the unit level to plan these missions, and pilots had difficulty identifying desired ground units within the immense target arrays sprawling across the KTO. Target information was seldom more than a set of coordinates indicating the position of a battalion-sized ground unit wedged among countless other identical units, any of which could be mistaken for the desired target. Target intelligence personnel were unable to obtain imagery of the Iraqi positions from CENTAF intelligence because headquarters was overwhelmed trying to sort out the concurrent strategic, counter-air, and anti-Scud operations. Wing target intelligence staffs ("targeteers") were intensely frustrated because they were unable to provide sorely needed target materials to the crews attacking the Iraqi Army. Missions were launched to attack specific battalions with little more than approximate locations of the parent divisions.

Materials that would have enhanced CENTAF’s ability to plan, direct, and attack the Iraqi Army were present in the theater, but largely unknown to Air Force personnel. The Army Intelligence Agency (AIA) had been studying the Iraqi Army’s dispositions in the theater continuously since the August invasion. Analysts in Washington mapped out Iraqi positions in great detail and provided Army units in the theater with detailed templates of each Iraqi division. The theater joint imagery production complex (JIPC) integrated AIA’s templates and current imagery from RF-4s and U-2s onto 1-50,000 or 1-12,500 scale maps, producing up to 400 copies daily, with the assistance of the 30th Engineer Battalion, for distribution to U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) "corps, division and brigade commanders and staffs." These products plotted Iraqi positions down to the level of individual tanks and were so accurate that ground combatants remarked after the ground war that they were able to predict enemy contact and open fire based on the information from the charts. These materials had the potential to help CENTAF orientation and targeting dramatically. Although the JIPC was "designed to support CENTAF," ARCENT became its primary customer. Gen Horner later remarked that ARCENT "overloaded" the entire intelligence system with so many requests the JFACC "couldn’t get [his] foot in the door . . . [and] just said, ‘to hell with it.’" It is ironic that ARCENT monopolized these products for picking potential targets while CENTAF went without as it tried to find and attack many of those targets.

The lack of target materials severely retarded Air Force unit learning curves against the Republican Guard. Each crew member formed individual perceptions of the battlefield, based on what he had observed. Within combat wings, there were hundreds of disjointed impressions of the battlefield, and crews had a difficult time blending these images into a coherent picture without a common framework to provide orientation. Little meaningful target information could be shared within the wing without a common reference. The nature of air war demands some means of maintaining continuity with the enemy. Each crew glimpses the enemy for only a few minutes each mission and then returns to base. Without a common reference, there is little potential for learning within a wing or squadron. This slowed the learning process because crews could not update a common image of the battlefield and aircrews had to build a picture from scratch every mission. The problem was even more pronounced when wings attempted to communicate with other organizations.

B-52 bombers and F-16 fighters conducted the bulk of the initial attacks on the Republican Guards in the KTO. Bombers conducted attacks from high-altitude using radar aiming. Without a visual weapons delivery capability, the bombers needed precise coordinates to attack the Guard units. The CENTAF target database, however, had few Republican Guard targets listed, and those listed were mostly division or brigades that were deployed over many miles. Without detailed target materials available, the GAT cell’s bomber planner, Capt. Steven Hawkins, developed an innovative targeting technique during Desert Shield. A chance conversation with a U-2 pilot revealed the U-2’s ASARS II radar to be capable of determining accurate coordinates of ground units located by radar. The U-2 radar was subsequently used throughout the war to locate army units in the KTO and provide coordinates to the bomber planner in Riyadh, which he then relayed to bombers enroute to the theater. Although this innovation gave the B-52s accurate coordinates in near-real-time, it masked another significant problem. The B-52s were attacking from high-altitude and encountered system accuracy problems that had not been noted in training due to the B-52’s previous low-altitude focus. Because target coordinates were being passed as the bomber was enroute, few knew the exact desired points of impact; therefore, poststrike analysis was slow to detect accuracy problems.

Fighter formations of four-to-eight fighters also attacked the Republican Guards from high-altitude. High-altitude tactics had been considered a relic of the Vietnam era by the majority of Air Force aviators and had been largely discarded after the mid 1970s. Survival and target acquisition in a European scenario appeared to require low-flying, and training throughout the 1980s had a clear low-altitude focus. High-altitude training often met with resistance. The common attitude was that low-flying is more demanding; if one can fly low, he can fly high. Although this may be so, a general lack of high-altitude experience masked some significant problems unique to high-altitude operations that would appear during Desert Storm.

A primary reason for the uneven shift to high-altitude is that CENTAF refused to dictate tactics, leaving those decisions to the tacticians and commanders at the unit level. It is likely that Generals Horner and Glosson shared the views of other Vietnam War aviators--that Vietnam was "a war of fatal over-supervision." When General Glosson was queried by a pilot whether he could use low-altitude tactics during Desert Storm his reply was "You can if that’s what the wing decides to do. The mission commanders and smart captains should be the ones deciding tactics, not higher headquarters."

USAF electronic superiority allowed air supremacy to be quickly achieved above 10,000 feet, but the numerous Iraqi anti aircraft artillery (AAA) pieces and shoulder-launched SAMs denied low-risk operations at lower altitudes. USAF and USN jammers, anti-radiation missiles, and the USAF’s direct attack of critical Iraqi air defense nodes collapsed the Iraqi integrated air defense system (IADS) in the first days of the war, providing Coalition airpower with a high-altitude sanctuary. Thousands of Iraqi AAA units firing autonomously could not be countered systematically and were best avoided by remaining at higher altitudes.

Although high-altitude operations entailed lower risk, they caused a variety of unanticipated problems. The most serious problems stemmed from the lack of high-altitude weapons delivery experience. High-altitude attacks revealed procedural and hardware shortcomings. Fighter units used visual deliveries that might have been appropriate for low-altitude attacks but held very poor prospects of success from high-altitude. Lack of familiarity with high-altitude weapons delivery characteristics led to misconceptions and mistakes. Hardware and software problems revealed poor high-altitude wind modeling. Wind modeling, critical to "dumb" bomb accuracy, attempts to predict winds at lower altitudes that will affect the weapons impact point. Limitations of wind models resulted in impacts well short of the target during B-52 and F-16 attacks. Difficulties were encountered by the A-10. Its most fearsome weapon--the 30 mm cannon--had to be fired at more than double its normal slant range and suffered in accuracy and effectiveness. Increased distance from fighter to target resulted from high-altitude ingress and egress, leading to reduced effectiveness in target acquisition, attack assessment, weapons effects, and weapons accuracy.

The problems of high-altitude tactics experienced by the F-16 units were quickly aggravated by CENTAF headquarters munitions decisions. A prewar weapons conference deprived F-16 units of guided anti-armor munitions and a wartime decision deprived them of their best unguided anti-armor weapon. Checkmate plans assumed all Maverick missile (AGM-65) qualified units would fire these guided anti-armor weapons against Iraqi tanks, but these tank-killing weapons had been shifted to the A-10 wing during Desert Shield. The decision made at a wing weapons officer conference in Riyadh resulted in the transfer of the theater’s Mavericks to the A-10 wing, capitalizing on A-10 expertise with Mavericks. The F-16 squadrons, on the other hand, could capitalize on their system’s compatibility with a superior anti-armor cluster bomb, the CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition (CEM). Large lethal patterns of submunitions generated by these area weapons minimized high-altitude accuracy problems. CBU-87’s radar (ground proximity) fuse allowed it to be used at all altitudes. High-consumption rates of CBU-87 during the first two weeks alarmed planners in Riyadh, and General Horner ordered CENTAF’s best unguided anti-armor munition be saved for the ground war. This decision was prudent if CENTAF believed it would have to provide a great deal of close air support, because many of CBU-87s features also made it CENTAF’s best unguided CAS weapon. The tradeoff, however, was that the conservation of CENTAF’s best unguided anti-armor weapon might increase the necessity for CAS.

F-16 squadrons then began to prosecute their attacks against the Guards with sub-optimal munitions for tank-killing. MK-20 Rockeye, an older anti-armor cluster bomb, was not well suited for high-altitude attack because its timer fuse led to erratic, unpredictable trajectories, which was not a problem at low-altitude. Other cluster munitions, CBU-52, 58, and 72, armed with fragmentation munitions were ineffective against armor. "Iron" bombs, (Mk-82 500 pounders and Mk-84 2000 pounders) became the F-16’s primary weapon. These munitions required a direct hit to kill a revetted tank, which was highly improbable from high-altitude. The diminished accuracy of high-altitude tactics was aggravated by sub-optimal munitions. The detrimental impact of this decision was not apparent because there was very little feedback on the state of operations against the RGFC formations. CENTAF headquarters knew little more than numbers of strikes flown. Wings, therefore, received no feedback from higher headquarters, and wing impressions were formed by the highly individual (and often inaccurate) impressions of the aircrews returning from strikes.

Successful orientation (and therefore adaptation) requires knowledge of the enemy state and actions in addition to knowledge of one’s own condition and actions. CENTAF commanders were unable to perceive accurately the state of the Republican Guards. Observation of the Republican Guard formations was hindered by poor weather and the United States’ highly centralized intelligence collection system. Frequent cloud cover (the worst on record for the region) masked the Iraqi Army from overhead photography throughout the first week.

Additional problems external to CENTAF arose in Desert Storm because the CINC gave ARCENT and MARCENT responsibility to determine the condition of enemy ground formations in their areas. The rationale was that "if the ground campaign’s initiation was to be determined by a point when air attacks had reduced Iraqi armor and artillery by 50 percent, then ARCENT should make that determination since the Army was to conduct the main attack." A lack of common BDA guidelines led to inter-service tensions and disagreements over the results of coalition air attacks. ARCENT, whose area of responsibility contained the Republican Guards, developed an independent means of reporting and processing BDA: ground liaison officers (GLOs) reviewed mission results and reported through Army channels to ARCENT intelligence (G-2) for independent BDA processing.

Although BDA was important to help headquarters orient on the battlefield, BDA in the form of post-strike photography was equally important for weapons delivery assessment at the unit level. Post-strike imagery can aid units in determining exact weapons impact points and helps the unit to judge munitions effectiveness. With post-strike imagery, the unit can accurately adjust weapons or tactics in response. The immense target array combined with the decentralized aimpoint selection, however, rendered weapons delivery feedback impossible. Combat wings had a nearly impossible time obtaining imagery from overworked CENTAF intelligence. The occasional photos that filtered down to the units were of little use because they were photos of isolated formations that could not be oriented to the larger framework of the battlefield. Furthermore, with decentralized aimpoint selection and hundreds of strikes flown each day there was no recognition of previous targets or attack parameters and little information could be gleaned from the materials presented.

CENTAF had little more than a sortie count to measure its efforts against the Guards, although this was no valid indication of effectiveness. The obstacles to observation and orientation revealed shortcomings of peacetime doctrine and training: large scale target arrays were not practiced against, feedback to the wings was not exercised, and inter-service BDA principles not agreed upon in peacetime. The consequences of air operations without BDA are increased uncertainty and a possible lack of insight into the true nature of the situation which can lead to a lack of adaptation.

At this point it is appropriate to address the issue regarding how "right" USAF doctrines and practices were for the situation at hand. CENTAF’s adversary was similarly equipped but employed differently than the opponent around which USAF doctrine was built. The Republican Guards’ defensive doctrine was quite different from the high-tempo offensive doctrine emphasized by the Soviets. The Iraqis did not present the lucrative target concentrations expected from Soviet rapid movement requirements. Defensive Iraqi doctrine led to immobility, dispersal, and fortification and the battle acquired the characteristics of an air-to-ground siege: a battle for which airpower has not been historically well-suited.

The objective was different from that envisioned by deep air attack, reducing effectiveness and hindering measurement. Deep air attack’s primary effects were delay and disrupt, with destroy as a tertiary objective. Against a rapidly moving opponent, delay and disruption may be accomplished economically with attacks on key transportation, logistics, and command nodes. Effectiveness can be measured by following the enemy unit’s progress across a map and monitoring his mobile communications. In the case of the RGFC attack, delay became irrelevant (with the enemy immobile), disruption became less significant, and destruction became the key criterion of effectiveness. With destruction as the main measure of effectiveness, key nodes faded in importance. Thousands of discrete, hardened, and dispersed targets gained equal significance, posing incredible targeting and measurement problems to CENTAF.

In spite of the problems posed by the altered objectives of the operation, USAF planning groups developed useful plans that called for attacks on important systems contributing to the RGFC’s combat effectiveness. Several valuable ideas that might have facilitated the attrition effort (FACs, mass and concentration, matching wings to ground units) were lost in the friction of planning complex operations.

The combat wings executing the attack did a good job recognizing the opportunity to conduct operations at high-altitude with minimal risk (a unit level innovation), although lack of high-altitude weapons delivery experience reduced effectiveness. High-altitude problems were aggravated by munitions choices that took away the F-16’s best anti-armor weapons, marginalizing F-16 effectiveness towards the destruction objective.

Feedback and analysis of early attacks on the Guard were unavailable, which led to a major innovation: the use of cockpit video tape as a means for planners to obtain feedback. Feedback (a combination of observation and orientation in the OODA context) would be a necessary but not sufficient condition for adaptation. Insights formed after the first ten days of the war and additional feedback in the form of ARCENT analysis would stimulate considerable adaptations.

CENTAF Adapts: 27 January-5 February

Between 27 January and 5 February, CENTAF implemented or facilitated the adoption of at least six innovations in the battle with the Republican Guards. These changes, conceived and implemented within a surprisingly brief ten-day period, adjusted some operations and initiated other new operations that considerably improved USAF’s efforts against the RGFC. Several of CENTAF’s changes, as indicated by General Horner’s comments above, were adaptations of tactics used at some point in the Air Force’s experience. Although a previous generation of Air Force aviators may have executed similar tactics, the crews that fought Desert Storm had been schooled in different techniques and had to create these unplanned, unanticipated and unfamiliar tactics as they went.

The first innovation improved effectiveness against the Republican Guard with A-10 attacks on the Tawakalna Division. Gen Glosson reversed a decision to concentrate A-10s against the forward echelon by assigning this additional weapons system against the Republican Guard, possibly in response to unfavorable F-16 and B-52 feedback. Use of the A-10, the USAF’s prime CAS platform, on deep interdiction constituted a major innovation because it was contrary to the attack-pilot ethos. Deep, high-altitude interdiction by the A-10 had been discussed in some circles, mainly by weapons officers, but ran contrary to accepted practices and culture. Deep interdiction was seen by many as a mission unsuited for the A-10: slow, and heavily armored, the A-10 would be exposed to enemy ground fire for extended periods of time during ingress and egress. If attacked, it would lack the energy and maneuverability required to evade SAMs at high-altitude. Close air support was viewed as the A-10 raison d’être, many pilots believed the proper use of their weapon system should entail low-altitude Maverick attacks on enemy positions "while standing on the shoulders of the lead tankers."

Several A-10 missions hit Iraqi radars beyond the border on the first day of the war, and A-10s were used deep over the largely undefended west Iraqi desert in a search for Scuds, but use of the A-10 deep behind the lines in the KTO was unexpected. On February 27, the commanders of the A-10 wings at King Fahd AB were told by General Glosson to prepare for attacks against the Tawakalna Division, located over fifty miles behind Iraqi lines.

Three days of wing-sized attacks on the Tawakalna appeared to have had a powerful effect. The division offered little further resistance and seems to have begun digging-in deeper. The Iraqis began to dig deep inside their revetments to decrease weapons effects, and to use covers to mask the contents of the many revetments. They increased their use of deception tactics, including moving "live" vehicles to revetments that were scorched by previous kills, and use of decoys in others. Active measures included the lighting of fires beside vehicles when fighters were in the area to give the impression that the vehicle had already been attacked.

The A-10 response was to fly lower to improve target acquisition and discrimination. There had been a constant "grass roots" pressure (frustration) to allow lower attack altitudes to utilize the A-10’s superb cannon. Re-evaluating the nature of the Iraqi threat (now perceived as manageable), and the problems with high-altitude attacks, the A-10 wing commanders allowed flights to make a pass as low as 4500 feet. In addition, normal A-10 tactics involving small two-ship elements were reinstated. The two-ship formations allowed more weapons passes and flexibility in the target area. Small formations operating over the battlefield allowed maximum effectiveness of each individual weapons pass. Increased familiarity with the deep interdiction environment and diminished Iraqi defenses led to a reversion back to more familiar operating procedures.

The A-10 attack on the Tawakalna is difficult to assess with certainty, but it appears that A-10 deep interdiction was an effective innovation. The tactics were left to the wing planners, who devised a good plan to deal with the uncertainty of a new situation. Personal efforts and connections led to the fortunate acquisition of valuable target planning materials. The wing was able to implement the changed tasking in a timely manner: two days from first tasking to execution. Inexperience with mass formations posed problems, but their use was a prudent measure to cope with uncertainty. Increased firepower allowed the formations to better cope with Iraqi air defenses, and presence of other aircraft helped the pilots to cope psychologically with a new, intimidating environment. Against the Iraqis, the large formations may have had enhanced psychological effects (shock, lowered morale) and cognitive effects (lower ability to react to massed raids), at some cost in terms of sheer physical effect (fewer passes over the target per aircraft). After three days, the perception of a decreased threat environment and familiarity with the new environment permitted a reversion to lower-threat tactical formations (two-ships) in order to maximize the physical effect of every mission.

As the first missions struck the Tawakalna, ARCENT estimated the strength of the Republican Guards to be essentially unaffected by the air attacks, catalyzing several other innovations within CENTAF. During the first two weeks of Desert Storm, CENTAF categorized feedback from the KTO as "nonexistent." On 29 January, General Schwarzkopf voiced frustration with the lack of BDA from attacks on the Republican Guards, exclaiming that vehicles "have to be on their backs like cockroaches for J-2 to assess a kill." ARCENT commander, Lt Gen John Yeosock responded two days later with an assessment that the Republican Guards were at 99% of full strength. Such poor results indicated the requirement for CENTAF to initiate considerable adaptation.

This ARCENT assessment was met with incredulity at CENTAF headquarters. Particularly since the air effort on the 29th and 30th of January contained the heaviest attacks on the Republican Guard of the entire war (458 and 408 airstikes hit the RGFC those two days).

In an effort to improve its myopic view of the battlefield, CENTAF headquarters ordered A-10s to reconnoiter the Tawakalna, to verify levels of destruction. Conventional reconnaissance (RF-4 photos) of the Tawakalna resulted in inconclusive findings, and the commanders in Riyadh decided to conduct close-in visual observation. The substitution of this attack aircraft for purpose-built observation systems constituted a major innovation. The A-10’s slow speed, armor, and survivability qualified it best to perform this mission. At great risk, two flights of A-10s visually inspected the Tawakalna from 2000 feet on February 1.

The pilots estimated the Tawakalna’s strength at 50% or less; but more significantly, extensive Iraqi countermeasures to coalition bombing became apparent to the low-flying pilots. The pilots noted roughly half of the revetments were filled with targets and the rest with "old farm equipment, plywood decoys, old pickups, and barrels of oil." From higher altitudes the decoys were indistinguishable from the live targets. Reflecting these findings, the A-10 wing commanders reported "We’re looking in the revetments from four to six thousand feet. It’s nearly impossible to tell what’s in them. . . . Our general impression is that we’re hitting revetments that may or not be lucrative."

Iraqi deception tactics represented a major obstacle to the Coalition air effort. Camouflage and decoys denied any certainty that airstrikes would hit valid targets. With live and false targets indistinguishable from altitude and only 50% of the revetments with valid targets, the potential existed for half of CENTAF’s blows to be deflected. If air attention could be further drawn away from live targets by giving them the appearance of destroyed targets (blackening with oil for example), the probabilities become even worse. Iraqi movement between revetments compounded the coalition problem because "frequent movement compounds the enemy’s problem of targeting in the absence of continuous observation."

The problems posed by Iraqi countermeasures were not uniformly perceived throughout CENTAF. Units using non-visual deliveries had little awareness of a decoy problem. Pilots performing visual attacks from high-altitude were aware of their inability to determine live from dead targets, but probably underestimated the Iraqi decoy effort. The following excerpts are from an F-16 pilot’s war journal, illuminating the problems with target discrimination:

The general under-appreciation of the deception problem appears to have inhibited innovations to deny its effects (orientation on the problem is a necessary condition for successful adaptation). Those most familiar with the Iraqi deception efforts were the A-10s pilots. To counter Iraqi deception the wing commanders offered the following suggestion:

CENTAF, however, seemed either unaware of the scale of effort required to "sanitize" an area, or it was unable or unwilling to achieve the concentration required. Pre-planned and well-supported wing-size attacks were not repeated after the initial assault on the Tawakalna, nor were additional planning materials made available to increase effectiveness. Although several areas received heavier attention than others, most days saw airpower spread throughout the KTO. Several groups appear to have been pushing for increased concentration of air effort against the Republican Guards. General Schwarzkopf wanted CENTAF to break one division to serve as an example to the rest. General Horner’s comments repeatedly return to concentrating efforts on the Guard. The A-10 message called for concentration to counter Iraqi deception tactics, but the required concentration did not materialize. This may have been the innovation that did not happen.

One possible explanation is that CENTAF attempts to concentrate were unsuccessful due to the numerous competing demands on airpower. Horner continually stressed the importance of destroying the RGFC: "do not lose focus on the Republican Guards. Everything else is secondary other than the defense of Saudi Arabia." The command’s best day against the Guard was 29 January, in which the RGFC received 76% of the strikes within the KTO, but still amounted to only 50% of the Coalition’s total strikes for the day. The RGFC received less than half of the strikes in the KTO for thirty-nine of Desert Storm’s forty-three days. From a theater-wide perspective, the Republican Guard received less than one in six of the Coalition’s 41, 309 airstrikes. Strategic, counter-air, interdiction, and Scud target sets required a certain level of "maintenance sorties" that may constitute part of theater airpower’s "overhead." Demands for CAS from the corps commanders continuously pulled the A-10s from preplanned interdiction targets. Even the CINC confounded concentration efforts by frequently specifying RGFC divisions as the "target of the day," impeding efforts at persistence by switching divisions each day. Although the 600 sorties per day used by the planners may have seemed possible, the friction of war as manifested in the competing demands for airpower put this figure out of reach.

Another means of achieving better results from the F-16 was developed in Riyadh. Nellis AFB tactics expert, Col Clyde "Joe Bob" Phillips devised a plan to capitalize on the F-16’s capacity for fast, short turnarounds on the ground to increase daily sorties by creating an F-16 forward operating location (FOL). Glosson ordered his largest "day-only" F-16 wing, the 363d TFW(P), to deploy support elements and conduct operations from the Saudi airfield at King Khalid Military City(KKMC). A-10s had been operating from KKMC located only sixty miles from the Iraqi border. F-16s operating there were able to exchange their drop-tanks for extra ordnance: KKMC-based missions carried four MK-84 2000 pound bombs (double the normal load of two). FOL operations allowed the wing to fly more sorties per day; KKMC missions launched from the 363d main base in Abu Dhabi to bomb the KTO; landed and rearmed at KKMC for a second sortie to the KTO (which did not requiring refueling); landed and rearmed at KKMC for a third mission and after attacking the KTO, air refueled to return to Abu Dhabi.

Phillips saw an opportunity to improve performance by using the same pilots on the KKMC missions to build familiarity with the terrain, mission, and timing. An increase in effectiveness was anticipated. This effort, however, met with little success. CENTAF’s ATO production section typically scheduled individual KKMC missions against two or three different targets per day. Furthermore, 363d wing planners do not appear to have received any guidance to use the same crews. One aspect of this innovation was not realized, due in part to the friction of forcing ideas through an organization at war.

Although FOL operations were a minor innovation, the implementation of the concept required considerable effort. A-10s were already operating from KKMC, but work areas, quarters, and F-16 specific logistics, support, and ordnance had to be arranged prior to initiating FOL operations. The concept was implemented with startling speed; the wing implemented a full scale operation in four days. Chief KTO planner, Lt Col Sam Baptiste planned for a gradual spin-up in sorties, but was over-ruled. Glosson and t