A Job Hooligan's Navy: The Military Role Of The U.S. Coast Guard Into The 21st Century CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: A Job for Hoolligan's Navy: The Military Role of the U.S. Coast Guard into the 21st Century Author: Thomas J. Vitullo, LCDR/USCG Research Question: Is the Coast Guard still this nation's fifth military service? Discussion: This research project examined traditional Coast Guard roles and missions from the pre-World War II era to present. This was done to give the reader a grasp of Coast Guard history and to draw any historical elements that may support the findings and future options for the Coast Guard's role in National Security Strategy. The Coast Guard's tendency in the past, regarding its role in national security, has been to relate its mission solely to the service's traditional naval element. Other options and elements of Coast Guard operations exist that could be exploited in strengthening the Coast Guard role in executing national security strategy. Thesis Conclusion: The mission of Environmental Protection, Maritime Safety, Law Enforcement and National Defense all function to support the National Security and National Military Strategies. The Coast Guard can continue to be a credible instrument for policy into the next century. The Coast Guard is slowly losing the "naval auxilary" component of its cutters. Historically it was this component that kept the service linked to the other military services. However, the recent trend for cutters to not participate in operations such as, Grenada (1983), Gulf Reflagging (1987), Panama (1990) and the Persian Gulf War may be a trend for the future. The Coast Guard cutter fleet of the future will have to undergo significant change if it is to survive. The cutters are primary tools in accomplishing the following: (1) Acting as maritime interceptions platforms in coastal or littoral waters, (2) Providing credible forward presence in the Caribbean Basin and Latin American in conjunction with normal operations, (3) Serving to expand the Coast Guard role in training Third World navies, and (4) Asset available for use by the CINCs and not just an extension of the Navy. The service cannot afford the loss of its military character that has carried it for 205 years. The service needs to emphasize its security and military missions to its personnel before another study determines the service may better be served as a civilian agency. CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Purpose of Study: With a changing world order, and a greater portion of our military assets becoming engaged in operations other than war, what will be the U.S. Coast Guard's future role in national security? The objective of this study is to determine which Coast Guard missions support the National Security Strategy and how Coast Guard assets could be best employed in the future. With the advent of the Post Cold War Era, the down sizing of United States (U.S.) military forces and the use of the military for "non-traditional" functions, such as operations other than war(OOTW), how does the Coast Guard, with its traditional maritime flavor and largely peacetime missions, contribute to U.S. national security strategy? The paper will examine what the Coast Guard's contributions towards national security strategy have been in the past. Based on historical data and survey information, the question as to how the Coast Guard can remain a critical contributor in future security strategies will be explored. Captain Bruce Stubbs, U.S. Coast Guard, conducted extensive research of this topic while assigned as the Coast Guard Liaison Officer at the Naval War College. In his research titled "The U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century," Captain Stubbs focused the scope of his thesis at the the Coast Guard's role in national security as it relates to naval warfare. Captain Stubbs also proposed a collateral objective, that the research would help to stimulate thought among Coast Guard senior and junior officers on what the Coast Guard future role should be.1 Study Methodology: The study consists of three sections. First, a review of Coast Guard operations from the pre-World War II era to the present. This serves to set the stage regarding Coast Guard support of National Security policies in the past and how the Coast Guard has progressed to its current level of support. The goal is to identify trends in Coast Guard support of National Security Strategy, and suggest which direction the Coast Guard should proceed in the future. Second, a survey questionnaire (see Annex A) , reflects opinions from various Coast Guard commands. There are two reasons for use of the questionnaire. First, primary source material concerning the topic is limited. Second, to garner the opinions of those Coast Guard officers who may be in positions where they will have the opportunity to influence Coast Guard policy as it moves into the next century. The survey analysis is of a political, not analytical nature. The goal was not to obtain a definitive matrix solution for each question. Political analysis provides a means to measure opinion and to indicate trends.2 The goal was to help stimulate thought on the topic and provide some support to the author's opinions on future Coast Guard support of national security. As a consequence, much of the survey data is left to subjective evaluation by the author. Captain Stubbs' research used a similar method. His questionnaire was directed to current and retired Admirals of both the Coast Guard and Navy and the various CINCs.3 The latest survey did not target that senior an audience for two reasons. First, personnel at that level of responsibility can be the protectors of "rice bowls" and not necessarily willing to part with components (people + missions' = money) of their particular service or command. Second, it is the responsibility of mid-level and junior leaders of the Coast Guard to look at the direction the Coast Guard is heading. It is incumbent upon the future leaders of the service to determine whether the Coast Guard still has a role as a military organization. As those senior members of the service that saw combat action during the Vietnam War era retire, we must look at our past military roles and decide whether they are still viable operational options today. The final part of the study consists of interviews with the Branch Chiefs in the following offices at Coast Guard Headquarters, Defense Operations and Cutter Management Division. These branch chiefs represent, elements of the Coast Guard that comprise the major components that support the Coast Guard's role in National Security Strategy. Additionally, these officers have extensive operational experience dating from the Vietnam War era. Problems with Study: The first and major limitation was the lack of primary resource material available. This is due to lack of doctrine dealing with the subject in the Coast Guard. Additionally, there has been a slow transformation of the Coast Guard during the last fifty years, from a service with a strong military component to one with increasing peacetime missions. Another factor was that the fluid nature of the research topic lent itself to conjecture by the author. The Coast Guard does not have concise publications like FMFM 1, "Forward . . .From the Sea" or NDP 1. The lack of Coast Guard doctrineprovides an additional element of uncertainty. Where doctrine usually withstands the changing of Commandants, other directives are often changed as new Commandants take office. Given the changes in the new world order, there has been a significant increase in national security issues that concern operations other than war (OOTW). Many of these OOTW issues lend themselves to solution by elements of the Coast Guard given the Coast Guard's multi-mission nature. As a cousequence, an opportunity exists for the service to have more than a supporting naval role in national security issues. The scope of the research question grew from the study conducted by Captain Stubbs. However, as Captain Stubbs states in his study, he may have been too narrow in the scope of his thesis questions, concerned more with aspect of the Coast Guard's role in national security as it relates to naval warfare.4 This study attempts to broaden the scope by reviewing all roles and missions that relate to the President's National Security Strategy. Though the author was able to arrive at valid conclusions, another step in the research process, if time had been available, should have been added. A second survey, providing the repondents a rough outline of the study's results and seeking additional input would have been useful in drawing additional conclusions and fostering further debate by other Coast Guard officers. CHAPTER TWO HISTORY OF THE COAST GUARD FROM PRE-WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COAST GUARD The Coast Guard was formally established on 20 January 1915, as a combination of the Revenue-Cutter Service and Life-Saving Service. The Coast Guard was to "constitute a part of the military forces of the United States . . . under the Treasury Department in time of peace and operate as part of the Navy, subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy, in time of war or when the President shall so direct."5 This combination of two very different services may be the source for the lingering feeling that the Coast Guard is only partly a military service. The Revenue Cutter Service saw military action during the Quasi-War, War of 1812, the first Seminole War, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War.6 Having served in these conflicts and maintaining a peacetime mission of regulating commerce on the high seas, the structure of the Revenue Cutter Service melded nicely with the military establishment in the Coast Guard in 1915. The members of the Life-Saving Service were not as accustomed to life in a military organization. Their ties were civilian based. They lacked the structure of a military organization and were very dependent on regional and civic concerns vice national/international interests of the United States. Ellsworth Price Bertholf, Captain-Commandant of the Revenue-Cutter Service, 1911-15, and of the Coast Guard, 1915-19, offers the following regarding the establishment of the Coast Guard: "The Coast Guard occupies a peculiar position among other branches of the Government, and necessarily so from the dual character of its work, which is both civil and military. Its organization, therefore, must be such as will best adapt it to the performance of both classes of duties, and as a civil organization would not suffice for the performance of military functions, the organization of the service must be and is by law military. More than 120 years of practical experience has demonstrated that it is by means of military drills, training and discipline that the service is enabled to maintain that state of preparedness for prompt performance of its important civil duties, which . . . are largely of an emergent nature."7 These two variations, one of a military organization and the second of a civilian service, are the foundations of the Coast Guard. These themes have been prevalent throughout the Coast Guard's history, from periods of high military involvement to an ever increasing role concerning civic duties and operations other than war. With the end of the Cold War the United States will be involved with a world where threats come less from a comparable military force but more from regional powers, increased low intensity conflicts and greater domestic requirements. The Coast Guard may prove to be the perfect organization for adaptive force packaging. EXPANSION AS A PRELUDE TO WAR (1936-1940) Before World War II engulfed the European Continent, the civil roles and missions of the Coast Guard grew. Three major acts of legislation expanded the civil/domestic roles of the service. The first change provided for the enforcement of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. The legislation that accompanied this mission established the Coast Guard as the United States' primary maritime law enforcement agency. The bill enacted 22 June 1936 states, "commissioned, warrant and petty officers were empowered to make inquires, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures and arrests upon the high seas . . . for the prevention, detection and suppression of violations of the laws of the United States, under certain limitations."8 The next was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which was designed to establish an American-flag merchant fleet capable of carrying the foreign commerce of the United States, and satisfy various defense needs during war. Initially only a small portion of the act affected the Coast Guard; the inspection and certification of lifeboats carried aboard the vessels. This responsibility quickly expanded to an increasing role in the Maritime Service. This role included licensing and training of merchant mariners, a significant task given the explosive expansion of the merchant fleet following the legislation of 1936.9 The final piece of legislation affecting the Coast Guard was the transfer of the Lighthouse Service to the Coast Guard in 1939. With the transfer came nearly five thousand full and part-time employees, and sixty-four vessels of varying size; and the responsibility of maintaining some 30,000 aids to navigation, which ranged from lighthouses and lightships to buoys and shore markers of nearly every navigable waterway of the United States.10 As these civic missions were becoming established, the threat of war in Europe loomed over the United States. Although President Roosevelt's goal was to keep the U.S. neutral, several measures were taken to protect vital U.S. security interests. Many of these measures melded nicely with existing Coast Guard missions. The first of these was the inspection of merchant vessels of belligerent ownership to decide if they carried offensive armaments. This role expanded to include overseeing the safe loading of hazardous cargoes aboard merchant vessels bound for Europe.11 The next mission assigned the Coast Guard was the use of patrol vessels and aircraft for Neutrality Patrol off the northeast coast of the United States. The Coast Guard patrol vessels that comprised this squadron had to forgo civil missions to meet the new security demands. These vessels were eventually reassigned to duties on strategic weather stations and the Greenland Patrols through the Atlantic Ocean. The final pre-war mission saw the Coast Guard assume a forward presence role off the coast of Greenland in 1941. Greenland was considered a strategic location due to its proximity to the Atlantic Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCS) and the valuable meteorological data that could be obtained for German forces fighting in Western Europe. The Danish people of Greenland requested assistance from the United States in patrolling their coast. The State Department considered the use of armed U.S. naval vessels to patrol Greenland, but was concerned this would be construed as an offensive act, something the U.S. did not desire. The State Department decided the use of Coast Guard vessels offered the best option, as Coast Guard cutters would not be taken as an offensive act by the U.S.: yet they would still provide a deterrence to German forces attempting to land in Greenland.l2 THE WAR YEARS (1941-1945) During World War II, the Coast Guard was a critical element of the Navy for the following reasons: The size of the Coast Guard at the outbreak of war produced a significant force multiplier for the Navy; the capabilities of the Coast Guard vessels and aircraft of like classes were equally equipped to conduct various missions for the Navy; the various peacetime missions of the Coast Guard acted as a force multiplier, as there was no significant learning curve for the Coast Guard personnel once they were chopped to the Navy. The primary missions assigned to the Coast Guard were: convoy escort (including Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) duties), port security and beach patrol, coastal pickets, manning of rescue craft during D-day, and manning of amphibious landing craft for assaults in the Pacific and Atlantic. Many of these duties meshed nicely with the Coast Guard missions and skills developed during peacetime. The Coast Guard did not just serve in these various military roles on paper. Its actions, as operational elements of the Navy, were no less distinguished then any other unit. By mid-1943, the total number of German U-boats sunk by U.S. Naval vessels was eleven. Of these, six had been destroyed by Coast Guard cutters.13 The Neutrality and Weather patrols, which consumed a large amount of Coast Guard assets before the war, turned into the Greenland Patrol during the war. A majority of Coast Guard assets saw service in the waters off Greenland's coast. It was critical to the success of the Allied effort in Europe to have accurate weather forecasts for that theater and to deny the Germans the same information. Greenland was a key location in predicting the Western European weather patterns. As a consequence, the Coast Guard became responsible for the capture of several German secret weather stations in Greenland.14 At the end of World War II, Coast Guard and Navy vessels of like class or design were equal in their capabilities for Anti- Surface Warfare (ASUW), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). This would be the last time that Coast Guard and Naval vessels of like class would be on par with each other. It would also be the last time that the Coast Guard, as a complete service, would serve under the Navy for national defense. The Coast Guard was successful as a service during World War II for the following reasons. First, this was total war, there was no time for rice bowls or fear of mission creep by one service into the realm of another. Second, the Coast Guard's peacetime missions, though vast and growing, as shown by the expansion just before the outbreak of war, were not so great that domestic politics would intervene to stop the use of Coast Guard assets because of a possible reduction in their peacetime missions. Third, the weapons system, such as gun batteries and anti- submarine depth charges, used aboard naval war ships then were of the nature that a vessel of like construction, like Coast Guard and Navy vessels, could quickly be equipped to meet the military missions. Two missions from the Coast Guard's involvement in World War II continue to this day in support of national security strategy. The first is the Coast Guard responsibility for Port Security operations. This capability was recently demonstrated on a large scale with operations in Southwest Asia. The Coast Guard deployed several port security personnel to assist with operations. This is also an area in which the Coast Guard is seeking to expand in the future. Second, the Coast Guard cutters that patrolled the Greenland coast before and during the war provided a credible deterrence, without causing serious political conflicts. The Coast Guard has been used in such "forward presence" roles in recent history off the coasts of Grenada and Columbia. The use of Coast Guard assets to perform such functions, when the political situation is sensitive, will be critical to future security concerns, as diminishing DOD assets are stretched thin. LOSS OF THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF THE COAST GUARD (1946-73) Was the fate of the Coast Guard military component sealed at the end of World War II? Prior to the end of the war, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Vice Admiral Waeshe, formed a committee to help determine the future of the Coast Guard. Vice Admiral Waesche remembered the tough struggle at the end of World War I to retain the Coast Guard as a part of the Navy.15 The goal of his committee was to detail the peacetime duties of the Coast Guard, and to ensure a speedy return of the service to the Department of the Treasury. To help facilitate the move, the committee downplayed the military aspect of the service and concentrated on the Coast Guard's civic duties. In this fight, Admiral Waesche's planning committee prepared the Coast Guard mission statement: To enforce all applicable Federal laws upon the navigable waters of the United States and its possessions and upon the high seas; to develop and promulgate safety requirements for the construction, manning and operation of vessels (other than public vessels) under the jurisdiction of the United States; to develop, establish, maintain, and operate aids to navigation and rescue facilities to promote safety on the navigable waters of the United States and on and over the high seas; and to maintain a military readiness function as a specialized service with the Navy in time of war. The committee placed emphasis on the civic nature of the Coast Guard missions. This was done to facilitate a quick return of the service to the Treasury Department and to its peacetime place in the government. The civic missions of the Coast Guard were distasteful to the Navy, who were more concerned with naval warfare. Despite the efforts of Admiral Waesche and his staff to produce a clear understanding of Coast Guard missions and service to the country, a study by Congress attempted to define the anomalous status of the service. In 1947/48, at the request of Congressman Everett Dirksen, a study was conducted to help ascertain the nature of the service and explain the "waste and extravagance in Coast Guard operations."17 Instead of identifying the Coast Guard as a useless service, which could be reduced or abolished to help government downsizing in the post war years, the study helped to cement the Coast Guard's status for several decades to follow. The opening remarks of the study offered great comfort for any in the Coast Guard who thought their future was at risk: The survey findings . . . show that all of the duties performed by the Coast Guard are in the public interest. Also, each duty is a proper part and responsibility of the federal government. The performance of these duties represents a necessary item of expense to the public, and they are now logically classified or grouped for performance by one government agency. No evidence has been noted that any other agency of the Federal Government could perform these functions at lower cost or with greater efficiency and better adequacy of service than does the Coast Guard.18 During the period that followed World War II Coast Guard participation in major military engagements was mixed. However, there was a significant increase in operations that could be classified as OOTW. These types of operations have grown significantly in their effect on current national security strategy. At the end of the war the U.S. Navy no longer wanted to maintain the oceanic weather stations, which were critical during the war for air commerce. In late 1947, when the Weather station program began in earnest, the vessels used by the Coast Guard were on loan from the Navy Reserve fleet.19 The requirement to maintain these patrols would remain in effect until the mid-1970s. At the end of WW II a determination of what the Coast Guard's role during war should be was made by Congress, the Navy, and the Coast Guard.20 It was decided that the Coast Guard's role during war "should be an extension of the of normal peacetime tasks."2l With the Coast Guard cutters involved heavily with civic missions, such as weather patrol and search and rescue, there was little flexibility to support the Navy during the Korean War. The Coast Guard would assume increased weather station patrols, port security tasks and search and rescue duties in the Pacific, as U.S. forces deployed to the Far East. Despite the lack of total integration of the Coast Guard with the Navy, as seen during WW II, many Coast Guard missions were expanded. The Coast Guard saw a significant increase in port security duties during the war, mostly as a result of fear that the Soviet Union could possibly explode a nuclear device in a U.S. port. The Coast Guard Reserve component was increased to help the short fall of resources available to sustain the increased tempo of the port security mission.22 After the war the Reserve would continue to be the main component of the Coast Guard Port Security Units. During this period, the Coast Guard undertook some of the first international military training with the Republic of South Korea. In l946, a Coast Guard detachment, headed by Captain George E. McCabe, organized and trained the Korean Coast Guard Service. This service would become the nucleus of the Republic of Korean Navy.23 The model of the Coast Guard then, and now, is an excellent example for third world navies to emulate. As had been the goal in 1946/47, the Coast Guard service in Korea was merely an extension of its peacetime missions. The reorganization of the reserve forces helped to establish permanent Port Security Units (PSU) that can be activated during national emergencies. The years immediately following the Korean War saw little change to the traditional roles of Ocean Station, Search and Rescue, and Maritime Safety. Though there was an increase in the Coast Guard role in international organizations, such as the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which was concerned with maritime safety practices and navigation at sea, there was little activity regarding the Coast Guard's military capability during this period. By the early 1960's the Coast Guard was again faced with a lack of clear definition concerning its roles and missions in the eyes of Congress. A roles and missions study conducted by the Kennedy Administration in 1961 helped to identify the service's major functions: port security, military readiness, law enforcement, search and rescue, aid to navigation, oceanography, and ocean station.24 The Coast Guard quickly assumed a major role in international crises; ensuring the safety of thousands of Cubans who fled their homes as Fidel Castro came to power.25 This role, concerning the safety of life at sea for immigrants fleeing their countries, continues as a significant Coast Guard mission today. On 1 April 1967, the Coast Guard was transferred to the Department of Transportation. The transfer of the Coast Guard to the newly formed Department of Transportation (DOT) initially met with some misgivings in the Coast Guard. The loss of the service's military element was the major concern. Initial opposition to transferring the service caused concern that the Coast Guard would be dismembered and its various functions spread throughout the government.26 The 1960's also brought a significant change to the Coast Guard fleet, as two new major cutter types were commissioned: the Reliance Class Medium Endurance Cutter(WMEC), and the Hamilton Class High Endurance Cutters (WHEC) . The former vessel was capable of 18 knots and equipped with only a single 3-inch 50 caliber gun of World War II vintage. The latter vessel had a true multi- mission character, being 378 feet in length, capable of 29 knots and equipped with a 5-inch 38 caliber gun, air search radar, 40 millimeter mounts, antisubmarine depth charges, antisubmarine torpedoes and sonar. Though fewer vessels of each class were built than the initial ship construction plans called for, these vessels continue to serve the Coast Guard today.27 Both classes of cutter have received a mid-life overhaul that should extend their service life an additional 15 years. Additionally, ship construction was conducted to support the roles of navigation and ice-breaking. The Coast Guard's assumption of the ice-breaking mission, both national and international, came about because of the Navy's desire to shed yet another civil role and concentrate on warfare missions.28 The 1960's also saw the last engagement of Coast Guard vessels in a war. As the war in Vietnam grew during the mid 1960's, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Roland, was trying to figure a way to get the service involved. His fear was that if the Coast Guard was limited to a support role, as had been seen in the Korean War, the Coast Guard's status as an armed force might be jeopardized.29 Coast Guard patrol craft fit nicely into the Navy's Operation MARKET TIME, (the operation designed to conduct coastal surveillance patrol). Initially, seventeen vessels formed Coast Guard Squadron 1 in the summer of 1965. By the Fall an additional nine patrol vessels joined the squadron. Although the Commandant believed that if the Coast Guard was denied a combat role it would begin to lose its military flavor, there were Coast Guardsmen who were not enthusiastic about going to war. Personnel on patrol boats who wished to be excluded from going to Vietnam were not required to do so. However, the Coast Guard had no lack of volunteers to replace them.30 Patrol craft were not the only Coast Guard vessels to see combat. In April 1967, Coast Guard Squadron 3, comprised of WHEC class cutters, formed and sailed for the Philippines. During the war the vessels from Squadron 3 would serve as part of the offshore assets for Operation MARKET TIME. Additionally, the cutters would provide naval gunfire support. By mid-1971, when the last of the large cutters had completed service in Vietnam and returned home, a total of thirty Coast Guard High Endurance Cutters had participated in Operation MARKET TIME, including seven of the new Hamilton Class cutters.31 Combat was not the only mission performed by Coast Guard personnel during the war. With the surge in merchant vessel traffic in the area supporting U.S. forces, the need for an effective aid to navigation systems became apparent. The Coast Guard deployed five bouytenders to help the Vietnamese government establish and maintain a safe navigation system. Additionally, Coast Guard Port Security Units were deployed in theater to help with the explosive handling mission. A total of 8000 Coast Guardsmen would see duty in Vietnam, but not more than 1000 at any given time. The role of Operation MARKET TIME could be described as an anti-smuggling operation, or to use current military terminology, as maritime interception operations. This would be the last time Coast Guard vessels would serve in such roles during war. By the mid 1970s, the Coast Guard performed three missions that support National Security and National Military Strategy today: Port Security, International Training, and Maritime Interdiction. First, the Port Security Units, largely be comrised of Coast Guard Reserve forces, would perform this military mission.32 Second, the Coast Guard role in training the Korean Coast Guard after WWII has served as the model for the Coast Guard role in future international training missions. Coast Guard organization and training missions serve as a model for many third world nations, which are less concerned with global stature than regional stability. Last, maritime interdiction has played as important a role in the service's previous 200+ years as it will in the future. Anti-smuggling operations would continue as a mainstay of Coast Guard cutter operations after Vietnam. Maritime Interdiction missions have varied from enforcement of United Nation's embargoes to monitoring of foreign fishing vessels off the U.S. coast. AFTER VIETNAM INTO THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD (1974-1995) The civic missions of the Coast Guard have grown significantly during the last 20 years. In 1967 the offshore fishery zone around the United States expanded to twelve nautical miles from shore. The addition of the 200 nautical Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the establishment of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation Act in the mid-1970s expanded the Coast Guard's domestic law enforcement roles. Additionally, the Coast Guard became the primary maritime enforcement agency for the war on drugs at sea. The maritime safety mission grew substantially with increasing concern for environmental effects of pollution and hazardous cargo.33 In 1980 the Coast Guard undertook what would become an increasing role in the interdiction of illegal immigrants to the U.S. In that year the Coast Guard began regular patrols of the Windward Passage, between Haiti and Cuba. From 1991 - 1995 this mission would absorb a large portion of Coast Guard afloat and airborne assets. These operations eventually became known as Operation ABLE MANNER, involving safety of life at sea, and enforcement of the United Nation's embargo against Haiti in cooperation with U.S. and foreign naval vessels. In 1983, the tiny island of Grenada provided the opportunity for Coast Guard forces to meet national security needs in a traditional sense. During the invasion Coast Guard assets assumed roles as search and rescue platforms for the invasion forces. Though the Coast Guard played only a minor role during the invasion, it was the follow-on mission which melded nicely with its peacetime missions. After organized resistance had collapsed and the country of Grenada was attempting to reestablish order, a security presence was needed. Two primary missions for the security force existed. First, to prevent the escape of Marxist fugitives and infiltration of weapons or military contraband. Second, to demonstrate a continuing U.S. commitment through naval presence. The Coast Guard became the logical choice to accomplish these missions for two reasons. First, the service had developed great expertise in maritime interdiction and coastal surveillance. Second, as principally a peacetime and humanitarian service, its presence was less politically sensitive than having a naval warship off the coast of Grenada.34 In the late 1980's, Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral P. Yost, put forth an effort to emphasize the military aspect of the service. During a Naval Institute seminar in 1987, the Commandant stressed the service's defense mission; "The Coast Guard has served in every one of our country's wars and regards military readiness as its most solemn duty."35 Some of the major changes made by the Admiral Yost, during his term as Commandant are: (1) To place a section on the Officer Evaluation Report, for Warfare Skills. (2) Implementaion of the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) commands.36 Despite efforts by the Commandant to strengthen the Coast Guard's military mission, his efforts seem minimal during a period with a general downward trend in the services military abilities. In 1987, during the reflagging mission of Iraqi oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, it was recommended by the the Chief of Naval Operations, for the services of the Coast Guard new 110' Island Class patrol boats to assist in the mission. Congress blocked sending these vessels. The concern was that there would be a significant loss of assets to conduct drug interdiction operations.37 The service, therefore, lost another opportunity to see military action. With Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990/91, the Coast Guard played another role with its Ports Security Units and the use of Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) aboard Navy vessels to assist in the enforcement of United Nations sanctions. Again, Coast Guard cutters had no role.38 From the Post-Vietnam war era the following missions played a role in the Coast Guard's support of National Security Strategy: Port Security, Forward Presence, and Maritime Interdiction. Over the last 50+ years of Coast Guard history the service has continually responded to an increase in missions, most of them civil in nature. The service has also been subjected to serious scrutiny regarding its missions and the need for such an organization. As evidenced after World War II and later in the 1960's, the Coast Guard peacetime missions helped to save the service from possibly being dissolved and its missions assigned to other government agencies. Many of the missions that fell upon the Coast Guard were cast aside from the Navy as being non-glamorous or less military in nature. These missions have, at times, helped to maintain the Coast Guard's military flavor. With the slow dissappearance of the traditional Naval warfare role, what options remain for the Coast Guard regarding support for the National Security and the National Military Strategy? The next Chapter will discuss current Coast Guard missions and their relationship with national security. CHAPTER THREE NATIONAL POLICY AND HOW IT RELATES TO THE COAST GUARD NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY Strategy at all levels consists of three elements: ends, ways, and means.39 Nationally and internationally the goals or policies of a nation are the ends. Ways are translated into strategy. Means are the combination of the elements of national power (military, economic, political, social) and could be called tactics. The missions performed by the the U.S. armed forces serve as means to support the National Security and National Military Strategies. This chapter will look at how the various Coast Guard missions support these strategies. Historically, U.S. national security meant only the national defense and the nation's foreign relations concerns. The singular challenge of the past half century has given way to a more diverse set of security challenges.40 The definition of national security has broad meaning, beyond the defense and well being of a nation's citizens, to global interconnectivity with other nations. The world is changing from a bipolar world of military superpowers, to a multipolar world that needs regional stability to guarantee prosperity. Threats affecting our nation's security are wide ranging. Militarily, the U.S. is concerned with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the increasing threat of their use by terrorist groups. Politically and economically, the U.S. faces mass migration of people from underdeveloped countries to those that are more economically stable. Internally, the U.S. culture has been troubled because of the effects of illegal drugs. The world's security concerns have become so interconnected that influence from one region may have a wide ranging effect across many continents and cultures. The current National Security Strategy of the United States provides the basis for national security policy. President Clinton divides national security interests into three primary objectives: (1) ENHANCING OUR SECURITY (2) PROMOTING PROSPERITY AT HOME (3) PROMOTING DEMOCRACY41 Security priorities vary depending on whether they are of survival, vital, major or peripheral interest. The means to achieve security are dependent on the combination of the elements of power. Historically, the Coast Guard's security role has been that of a supporting arm to the Navy. With the changing focus of national security, largely related to military solutions, what elements of the national security does the Coast Guard support? The Coast Guard tends not to be directly involved with security interests concerned with either survival or vital roles. The service does have a direct role in those major and peripheral areas that affect economic, social and environment concerns of the nation. The National Security Strategy places emphasis upon the emergence of nonmilitary objectives to support our security.42 Security objectives that directly relate to the Coast Guard are as follows: 1) ENHANCING OUR SECURITY o Maintaining a Strong Defense Capability: Though military capabilities are critical to our security, the Coast Guard is a contributing member in the following areas: - Providing Credible Overseas Presence - Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other Missions (including illegal migrant interdiction) - Peace Operations - Protecting Environment Resources 2) PROMOTING PROSPERITY AT HOME o Economic and security interests are becoming interwoven and dependent on activities external to the United States. o Ensuring the safety of economic markets. o Economic expansion is dependent upon a stable global environment and halting cross-border environmental degradation. o Providing for future U.S. energy needs. 3) PROMOTING DEMOCRACY o Enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations. o Promoting democracy and human rights as promoted by the United States o Humanitarian assistance programs and nation building. In the new National Security Strategy, the President suggests that the ability to develop public support for these new and varying security priorities has become increasingly more difficult.43 The frequency with which the U.S. military has been deployed for humanitarian operations, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, has far surpassed what was experienced during the Cold War. With the Department of Defense (DOD) down sizing, the requirement for services capable of multiple missions has grown. The Coast Guard has historically demonstrated a unique ability to assume new missions without a loss of effectiveness in other areas. An opportunity exists for the Coast Guard to become much more involved with the DOD in operations that are of a noncombatant nature. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY The unique nature of the Coast Guard, with its numerous peacetime missions within the Department of Transportation, has if difficult to fully identify its role in the National Military strategy. As envisioned at the close of World War II, the Coast Guard's military missions would be an extension of its peacetime role.44 During the Cold War period many solutions to national security issues were of a military nature. This placed the Coast Guard at a disadvantage, regarding national security strategy, due to the civic nature of the service's missions. The new National Military Strategy of the United States provides a view of how the Military services will support the President's National Security Strategy. The new policy is based on four principal dangers that must be addressed by the military: regional instability; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; transnational dangers (such as drug trafficking/terrorism); and the dangers to democracy and reform.45 This new strategy requires the appropriate military capability together with economic, diplomatic and informational elements of the United States' national power.46 There are two major national military objectives: promoting stability and thwarting aggression. The new military strategy has three major components to provide for its success: peacetime engagements, deterrence, conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our nation's wars. A review of these major components reveals how the Coast Guard can support the policy in the following areas: o Peacetime Engagements: - Promoting democracy through military-to-military contact, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, and counter-drug operations. o Deterrence and Conflict Prevention: - Responding to potential adversaries and denying them their goals through crisis response, arms control, noncombatant evacuation operations and sanctions enforcement. o Fighting and Winning our nations' Wars: - Responding to emergencies and integrating with DOD assets to support national policy. COAST GUARD MISSIONS AND HOW THEY RELATE TO NATIONAL SECURITY The Coast Guard's heritage dates to the Revenue Cutter Service's formal establishment under the Treasury Department in 1790, as a maritime organization responsible for the enforcement of revenue laws and the prevention of smuggling.47 Since then, the service's missions have grown significantly. The basis for most of the Coast Guard's authority is derived from United States Code (U.S.C.). Title 14 of the U.S.C. establishes the Coast Guard as a military service always, not just in wartime. The Coast Guard, by law, is one the five armed services. However, its long history of peacetime missions often gives it a less then traditional military flavor. The Coast Guard provides the nation with a maritime capability that is flexible in nature and with assets that are multi- mission in nature. AN AVERAGE COAST GUARD DAY Board 90 large vessels for port safety checks Process 120 seamen's documents Seize 209 lbs marijuana and 170lbs cocaine worth $9.2 million Conduct 191 SAR cases Respond to 34 oil or hazardous chemical spills Conduct 120 law enforcement boardings, identifying 65 violations Investigate 17 marine accidents Inspect 64 commercial vessels Save 14 lives and assist 328 people Save $2.5 million in property Service 150 aids to navigation Interdict 176 illegal migrants FIGURE (3-1)48 Coast Guard missions can be divided into four broad areas: maritime safety, law enforcement, environmental protection and national defense. These broad mission areas are further subdivided into supporting mission areas: MARITIME SAFETY - Recreational Boating Safety (largely handled by Coast Guard Auxiliary) - Commercial Vessel Safety - Search and Rescue (SAR) - Waterways Management (largely consisting of Aids to Navigation management) - Ice Operations (both domestic and international) - Port Safety and Security Within the Maritime Safety mission area, only the port safety and security, and ice operations have a role in the National Military and National Security Strategy. LAW ENFORCEMENT - Interdiction of illegal drugs/contraband from entering the United States - Enforcement of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) for fisheries and other natural resources. - Interdiction of illegal aliens from migrating to the United States. - Enforce all other applicable laws and regulations which correspond to maritime safety. All of the supporting missions under law enforcement have a role in current National Security Strategy or Military Strategy. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION - Preventing illegal discharges of hazardous material into the sea. - Coordinating spill response and cleanup activities. - U.S. representative at various national and international conferences on maritime environmental issues. - Regulatory inspection (a portion of port safety and security) All environmental protection missions support the current National Security and Military Strategies. NATIONAL DEFENSE - Maritime Defense Zone (done together with the Navy) - Port Security and Harbor Defense - Maritime interception/embargo enforcement (surveillance and interdiction) - Cutter convoy escort capabilities (limited capability platforms) All of the Coast Guard's peacetime operations support the security concerns identified above. Operations may be limited to a geographic theater of operations or hemisphere. However, the Coast Guard's ability to conduct world wide operations has been proven in the past. A dilemma for the Coast Guard has been that there is not a clear delineation between mission areas. This is evident when reviewing the support missions for national defense. Many of these are spinoffs from daily mission areas. This is further complicated when trying to see how the various missions support national security and the national military strategy. A problem has been the Coast Guard's ability to clearly define the service's common purpose. The Coast Guard needs a governing service doctrine in this area. a doctrine would provide clear guidance on the Coast Guard's role in national security and a better understanding by service members of the relationship with the DOD. The Coast Guard's link to military operations and support of security policy has previously been with the Navy. The Navy-Coast Guard Board or NAVGARD Board, as it is commonly referred to, was established to provide high-level coordination and recommendations on major policy issues of mutual interest to the Navy and Coast Guard.50 The next section will analyze whether the NAVGARD Board remains the best mechanism for the Coast Guard's support of national strategy. CURRENT RELATIONS WITH THE DOD The NAVGARD Board was established in 1980, with four primary functions: 1. Advise and make recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard on policies, concepts, and issues which require high-level Navy/Coast Guard coordination. 2. Consider and recommend Navy-Coast Guard positions on Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives which mutually affect their services. 3. Consider and recommend Coast Guard-Navy positions on Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) initiatives which impact the naval services. 4. Consider and make recommendations on naval warfare capabilities, doctrines, objectives, and related requirements in support of national strategy.51 This mechanism has provided a valuable path for supporting current/future weapons systems and the roles of Coast Guard forces in national defense. It was an adequate mechanism when the primary national security risk was based solely on a military solution and the Coast Guard's participation was linked closely to naval warfare. Since the end of the Cold War, the Coast Guard's role in national military strategy has been strengthened with a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the DOD and DOT on the use of U.S. Coast Guard capabilities and resources in support of National Military Strategy. This MOA was signed in November 1994. Three primary areas regarding the Coast Guard's national defense roles were agreed upon as follows: - Maritime Interception Operations - Environriental Defense - Deployed Port Operations-Security and Defense 52 However, this MOA was initiated by the NAVGARD Board and is still dependent on the link between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, as is the NAVGARD Board. The problem is two-fold: First, the Coast Guard continues to link its national security role with that of national defense or military solutions. Second, with the DOD in its eighth year of a draw down, and third year of roles and missions studies, all services may be looking for other means to minimize reductions on top (people + missions = money). The Coast Guard may find itself in competition with the DOD and particularly the Navy. Additionally, the various service chiefs are no longer the "War Fighters" for the U.S. This role has shifted to the combatant CINCs. The Coast Guard and the U.S. may be better served if some functions for national security affairs are shifted away from the liaison with the Navy and placed with the various CINCs. CHAPTER FOUR SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSIS The author sent a survey questionnaire, at Annex A, to various Coast Guard commands to obtain opinions regarding the Coast Guard's role in supporting national security strategy. The object of the survey was to obtain personal opinions from service members. The survey was not designed to prove a certain theory or provide a definitive solution for the Coast Guard's security options. The survey went to the following Coast Guard commands: Coast Guard Area Commanders Office of Cutter Operations (2), Coast Guard Districts Commander Chiefs of Operations (10) Commanding Officers Coast Guard High Endurance Cutters (12), and Commanding Officers Coast Guard Medium Endurance Cutters (26). The groups were divided in the survey analysis as shown in figure (5-1). Figure (5-1) also shows the response numbers by groups. The goal was to obtain a 50 percent response in the survey. Though the percentage was not as high as desired (36 percent), the data was valuable in providing a wide range of information. No response was received from group one. This group will be omitted in the subsequent analysis matrixes (figures 5-2, 5-4 to 5-6) Image QUESTION ONE: Should the Coast Guard continue to design and crew cutters based on an ability to assume the role of a naval combatant? The question was particularly directed at the Coast Guard cutter fleet. The lack of a role for the cutter fleet in the Persian Gulf may have signaled an end to the naval warfare mission for future cutters. Image The response to this question was an even split. The major theme in most of the responses was that Coast Guard cutters first need to be built and manned to formally support Coast Guard operations (SAR, maritime interdiction and law enforcement). The Coast Guard uses Navy Command and Control systems and Communications technologies to support many of its peacetime missions. The use of these systems in peacetime is justified by the naval warfare mission that many cutters might have to preform. The Coast Guard weapons systems are "on loan" from the Navy. The systems that are employed by the Coast Guard are often near the end of their service life. The need for complex and expensive weapons systems, however, is losing its appeal to some respondents. Technological advances in weapons systems have outgrown the Coast Guard requirements in the naval warfare arena. In the November 1994 MOA between the Department of Transportation and the Department of Defense, the major defense mission for Coast Guard cutters would be Maritime Interception Operations. This mission is accomplished in a relatively low-threat environment and melds nicely with Coast Guard routine execution of peacetime duties.53 By using Coast Guard assets in this role combat effectiveness is enhanced by redirecting naval combatants to higher-threat missions.54 The combination of the above two elements reinforces the need for large Coast Guard cutters. Though the cutters do not necessarily need to be configured as naval combatants. During my interviews with the Branch Chiefs of the Office of Defense Operations and Cutter Management at Coast Guard Headquarters, they described what is called the "Slippery Slope" theory. The Coast Guard has had limited growth or even a declining capability in the naval warfare missions in comparison to the Navy since World War II. This declining capability is compounded by the lack of serious participation by Coast Guard cutter assets in a Naval Warfare mission, since Operation MARKET TIME in Vietnam. Figures 5-3 A-C, depicts this theory for the three major Naval Warfare areas Anti-Air Warfare(AAW), Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) Figure 5-3 A graphically contrasts the AAW capabilities between the Navy and the Coast Guard from the end of World War II to the present. The various peaks in the Navy graph can be attributed to advances in radars, missile systems, and command and control capabilities. The upward swing on the Coast Guard line can be attributed to the addition of the MK 75 Gun Fire Control System (GFCS) on the 270 Class WMEC and the Phanlax Close in Weapon System (CIWS) and MK 75 GFCS on 378 Class WHEC. The AAW systems that are currently in use aboard Coast Guard vessels are self protection systems only. These systems were not designed for, nor do they possess, the capability as an offensive weapon. Images Figures 5-3 B, graphically contrasts the ASW capabilities between the Navy and the Coast Guard from the end of World War II to the present. Again the various peaks on the Navy graph can be attributed to advances in sonar, torpedoes and command and control capabilities. The downward tail on the Coast Guard line can be attributed to the removal of all ASW equipment from 378 Class WHEC. Figure 5-3 B: Comparison between USN and USCG ASW capabilities from 1945 to 1995.56 Figures 5-3 C, contrasts the ASUW capabilities between the Navy and the Coast Guard from the end of World War II to the present. The various peaks on the Navy graph represent advances such as surface to surface missile, AEGIS system, phased-array radars, and command and control capabilities. The small upward spike, followed by the downward trend on the Coast Guard graph, represents the initial installation of the Harpoon weapons system aboard 378 Class WHECs and then their recent removal. Image Figure 5-3 C: Comparison between USN and USCG ASUW capabilities from 1945 to 1995.57 As depicted in the graphs, Coast Guard WHEC class cutters have lost a large portion of their naval warfare capability, particularly in ASW and ASTJW. These losses bring the naval warfare element of the cutter mission area to an extremely limited status. This raises the question whether the Coast Guard still has a viable naval warfare role? Some survey participants did suggest that the Coast Guard can conduct maritime interdiction and limited forward presence operations in the Caribbean with its current naval warfare capabilities. These opinions support the Maritime Interdiction Operations capabilities as identified in the November 1994, Memorandum of Agreement, between the DOT and DOD on Coast Guard defense capabilities. The Coast Guard can provide a force multiplier if needed, by relieving naval combatants of duties a in low threat environment. The long standing tradition that cutters are an integral part of the blue water naval combatants must give way to Coast Guard missions that support National Security policy. In future Coast Guard cutter design efforts, considerations must be given for rapid expansion of the naval warfare mission if a significant crisis arose. Coast Guard assets may be needed as the follow-on echelon of naval forces and future cutter designs should support a quick transition to combat readiness. However, the Coast Guard has lost the "naval warfare" connotation with its afloat units. QUESTION TWO: Should the Coast Guard seek a greater role in OOTW type missions in the future? With the end of the Cold War, and the national security strategy being focused less on a singular military threat, the United States has seen a significant increase in OOTW. The Coast Guard historically has been a front runner in missions of an OOTW nature (anti-smuggling law enforcement, refuge interdiction) As one respondent phrased it, "OOTW is what the Coast Guard does for a living. We should continually examine ways we can do more." The Coast Guard has continually sought this type of mission throughout its history. The examination of the Coast Guard's past indicates the service's ability to take on increased OOTW missions to support national security. This is evident in the increased roles the Coast Guard has assumed in law enforcement, environmental protection, and maritime safety duties during the last fifty years. One respondent suggested that this does come at a price. Operations off Haiti and Cuba in l994 had a serious draining effect on other peacetime missions of the service. The services within the DOD are also starting to receive additional tasking beyond their traditional core mission of preparation for war. Some survey respondents indicated that the Coast Guard should only support OOTW as it relates to current Coast Guard missions and not get into a contest with the DOD over possible future roles. During the past forty years the other services have concentrated solely on preparation for war. The Coast Guard's multi-mission nature lends itself as a model for DOD and particularly the Navy for the future.58 The Coast Guard serves as an example in the following ways: First, by being able to conduct humanitarian operations while remaining prepared for war. Second, by not taking the simplistic hawk vs dove view of the world as the Post Cold War period unfolds. Last, by not equating the success of the service to budgetary dollars. All the services must remain focused on finding creative ways to solve future problems.59 It would be a mistake to sit idly by, as the DOD expands into mission areas that could be solved with current Coast Guard resources. The major obstacle is doctrinal, which is how to employ Coast Guard forces. One respondent gave the best option for a future course of action. The Coast Guard needs to establish liaisons on the CINC staffs. The CINC is the current "war fighter," and this involves the use of United States assets in OOTW. It is no longer the various service chiefs who decide how to employ forces, but the operational CINCs. A Coast Guard liaison on each of the CINC staffs would provide an avenue of support by Coast Guard assets in national security issues. The current liaison with the DOD through the NAVGARD Board and liaisons on the CINCLANT and CINCPAC naval fleet staffs may be adequate for dealing with procurement of weapon systems/equipment and training programs. However, the Coast Guard needs representation at a senior level on the CINC staffs. This will ensure that all aspects of the service are used to support security threats. Capt K. Kirkpatrick, USCG, in his research at the Naval War College, on the Coast Guard and the adaptive planning process, presents the following solution to this problem: First, the Coast Guard must look at the broader role of supporting the CINCs as opposed to primarily supporting the Navy.60 The Coast Guard must look at its roles in relationship with the deliberate planning process and in conjunction with the Navy and the CINCs discern how the service meets U.S. security needs.61 Second, the Coast Guard must present its national security and defense roles to the service members, the Department of Transportation, National Security Advisors and to the Department of Defense.62 Given the diminishing nature of naval warfare as an area for support of national security strategy by the Coast Guard, it seems the Navy may not be our best liaison. better balance in the employment of its Law Enforcement Assets? The high pace of Alien Migration Interdiction operations has had a deletrious effect on Coast Guard operations over the last several years and whether more traditional law enforcement missions (Drug smuggling and fishery enforcement) have suffered. Image This question may have been too regional in nature given the varying comments received from many survey participants. The Coast Guard Law Enforcement role can be divided into four major areas: * Anti-smuggling/Drug Enforcement * Fishery Enforcement * Alien Migration Interdiction * General Law Enforcement (Vessel Safety at Sea) The major theme in most of survey respondents who thought that a balance already existed was that the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of drug enforcement during the "Miami Vice" hey days in the 1980's. During that period there was a large commitment by the Reagan Administration to increase the war against drugs. As the primary maritime enforcement agency it was natural for the Coast Guard to take a leading role. This leap in emphasis in drug law enforcement may have caused a seemingly disproportionate relationship to the other law enforcement roles. Other respondents said that because of alien migration operations over the last 3-4 years, the cutter's ability to conduct law enforcement operations in the drug or fisheries fields had suffered. The knowledge of law enforcement regulations and their practical application is a highly perishable skill for cutters law enforcement members, if not regularly exercised. These types of losses could be equated to the loss of war fighting skills by other DOD forces, if they were to solely engage in OOTW type operations that did not exercise war fighting skills. One respondent indicated that the Coast Guard must be ready to answer "all bells" as they occur, but the service can ill afford to allow certain mission capabilities to atrophy due to increasing operations tempo in a particular area. Where does this leave the operational units, which must balance training for future missions with the high pace of current operations? First, it should not be the sole responsibility of each command to ensure that they are not deficient because operations have limited their ability to train for other missions. Both staffs and planners must provide operational schedules for varying operational missions to ensure that adequate time, resources, and exposure to other missions exist for all units. With the war on drugs slowing, and the loss of funding under the drug umbrella, the Coast Guard has seriously cut back resources for this mission. Trying to support components of national security strategy that fluctuate due to political influence, and high media visibility (as with the Haitian and Cuban operations), is difficult. The Coast Guard may suffer through operational peaks and valleys that are politically driven, having adverse effects on mission areas. QUESTION FOUR: Is the Coast Guard in need of reorganization? This final question in the survey caused the most concern and confusion among respondents. The goal of the question was to see whether the current Coast Guard organization (particularly at the Headquarters level) and the various operations elements of the Coast Guard that can support national security policy lack the proper internal organization to maximize effectiveness. The fourth survey question failed to produce the expected result that there was a need for reorganization. Though the responses were mixed, one survey participant put it best, "The public needs to see one Coast Guard on the waterfront." As discussed earlier, the Coast Guard missions that support National Security are not clearly defined. The elements are divided among four major offices of the Coast Guard; Navigation, Operations, Readiness and Reserve and Marine Safety (NORM). Some respondents said that to disestablish "NORM," and return to a concept of an Operations Directorate would cause a serious power imbalance. However, given the changes in National Security and National Military Strategies in the Post Cold War era, the Coast Guard must seek to better organize how it will support these areas. CHAPTER FIVE HOW THE COAST GUARD CAN SUPPORT FUTURE SECURITY STRATEGIES "The Coast Guard cannot significantly improve its naval wartime performance until it concentrates more of its resources on that objective during peacetime. . . especially if it acquires new or expanded naval wartime missions in the near future."63 During the 1980's, when the DOD was experiencing significant growth, the above quote, stressing a firmer commitment to the Coast Guard's naval warfare capabilities, made sense. Strengthening the Coast Guard's naval warfare component would also reinforce the service's support of National Security and National Military Strategies. The Coast Guard did experience some growth during this period with the establishment of Maritime Defense Zones(MDZs) and the placement of improved weapons systems on the WHEC Class cutters. However, growth in the national defense mission area has given way to changes caused by the arrival of the Post Cold War period. The Coast Guard has continually seen action in our country's wars. Threats to national security can no longer be addressed solely with military solutions. The U.S. needs to be flexible in its ability to respond. The Coast Guard officer corps no longer possesses the skills or platforms to be naval "Surface Warfare Officers." However, this does not mean the service should not remain a part of the military. As the first Commandant of the Coast Guard, Ellsworth Price Bertholf, offered: "Its organization, therefore, must be such as will best adapt it to the performance of both classes of duties, arid as a civil organization would not suffice for the performance of military functions, the organization of the service must be and is by law military. More than 120 years of practical experience has demonstrated that it is by means of military drills, training and discipline that the service is enabled to maintain that state of preparedness for prompt performance of its important civil duties, which . . . are largely of an emergent nature."64 Recently, the Coast Guard has sought to strengthen its role within the DOD in support of National Security and Military Strategies with the November l994 Memorandum of Agreement. This agreement provides three areas as to how the Coast Guard can support national defense roles and missions for the future: (1) Environmental Defense Operations, (2) Deployed Port Operations Security and Defense and, (3) Maritime Interception Operations. However, as previously discussed the Coast Guard's link for security missions remains through the NAVGARD Board and the liaison between the CNO and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In order for the Coast Guard to remain a valuable asset for future national security strategy the service must accomplish the following. First, the service must be able to clearly articulate what it has to offer in support of future national security objectives. The dilemma is, how does the Coast Guard solve this problem? The service needs to establish doctrine to pilot its relationship with national security. Cdr Waterman, USCG, conducted research in this area based on the thesis that internal Coast Guard policy guidance does not communicate a coherent vision of the service's national security potential.65 Many senior and mid-level Coast Guard officers are neither conversant in National Security nor National Military Strategy, or how the Coast Guard can support these policies.66 The lack of doctrine makes the service a continual target for well intentioned studies. Recent efficiency proposals, such as the l982 DOT study and the l9B4 Grace Commission, provided recommendations to privatize and subdivide or eliminate the Coast Guard.67 In its own defense the Coast Guard must provide clear doctrine as to how it supports national security and military policies. Doctrine would establish common framework, purpose and guidelines for future planning and decision-making about the Coast Guard.68 By establishing a means to continually study the National Security and National Military Strategies, and how Coast Guard missions support them, the Coast Guard would also help educate its personnel, reinforce service morale and service identity. This will require more than a Commandant mission paper or vision statement to accomplish. The raw materials for such a doctrine exist in the following: (1) The 1994 Commandant's Direction, (2) Commandant's Long Range View and, (3) the 1994 Memorandum of Agreement with the DOD. Though this material discusses in generic terms what the Coast Guard does and provides direction for the service, they are not suitable as doctrine. The Coast Guard needs to capture what exists in service manuals, standard operating procedures, policy statements and memorandums of understanding and agreements with other services into a concise standard for support of national security strategy.69 An important step has been taken in this area with the assignment of a Coast Guard Liaison Officer at the Naval Doctrine Command in 1994. From the service's origin, as the Revenue Cutter Service, the Coast Guard has been involved in all major military conflicts of the United States. The role of the Coast Guard, as an armed extension of the Navy during war, has great historical value and provides tradition to the individual service members. To cast aside a mission which the service has performed so well is not easy. The time is upon Coast Guard leadership, however, to think less about naval warfare missions, as the main element for supporting the National Security and National Military Strategies and more on the use of other elements of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard must divorce itself from the notion that national defense and naval warfare solely equate to support of national security. The organization has continually tried to relate the national defense mission only with assets that may operate in a hostile environment. With the blue water threat to the U.S. lessened, the need has arrived to look at other areas of the Coast Guard for support of security policy. Captain Stubbs drew the following conclusion for the Coast Guard's large cutters (WHEC and WMEC classes) in naval warfare during his study: There will be no justification for the Coast Guard's large cutters, medium and high endurance, to retain combat systems, sensors and weapons. Coastal defense requirements for the CONUS based MDZ commands will not generate the need for combat systems for these cutters. . . The Coast Guard's patrol boats have utility in regional conflicts as coastal patrol and interdiction assets. If the Navy decides that it has no requirement to deploy them to such a conflict, these cutters too will have no need for combat systems. The only requirement for weapons systems will be law enforcement duties and low-order confrontations with other nation- states. Basically Coast Guard cutters will become a family of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and possible loose their naval auxiliary status.70 In performing its peacetime missions, such as maritime law enforcement, migrant interdiction operations, and port safety and security the Coast Guard operates in the OOTW environment daily.71 The service remains a major contributor for OOTW type operations because of its familiarity with that operating environment. Despite the changes in threat to U.S. security, there remains a valid need for the military element of the Coast Guard into the next century. Recent operations off Haiti and Cuba prove that the Coast Guard can quickly adapt to a changing environment. During the months prior to the U.S. troops going ashore in Haiti, Coast Guard cutters preformed dual roles. First, as a humanitarian service saving the lives of thousands of Haitian migrants. Second, as a member of a multi-national force responsible for enforcement of the United Nations embargo against Haiti. Once troops were ashore in Haiti, some Coast Guard units which were previously involved with the humanitarain and enforcement efforts, had to quickly change modes of operation and become part of the Harbor Defense Forces in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti. At the same time other Coast Guard units were redirected from Haiti to conduct migrant interdiction operations off the coast of Cuba, in the vicinity of Havana. The multi-mission nature and flexibility of the service during this period suggests the Coast Guard can maintain a military mission, yet still conduct its peacetime duties. Third, the Coast Guard must seek out and gain representation on the various CINC staffs. Keeping the Coast Guard's ability to support future National Security and National Military Strategies tied solely to the Navy may be hazardous. As the Navy seeks to expand her roles and missions, the Coast Guard may find itself in direct competition for missions. The Coast Guard must seek a broader role of supporting the CINCs, as opposed to primarily supporting the Navy.72 Captain Kirkpatrick, USCG, offers the following, as to how the Coast Guard can best contribute to the CINCs missions. Internally to the Coast Guard should: 1) Form an organization responsible for national security planning. 2) Determine the service's national security role. 3) Articulate this role to the service, the DOT and Congress. Externally the Coast Guard should: 1) Place officers on CINC's planning staffs 2) Redefine the Coast Guard relationship with the Navy in national defense matters. 3) Articulate to the CINCs what the Coast Guard has to offer in the national security and defense arena.73 Additionally, without proper support on the CINC staffs, the U.S. government is denied the advantage of being able to use all available resources to resolve security concerns. The capabilities of the Coast Guard have not gone unnoticed. John White, chairman of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, states, "The Coast Guard provides a model we ought to think about, they have terrific capabilities."74 Last, the Coast Guard must expand its role internationally. The Coast Guard can serve as the role model for many Third World navies. The Navy currently executes a majority of the maritime aspects of the U.S. Security Assistance Program (SAP).75 However, the Navy lacks the expertise and understanding of how to relate to third world services, due to the nature of their missions. The Coast Guard offers the following to SAP. First, the organization of the Coast Guard is much like that of many Third World Navies.76 The small size of the Coast Guard demands that its personnel and mission be multi-dimensional. Coast Guard and Third World units may find themselves doing law enforcement, or humanitrarian service all in the same day. Second, the Coast Guard holds a unique status from that of the Navy and other DOD services. The diplomacy carried by a naval combatant may not be the proper choice when trying to strengthen relations with Third World countries.77 Third, Coast Guard cutters and patrol craft are similar to those in use by Third World countries. The high technology in use in the Navy provides little common ground for professional exchanges. The Coast Guard does have an active role through its Mobile Training Teams. However, these teams have been unable to keep up with the demands placed upon them.78 The wide range of missions the Coast Guard performs requires that the service maintain some level of military capability in support of the National Security and National Military Strategies. The Coast Guard is slowly losing the "naval auxiliary" component of its cutters. Historically, it was this component that kept the service linked to the other military services. The Coast Guard can continue to be a credible instrument for national security by: (1) Acting as maritime interception platforms in coastal or littoral waters, (2) Providing credible forward presence in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America in conjunction with normal operations, (3) Receiving an expanded role in training Third World navies, and (4) Becoming a tool available for use by the CINCs and not just an extension of the Navy. These roles for the Coast Guard become increasingly more important in light of the DOD draw down and the nation's committment to be able to respond simulataneously to two major regional contingencies. The use of Coast Guard assets will allow for the deployment of DOD assets to more traditional military roles. The major challenge for the Coast Guard is that it must better define how it will support these strategies in the future. ENDNOTES 1. Bruce Stubbs, The Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty First Century. Naval War College, Newport, June 1992, xxviii. 2.Louis White, POLITICAL ANALYISIS, Technique and Practice. Brooks/Cole Publishing, Pacific Grove, 1983, 180. 3. Stubbs, 2. 4. Stubbs, xl-xli. 5. Robert Erwin Johnson, GUARDIANS OF THE SEA, HISTORY of the UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 1915 to PRESENT, 32-33. 6. Johnson, 2-3. 7. Johnson, 33. 8. Johnson, 158. 9. Johnson, 158-160. 10. Johnson, 162. 11. Johnson, l72. 12. Johnson, 175-177. 13. Johnson, 138. 14. Commandant's Bulletin, U.S. Coast Guard. December 1994, 19-23. 15. Johnson, 256-257. 16. Johnson, 257. 17. Johnson, 263. 18. Johnson, 263. 19. Johnson, 266-270. 20. Johnson, 281. 21. Johnson 281. 22. Johnson, 281. 23. Johnson, 281. 24. Johnson, 29O. 25. Johnson, 321. 26. Johnson, 340-343. 27. Johnson, 326-328. 28. Johnson, 327-328. 29. Johnson, 331. 30. Johnson, 332. 31. Johnson, 331-337. 32. Johnson, 282. 33. Johnson, 344, 347-349, 356-360. 34. Dale Thompson, "The Guard in Grenada." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis, November 1984, 66-69. 35. Paul Yost, "Coast Guard Commandant Meets the Press." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis, June 1987, 58. 36. Yost, 58-59. 37. Kent Kirkpatrick, The Coast Guard and the Adaptive Planning Process. Naval War College, Newport, MAy 1992, 18-19. 38. Norman Bradely, "Waging Peace." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis, December 1991, 52-54. 39. David Jablonsky, Why Is Strategy Difficult?, Reprint from Gary Geunter The Search for Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, Army Was College, 1993, D-79. 40. William Clinton, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994, i. 41. Clinton, 5. 42. Clinton, 1. 43. Clinton, 29. 44. Johnson, 281. 45. John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, i. 46. Shalikashvili, i. 47. Irving King, George Washington's Coast Guard, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1978, 16-17. 48. U.S. Coast Guard Commamdants Bulletin, Washington D.C. January 1995, 30. 49. Ty Waterman, Wanted: Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard as an Instrument of National Security. Naval War College, Newport, February 1992, 17. 50. COMDTINST 5420.23B, Navy and Coast Guard Board. Washington, December 1989, 1. 51. COMDTINST 542O.23B, 1. 52. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation on the Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy. Washington, November 1994,1-6. 53. Robert Kramek, Memorandum of Agreement Between the DOD and DOT on use of Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy, November 1994. 54. Kramek, 6. 55. Interview with CAPT Jay Creech, USCG, USCG HQ, G-OCU. Washington, December 1994. Intreview with CAPT Don Grosse, USCG, USCG HQ, G-ODO. Washington, November 1994. 56. Interview with CAPT Jay Creech, USCG, USCG HQ, G-OCU. Washington, December 1994. Intreview with CAPT Don Grosse, USCG, USCG HQ, G-ODO. Washington, November 1994. 57. Interview with CAPT Jay Creech, USCG, USCG HQ, G-OCU. Washington, December 1994. Intreview with CAPT Don Grosse, USCG, USCG HQ, G-ODO. Washington, November l994. 58. Ronald Fraser, For a Flexible Navy, the Coast Guard is a Model, Navy Times, Marine Corp Edition 13 Feb 1995, 29. 59. Fraser, 29. 60. Kent Kirkpatrick, The Coast Guard and the Adaptive Planning Process. Naval War College, Newport, May 1992, 2. 61. Kirkpatrick, 2-3. 62. Kirkpatrick, 3. 63. Ronald Fraser, "The Coast Guard: Quo Vadis?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annappolis, 1984, 40. 64. Johnson, 33. 65. Waterman, ii. 66. Kent Kirkpatrick, The Coast Guard and the Adaptive Planning Process. Naval War College, Newport, May 1992, 16,17. 67. Bruce Stubbs, 'The Coast Guard's Dilema," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1987, 44. 68. Waterman, 24. 69. Bruce Stubbs, "A Defense Doctrine for the Coast Guard," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1989, 120-122. 70. Stubbs, xlvii. 71. Louis Orsini, The Right Service for the Job - Security Assistance and the Coast Guard, Naval War College. New Port, May 1990, 10. 72. Kirkpatrick, 2. 73. Kirkpatrick, 8. 74. William Matthews, "Other Agencies Should Share Burden of Peace," Army Times, November 1994. 75. Orsini, ii. 76. Orsini, 15. 77. Orsini, 16. 78. Timothy Cook, "Finding a New Niche," U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding, Annapolis, December 1992, 86-90. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Johnson, Robert Erwin. Guardians of the Sea, History of the United States Coast Guard, l9l5 to the Present. Annapolis Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Geurtner, Gary L. Search for Strategy, Politics and Strategic Vision. Wesport: Greenwood Press. King, Irving H. Washington's Coast Guard Annapolis Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978. Stubbs, Bruce B. U.S.Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty First Century Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1992. White, Louise G. Political Analysis,Technique and Practice Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1983. MANUALS/DOCTRINES Clinton, William. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington: The White House, July 1994. Dalton, John H. Forward . . .From the Sea. Washington: Department of The Navy. November 1994. Powell, Colin. National Military Strategy of the United States Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992. Shalikashvili, John. Military Strategy of the United States Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1995. U.S. Coast Guard. The Commandant's Strategic Agenda Commandant Instruction 16000.21. Washington. 21 September 1990. U.S. Coast Guard. The Commandant's Long-Range View Commandant Instruction M16014.1D. Washington. 31 October1989. U.S. Coast Guard. The Commandant's Direction Commandant Instruction 16010.12. Washington. 10 August 1994. U.S. Coast Guard. Minutes from the NAVGARD Board Meetings. Washington. U.S. Coast Guard. Program Direction for the Defense Operations Division Washington. 28 October 1994. \ BIBLIOGRAPHY (con't) U.S. Joint Chiefs. Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. Joint Publication 1. Washington. 11 November 1991 U.S. Marine Corp. FMFM 1. Washington. 1989. U.S. Marine Corp. The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense Washington. 1991. U.S. Navy. Warfare. Naval Doctrine Publication 1 Washington. 28 March 1994. PERIODICALS/ARTICLES Abel, Ltjg Christopher A. (USCG) "Forgotten Lessons of Riverine Warfare." Naval Institute Proceedings January 1982, 64-68. Adams, Lcdr Michael R. (USCG) . "Navy Narcs." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings September 1984, 35-37. Barnabee, Ltjg Randall A. (USCG). "A New Course for Marine Safety." Naval Institute Proceedings. December 1992, 90-93. Bradely, BM3 Norman D. (USCGR) "Waging Peace." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1991, 52-54. Brigham, Capt Lawson W. (USCG). "The Coast Guard in Review." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings May 1994, 139-142. Brigham, Capt Lawson W. (USCG). "The Next Commandant's Challenges." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. December 1993, 28-29. Brigham, Capt Lawson W. (USCG). "The Coast Guard in Review." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Naval Review l992, 157-163. Brown, Lcdr Alan (USCGR), "The Coast Guard Reserve: Ready for What?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1992, 82-85. Collier, Cdr Michael W. (USCG). "New Cruising Cutter." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings April 1994, 72-74. Cook, Lt Timothy A. (USCG). "Finding a New Niche." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1992, 86-89. Fraser, Cdr Ronald (USCGR). "The Coast Guard: Quo Vadis?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings February 1984, 40-45. BIBLIOGRAPHY (con't) PERIODICALS/ARTICLES (con't) Fitzgerald, Capt Carmond C. CUSCG) and Olson, Capt John R. (USCGR). " Answering the Call." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1992, 94-96. Fitzgerald, Capt Carmond C. (USCG) and Mehaffy, Capt George L.(USCGR). "One Coast Guard." Naval Institute Proceedings December l993, 30-32. Kramek, Ens Joseph E. (USCG). "The Crowded Deck." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December l993, 48-52. Kime, Adm J. William (USCG). "Looking to the Future." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December l99l, 62-63. Kime, Adm J. William (USCG). "Waging a War to Protect the Seas." Naval Institute Proceedings October l99l, 57-6O. Kime, Adm J. William (USCG). "Change." Naval Institute Proceedings December l993, 26-27. Kurz, CWO Gary (USCG). "Looking For Adventure?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1993, 35-37. Larzelere, Capt A.R. (USCG). "The Coast Guard and the Southeastern Frontier." US. Naval Institute Proceedings Naval Review 1980, 141-l53. Marian, Lt Thomas P. (USCG). "The Coast Guard After the Revolution." U.S. Naval institute Proceeding. September 1992, 80-82. McKay, Lcdr Terry A. (USCG ret). " Where is the Coast Guard Going with the Commercial Vessel Safety Mission." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1993, 4O-41. Moore, Capt Robert G. (USCG). "Hip Boots or Blue Water? An Examination of the U.S. Coast Guard and its Future." U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding Naval Review 1982, 183-l97. Nelson, BM3 Kurt R. (USCG). "War and Peace: A New Look at the Coast Guard." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1993, 43-44. Orsini, Cdr Louis J. (USCG). "In Need of a Plan." U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding December 1991, 59-61. Stanley, HS2 Michael S. (USCG) . "The Real Coast Guard." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1993, 33-34. Stubbs, Bruce. "The Coast Guard's Dilemma," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings April 1987, 44-48. BIBLIOGRAPHY (con' t) PERIODICALS/ARTICLES (con't) Stubbs, Bruce. "A Defense Doctrine for the Coast Guard," Naval Institute Proceedings October 1989, 120- 122. Venzke, RADM Norman C. (USCG ret). "Should the Coast Guard Stay in the Icebreaking Business." Naval Institute Proceeding December 1992, 97-98. Watts, Lt R.B. (USCG). "Creating Deployable Harbor Defense." U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding December 1993, 45-47. Watts, Lt R.B. (USCG). "Let Us Not Forsake Military ." U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding December 1991, 55-58. Williams, Lt Norman W. (USCGR). USCG: "The Right Staff?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding December 1984, 145- 146. PAPERS Bjostad, Lcdr James. (USCG). Coast Guard Support of USSOUTHCOM Missions in Central America. Naval War College, Newport. February 1994. Cunningham, Capt B.G. CUSCG) and Saunders, Cdr N.T. (USCG). Regional Security in the Eastern Caribbean; Policy Direction and United States Coast Guard Involvement. Naval War College, Newport. March 1985. Kirkpatrick, Capt Kent (USCG). The Coast Guard and the Adaptive Planning Process. Naval War College, Newport. May 1992. Orsini, Cdr Louis J. (USCG). The Right Service for the Job - Security Assistance and the Coast Guard. Naval War College, Newport. May 1990. Sabol, Cdr Alber J. (USCG). An Overview of Maritime Defense Zones: A Coast Guard Perspective. Naval War College, Newport. March 1986. Stubbs, Cdr Bruce B. (USCG). A Coastal Warfare Capability for Regional Contingency Operations From Current Navy Coast Guard Assets. Naval War College, Newport. May 1991. Waterman, Cdr Ty. (USCG). Wanted: A Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard as an Instrument of National Security. Naval War College, Newport. February 1992. ANNEX A SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTION ONE Subject: TRADITIONAL ROLE OF COAST GUARD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PAST 1. Coast Guard involvement in major military conflicts in the past focused on the cutter fleet. At the end of World War II, the military capabilities of the cutter fleet serving during the war were parallel with similar type combatants of our sister service. Since World War II, the nature of war has changed significantly. As the complexity of war changed, the Navy's technology to wage war grew proportionately. For the Coast Guard, our afloat warfighting capabilities have grown in spurts. Recently, they have begun to diminish with the removal of various weapons system from some cutter classes. The limited role played by Coast Guard afloat units during Operations Desert Shield/Storm signaled a seemingly greater domestic role for our cutters. Major contributions were Squadron staffs/LEDETS/Reserve Port Security units. The Coast Guard's role under DOD control is vague. Considering the current world political/military environment, should we seek to continue designing and manning cutters based on an ability to assume the role of a naval combatant? QUESTION TWO Subject: ASSUMING THE LEAD IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) 2. The current DOD roles and mission study are hoping to better define the DOD services role in OOTW. Conventional warfare may be outdated. The Coast Guard has emerged as a front runner with our ability to conduct operations other than war. Should the Coast Guard push for a greater role in these types of operations in the future? QUESTION THREE Subject: EMPHASIS ON THE DRUG WAR 3. Operations with main emphasis on law enforcement have been hampered over the past three years because of migrant interdiction operations. Given that both drug trafficking and migrant flow are considered security concerns under the new Presidential security strategy, should the Coast Guard seek to focus attention back toward efforts in drug and general law enforcement arenas? Do you believe that an adequate balance among Coast Guard mission areas exists? QUESTION FOUR Subject: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY ASSETS AND OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OF COAST GUARD 4. Current organization of Coast Guard Headquarters, Area Staffs and Districts fail to place the Coast Guard operational elements that relate to Coast Guard security assets in a clear internal organization. Coast Guard Headquarters, Office of Law Enforcement and Defense Operational (G-O), which is the Coast Guard's traditional link to its role in national security affairs, controls only a small portion of operational mission assets. The new national security policy contains security concerns that parallel Coast Guard missions. Should the Coast Guard expand the responsibilities of the operations staff to possibly include the following: Readiness and Reserve, Marine Safety (port security/operations) and Environmental Protection and Navigation and Waterways Management?
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