Military

The Hunt For Adequate Protection: Ground-Based Air

Defense In the USMC

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

 

 

 

                                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

TITLE:             THE HUNT FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION:

                   GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE IN THE USMC

 

 

AUTHOR:            Major Mark A. King, USMC

 

 

PROBLEM:           Based on the current threat and what USMC GBAD has been and

currently is--what should it be in the near term? How can the USMC provide adequate

protection to its forces as part of Joint and Combined operations?

 

 

DISCUSSION:        This study reviews the neglected history of USMC ground-based

air defense, discusses the current threat, examines current USMC doctrine and that of its

sister services, outlines the options for the future, and ends with recommendations for the

future. Appendixes are used to describe the current US AD systems and their general

capabilities against the current threat. The focus is on doctrine and fighting Joint within

the realities of both the current threat and the current economic realities.

 

 

THESIS:     The USMC should give GBAD the appropriate focus in its doctrine by

organizing it under the operational function of PROTECTION. The USMC should keep

its Ground-Based Air Defense firepower, and integrate that firepower better into a truly

Joint air defense system by reducing and streamlining its redundant command and control

system.

 

                                   CONTENTS

 

 

SECTION                                                                                                               PAGE

 

I.   INTRODUCTION                                                                                           1

 

II.  HISTORICAL REVIEW                                                                                      4

 

III. THE THREAT-- 1995-2005                                                                                11

 

IV.  CURRENT USMC DOCTRINE                                                                     17

 

V.   CURRENT SISTER SERVICE DOCTRINE                                               19

 

VI.  OPTIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEDATIONS                           27

 

 

APPENDIXES

 

A.    THE BAILISTIC MISSILE THREAT                                                             39

 

B.    MAA 32 DEFICIENCIES                                                                                  40

 

C.    USMC MASTER PLAN-- ANTIAIR WARFARE                                           41

                         RECOMMENDATIONS

 

      CURRENT US AD WEAPONS AND C3 SYSTEMS                             42

 

E.    US AD SYSTEMS VS THE THREAT                                                              46

 

 

 

NOTES                                                                                                                  47

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                               53

 

                       THE HUNT FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION:

 

                    GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE IN THE USMC

 

 

 

                                I. INTRODUCTION

 

 

 

    "The use of aircraft in warfare will become of increasing importance as time goes on.

 

New developments and improvements will modify their tactical employment. Similarly,

 

the necessity for providing adequate protection against them becomes more and more

 

pressing."1 An officer wrote these words in 1933 as he was trying to ensure Marine

 

forces would have what they needed to defend advanced naval bases. How prophetic

 

those words proved to be eight years later at Pearl Harbor. The words are no less true

 

today than they were 62 years ago - let us make certain that we provide "adequate

 

protection against them."

 

    Today the hunt for adequate protection against air attack continues. USMC fighter

 

aircraft and ground-based air defenders are both under review in the current examination

 

of the roles, missions and functions of the armed forces of the United States of America.

 

The 1993 report on roles and missions by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff

 

General Colin Powell, stated that in the post Cold War world the US no longer needs the

 

redundancy of air defense capability which was necessary when the US faced the large and

 

sophisticated aircraft threat of the Soviet Union.2 The report went on to recommend that

 

a Joint commission analyze the entire spectrum of the current and near term Theater Air

 

Defense (TAD) requirements and develop a proposal.3

 

    It has been almost fifty years since an enemy air force attacked Marines.4 During my

 

entire career in the Marine Corps, the debate has raged over how much and what type of

 

air defense capability the Corps needs. A particular system often singled out for

 

elimination by Marine forces are the Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) missile units.

 

Within the past three years the scrutiny increased to the point that USMC HAWK was

 

only one decision away from elimination in its entirety.5 The USMC finally decided to

 

save one HAWK Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) battalion for the active duty

 

structure. The only other USMC ground-based air defense asset, the Low Altitude Air

 

Defense (LAAD) units, have fared better in this debate because of their comparatively low

 

cost, great utility, and constant visibility with the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU's).

 

    How did the USMC get to this point and does the USMC need its own organic air

 

defense capability? The purpose of this study is to examine this question without the bias

 

of any preconceived agenda either to save or to get rid of anything. The goal is to develop

 

a course of action that will provide the "adequate protection" that Marines will need in the

 

future.

 

    In this study I will use the following process to arrive at that goal: historical

 

background, threat description, current doctrinal solutions, and options for the future with

 

conclusions and recommendations. I will first review the historical setting of

 

Ground-Based Air Defense (GBAD) in the USMC. I will then provide an overview of the

 

threat facing the USMC forces. I will go on to describe the current USMC doctrinal

 

solution to this threat and then outline the doctrinal solutions of our sister services. I

 

will provide a brief description of the weapon systems and command and control

 

mechanisms which each service is currently using to provide their solution. Lastly, I will

 

define and analyze the options for the future, and then provide a conclusion and

 

recommendations for the future of ground-based air defense in the Marine Corps.

 

    Before starting the historical review, it is essential to understand the basic parameters

 

of this quest. First, I will focus the study on the next ten years--1995-2005. This is

 

important because the task becomes increasingly difficult and speculative beyond that

 

point. Beyond ten years it is very hard to clearly define how the threat will evolve and to

 

accurately predict how technological solutions will grow. Second, I will concentrate on a

 

study of concepts and missions rather than technology. Technology is certainly very

 

important, and the study will discuss its impact; but the process by which the USMC

 

chooses to solve the problem is my focus. Third, the USMC has limited resources to

 

provide the solution. The USMC does not have the resources of the Cold War era

 

available under the Reagan mandate; therefore, it must base the solutions on cost

 

effectiveness and hard nosed practicality. Consequently, USMC must eliminate

 

nice-to-have redundancy and potentially low risk capabilities. Finally, the study will

 

consciously try to focus on ground-based air defense, but we must realize that aircraft and

 

command and control are a large part of both the problem and the solution.

 

                             II. HISTORICAL REVIEW

 

 

 

    There is no official history of ground-based air defense in the United States Marine

 

Corps. Written histories exist on other ground units, air units and most every type of unit,

 

but not on the overall history of ground-based air defense units. Specific ground-based air

 

defense unit histories and command chronologies exist, but there is no comprehensive

 

written work dealing with the entire topic. The most famous USMC ground-based air

 

defense units, the Defense Battalions of World War II, will soon have a history published.6

 

Probably the most famous historical book about ground-based air defense is Ack, Ack by

 

Sir Frederick Pile about the British antiaircraft efforts during the Battle of Britain.7 Most

 

surprising is the fact that there appears to be only one comprehensive work which deals

 

with the history of US ground-based air defense at all - a small book (183 pages)

 

published by a former Air Force officer, Dr. Werrell, in 1988; Archie, Flak, AAA and

 

SAM a Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense.8

 

    Why the USMC has never written a ground-based air defense history is an

 

interesting question - Dr. Werrell devotes a paragraph to why there is so little written

 

about US ground-based air defense in his preface.9 Dr. Werrell maintains this neglect is

 

for the following reasons: research is difficult and source material is fragmented; the topic

 

does not have "sea appeal" which aircraft or offensive weapons have. Offensive use of air

 

has been the focus of US experience, and the air offensive community has had the ear of

 

both Congress and industry. Many agree strongly with Dr. Werrell's observation that

 

because the US has had air superiority so much of the time that the US leadership takes air

 

superiority for granted.10 Whatever the reasons, the lack of a written history is still a poor

 

reflection on the community as a whole.

 

    The Marine Corps' history of defending its forces against aircraft began during World

 

War I when the new technology called airplanes first attacked Marines. Like everyone

 

else, the Marines' first antiaircraft weapons were the same weapons they used against the

 

enemy on the ground - small arms and machine guns. Initially the gunners would simply

 

aim the weapons skyward. As the war continued, increased air attacks fostered early

 

forms of specific antiaircraft weapons: machine-guns on antiaircraft mounts, and artillery

 

set up specifically for antiaircraft defense.11

 

    During the interwar period, as the technology of aircraft developed, so did the early

 

techniques of how to defend Marine Expeditionary Forces against such air attacks.12 The

 

services designed and developed antiaircraft machine-guns further and, most importantly,

 

antiaircraft artillery.13 The USMC also develop specific antiaircraft units during this

 

period known as Defense Battalions.14 Their mission was twofold: to defend the

 

advanced naval bases against ships and against air attack. The weapons used by the

 

defense battalion were twelve --90mm AA Guns, eight--4Omm Cannons, 20mm Guns, and

 

50 Cal antiaircraft machine guns. They had searchlights and the SCR 270 radar.15

 

    During World War II these defense battalions saw extensive combat in the Pacific

 

theater. Wake Island, Guam and Guadalcanal were three of their most famous actions.

 

Their defense of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal played an important role in winning that

 

crucial battle.16 As the war went on, radar and sophisticated flak were to play increasingly

 

important roles, and by the end of the war antiaircraft artillery had become very effective

 

because of further development of these two technologies. A little known fact is that

 

during World War II ground-based air defense killed more aircraft than fighter aircraft.17

 

Although fratricide was a problem for all air defenders during World War II, the USMC

 

only lost three aircraft to friendly AA fire.18

 

    In the Korean war USMC ground-based air defense units, including 1st Antiaircraft

 

Artillery Battalion from Camp Pendleton, California, served in support of the First Marine

 

Division and the First Marine Air Wing. The North Korean air force never challenged the

 

United Nations' air superiority in the south and the antiaircraft (AA) units used their

 

secondary role as effective direct fire weapons against enemy ground forces.19 These

 

antiaircraft artillery units consisted of 90 mm Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) gun

 

battalions, 75 mm AAA gun battalions, AAA Automatic Weapons (AW) self-propelled

 

battalions, and AAA Automatic Weapons (AW) battalions.20

 

    Between Korea and Vietnam the development of surface-to-air missiles brought a

 

tremendous change in both the technology and organization of ground-based air defense in

 

the USMC. The USMC's first surface-to-air missile was the Terrier (operational in the

 

Navy in 1956), and the unit to which it belonged became known as the Medium

 

Antiaircraft Missile battalion.21 In 1958, this unit replaced the light antiaircraft artillery

 

battalion which consisted of quad 50 cal machine-guns mounted on half-tracks, and twin

 

40mm AA guns mounted on tank chassis.22

 

    Before the Terrier was even three years old, the USMC replaced it with the HAWK

 

missile system which the Raytheon company develop in the late 1950's. The USMC

 

renamed the newly equipped units the Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalions.23 Since 1960

 

this HAWK weapon system has been the centerpiece of USMC integrated air defense.

 

    Around 1960 air defense battalions began the transition from ground combat units to

 

Marine Aviation units.24 The USMC integrated them into the developing Marine Air

 

Command and Control System (MACCS) consisting of units tasked with the aviation

 

command and control mission: the Marine Aircraft Control Groups. The purpose of

 

moving ground-based air defense units under Marine aviation was to integrate the entire

 

air defense effort under the wing - fighters and surface-to-air missiles with the MACCS as

 

the agency in charge of the overall air defense effort. Prophetically, in 1957 an officer at

 

the Junior School had written a research paper which recommended this move of the

 

heavy antiaircraft artillery units to force aviation. 25 Another reason that this transfer took

 

place was the fact that USMC leadership saw defense of air bases as the primary mission

 

for these air defense units.

 

    In 1962 the USMC deployed LAAM Battalion units to South Florida during the

 

Cuban missile crisis. After the crisis passed, 3d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion did not

 

return to Marine Corps Base at Twenty-nine Palms, California. Instead, it went to Cherry

 

Point, North Carolina, where it was to spend the next 34 years serving the USMC as part

 

of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing. 26

 

    In 1965 Battery A, 1st LAAM Battalion deployed to South Vietnam to protect the

 

Da Nang air field.27 ft was the first USMC ground unit to deploy to South Vietnam.

 

North Vietnam never challenged US air superiority in the south and the LAAM units

 

re-deployed home in 1969-70. Although USMC ground-based air defense units never

 

fired in anger during their time in Vietnam, HAWK units did have a deterrent effect on the

 

North Vietnamese decision not to attack the US forces in South Vietnam with their

 

aircraft. Surface-to-air missiles did kill three North Vietnamese MIG's -- all credited to

 

ships of the US Navy. 28

 

    During the Vietnam period a new weapon became operational. It was the heat

 

seeking, shoulder-fired, man portable Redeye missile.29 With the addition of this new

 

short range air defense weapon for forward areas and low altitude, the USMC had

 

established the basic pieces for integrated air defense: Fighters, HAWK, and shoulder-

 

fired missiles. This triad has remained the foundation of USMC ground-based air defense

 

to the present. From 1966 to 1995 this basic air defense system has remained: Light

 

Antiaircraft Missile Battalions with HAWK; Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) units

 

w/Redeye missile systems and later Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions with Stinger; and

 

fighter squadrons with F-4's and now F/A-18's.

 

    Since the Redeye Antiaircraft units moved from the Marine Division to the Marine

 

Aircraft Wing in 1969, the Marine Divisions have had no organic air defense weapons.30

 

Because of this and the fact that Marine Divisions have not come under air attack --

 

generations of Marines have not even thought about air attack. Air superiority has

 

become an assumption - one that I called a dangerous assumption in a 1989 article in the

 

U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.31

 

    The HAWK system has gone through four phases of improvement since its

 

fielding in 1960. During the late 1960's Raytheon fielded Improved HAWK (called

 

I-HAWK) with the primary improvement being the missile as a certified ammunition round

 

and a computer capability called the Automatic Data Processor (ADP). Raytheon then

 

went on to upgrade HAWK with the first of three Product Improvement Phases (PIP's).

 

The first (PIP I) came in 1979 and included improvements to the acquisition radars and,

 

for the first time, a data link capability called the Army Tactical Data Link (ATDL). In

 

1983 Raytheon fielded the PIP II which included major improvements to the illumination

 

radars, ADP capability and a new system which allowed for visual tracking of targets

 

called the Tracking Adjunct System (TAS). PIP III started its fielding immediately prior

 

to the Gulf War. It brought a complete digitalization of the system, significant

 

improvements in maintenance reliability and better tactical mobility.32

 

    The USMC fielded the Redeye missile system in 1966 and later replaced it with

 

Stinger in 1982. The USMC adopted the Stinger RMP (Reprogrammable

 

Microprocessor) in 1989.33  In 1994 the USMC began fielding the AVENGER weapon

 

system which has eight ready to fire Stinger rounds, a .50 caliber machine gun, and a

 

Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR).

 

    Since 1982 a Low Altitude Air Defense platoon (minus) has supported all Marine

 

Expeditionary Units (MEUs), earlier called Marine Amphibious Units. These are the most

 

forward deployed and visible of all the USMC ground-based air defense units and have

 

served in every MEU (SOC) operation from Beirut in 1983 to Somalia in 1994.

 

    During the Gulf War the USMC deployed all active duty LAAM and LAAD

 

battalions as well as elements of both reserve battalions. They served in general and direct

 

support of I MEF units from Bahrain to Kuwait City and all amphibious forces from the

 

Mediterranean to the Arabian Gulf.  As with the Korean and Vietnam wars, no enemy

 

aircraft attacked US ground forces, but unlike the Korean and Vietnam wars, the enemy

 

utilized a new threat to attack US ground forces: tactical ballistic missiles.

 

    Since the Gulf War the USMC GBAD units have been the subject of continuing

 

deactivation and reductions. At present there is only one active duty LAAM Battalion,

 

located at Yuma, Arizona; two active duty LAAD Battalions, located at Camp Pendleton

 

and Cherry Point, and one Stinger Battery located in Okinawa, Japan. The reserves have

 

one LAAM Battalion and one LAAD Battalion located throughout the United States.

 

 

 

    SUMMARY OF USMC GBAD HISTORY

 

    All the USMC ground-based air defense aircraft kills came in the forty-five years

 

(1915-1960) while it was antiaircraft artillery organized with the ground combat units.

 

During the past thirty-five years (1960-1995) the USMC surface-to-air missile units have

 

killed no hostile aircraft while organized within Marine Corps aviation command and

 

control. This does not mean that the GBAD units of the past 35 years have been less

 

effective or professional than their predecessors; they have just had no enemy targets to