The
Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982: A Case Study And Lessons
For
The United States Today.
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - History
The Falkland Islands
Campaign of 1982:
A Case Study and
Lessons For The
United States Today
LCDR Andrew A. King
Executive
Summary
Title:
The Falklands Campaign of 1982: A Case Study and Lessons for the United States
Today.
Author:
Lieutenant Commander Andrew A. King, United States Navy
Thesis:
Cutbacks and reductions in defense spending under consideration will inhibit
the
Armed
Forces' ability to conduct sustained combat operations overseas of the type
envisioned
by the authors of "...From the Sea."
Background:
This paper is a case study of the campaign mounted by Great Britain to
retake
the Falkland Islands from Argentina in 1982. A number of deficiencies in the
British
forces participating in the campaign were the result of decisions made to
reduce
defense
spending in the 1960's and 1970's. These reductions were the result of a
prolonged
debate undertaken by the government on Britain's role in the world and her
need
for an expensive navy. By April 1982, the Royal Navy was preparing to retire
both
aircraft
carriers and had slashed spending on shipbuilding programs. The timing of the
invasion
was nearly disastrous, and the outcome was by no means certain until the final
days
of the land campaign on East Falkland. This campaign serves as an excellent
model
for
the kind of campaign envisioned by the authors of "...From the Sea,"
particularly as
we
debate the same kinds of questions in this country today that were debated
across the
Atlantic
more than twenty years ago.
Recommendation:
The United States should use the Falklands War as a model in
determining
its ability to conduct sustained combat operations overseas, on short notice,
according
to the concepts espoused by "...From the Sea."
Table of Contents
Executive
Summary ii
Outline
iv
An
Unexpected War 1
Historical
Origins 3
The
Campaign 9
An
Analysis 47
Some
Important Lessons for the United States 60
Endnotes 69
Acknowledgements
70
Bibliography
71
Map
of the Falkland Islands 73
The Falkland Islands
Campaign of 1982:
A Case Study and Lessons For The
United States Today
Outline
Thesis
Statement: Cutbacks and reductions in defense spending under consideration will
inhibit
the Armed Forces' ability to conduct sustained combat operations overseas of
the
type
envisioned by the authors of "...From the Sea."
I.
Great Britain found herself in an unexpected war for which she was ill-
prepared.
A. Defense cuts had reduced the Royal Navy's ability to project
power
overseas.
B. The British Armed Forces were oriented towards a conflict with
the
Warsaw Pact on and near the
European continent.
II.
The history of the Argentinian dispute with Great Britain over the
Falkland Islands goes back some
200 years.
A. The islands were discovered by the British.
B. The islands were visited and claimed by three nations.
C. Britain, France, and
Spain all established settlements in the islands.
D. The British seize control of the islands by force in 1833.
E. Argentina continued to claim sovereignty over the islands.
F. The United Nations directed Argentina and Great Britain to
negotiate an end to their
dispute.
G. Argentina, seeing no progress in negotiations, invaded the
islands
and seized them by force.
III.
The Case Study: Great Britain conducted a campaign to recapture the
Falkland Islands.
A. Great Britain dispatched a task force to the South Atlantic to
recapture the islands.
1. Great Britain mobilized its merchant fleet for the war effort.
2. RADM Woodward was appointed task force commander.
B. Argentina enjoyed a number of advantages, but the Royal Navy's
early deployment of its
submarine force leveled the playing field.
C. South Georgia was recaptured on 25 April.
D. Argentina dispatched its fleet to engage the approaching task
force.
1. The Argentine Navy attempted a coordinated attack against
the British carriers,
but was unable to execute it.
2. HMS Conqueror found one of the Argentine surface action
groups and sank ARA
General Belgrano.
3. As the Argentine fleet retired, the Argentine Air Force
attacked and sank HMS
Sheffield to recover the Navy's
honor and attempt a
crippling blow to the carriers.
E. The British task force prepared for an amphibious assault on
East
Falkland.
F. The landing force arrived and proceeded to assault the San
Carlos
area. After five days, the beachhead was secure,
and most
equipment and all of the men
were ashore.
1. A number of pre-assault operations were undertaken to
facilitate the
invasion.
2. The landings were marred by Argentine air attacks.
3. RMS Atlantic Conveyor was sunk, taking supplies and aircraft
with it to the bottom.
G. 3 Commando Brigade conducted a rapid eastward advance to invest
Port Stanley.
1. 3 Para recaptured Teal Inlet.
2. 2 Para recaptured Darwin and Goose Green following a two
day battle.
H. Reinforced by 5 Brigade, the land forces recaptured Port
Stanley on
14 June.
IV.
The British campaign was handicapped by a number of disadvantages.
A. Command and control was complex and difficult at times.
1. Some control over the task force was exercised from
London.
2. RADM Woodward was encumbered by his inability to
direct the Royal
Navy's submarines operating in theater.
3. Communications were a problem for volume and
compromising
operational security.
B. Intelligence was lacking at the start of the campaign.
C. The lack of airborne early warning led to the loss of several
ships.
D. The logistic supply line was long and vulnerable, but the
British
made it work.
E. The asymmetry of forces and technology favored Great Britain.
V.
There are a number of important lessons for the United States in this
campaign, particularly with our
new focus on littoral warfare.
An Unexpected
War
At the end of March 1982, Great Britain
suddenly and unexpectedly found herself
preparing
to fight a war 8000 miles away, in a remote area of the South Atlantic Ocean
more
than 4000 miles from her nearest outpost off the coast of West Africa.
Unprepared
for
war so far away and unable to defend the islands, she could only watch
helplessly as
a
middleweight continental power began deploying forces for an invasion that no
one
could
have predicted. From the outset, there was only was possible answer: deploy
forces
to
recapture the islands and restore the rule of law.
The timing was nearly catastrophic;
defense cuts had drastically reduced the Royal
Navy's
ability to project power across an adversary's shores. Defense planners in the
1970's
had invested their dwindling resources in a navy that would operate as part of
a
larger
NATO force to defend the North Atlantic and European continent against a
Soviet/Warsaw
Pact invasion. With British foreign interests narrowing in the wake of
rapid
decolonialization, politicians could no longer justify a huge navy, and were
not
prepared
to finance one in the austere financial climate the nation then faced.
By 1981, Britain's last two aircraft
carriers were slated for decommissioning. The
surface
combattant force had a distinct orientation toward antisubmarine warfare, and
the
naval
air arm's only carrier-based fixed-wing air asset was the Sea Harrier.* Fleet
air
______________________________
*With
the decision to eliminate the carriers, the Royal Navy had no need of other
kinds of aircraft.
defense
and amphibious projection were predicated on the assumption that any future
conflict
would occur within range of support from allied fleet carriers or shore-based
aircraft,
and that the Royal Air Force would provide those services formerly rendered by
a
carrier air wing. The Royal Navy thus
had no organic airborne early warning
capability,
and Sea Harrier pilots had only minimal training in air to air combat.*
Although the Argentine dispute with
Great Britain over the Falkland Islands was
nearly
150 years old, no blood had been shed over the islands' sovereignty in that
time,
and
negotiations mandated by a U.N. resolution had been in progress for more than a
quarter
century by 1982. Periodic bombast and rhetoric from Buenos Aires were
common,
so the distant rumblings that began early that year were not recognized as
being
indicative
of Argentine intentions. Indeed, the first indications that an invasion was
probable
didn't materialize until just days before Argentine forces began deploying into
the
South Atlantic. By then, it was too late to deter the invasion, and Britain
could only
begin
making preparations for a campaign to recapture her colony.
___________________________
*In 1981, the Sea Harrier's primary mission was
to intercept and destroy long range Soviet bombers with short range
missiles.
Its secondary mission was sea surveillance and reconnaissance. The airplane had
a limited capability against ground
targets
and surface combatants: the loft delivery of 1000 lb bombs. Since no money was
available to modify the planes for smaller
bombs,
pilots were not trained to perform close air support. Air combat maneuvering
was not an intended mission either, since
long
range Soviet bombers over the North Atlantic would have to operate beyond the
range of fighter protection. That
assessment
was revisited in the summer after two U.S. Navy F-14's shot down two Libyan
SU-22's over the Gulf of Sidra. Pilots
began
training for air-to-air combat shortly thereafter, but by the time of the
invasion, only a handful had completed training.
Of
note is that of the 25 pilots deploying with the task force in April, only
eight were night qualified.
Historical
Origins
The dispute over the legal ownership of
the Falkland Islands has its origins in the
era
of European exploration and colonialism. First discovered in 1690 by a British
sea
captain,
the islands were visited, claimed, and briefly occupied at various times over
the
next
century by the British, Spanish, and French. None of the early expeditions to
the
islands
led to a permanent settlement, and it appears that most visitors were only too
happy
to leave the cold, wind-swept rocks.
The French established a settlement on
East Falkland in 1764, naming it Port
Louis
after King Louis XV, while a British colony was established on West Falkland at
Port
Egmont in 1765. Neither settlement was aware of the other's existence for more
than
a year, but the inevitable discovery initiated a chain of events which led to
Great
Britain's
first Falklands crisis. Both the British and French governments asserted their
claims
to sovereignty over the territory and issued demands for the other to withdraw
its
settlement.
Spain, apparently unaware of any
settlement in the Falklands, was furious when
she
learned of the Anglo-French dispute and demanded that both parties leave the
islands.
The
Spanish reminded the French government that in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713),
France
had formally repudiated all but then established claims in South America.* The
_________________
*French Guiana and some islands in the
Caribbean Sea.
French
were in no mood to go to war with Spain, who was then an ally, and King Louis
XV
was persuaded to cede the French claim to Spain in 1767 in exchange for
financial
compensation.
That matter settled, Port Louis was turned over to the Spanish and
renamed
Puerto Soledad. A Spanish expedition from Buenos Aires was dispatched two
years
later to forcibly remove the British from Port Egmont.
The British government responded to this
crisis by commencing a round of
diplomatic
talks with Spain. Despite threats made by both nations, neither was really
anxious
to go to war over the distant islands. The crisis was resolved by a secret
agreement
that apparently permitted a British expedition to return to Port Egmont
without
opposition, provided that the expedition would not remain there permanently.*
A
British expedition duly arrived in 1790, raised the Union Jack, and remained
for three
years
before returning home. On departing, the expedition left behind a plaque
declaring
that
the islands were the sole property of King George III. Great Britain and Spain
thus
appear
to have diffused the crisis without going to war or formally conceding their
respective
claims.
East Falkland remained occupied by a
Spanish garrison until 1810, when events
in
South America compelled Spain to recognize the independence of the emerging
nations
there
and to withdraw her forces. With the Spanish gone, the islands were left
without
__________________
*The exact terms of the agreement are lost to history.
Its terms have been the subject of much speculation, and are
at
the heart of contemporary Argentine claims.
government,
and became a shelter used by whaling vessels to escape South Atlantic
storms.
Argentina made her first formal claim to the islands in 1820, arguing that they
were
an integral part of her Spanish paternity, inherited by the new nation upon
independence.
A provincial governor was duly appointed and a garrison established
A British task force of two frigates
arrived in January 1833 to reassert British
sovereignty
over the islands following a brief action between the United States and
Argentina
there. (The Argentine governor had seized two American fishing vessels for
illegally
catching seals off the islands. A nearby American frigate retaliated a few
weeks
later
by destroying most of the settlement and spiking the Argentine guns.) Surprised
and
without
means of defense, the Argentine garrison was forced to lower its flag and
return
to
Argentina.
Argentina never forgot the humiliation
she experienced at the hands of the Royal
Navy,
and generations of Argentians were subsequently raised to believe that the
islands
were
under the military occupation of a foreign power. An aggrieved Argentina
declared
that
the islands would again be Argentine one day.
The dispute continued, unnoticed by the
world, for more than a century. For
much
of that time, the Argentine government made periodic official statements to
indicate
that it still considered the islands a national territory. For their part, the
British
remained,
and the islands were administered as a crown colony. Meanwhile, colonists
arrived
and settled in the islands, establishing permanent homes and new settlements.
Over
the years their descendants, themselves natives of the islands, gradually
acquired
their
own identity, becoming Falkland Islanders even as they chose to remain British
subjects.
The dispute surfaced again in 1964, when
Argentina demanded that the United
Nations
order the islands decolonized. The U.N. considered the issues, and in 1965
directed
both nations to negotiate the sovereignty issue. Great Britain and Argentina
complied,
and conducted regular negotiations with little progress for nearly seventeen
years.
The islanders, understandably, insisted on their right of self determination
and
were
firm in their desires to remain British. The Argentines, in turn, rejected the
British
government's
recognition of the islanders' rights and demanded the unconditional return
of
the territory. No compromise was forthcoming from either side.
In December 1981, General Roberto Viola
stepped down as president of Argentina
for
reasons of failing health. General Leopoldo Galtieri, already a member of the
ruling
military
junta, replaced him as president. Ascending to the presidency, however,
required
the
support of Admiral Jorge Anaya, the commander in chief of the navy. Admiral
Anaya
was a fanatic nationalist, and he made his support for General Galtieri
conditional
on
a pledge that he would support a move to "recover" the Falklands.
General Galtieri
agreed
and decided that for symbolism, the "repatriation" should occur prior
to the 150th
anniversary
of the Argentine expulsion, then a little more than a year hence. In a speech
he
gave shortly after taking office, he declared that 1982 would be "the Year
of the
Malvinas."
Faced with numerous social and economic problems at home, it is likely that
the
junta viewed the military adventure as a means of diverting public attention and
capitalizing
on the intense nationalism surrounding the dispute.
Matters came to a head in February 1982
with a new round of talks in New York,
the
first to take place following the installation of the new president in Buenos
Aires. As
before,
the two nations' positions remained incompatible, and the talks amounted to
little
more
than a formal exercise of diplomacy. The foreign minister's reaction to the
continuing
impasse was a public declaration that if negotiations could not produce the
desired
result, Argentina reserved the right to employ "other means" to
resolve the
dispute.
The final crisis began when scrap
dealers were landed on South Georgia on 19
March
1982 by the Argentine Navy for the purpose of dismantling an old whaling
station,
long in disuse. The landings were made
without the permission of the
immigration
authority in Grytviken, the settlement that served as the dependency's
"capital."
Once ashore, their first action was to raise the Argentine flag and sing their
national
anthem. Annoyed by their activity, the British dispatched HMS Endurance, an
Antarctic
survey vessel with marines embarked, to remove the scrap dealers.
The dispatch of HMS Endurance placed the
Argentine junta in a difficult position.