The Selling Of Military Operations Other Than War CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: THE SELLING OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR Author: Major James F. Jamison, United States Marine Corps Problem: Military Operations Other Than War can take years to accomplish. The support of the American people is key to their successful completion. In the past, the selling of those operations to the public, particularly the effort at the national level, has been inadequate. Discussion: Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are an integral part of our national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Unlike war, MOOTW rarely generates the national will required to stay engaged in the expenditure of human and monetary resources. The American people have the power to grant patience and persistence to U.S. military forces, who are often the major players in providing presence in the MOOTW area of operations. Today's post-Cold War domestic marketing environment is characterized by pragmatic rather than ideological priorities. At the national level, poor presentation of the cost-to-benefit ratio has resulted in the public's lukewarm embrace of MOOTW. This paper analyzes the obstacles that must be overcome to sell MOOTW to the American people. It then presents techniques, borrowed from the commercial advertising and mass communications worlds, required to advertise MOOTW to the American people--to convince them of MOOTW's positive cost-to-benefit ratio. An analysis of failures and successes in the employment of the above techniques, as seen in Somalia and Haiti operations, is included. Finally, this paper examines the integration of advertising techniques in a strategic framework called "advertising-based public relations." Key to this concept is the critical link between strategic, operational, and tactical public relations efforts. What is "advertised" at the national level must be reflected by the actions and words of those forces actually executing the MOOTW. Thesis: Advertising-based public relations campaigns, successfully employed at the national level, are critical to the success of future Military Operations Other Than War. The American people are the final judges of the United States' MOOTW engagement. In the future, public relations efforts must be greater and more consistent than in the past if the American people are going to allow continued employment of MOOTW as part of our national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. CONTENTS Chapter Page 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. PUBLIC OPINION AS AN ENABLER 4 If Its Not War, What Is It? 6 Advertising-based Public Relations For MOOTW, 8 Public Relations Is Not Propaganda--A Disclaimer, 11 The Three P's, 12 The Buck (and Ad) Stops Here, 14 3. MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ARE HARD TO SELL 18 The Lost Specter of the Soviet Union, 18 Where's the Beef?, 19 535 Secretaries of MOOTW, 21 A Quagmire From Which Even The Operators Shy, 23 All Is Not Lost, 24 Overcome The Hurdles of Mass Communication, 25 Attract Attention, 25 Public Acceptance, 26 A Rose By Any Other Name, 27 Interpreted and Stored For Later Use, 28 4. MOOTW PUBLIC RELATIONS PRINCIPLES 30 Strategic Approach to Public Relations, 30 The Government Does Advertise, 33 Advertising Is Part of American Life, 35 Advertising-based Public Relations Techniques, 38 Find the Need and Fill It, 38 Positioning the Operation Positively, 42 Create the Right Image, 46 Be Sensitive to Your Audience, 50 Spread Your Story First, 52 Know The Product, 54 Clear Message By The Right Spokesperson, 55 Not All Operations Other Than War Can Be Sold, 58 Vacillation Blurs The Message, 60 1,2,3,4, What The Hell Are We MOOTW-ing For? 61 5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOOTW PUBLIC RELATIONS 64 Recommendations For Strategic Public Relations, 65 Reorganization, 66 Undersecretary of State For Public Diplomacy, 67 Director Of Public Diplomacy And information, 68 Crafting Successful Advertising-based Public Relations Campaigns, 70 Recommendations For Operational Public Relations, 71 Public Relations In A Crisis, 73 Train The Troops, 75 MOOTW And The Media, 77 Wargame Public Relations For OOTW, 78 Future MOOTW Communications, 79 Rules Of Engagement, 79 Information Superhighway, 80 The Military's CNN, 81 6. CONCLUSION 82 Bibliography 92 THE SELLING OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR If I were starting my life over again, I am inclined to think I would go into the advertising business in preference to almost any other. Franklin D. Roosevelt CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) have become a major tool used to support the United States' National Security Strategy (NSS). Increasingly more important, and certainly more visible, MOOTW is specifically addressed in the 1994 NSS of Engagement and Enlargement. In the preface to that document, President Bill Clinton states, "our nation can only address this era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively involved in global affairs."1 To engage the world with our military in operations other than war, the government must achieve the support of the American people. The United States can only sustain the necessary commitment to "our active engagement abroad," as President Clinton makes clear, "with the broad, bi-partisan support of the American people...."2 Unfortunately, the government has not been consistently successful at this endeavor. At the national level particularly, there seems to be a lack of a strategic approach to public relations that would ensure "the patient application of American will."3 The uncertainty of the "new world order" and the public's increased access to instant, powerful communication mediums have further complicated the problem of convincing the American people to support MOOTW involvement. The less than adequate effort at convincing the people of MOOTW's positive cost/benefit ratio has had a negative effect on the long term success of past operations. It will continue to cast a shadow over the future MOOTW unless we find a solution to this dilemma. The power of advertising techniques applied within the framework of a strategic-to-operational public relations plan may be part of the solution. What is referred to in this paper as "advertising-based public relations" borrows effective methods from the commercial advertising world and marries them to the strategic and operational public affairs considerations necessary to garner the people's support for MOOTW. This paper investigates the importance of, and approaches to, MOOTW public relations as they relate to the American people's acceptance of those operations. Chapter Two examines the context in which MOOTW fits today and points to the importance of effectively advertising those operations to the American people. Additionally, the definitions of MOOTW and advertising-based public relations are presented. Chapter Three addresses the difficulties encountered when trying to convince the people that MOOTW is something they should embrace. Chapter Four then investigates the techniques of advertising-based public relations and points to examples of failures and successes in the "selling" of MOOTW that illustrate those methods. To this end, operations in Somalia and Haiti provide many current and relevant examples. Finally, Chapter Five details, with an eye to future improvement, some strategic, operational, and tactical considerations of advertising- based public relations. The concepts presented here have application for a broad swath of military officers- - for commanders and staff officers alike. Understanding the importance of public opinion, as influenced by advertising-based public relations, will be "critical to the success" of future MOOTW.4 CHAPTER 2 PUBLIC OPINION AS AN ENABLER The success of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) depends largely upon the interest and resolve of the people. Karl von Clausewitz gave us the concept of a trinity (government, army and people), whose variable energies, unpredictable interests and capricious priorities often move politics along the horizontal continuum to war. Somewhere along that line exist Military Operations Other Than War. MOOTW employ the military as an instrument of operational diplomacy that is short of limited war. It is during the juxtaposition of military operations in an endeavor innocuously titled "other than war" that the people part of the trinity takes on even more influence than it has in "real" war.5 There is an enabling force, in the absence of war, that can bolster the elusive will of the American people. Given the significance of "will," a successful "public relations" strategy may be a prerequisite for the United States government to employ military forces for the period of time sufficient to accomplish a MOOTW. Specifically, advertising-based public relations, when exercised with integrity and finesse, has a galvanizing effect on public opinion. Conversely, as is most commonly the case, ignoring this critical facet of selling MOOTW on the national level can result in failure regardless of the inherent value or national interest of that operation. Public opinion, in large part, is the score keeper of the success or failure for all military applications in a society such as ours. Therefore, public relations is an essential function performed at the national level to ensure the American people sanction the use of military forces for MOOTW. Unfortunately, appreciation of this thesis is not always enjoyed by those leading and serving in the U.S. government. The "great drama" of war that Jomini saw as a stage for heroes does not exist in MOOTW.6 The emotions evoked by war are not stirred in the American people by MOOTW and thus other, more pragmatic, views dominate. War tends to solidify the people with anger and hostile rage. MOOTW, while occasionally capable of arousing similar emotions, is more likely to elicit sympathy, pity or compassion. The speed of communications--with their near-universal reach--has brought to the people raw information they use to form opinions more quickly than before. These two together, as John Keegan observed, have resulted in "the popular will, often little more than a formulation of popular sentiment under the influence of television," becoming "the most potent of pressures on policy."7 Popular will is the force that allows leaders to dictate international affairs with confidence and soldiers to deploy with the hopes of a homecoming parade. Victory, by the traditional definition of war, is not achievable in MOOTW. The American way of war has the expectation of victory in unconditional terms by overwhelming force.8 General U.S. Grant typified this approach in 1862 when he sent word to Major General S. B. Buckner, CSA, in Fort Donelson: "No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."9 War provides the promise of satisfaction. MOOTW will yield, even at their most successful, only stabilization, settlement, evacuation or neutralization. In short, MOOTW are exactly that--other than war. MOOTW often share the mortal danger of war without enjoying its potential for glory. If It's Not War, What Is It? A label that has a negative as its root is suspect. "Other than War" leaves a reader with myriad definition choices. MOOTW as a label however, does nothing more than tell the reader what it is not. For the purposes of this paper, the following definition, drawn from Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, is appropriate: Operations other than war (MOOTW) may be of short duration or extremely protracted. These operations may require years to achieve the desired effects. The underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. In MOOTW, other government agencies will often have the lead. Operational commanders may find themselves operating under restrictive rules of engagement. MOOTW will not always be peaceful actions. However, overwhelming force may complicate the process toward the mission's objective. The principles that guide MOOTW are: objective, unity of command, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. MOOTW include, but are not limited to, a long list of activities: noncombatant evacuations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combatting terrorism, support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids. President George Bush referred to the above list as "our most active threat for the remainder of this century."10 It may well be the most active threat, but it is not the most easily identifiable one. In large part, the difficulty in successfully devising an advertising-based, public relations campaign for MOOTW may lie in the vagueness of its operational definition and the cloudiness of the threat. The wide range of stated and implied tasks required to accomplish myriad missions that may be short or long, peaceful or confrontational, complex or simple, sudden or well-planned, have tended to confuse the issue. It is the job of advertising-based public relations to alleviate the American people's confusion over MOOTW. Advertising-based Public Relations for MOOTW Public relations is "the attempt, by information, persuasion, and adjustment, to engineer public support for an activity, cause movement, or institution."11 Its activities should be planned and executed by trained professionals based on both scientific principles and the social priorities of the age. A dispassionate approach, similar to that of the engineer solving physical science dilemmas, characterize the most successful public relation campaigns.12 Americans have been inundated with commercial advertising for years.13 It has permeated almost all aspects of life: roadside billboards, direct mailings that clog the post box, unsolicited FAX advertisements, flyers placed under windshield wipers, 30-second TV commercials that cost more to produce than the show they sponsor, the popular soda can that briefly appears in a feature film star's hand and info-mercials that cross the line between entertainment and advertising. These are but a few examples. To reach the public through this advertising cacophony, MOOTW messages must be framed in imaginative vehicles and distributed by efficient media. What is required to educate and inform the public is so much more than just traditional military public affairs. Public relations is not public affairs. The definition of the two is separated by one key element--advertising. The field of public affairs in its military definition has no bias or interest in attitude adjustment or persuasion; and, it is oriented on the media. The media frame the message, edit it and deliver it. Public relations for MOOTW, on the other hand, should use advertising to compete for the ear of the American people--it is oriented on the people. While the media may still deliver the message, it has been initiated, framed and edited by those who direct and conduct the MOOTW. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in his first statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, struck to the heart of this concept: I think we have a responsibility to try to define our foreign policy to the American people and to define America's role in the new world. I intend to travel around the country to explain our foreign policy initiatives and seek the support of the American people.14 Rosser Reeves, a respected American advertising man, referred to advertising as "the act of moving an idea from the head of one man into the head of another."15 According to Eric Clark, author of The Want Makers, advertising combines "the passion of Patton with the cunning of Rommel."16 Unlike propaganda, however, advertising is something the public is comfortable with. The American Heritage Dictionary defines advertising as "the action of attracting public attention to a product or business."17 The 1994 National Security Strategy implies MOOTW are the business of the engagement half of "Engagement and Enlargement." As such, they constitute what the same source defines business to be: "our rightful concern, interest or responsibility."18 The definition applied to advertising MOOTW in this paper is a hybrid of those quoted above, incorporated with some of the thoughts presented to the International Advertising Association at its 1984 conference: Advertising-based public relations is the overarching term that encompasses the methods of education and conduits for the communication of information that are critical to the American peoples' understanding of complex and emotionally charged subjects. It utilizes non-competitive techniques of commercial advertising short of intentional manipulation for persuasive purposes and is as politically non-partisan as feasible. Within the framework of the National Security Strategy it falls under the purview of the psychological element of national power.19 All advertising can be categorized as either generic or competitive. Competitive advertising is characterized by direct comparison to another product. Pain relievers often use this type, as do politicians. The competitive approach is less interested in pointing out the merits of the product than it is in hawking the relative quality and value compared to rival brands. Generic advertising is concerned with presenting information about the concerned product, service, or endeavor. This is not to say that generic is less powerful than competitive advertising. However, advertising for MOOTW must remain generic lest it be categorized as partisan. The line that separates advertising and propaganda is thin. It has even been argued effectively that there is no difference.20 For the purposes of advertising MOOTW, the cynic and the naive alike must be persuaded. Public Relations Is Not Propaganda--A Disclaimer This paper in no way advocates the use of domestic propaganda or covert manipulation of information. Clearly, either of the above would alienate the American people rather than persuade them to "buy into" the commitment required to accomplish MOOTW (and goes against the traditions of American democracy). Donald T. Poe emphasizes the primacy of credibility when he writes: Too many times in the past it was thought that the American people were incapable of understanding the problem or reasons for action and the leadership succumbed to paternalism. In some cases it appears that the leadership has attempted to manipulate the American people rather than lead by means of the objective traits of credibility and honesty. The people innately want to believe in the President. If he demonstrates credibility he will be believed, as no source of information is given greater weight than is the President.21 The American people are predisposed, according to Poe, to have faith in their leaders, particularly the President, in international matters. In today's open and democratic society the people have far too many sources of instant and open information bombarding them to fall victim to propaganda. On the strategic level, the National Command Authority possesses the most powerful tool an advertiser can bring to the situation--credibility. To risk the loss of credibility through the use of propaganda or manipulation of information would be counterproductive. Emphasizing the positive while simultaneously recognizing the negatives of an operation would help persuade without the loss of credibility. A public relations campaign for MOOTW must have the truth at its root. The timing and presentation of that truth are essential to the successful selling of MOOTW. The Three "P's" Successful MOOTW require presence, persistence, and patience. These so called "three P's," are strongly affected by public opinion.22 The National Command Authority can order a military presence, but the American people must be sold on the value of the operation for the last two P's, persistence and patience, to be granted. As Harry G. Summers, Jr. observed, the object (end state) of a military operation must be agreed upon prior to the commitment of forces. The value of that objective must then be determined. Next, the costs, both practical and moral, must be calculated and compared to that value. An operation should only be joined if the benefits exceed the costs.23 The United States turned the Haiti peacekeeping operation over to the United Nations in March 1995. This act provides an excellent example of the above argument. President Clinton ordered the presence of American troops in Haiti on 19 September 1994. "The mission was narrowly defined" and, using those simple goals as a measure, "a success."24 But peacekeeping is a mission that can, and has, required years to accomplish properly. The situation in Haiti, for example, does not lend itself to short-term solutions. The small nation is facing an ever-rising tide of criminal violence--including the recent political assassination of a high-profile opponent of the Aristide government, Mireille Durocher Bertin, in March 1995. The rate of unemployment is stationary at seventy-five percent, and the judicial system has yet to try a case. Haiti is not ready for the U.S. to turn the mission over to 6,000 U.N. peacekeepers. Chavannes Jean-Baptise, a backer of President Aristide, states, "President Clinton wants to portray this as a success, but for the Haitian people it has not been a success. The United States, however, is abandoning the Haitian mission "in part because of the lack of support by the American people...."26 It is that support which grants patience to the State Department and persistence to the U.S. forces responding to the MOOTW. Without public support, MOOTW is destined to be limited in scope and time. Unfortunately, MOOTW takes both to be truly successful. The Buck (and the Ad) Stops Here Public relations has been, and is currently, employed as an influencer of national power. Advertising-based public relations resides in the psychological portion of the elements of National Strategy. The executive branch must harness this power to solve the "increasingly difficult problem of obtaining domestic legitimacy" for a strategy that involves MOOTW as a part of its implementation.27 It has been argued that public relations is a facilitating force in all four elements of national strategy: economic, political, psychological and military.28 For the purposes of this paper, however, advertising-based public relations is treated as an enabler for the psychological element of power as the latter depends on the American people's will. The proper use of public relations and advertising techniques by the NCA will help ensure the American people are aware that cost/benefit calculations have been made and thus provide the information that will equip them to justify short-term costs for long-term gains. "The American taxpayer," according to a senior Army officer who addressed the Command and Staff College in 1995, "is being asked to pay the price of MOOTW--in terms of decreased military readiness and increased fiscal costs--without benefit of a coherent explanation." Of Donald T. Poe's four requisites to bring the country into military operations, perhaps the most important is to "keep the goals honest and ensure that they are understood by the American people."29 The will of the American people is recognized worldwide as the United States' strategic center of gravity.30 It is ironic that this nation's defining principle, freedom of speech, is also a critical vulnerability that can be exploited by those external forces who would manipulate public opinion. Players involved in the drama of conflict and the tragedy of MOOTW are currently employing public relations firms in an effort to influence the American's public opinion.31 This source of power has long been recognized. Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense during the 1962 Cuban crisis, for example, said, "News flowing from actions taken by the government is part of the weaponry."32 Those firms are attacking the critical vulnerability to spread their story; to further their cause on the world--and particularly the American--stage. Bard E. O'Neill writes of this phenomenon: Propaganda directed at groups inside external- support states, particularly in pluralistic democracies, may also be somewhat effective; witness the Nicaraguan government's successful 1984-1985 campaign to influence American political leaders and the attentive public by criticizing both the Contras' human rights abuses and their attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government. Other examples of efforts to deny external support to insurgent groups through the use of international publicity efforts are the depiction and excoriation of terrorist acts of the PLO by Israel and of the IRA by Britain. That the existence, content, and effectiveness of communications efforts vary considerably from situation to situation does not mean they can be overlooked by analysts, since in specific cases they could be important.33 It is recognized that the United States government is often the sole director of the play, but the American people have the right of script approval. By bringing the power of American public opinion to bear, the strategy goes, whatever ideological, cultural, religious, or national disagreement in which your region is embroiled has a better chance of being resolved in your favor. Major General James Jones, after two years of study and twenty trips in-country, said of the actors in Boznia-Herzagovina, "each side played the world press masterfully. They attempted to manipulate public opinion to the point that no one held the moral high ground."34 The U.S. government must maintain the moral high ground when it is seeking public support for MOOTW. Even when this is accomplished, however, there are other dilemmas to solve and obstacles to overcome if MOOTW is to have the will of the people providing its forces with persistence and patience. MOOTW are a major manifestation of the National Security Strategy's engagement. With this in mind, the connection between MOOTW and advertising-based public relations resides at the national level. However, the speed and access of modern communications and the open nature of MOOTW public relations has connected the strategic to the operational (and even tactical) levels. Commanders at all levels must understand the power of advertising-based public relations to influence the will of the American people. For the American people to support an enterprise, they first must understand it. Advertising-based public relations attempts to educate and persuade by providing that understanding. And that is no easy task. CHAPTER 3 MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ARE HARD TO SELL Public relations and advertising techniques, so effective in other aspects of our capitalistic society, have been applied (although often ignored) to MOOTW with varying degrees of success. MOOTW must be presented to the American people differently today than in the past for a variety of reasons. Four factors lead the list. First, the Soviet Union no longer exists; the umbrella of the Cold War no longer shades the cost of military operations. Second, the nation as a whole has become much more price-conscious; they demand that national interests be involved. Third, foreign affairs, once the exclusive purview of the Administration, have become fertile ground for Congressional partisan in- fighting. Finally, the speed of communication and the people's ever-increasing access to open news sources, in combination with the first three, have complicated MOOTW public relations. The Lost Specter of the Soviet Union LtGen Robert B. Johnston, Commander of the Marine Expeditionary Force that reacted initially to the Somalia humanitarian operation, recently assessed: "the attitudes of Americans... have been forever changed by the elimination of the Soviet menace."35 The National Strategy was in harmony with the "strategic culture of the people it served" during the Cold War; there was a national "consensus generally obtained throughout the period in terms of the overall objective of containment."36 Along with the demise of the Soviet Union went the blanket justification for the use of military forces that was so prevalent during the Cold War. The fight to contain the Soviet communists was the clear objective; the value was nearly unarguable. Thus, by 1995 standards, high human and monetary costs were often acceptable to obtain containment goals that were arguably outside the national interest. When the Berlin wall fell in 1989, it signalled a new and much lower cost-to-value ratio that is applied to MOOTW today. The "peace dividend" has not been as much a financial gain as a shift in the national mood. The "domino" theory, for example, once used so effectively to justify the commitment of troops and expenditure of funds, no longer applies in the post-Cold War world. Where's The Beef? The American economic experience at mid-decade reveals a society bombarded by prophecies of doom at the hands of trillion dollar deficits. Real earnings adjusted for inflation have been flat for half a decade; people are working more hours to earn the same wages. The media has dubbed the "middle class wage earners" (below $75,000 per annum) as the "anxious class." All this uneasiness goes a long way in explaining the new-found popularity of no-frill malls and super discount outlets in the nineties. Americans are looking for value; they want their diminishing dollar to stretch a bit further. These same people see the urban blight, perceived increase in violent crime, and moral decay depicted on the nightly news and daily papers. They pay their federal taxes and look for the fruits of this payment. Despite record tax rates, the Federal debt is now so high that an increase of just one point in interest rates will propel the deficit $142 billion higher than projected for 1996.37 With these dismal figures topping the American political agenda, it is difficult to justify a half billion dollar expenditure on an operation halfway around the world that yields no apparent benefit to Americans. They want a tangible return for their foreign investment dollar. Unveiled on the 7th of February, 1995, President Clinton's proposed budget has just two double-digit percent change categories. A twelve-percent increase was allocated to justice and law enforcement while an equivalent percentage was slashed from international affairs and economic aid.38 This transposition has vaulted internally spent justice money totals over those spent engaging the world with international government spending for the first time in decades. The largest area of increase within the justice category is over one billion additional dollars to help the INS seal our borders. President Clinton's proposed budget for 1996 reflects an appreciation for the country's concerns. The document, however, only indicates the cost of engagement. It does not address the benefits. Over 16.7 billion international affairs dollars are spent on engagement, of which MOOTW are a part. Additionally, unspecified chunks of the defense and transportation budgets are similarly committed. The American people are starting to demand, as a recent competitive hamburger advertisement asked, "Where's the beef?" Five Hundred And Thirty Five Secretaries Of MOOTW The old, and perhaps never quite correct, rule that "politics ends at the water's edge" has little meaning for today's MOOTW. The executive branch no longer enjoys "the Kissinger era of White House Dominance of Foreign policy."39 When the exposure of the "Iran-Contra episode helped to obscure as much as highlight" the executive's limitations (and liabilities) as exclusive foreign policy formulator, members of the House and Senate gladly filled the gap. Every senator and representative, it seems, has a staff that is concerned as much with the events of the world as they are with those in their bosses' states and districts.40 The Congress, according to Carnes Lord, is now competing in an area that once was nearly the exclusive domain of the executive branch--initiation and sustainment of MOOTW: Congress is very much part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The fragmentation of authority as between foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence committees, not to mention appropriations and budget committees, in both houses exacerbates the fragmentation of decision-making authority within the executive branch in the national security area.41 The Secretary of Defense, William Perry, also recognized this phenomenon and railed against it. The 1994 Republican "Contract With America" provision for a strong defense policy carried with it a contentious implication. Secretary Perry has stated his opposition to the efforts of Congress to take a more active role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. In a February, 1995 interview with Jane's Defence Weekly, he emotionally addressed a congressional proposal to create a commission to review national needs: "If you find that I am incapable or unwilling to meet those responsibilities, you should ask me to step down as Secretary of Defense."42 President Clinton complained that his "constitutional responsibility to conduct U.S. foreign policy" was severely hampered by proposed "restrictions on U.S. participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations."43 In an effort to balance the Federal budget by the year 2002, the House of representatives plans to dictate via its purse strings what particular MOOTW, among other initiatives, the executive branch can use to engage the world. A Quagmire From Which Even The Operators Shy The chapter on OOTW in the Army's FM 100-5, Operations opens and closes with an admonition to its readers: "The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. The Army organizes, trains and equips to fight and win the nation's wars. This remains its primary mission." (emphasis added). The current ...From The Sea Navy/Marine Corps doctrine, for all intents and purposes, ignores MOOTW. In other words, the military does MOOTW when it has to, but, apparently with less than enthusiastic effort. MOOTW is not war. The military, generally slow to adjust structurally, is having some difficulty determining the correct forces and training required to best accomplish the myriad MOOTW missions. During this transition, the public relations effort can be affected adversely. For example, in reference to the Marines' adaptation of less- than-lethal weapons (pepper spray, bean bag ammunition, etc.) for Operation United Shield, a Marine colonel recently sarcastically quipped, "If we just fired beans instead of bean bags, we could call it a feeding program."44 On the eve of the U.S. Marine landing in Somalia during Operation United Shield, LtGen A. C. Zinni, the operational commander, recognized the drastic shift from war to MOOTW: "I think the whole nature of warfare is changing--the military probably shouldn't fight it."45 While the above is less than an enthusiastic embrace, it is clear that in an era of diminishing defense budgets, the service that can perform MOOTW will survive. The lukewarm MOOTW endorsement by operational forces, however, has not precluded every lobbyist to the Roles and Missions Commission from exalting their services' inherent ability to perform what has not been funded and trained for.46 All Is Not Lost Today's MOOTW public relations must rely on appeals to the tangible economic and political benefits rather than lofty, idealistic goals. The monumental shift in the world order, in combination with a pragmatic, well-informed, and sometimes cynical public has forced national security interests into a harsh light. For these reasons, the NCA must muster the support of the people when it commits the military to MOOTW. There is still opportunity, however, to engage the military and also have the popular support required for success. The American people remain as committed today to an active world affairs role as they were in the 1980's.47 However, the commitment is of a different nature. As Patrick Cronin noted: "Fighting ideological battles with Communist states has decreased in priority; protecting American economic interests and maintaining a global military, economic and political position continues as a high priority."48 A MOOTW public relations campaign must tap into this pragmatic predisposition for international engagement rather than alienate the consumers. Overcome the Hurdles of Mass Communication Advertising-based public relations is dependent upon communication. The majority of Americans "depend upon mass- communication products for a large majority of all the information we receive during life."49 To succeed in persuasive communication, "four hurdles have to be cleared: it must (1) attract attention, (2) be accepted, (3) be interpreted, and (4) be stored for use."50 Interestingly, the four-step communication model is applicable to both inter-personal and mass communications: Mass Communication faces the same defenses and must leap the same hurdles: attention, acceptance, interpretation, and storing. It requires the same kinds of contracts between sender and receiver for entertainment and instruction. It must depend upon activating the same kinds of psychological dynamics if it is to persuade.51 Attract Attention. For MOOTW, the first step, to attract attention, is often the least burdensome. In the past, unfiltered images from commercial media sources have been instrumental in gaining attention for particular MOOTW. In fact, it is often that initial coverage which is the primary cause of the government's interest. The phenomenon of CNN-ization is a powerful attention getter. The images in print, television and radio are often portrayed in such compelling terms that the most basic emotions of the public are touched. Guilt, sympathy and frustration are at the root of public outcries for the government to do something-- anything--to alleviate the suffering or right the wrong. Even so, MOOTW must still fight for its place at the public's interest table. Edward Bernays argues that "competition for the attention of the public has been continually broadened and intensified because the public decides whether an enterprise is to succeed or fail."52 Once that attention is gained, the message must be delivered in such a form that the majority of Americans can accept it. Public Acceptance. Overly sophisticated and complex approaches to educating the public on MOOTW via public relations is counterproductive. Gaining acceptance, once attention is gained, relies on the clarity, perhaps even the simplicity, of the message. Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson argue that although access to more political affairs information has increased in the last twenty years, public interest in and knowledge of such affairs has not increased and may actually have decreased.53 The reason for this decline may lie in the cyclic process of gaining acceptance through simplistic or attention-getting methods common to the highly competitive media marketplace: The public, press, and political leaders are caught in a spiral. Sophisticated news coverage requires an interested and informed public. Without an educated audience, journalists and leaders must simplify their message and package it as "entertainment," thus reducing further the sophistication of the public at large.54 Acceptance is important enough to simplify--not oversimplify--a MOOTW. The message, however, does not need to be watered down to the lowest common denominator. As discussed in the next Chapter, the "attentive public" and the "elites" should be targeted, and the message designed to meet their needs. From their acceptance of a MOOTW will flow that of the "general public's." A Rose By Any Other Name. In an effort to gain legitimacy for an operation and thus be accepted within the public mind, MOOTW have been "code-named" with more than mere attention-getting as the intent--the very name must also aid in the operation's acceptance. The days of naming operations based on computer-generated random labels are gone. Operation Overlord of WWII had a very dignified name, yet did nothing to describe its goals or methods. Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson write: "Advertisers know the power of naming and select brand names for their products--such as Head & Shoulders shampoo, DieHard battery, Close-up toothpaste, that draw attention to the brand's major selling benefit."55 Today MOOTW names such as Restore Hope, Provide Comfort, and Restore Democracy reach out to the public for acceptance of the virtuous cause in which that operation is involved. The labels of MOOTW are a two-edged sword. A well- chosen label will help people identify with the MOOTW "product." In turn, this will aid in building public support for the MOOTW. The American people, however, will expect the military to deliver the operation "as advertised" by the government. In the minds of the American people, the Marines intervened in Somalia (Operation Provide Hope) in order to restore the hope of the Somali people. When the bodies of American soldiers were depicted being dehumanized by the "hopeful" Somalis, the American people realized the advertised operation--Provide Hope--was not the product they had ended up with. Interpreted and Stored for Later Use. The public interprets the accepted messages based on three public relations factors: adjustment, information and persuasion.56 The American people can adjust to changing situations very well. Cultural, religious and ethnic diversity have trained the public over the years to adjust to, rather than confront, changing situations. However, information must be presented that is pertinent, understandable and not beyond the range of adjustment. In other words, the message and image of MOOTW must not be beyond the scope of already pre- adjusted information. Psychologist Gordon Allport points out that it is the nature of Americans to divide up and categorize the "buzzing boom of information" that is directed at them.57 To be interpreted and stored, psychologists argue, information must be able to fit in one of the brain's storage bins that have been pre-adjusted. Once this process is complete, persuasion can then take place. Stored information that is communicated via advertising-based public relations is another way of positioning an operation. The general value that an entity has will be stored without regard to particular facts or justification. This generalization defines the public's tolerance datum. Once the public has established a general position on MOOTW, either positive or negative, public relations efforts must recognize this as the basic starting point for a campaign. CHAPTER 4 MOOTW PUBLIC RELATIONS PRINCIPLES Strategic Approach to Public Relations In 1942, Admiral Ernest J. King was asked to state the Navy's public relations policy. He answered "Don't tell them anything. When it's over, tell them who won."58 That probably worked well then. The nation was at war and the American people understood that information presented before an operation was completed carried a heavy price-- compromised plans. Even if the people did demand more than this, communication means would have been too slow to respond. This is not the case for today's MOOTW. Today, a more proactive, strategic plan for advertising-based public relations is required. Admiral King's approach will not stand up under the harsh glare of TV lights, editorialized video feeds, or the speed of satellite communications that characterize today's MOOTW operations areas. The best time to create the foundation for public relations is prior to an individual MOOTW. The individual use of the techniques discussed here is not necessarily enough to result in successful advertising-based public relations. A proactive strategy is the mortar that holds the principles together and allows the NCA to get out ahead of the problems inherent in advertising MOOTW. Sun Tzu captured this general principle over two thousand years ago: Plan for what is difficult while it is easy, do what is great while it is small. The most difficult things in the world must be done while they are still easy, the greatest things in the world must be done while they are still small.59 It is often too late to effectively engage in advertising-based public relations after a crisis has erupted. Indeed, a public relations campaign becomes proportionally more difficult to implement as the time from crisis to action increases.60 The best that can be accomplished when a plan is not in place is spinning a positive thread through the sequence of unanticipated events. Edward L. Bernays stresses the importance of establishing a clear sense of direction early in the process: "Every successful public relations campaign must be predicated on laying out in advance a whole series of objectives to be attained in orderly fashion. The cumulative effect of their total realization is the achievement of the ultimate overall goal."61 In today's Total Quality Management parlance, it is obvious that Bernays' "overall goal" is the leader's vision. It is imperative that this vision translate via the distribution of information--advertising--to the American people. As important as a coherent plan is, MOOTW public relations must be based on the truth. As Bernays writes: Public Relations strategists are concerned with truth always, for they must be realists. But they are equally concerned with the people's interpretation of the truth.62 It is that "interpretation of the truth" that gives advertising-based public relations its mission--to educate and inform the American people. When this is accomplished with skill and integrity, the difference between the truth and the perception of the truth are very hard to discern. When ineptly presented, on the other hand, "telling a man a truth he rejects may only make him more set in his ways."63 The encompassing goal of advertising MOOTW is to create a strategic consensus in the absence of an identifiable, unambiguous strategic threat. The American people must buy what the government is selling and the military promises to deliver. These three entities, the people, government and military, need to be aligned strategically to ensure the necessary staying power for MOOTW. Military strategist David Jablonsky, recognizes the primacy of this alignment in his essay, "Why Is Strategy Difficult?" As he stresses, "the key to maintaining balance today in the U.S. national strategic calculus" is to generate "a strategic consensus that counteracts the centrifugal forces playing on the elements of the American version of the Clausewitzian trinity."64 That balance must be established by the NCA via advertising-based public relations. The Government Does Advertise. The United States government is no stranger to advertising, particularly when the definition used in this paper is considered. Indeed, the government is already fighting a war using advertisements as a primary weapon: the war on drugs. This is a multi-billion dollar struggle that has been waged on many fronts. Anyone who has viewed a "this is your brain ... this is your brain on drugs ... questions?" commercial will realize that the government is involved in the business of persuasion. Eric Clark recognizes the image-building power of advertising when he writes: Advertising is attractive to both government and the agencies. For the government it allows it to project the image it wants. Whether an advertising campaign against heroin is the best way of spending the money is debatable, but it allows the government to be seen caring.65 The quality of these advertisements, in the parlance of the adman, is "slick" and speaks volumes to the ability the government can show when it applies itself. The selection of the label "The War Against Drugs" itself, underlines the emotion evoking nature of war as opposed to MOOTW. The framers of the strategy to expend billions of counterdrug money, no doubt, recognized "Actions to Prevent Drug Abuse" as a title for the collective fight against illegal drugs would leave the American people little to rally behind.66 The United States has recognized the value of public relations in one form or another for years. In fact, in 1936 President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the employment of over 200 publicity agents, writing an average 1,600 press releases a month, in an attempt to encourage the media to convince the American People of the need for the New Deal.67 An approach this heavy-handed is likely to fail today for its propaganda-like nature. Yet the primacy of setting the public relations strategy from the top and the importance of public opinion in accomplishing any endeavor still ring true. The Government, however still does advertise internationally as blatantly as FDR did. The entity charged with international public relations is the 8000-employee strong United States Information Agency.68 A bronze plaque near the entrance of its Washington, D.C. headquarters proclaims, "USIA - Telling America's Story to the World." Provisions of the Smith- Mundt Act restrict, by law, the USIA from exercising its powers within the borders of the United States. An agency charged with promoting the "primacy of democracy abroad" is barred from communicating that same message within U.S. borders. There is no equivalent organization to USIA that is charged with advertising-based public relations domestically. The public understands the language of advertising. Advertising-based public relations would be accepted by the American people, without the fear of propaganda that limits the USIA. It has been argued that advertisements trace our sociological history as a panorama of life as it was lived. American society could be better judged by observing the advertisements in the newspaper rather than the news itself.69 Advertising is a part of life in America. The public views advertising as both the exercise of domestic political power and as a part of the normal course of living in the United States.70 The typical American watches thirty hours of television a week; that equates to 37,822 television advertisements. Add to that the din created by 9,872 commercial radio stations, 482 newspapers, and 11,328 magazines and Americans are constantly exposed to some form of persuasive medium during their waking hours.71 Although the United States represents a mere six percent of the world's population, over fifty-six percent of the world's advertising budget is spent here.72 World-wide advertising expenditure recently "topped $225 billion, more than the gross national products of Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Israel and Kenya added together."73 Of that annual amount, $45 billion is spent on advertising and $60 billion on product promotions (coupons, free samples, rebates, etc) in the United States.74 It is no wonder that many Americans comprehend the language of advertising so well. In the broadest sense, MOOTW must be advertised starting from the national and moving to the operational level with a top-down approach to ensure strategic to tactical continuity. Domestic public relations at the national level is the nuts and bolts of "strategic public affairs."75 The strategic approach to public relations, by Carnes Lord's definition, is distinguished from the public affairs activities commonly discharged by various government agencies. It attempts to generate strategic approaches to shaping the domestic political itinerary and to engaging the public more actively in serious consideration of fundamental security issues.76 Advertising-based public relations is the general rubric under which are found the principles for selling MOOTW. To formulate the strategy Lord speaks of, the lessons of the commercial world may be applicable to the MOOTW sphere. There are many identifiable advertising tactics that translate from the commercial world to the language of selling MOOTW. When blended together and framed within the public relations strategy, the void between commercial advertising and MOOTW advertising is not as large as it might appear. There are, however, some key differences. First, commercial advertising is paid for by the producer or marketer and MOOTW public relations, per se, are unfunded. However, just like Ford, Nissan or Proctor and Gamble, the NCA will be held responsible for the advertising used and the delivery of the product. Second, the American public will hold the government and its representatives to a higher standard than it will commercial hawkers. As discussed in Chapter Two, the use of propaganda, information manipulation, and subliminal persuasion are not advisable in selling MOOTW. For this reason, many of the most effective methods commonly used commercially can not be included in the MOOTW public relations strategy. There are, however, many that legitimately can and need to be borrowed from the commercial world for use in MOOTW advertising-based public relations. Both commercial advertising and MOOTW advertising require identifying target audiences and concentrating the focus of effort on those demographically disposed to use the product being sold. MOOTW, as the product of the engagement portion of our 1994 National Security Strategy, should be the concern of all citizens. Unlike the relatively homogeneous demographic slice of the population that would buy Efferdent for example, consumers of MOOTW represent the entire American political, economic, and cultural pie. Some of the applicable techniques have been widely used in the selling of political candidates since General Dwight Eisenhower first successfully utilized TV "spot" advertising in l952.77 The American people have become used to, and thus tolerant of, the use of these advertising methods for other than commercial products. Of course, a MOOTW is not a political candidate or a tube of toothpaste. When MOOTW are advertised, the trust of the American people is the action sought. An operation conducted as it was advertised is what the American people will expect in return. Advertising-based Public Relations Techniques The first of the advertising-based public relations techniques is to Find the Need and Fill It. For MOOTW sales, this is focused around the determination of the general overarching desires of the people. Satisfying those desires is accomplished via the application of the other six techniques: Position the Operation Positively, Create the Right Image, Be Sensitive To Your Audience, Tell Your Story First, Know the Product, and Clear Message Sent by The Right Spokesperson. When thoughtfully applied, these techniques can spell the difference between success and failure of a MOOTW, for the final judges (and consumers) are the American people. The following sections will identify the above techniques and analyze them in the context of operations in Somalia and Haiti. Find the Need And Fill It. "To advertise effectively today, you have to get off your pedestal and put your ear to the ground. You have to get on the same wavelength as the prospect."78 The most basic principle of salesmanship is finding the need and then filling it. Advertising, by extension, is the tool with which the salesman presents the product to appeal to the prospect's needs. The consumers of denture cleaners, the majority of which fall into a relatively narrow demographic group, have needs that Proctor and Gamble, among others, have identified. Market analysis firms spend millions of dollars annually determining what should sell. Advertisers then spend billions ensuring it does. The survey method of canvassing preferences, both telephonic and written, has served the business world well for decades. These methods tap into a relatively benign list of preferences (e.g., the 50-66 year-old age group from middle-income households prefer unflavored liquid laxatives to those with cherry flavor.) While this information is valuable to laxative producers, something broader is needed for advertising MOOTW. Unfortunately, the need expressed for MOOTW is less an opinion of convenience and more a gauge of emotion. Consumers of MOOTW represent all slices of America's voting demographic pie and thus traditional target-based advertising will not be effective. An effective way of categorizing the public toward which to target MOOTW advertising is the four-division model:79 STRATA DISCRIPTION General Public Variety of interests; probably no strong beliefs; at least not for significant lengths of time or farther afield than immediate environments Attentive Public Informed and interested in national problems; deeply held convictions; education level average to above average Elite Public Policy and opinion leaders; argues the issues; high degree of influence on decisionmakers; well educated The fourth strata in the above model consists of the decision makers--the official or executive leadership. In the pluralistic American society of the late twentieth century, an advertiser representing the fourth strata must be concerned with all three public divisions. The best way to influence the opinions of the general and elite publics is to target the middle attentive public. The general public will follow their example and the elites will react to the consensus they build. Voting trends and polls can serve the advertiser of MOOTW equally as well as surveys do their commercial counterparts. Analysis of these trends and poll results "provide the lowest level of transferability of quantitative data to preference evaluations."80 Of course, MOOTW must be selected on criteria based on the National Security Strategy--not on an ability to advertise it to the American people. Once the course is set, however, the support of the American people must be rallied. An advertising-based public relations campaign, targeted at all three levels of political influence with the priority on the attentive public, will yield the best results. When the crisis in Somalia came to its height in 1992 the Administration gauged the need of the American people and attempted to fill that need. The execution of Operation Restore Hope fell on the seam between U.S. administrations. A little over a month after the first landings, a new President, with a green staff, sat in the White House. It seems certain that the original mission was understood. The American people's need was to provide humanitarian relief. To fill that need, Operation Restore Hope was embarked upon. It is not as clear, however, that the conditions required to transition from a U.S. to a U.N. -led coalition were equally well understood. As was discussed earlier, a coherent, top-down strategy is key to a successful advertising-based public relations campaign. In reference to filling the need, Americans expressed a desire to not get mired in long-term Somalia operations. Then-Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell also stressed the importance of stating the exit strategy up front and questioned "whether conditions in Somalia would permit a smooth handoff to U.N. peacekeeping forces" after the desired "relatively brief deployment of U.S. troops."81 While the operation was filling the need in the minds of the American people by strong efforts at the national level, when the mission "crept" the initial good ground work was actually counterproductive from a purely public relations standpoint. President Bush sent our troops to accomplish "a definable, doable mission" because our benevolent, powerful country wanted to do that which "no other country...would undertake."82 Perhaps the above concern, from an advertising point of view, was well founded considering the American public's reaction not only to their soldiers' being killed while involved in a humanitarian operation, but also while under the control of a foreign country's general. Position the Operation Positively. The relatively new advertising principle of "positioning" has applicability to the selling of MOOTW. Positioning "is not what you do to a product. Positioning is what you do to the minds of the prospects."83 In other words, by properly defining the value and concept of a MOOTW as positive in the public's collective mind, the need to satisfy the consumer value to expense ratio will be filled. To successfully advertise MOOTW today, reality must be at the forefront of a positioning campaign. American people generally tend to be pragmatic. This is particularly true when considering MOOTW where the national interest does not appear to be vital. They demand to know the "why" and "what is in it for us" before they will be sold on anything. Reality is what is already in the mind. An advertiser can not change a product; he must, therefore, change the mind of the buyer and what he/she accepts as reality. Positioning merely "reties" the connection between what is needed and what is being sold rather than "creating something that doesn't already exist" in the collective conscience.84 Thus, to connect MOOTW to the needs of the people, the value of that operation must be defined as more tangible than idealistic in nature. To justify the recent operations in Haiti, for example, the Administration stressed the importance of helping a country establish and maintain democracy within its borders.85 At one time, prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, this would have been positioned in the positive sector of the majority of American voters' minds. The fact is, however, that the benefit did not measure up or "connect" to the cost, and it was rejected by the people.86 Operation Restore Hope suffered from a disconnect between strategic goals and the perception of its operational execution and proves to be a good example of the above analysis. The result was an operation that was positioned one way and executed another. Robert B. Oakley, Presidential Envoy to Somalia, said of the decision to commit U.S. ground troops to a multilateral coalition in Somalia: "It would be up to him [President Bush] to make the decision. He chose the strongest option and the United States embarked upon a major humanitarian intervention."87 That vision was depicted to the American people in terms of dying adults and, even more powerfully, as "more than 70 percent of the children" dead.88 The media images keyed on what was sensational and accessible--the suffering--but paid only cursory attention to the clan in-fighting. In the end, Ambassador Oakley conceded, the administration embarked on Operation Restore Hope "with a perception that we could actually help in Muslim Somalia" which was fueled by the "media-driven desire for a fresh look" at getting involved.89 Although there is evidence that the advertised strategic vision did include an "end to clan fighting," the focus of the intervention initially was the one million people on the edge of survival.90 F. M. Lorenz writes: Media coverage centered on the tremendous suffering and starvation in the interior of the country. The faces of starving children on the evening news were important factors behind the deployment....91 According to Ambassador Oakley, President Bush was finally led to launch Operation Restore Hope based on "public opinion and conviction."92 Public Opinion favored feeding the Somalis. However, the operational methods to accomplish the feeding were clear to the CINCENT, but were not necessarily shared by the public.93 Thus, public expectations--really what was advertised to them and thus positioned in their minds--revolved around humanitarian relief. The Pentagon, on the other hand, had determined a course that would use "overwhelming force." As then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said, "there will be no question in the mind of any faction leaders in Somalia that we would have the ability to impose a stable situation if it came to that, without their cooperation."94 The images of the camouflaged Marines and Navy SEALs climbing out of the blackness of the night in the Indian Ocean and into a flood of camera lights from the international press serves as a searing benchmark of disconnect between the positioned strategic vision and operational realities. The night vision goggle-bedecked forces had good reason to come ashore prepared for the worst case. However, the public was promised good Samaritans and the media was there to bring their compelling story. The media captured images of operational competence, according to a senior Marine officer who addressed the Command and Staff College, that were disconnected from the humanitarian show the Administration expected on the beach. Clearly, the operational actions did not echo the national advertising-based public relations effort that concentrated more on the logistical aspects of relief and less on a midnight forced entry from the sea by elite forces. It is this juxtaposition of military force in "other than war" operations that must be dealt with at the national level. The advertising principles of Know The Product and Creating The Right Image were violated. That said, however, the American public was still prepared to give humanitarian aid a chance largely because of the public relations principles that were followed. There were bright spots on both the national and operational levels. Create The Right Image. Image is very important in things political. In 1980, then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was taught to modulate her extremely shrill and non-commanding voice to help carry the election. In France the next year, Francois Mitterrand agreed to change his appearance at the urging of image-maker Jacques Seguela. After detailed research, a series of posters depicting him as la force tranquille were widely distributed.95 In essence, Mitterrand was a product. He changed himself to fit the image that would sell and he won the election. The image of an individual MOOTW is not so easily changed. The operation as a product is what the advertiser has to work with; the image cannot be defined or altered much once forces are flowing to the hot spot. The genesis of the operation, however, is susceptible to image-building. In the absence of a general national-level image of MOOTW, an image will be created by the international media or actions at the United Nations prior to the commitment of US forces. The image for MOOTW thus must be created in the general sense prior to the eruption of the crisis that is the genesis of the operation. Once that general image is created, however, it is easily changed by reported actions from the MOOTW area. When the Special Marine Air Ground Task Force landed on the beach in amphibious assault vehicles and touched down at the Mogadishu airport in helicopters, there were fifty-two "troops" without weapons. They were neither Marines nor sailors. They were reporters and photographers--armed with microphones, word processors and cameras--there at the expressed invitation and near insistence--of the Marine Landing Force Commander.96 As stated earlier, the restrictions that the media will accept on their movements during MOOTW are much less restrictive than those during war. The leadership of Operation Restore Hope, realizing the image creating power of the media, took extraordinary measures to reach out to the press corps. Rather than resent their presence, the Joint Task Force embraced them; they put one on each helicopter and amphibious vehicle. The press was given detailed pre-event operational briefings, often receiving the information at the same time as the subordinate military commanders who would execute the mission.97 This openness gained the trust of the media. More important than their trust however, was that it helped make them part of the team. The media is crucial to creating and maintaining the correct image, for it was literally their individual "images" shown on television, magazines, and in newspapers that collectively formed the image the American public had of the operation. As FM 100-23 states, the effort to "keep the public informed" prevented "voids in information supplied to the media by the military" from being filled "with hostile propaganda or media speculation." A Marine officer who assisted in supporting the members of the media during Operation Restore Hope writes: Opening up all aspects of the operation to the media, the press generally responded with fair and accurate reporting. The operation's public affairs officer, Colonel Fred Peck, USMC was in theater before the operation began. He escorted members of the press aboard the USS Tripoli on 8 December for what was to become the norm for Operation Restore Hope, a complete briefing on the next morning's assault by the 15th MEU(SOC) Commander and the Commander, Amphibious Squadron 3.98 Early in the execution of Operation Restore Hope an incident occurred that could have had devastating public relations consequences for the created image of the operation. At a checkpoint in Mogadishu, a truck carrying several Somali youths came careening down the road. The driver was unresponsive to slow down signals from the military members manning the checkpoint. In a split-second decision, the non-commissioned-officer-in-charge of the checkpoint had his men fire on the truck for fear that the driver was acting with malice. Several Somali teens met their death in grizzly fashion. A post-incident investigation revealed that rather than wishing the military harm, the brakes on the truck had failed and the driver had simply lost control. A senior Marine commander of Operation Restore Hope said that the only reason the media did not lambast the military for shooting and killing the teens was the relationship that had been fostered between the military and the media.99 It was that relationship that aligned the image with the reality. The media were intimately aware of the difficulty facing the young soldiers and Marines because they were right there with them--from the briefing tents to the city patrols. The final draft of "Lessons Learned Somalia: A First Look" written for the Institute for National Strategic Studies states: The responsibility of sharing situational awareness with the media is a basic and most important function in an age where information influences everything but especially affects those military activities carried out with the concurrence of the International Community.100 The media in Somalia were given that situational awareness and were therefore inclined to give balanced reports based primarily on the mutual respect the operational commander and his subordinates had encouraged in word and deed. Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations makes it clear: The media is an important channel to the American public. In the high visibility, politically sensitive peace operation environment, public opinion is a critical element. By proactively assisting news media representatives, commanders help them understand the Army role in peace operations and produce stories that foster the confidence of the American public. Be Sensitive To Your Audience. There is a danger in generalizing the American people's behavior as if they were a homogeneous social entity. As William N. McPhee writes in Formal Theories of Mass Behavior: "Powerful social systems are complicated and therefore tend to be complicated uniquely."101 That said, however, generality must be applied in some degree to model, and thus understand, the public's reaction to potential advertising options. Performing market analysis on subunits within the United States yields little that is useful to the development of a public relations strategy. But, "within a larger model one notices many things that are general."102 These generalities must be acknowledged by the advertiser and made the foci of the public relations campaign. The American people are notoriously fickle and short on collective memory. Donald Poe discusses this trend: Public opinion tends to be regarded by policy makers as mercurial. Whatever the polls may show at any moment about levels of support for defense spending, foreign aid, international military involvement, and the like, the fact is that opinions are likely to fluctuate wildly in response to immediate international stimuli, regardless of contrary views solicited in the abstract.103 In other words, an advertiser would be foolish to base a campaign on a single poll or series of polls immediately after a crisis erupts. The information that people need would be more successfully viewed "as an integral part of a sustained program of planning, rather than as a 'one-shot' device to meet an emergency."104 Successfully handling a single public relations battle is not the goal; rather, the campaign to sell MOOTW must succeed over the long-term. The American people "are generally short-term thinkers; this causes problems when long-term situations are encountered."105 MOOTW are often conducted in response to the culmination of a festering situation. The typically dramatic crisis that draws the United States into action usually has been years in the making. More importantly, according to Army Field Manual 100-5, some MOOTW "may require years to achieve the desired result," requiring the application of the three P's discussed in Chapter Two. The American way of war, the application of overwhelming force, does not work particularly well in engagements that require more patience than firepower. Advertising is the force that bridges the gap between long-term operations and the American short-term fix it and forget it approach. There is another factor affecting American culture that must be considered when designing an appealing campaign. As individualistic as Americans may perceive themselves to be, in reality they are joiners. They join churches, softball teams, veterans organizations, environmental groups, political committees, neighborhood crime watches, and bridge and poker nights. Generally, Americans "are group animals; they want to be in the mainstream."106 This mentality drives commercial advertisers to use team and consensus-type approaches to frame their messages. For example, it is common to hear the words "most popular," "best selling," or "number one seller in its class." Despite Robert Putnam's recent argument to the contrary in his paper, "Bowling Alone: Democracy in America in the End of the Twentieth Century," Americans still enjoy that old propensity for forming associations.107 Alexis de Tocqueville raved about it in the 1830's and President Clinton emphasized its importance in his 1995 State of the Union Address: Americans have a need and "an ability to associate with people" to solve problems and answer questions.108 Advertisers of MOOTW would do well to keep this in mind when framing their messages. Spread Your Story First. LtGen A. C. Zinni highlighted one of the most elusive, yet important, enabling functions of conducting MOOTW: "when something [news] breaks, you [the commander] have to get control of the storyline first."109 In positioning an operation in the minds of the American people, "there is no substitute for being there first:"110 The chief pressures are on the wire services; a beat of two or three minutes by the Associated Press or United Press International may determine which service is used by hundreds of newspapers, radio and television stations, and networks and syndicates.111 This kind of competition is what has driven today's media to be nicknamed "journalism in a hurry." In MOOTW this speed can be critical because accuracy, in many journalists' approaches, has been replaced by "firstness." Operational commanders must be aware of this and correct inaccuracies swiftly and surely. In combination with being forthright with the press, maintaining the initiative and setting the agenda form the base for mutually satisfying press relations. Of course, getting "control" of the storyline is more difficult during MOOTW than during war. The genesis of a requirement to conduct a MOOTW is often also the exact sensational crisis to which the media flocks (or has already flocked). Major General Jones, CG 2ndMARDIV, described this phenomenon for the MOOTW in Northern Iraq: "I give the press a great deal of credit for getting us into this operation [Provide Comfort]. They galvanized....public opinion and drove us [the U.S.] to act."112 An excellent example of gaining "control" by telling your story first can be seen in the landing at Mogadishu, Somalia in December of 1992. It was discovered that the originally planned L-hour coincided with a time in U.S. television markets which would provide little live coverage. Action was taken to spread the Administration's story first by ensuring the live images of the operation were shown rather than having the public's first view be through the media's "filter." The landing was delayed three days, from the sixth to the ninth of December to accommodate a larger television audience in the United States.113 The mission was not compromised, yet the primacy of the American people's support was considered essential at the national level. A successful example of telling your story first, this action demonstrated the power of controlling the tempo of advertising-based public relations. Know The Product. The product is more important than the manufacturing process that brought it to market. Leaders, as Clausewitz tells us, must recognize the type of war they are fighting. So too must the framers of an advertising campaign for MOOTW. It is essential to avoid advertising one product only to deliver another. "Bait and switch" may work short-term. As stated earlier, however, MOOTW is the business end of engagement and will be with us for the long term--as long as our National Security Strategy remains non-isolationist. From a purely public relations viewpoint, the execution of operations in Somalia were a success. At the national level, however, the disconnect between strategic advertising and operational product was too great for the American people to reconcile and they withdrew their support.114 The final result was that all operations in Somalia with American troops in the balance came to an end before the mission was complete. As Dan Simpson, U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, understated, "The world may have bitten off more than it could chew in terms of trying to bring the Somalis to a government."115 It seems clear that the American people did not know what they were "taking a bite of." Knowing the product is essential to the MOOTW public relations effort. Unless the product's qualities and deficiencies are understood, advertising-based public relations efforts may well advertise something that doesn't exist. An appropriate accounting for the failure to "sell" the American people on the "product" of Somalia operations came, when addressing the 10th Mountain Division in March, 1993, President Clinton said: "If there are any debates still to be had about our mission in Somalia, let people have those debates with me. But let there be no debate about how you carried out your mission...."116 Clear Message by the Right Spokesperson. "In the absence of a coherent explanation" of why the military is being committed "even talk show hosts can turn the American people around on a dime."117 Peacekeeping is one of several missions under the umbrella of MOOTW. It is not an over- simplification to ensure that the American people understand, via the press corps, why the Marine Corps, not the Peace Corps, will be keeping the peace. These elements of information need to be imparted to sell a MOOTW; they follow time-tested principles used to hawk everything from laundry soap to luxury cars. The person in front of the camera or quoted in the paper has an immediate and powerful effect on the message that is being transmitted. On a national level, the spokesperson should be chosen carefully. Commercial advertisers have long recognized the connection between the spokesperson and the positioning of the product in the minds of the target audience. The Marlboro Man is not frail; the Virginia Slims lady is far from unattractive. That said, however, the most important quality a spokesperson can have is the confidence of the people.118 Of all the American institutions, the most trusted by the American people is the military. In addition, the credibility of subject matter that a military spokesperson brings to the podium acts as a force doubler. Back in Washington, all other things being close to equal, both the trust and credibility cards are played with a military spokesperson out front. At the site of the MOOTW, the spokesperson should either be military or State Department-- preferably the former. Often the commander will not be able to choose who is "in front of the camera." The 28 February, 1995 Washington Post front-page story covering the progress of Operation United Shield, the U.S. - led withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia, proves that no matter how well trained the Public Affairs Officer is, he may not be the one "in front of the camera." It is a good example of the type of "soldier commentary" that FM 100-23 discusses. Staff Sergeant Matt Mutarelli, a Special Forces soldier, was quoted three times in the above Washington Post article, the official U.N. Commander once. The Sergeant's interview was not human interest pablum. On the contrary, he provided an evaluation of not only the military capability of the clan forces arrayed across from his position on the Mogadishu airport, but also his insight into their intentions. Finally, the Sergeant defined for the Post's readers, presumably as the resident expert, what the endstate of the clan fighting would be.119 To read what the U.N. spokesman had to say in the above article, one had to turn to page A14. Even then, the official spokesman's remarks were used only to report the historical average wage of a Somali. The significance of the situation illustrated above is not whether the Sergeant was correct or not. In fact, his opinions in this case did match the commander's reported position. The point is that the media would quote any source that would answer their questions about Somalia. Often, these opinions were given as much exposure and as much weight as the commander's. To a military reader, the Sergeant's comments were his own--not the official position of the command. However, it is often difficult for the attentive public, generally unfamiliar with rank structure or military billets, to attribute the correct weight to statements from the commander, his spokesmen, or the Marine that just happens to be collared by a reporter. All of the advertising-based public relations techniques discussed above are powerful tools. They must be utilized, however, with integrity if they are to remain in the nation's "tool box." Not All Operations Other Than War Can Be Sold The above discussion in no way means to intimate that a MOOTW which is flawed in its most basic objectives or fundamental execution can, or should be, "sold" using these persuasion techniques. Legendary advertising man Leo Burnett remarked: "anyone who thinks that people can be fooled or pushed around has an inaccurate and low estimate of the people--and he won't do very well in advertising."120 The MOOTW product is unlike an automobile product. However, the techniques of selling them in many ways bridge the huge gap between the two, just as the failed campaign to sell the Edsel by Ford in the 1950's was doomed because the product was unneeded (besides being considered by some to be one of the most unattractive cars ever built). Unprecedented investment was made in the creation of six new plants and four thousand new dealerships to give the Edsel the image of "newness." Similarly, a MOOTW that has questionable success possibilities, or is domestically divisive without other overriding redeeming qualities in the eyes of the American people, cannot be "sold." Without proper public relations and advertising support, however, MOOTW's that do have merit and are integral to the National Strategy may go unsold also. This goes to the heart of this paper's purpose and beyond merely identifying the advertising techniques. An example of this latter category of MOOTW is underway in Haiti as this paper is being written. Objectively, Operation Restore Democracy should be a success in the eyes of the American people. The goals of returning order, food and Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti have been accomplished. Democratic elections are scheduled for April, 1995. At this writing only one American has died directly from those efforts. Why then is it a failure in the minds of most "judges" of MOOTW--the American people?121 Many of the positive operational lessons learned from Somalia have been refined and applied in Haiti. However, advertising-based public relations errors at the national level have relegated Operation Restore Democracy to the fast-growing heap of questionable American MOOTW hardly before the first Blackhawk helicopter had landed in Port-au- Prince. Vacillation Blurs the Message. The halting manner in which the United States took military action in Haiti tended to open the policy up to criticism from the "535 Secretaries of MOOTW." Unlike the publicly perceived swift action taken in earlier Latin American MOOTW (e.g., Operation Urgent Fury), Operation Restore Democracy can trace its public relations roots back over a year prior to the execution. William Safire writes: By stretching the squishy ultimatums over a year, by his own body language of apology and agonized reluctance in making his case to Americans, Mr. Clinton gave up some of his Presidential war power to Congress while constricting the United States' freedom of action in hemispheric affairs.122 The final months were characterized by an odd combination of forces standing by off-shore and in the U.S., saber rattling, and last minute negotiations led by former President Jimmy Carter. He was certainly the right spokesperson, but was not armed with a clear message. Just weeks after President Clinton called General Cedras and his partners "thugs and murderers," the American people had a hard time reconciling the former president's deal which included the purchase of several of the "murderers'" beach properties.123 All the while, every politician with access to a microphone weighed in with his/her opinion. Everybody was trying to tell his story first; the result was a cacophony of competing public relations efforts that left pre- operation public approval for the operation, a good gauge of the image created, at less than thirty one percent.124 1,2,3,4, What the Hell Are We MOOTW-ing For? There was no coherent, long-term public relations strategy for educating the American people as to the driving reason for our involvement in Haiti. As discussed earlier, the public might well have responded well to the pragmatic. Indeed, eventually a reason for the operation was offered--protect the borders from illegal immigrants--that may have formed a rallying cry. Unfortunately, the Administration, apparently not sensitive to its audience, attempted to persuade the American people with lofty "restoration of democracy" that fell on the deaf ears of Americans who were more interested in the solution to domestic problems.125 Add to this the short-lived public relations theme that General Cedras and company were brutal killers and credibility was sure to be lost if a bargain to work with them was struck. The American people like their villains to remain villains and not turn into "o.k." guys from whom we buy beach houses. When asked if the Administration intended to continue the use of military action without the consent of the American people, he replied: In terms of popular approval, the American people, probably wisely, are almost always against any kind of military action when they first hear about it, unless our people are directly attacked. And they historically felt that way, and obviously at the end of the Cold War, they may be more inclined to feel that way. The job of the president is to do what is right.126 The support of the American people was not forth-coming because the operation was not positioned properly. A clear message was not sent at the national level. The American people were never convinced about "what is right" for operations in Haiti. Consequently, the right image was not created. Although the operation to this point must be characterized by almost all possible measures as a success, the fact that the people's consent was never asked for, nor given, is a harbinger of doom. The patience and Dersistence discussed in Chapter Two has not been granted by the American people. U.S. forces are being pulled out of Haiti ahead of schedule, partially because the Administration realizes that without popular support the operation is a liability. At this writing, the Haitians are not fully prepared to have the Americans leave. The presence ordered by the NCA may well prove inadequate for the long-term success of Operation Restore Democracy because the American people were never convinced there existed a positive cost/benefit ratio for military operations in Haiti. A coherent advertising-based public relations campaign might have delivered the American "will" and in turn, patience and persistence. CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOOTW PUBLIC RELATIONS Future security strategies will probably have the engagement portion of our current NSS as a common denominator. Advertising-based public relations will continue to be an enabling force. Many of the past MOOTW advertising shortfalls on the national level have at their root a lack of a single source, accountable structure for strategic public relations. The future selling of MOOTW must recognize and correct this deficiency. It is clear that, for the military, MOOTW is the functional arm of the engagement strategy. To say that MOOTW is solely a military function, however, is to ignore the lessons of the past. The future of MOOTW must recognize the primacy of public support to its success. That support must be garnered strategically by the civilian leadership and supported operationally by the actions of the military commander and State Department personnel in the MOOTW area of operations. Advertising-based public relations will be a key element in the implementation of our future National Security Strategies' business of engagement. The future of MOOTW advertising will be dependent on the larger strategic reorganization of the functions associated with a "stronger strategic planning effort at the national level."127 The military will need to change also. This change will not be structural but, rather, in approach. Public affairs officers will need to be included as equal battlefield activities players during the planning for and execution of MOOTW. The nature of their functions will not be limited to traditional liaison to the media. Rather a more robust mission of public relations--vice affairs--will need to be planned for and implemented. Former Commander-In-Chief of U.S. Central Command, General Joseph P. Hoar writes: "developing a comprehensive strategy that coordinates all the instruments of national power--not just the military--greatly enhances the probability of achieving the stated objectives."128 Advertising-based public relations is one of those "instruments of national power," and if not utilized may result in a MOOTW not achieving its objectives. Recommendations For Strategic Public Relations As discussed in Chapter Two, strategic public affairs and advertising-based public relations are key to engaging public consideration of security issues. President Clinton, in the conclusion of his 1994 National Security Strategy, addressed the importance of the support of the American people in "engagement abroad": Of all the elements contained in this strategy, none is more important than this: our Administration is committed to explaining our security interests and objectives to the nation; to seeking the broadest public...support for our security programs and investments.129 The President's commitment today must be backed by an organization that can implement and integrate the public relations "lessons learned" from our early forays into MOOTW that will result in future public support for this active engagement policy. The White House, however, is not that organization. White House officials are often more "interested in short- term public relations" than the extended, strategic considerations and planning for MOOTW.130 The heavily partisan approach to national governance that has characterized the twentieth century's second half makes the White House's direct actions suspect in the "selling" of the long-term strategy of MOOTW to the American people. In order to best address past MOOTW public relations shortcomings, a future reorganization of the Administration's indirect arms should be undertaken--they may hold the key to this dilemma. Reorganization. The State Department, National Security Council, and the United States Information Agency all have a stake in the selling of MOOTW. Internationally, the reintegration of many USIA functions into the State Department, while sacrificing some of the independence of USIA, will have the net effect of "building a new public consensus to sustain our engagement abroad," as sought in the NSS. The State Department, with its traditionally lackluster institutional attitude towards public diplomacy, and particularly toward strategic political affairs, would be infused with the passion the USIA has shown in this role.131 USIA, while stripped of its public diplomacy duties, would still be a relatively independent and viable, albeit smaller, operational partner of the State Department. Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. A suggested approach to the above proposal involves the creation of a new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, with authority over the Department's bureaus of Public Affairs, International Communications and Information Policy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and a new bureau which would be responsible for international information, international political affairs and education and cultural affairs.132 This would elevate public diplomacy and, more importantly, MOOTW advertising from its sub-category of strategic public affairs, to the Departmental level where it is under the direct influence of the Administration. Currently, the State Department's Public Affairs Office is at the Assistant Secretary level--right next to the "Chief of Protocol" in the wire diagram.133 The strategic- to-operational public relations disconnect that characterized the Somalia operations might have been avoided had the State Department Public Affairs section had more influence early in the planning process. From another perspective, the above reorganization would give strategic public affairs a much needed home and transform it from a theoretical to an actual sub-element of National Power. Director of Public Diplomacy and Information. Those responsible for White House public affairs tend to be cautious, reactive, and short-term oriented.134 Additionally, there is the institutional pitfall of being overly responsive to their most visible and immediate constituency--the national media. For this reason, it is vital that the NSC work closely with the White House. The public relations disconnect between the strategic humanitarian flavor and the operational realities of Somalia might have been avoided if the NCA had the long-term advertising advice that should be a part of standing considerations for involvement in MOOTW. The creation of a permanent directorate titled "Director of Public Diplomacy and Information" would ensure the president would be advised on this vital area for MOOTW by a source dedicated to strategic public affairs. Since 1982, when a formal committee under the rubric of the Special Planning Group for Public Diplomacy was formed, certain ad hoc public affairs and public liaison activities have assisted in handling issues of salience from a White House point of view.135 Overall, however, a great deal more could be done in the future to foster an Administration's strategic approach to public affairs if a separate and permanent seat at the NSC table was reserved for issues involving public diplomacy and information. The White House and, by extension, the NSC should have the leading role in that approach. Tomorrow's NSC public relations needs, particularly for MOOTW, will be equal to or greater than those of today. The reasons for this, delineated earlier in Chapter Three, are unlikely to change in the future. Domestically, the above proposals would enhance the President's access to the Strategic Public Affairs Bureau at the State Department and the crisis MOOTW public relations efforts at the NSC. Both effects will tend to shorten reaction time to a coming MOOTW and, with the proper coordination, would ensure unity of effort in the initiation, development and dissemination of the national public relations campaign for a particular MOOTW. This approach would help alleviate the perceived vacillation on the commitment of forces to Haiti discussed in Chapter Four. Additionally, the unified effort among the NCA, NSC and State Department would shield the campaign from the "five hundred and thirty five secretaries of MOOTW"--Congress-- until the momentum of a national approach to a particular MOOTW was well developed. As argued earlier, the momentum for Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti never quite got moving, thus the support of the public was never garnered. The shorter reaction time gained from the above reorganization may have allowed a more unified Administration public relations approach and resulted in greater public approval of the operation. Crafting Successful Advertising-based Public Relations Campaigns. When advertising-based public relations is at its most persuasive, and the principles enumerated earlier in Chapter Four are scrupulously followed, the possibility that the American people will "buy" a MOOTW is increased. As discussed, to persuade the American people to support MOOTW, the NCA must educate and inform the public about the cost/benefit ratio. This is a two-step process. First, the positioning of MOOTW in general as the business of our engagement policy must be made early and consistently. Next, the operational commander must make good on the positioning efforts made by the NCA with the actions and non-actions of the forces sent to the MOOTW area. The NCA's vision for the operation must be clear if the message is to get through to the public. Equally important, the message to the public must align with the "commander's intent" to ensure the "product delivered" is the same as the "product advertised." The minimum information that should be encapsulated in the separate foci of a campaign are as follows: + What Enduring National Interest Is Involved - survival as a free and independent nation - a healthy and growing economy - good relations with allied and friendly nations - a stable and secure world environment + What is the practical benefit to the United States - economic - military - political + What are the short and long term costs - monetary - military deployment - depreciation of equipment - risk to deployed personnel - the context of benefits + What is the desired endstate - stability - evacuation - degree of relief + Why the United States should do it, as opposed to someone else. And why it should be done now. These elements need to be integrated in a coherent justification for action that appeals to the pragmatic public. Ideology is fine. It should be introduced, however, only to gain the moral high ground, rather than as an end or justification in and of itself for a MOOTW. Recommendations For Operational-Level Public Relations Looking specifically at the Marine Corps, there is evidence that a strong appreciation of the value of advertising-based public relations for MOOTW is beginning to be understood. However, the formalization process is in its infancy. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program (MSTP) was created to teach the commanders and staffs of the three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) techniques for planning and fighting wars. A key principle of the planning is the division of "battlespace activities" into seven functional areas: Command and control support, maneuver, fires, aviation, intelligence, mobility- countermobility-survivability and combat service support. For MOOTW, however, these seven categories do not cover one of the most important considerations--public relations. Planners for Operation Restore Hope did, however, add another functional area entitled "media." While this does not cover all the aspects of advertising-based public relations, it does at least acknowledge the greater effect the images from the MOOTW country will have on the people of our country. As argued earlier, the way an operation is perceived by its sponsors--the American people--is influenced greatly by the actions and non-actions as they are presented from the MOOTW zone of interest. Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 makes this point: In order to accomplish the larger objectives in [MOOTW], military leaders must consider the effect of all their actions on public opinion. The legitimacy of the actions of an armed force, or even the individual members of the force can have far-reaching effects on the legitimacy of the political system that supports the force. The leader must ensure that his troops understand that a tactically successful operation can also be strategically counterproductive because of the way in which they executed it and how the people perceived its execution. Therefore, the volume and nature of the information passed back to the consuming public demands the attention of the Operational Commander. Today, the media cannot realistically be herded in pools, have their releases delayed, or be exposed to only the images chosen by the commander. What, then, can be done operationally to ensure the perceived execution is as legitimate as the actual execution? Public Relations in a Crisis. At the same time, on the operational level, the response to a crisis must not be purely reactive. The principles discussed in Chapter Four translate, albeit in a compressed manner, to a crisis scenario. The structure of that response in operational terms is nearly as important as the substance of the public relations copy. When integrated at the Marine Expeditionary Force (or equivalent) Headquarters, the following initiatives will enable the utilization of the advertising- based public relations. First, develop, promulgate and frequently review the unit's Public Relations Crisis Response Plan. The commander must be involved in the preparation of this document, for it is he/she advised by the public affairs officer among others, who is the key person during the response to a crisis. The commander is also ideally the primary spokesman. His position gives him the credibility and accountability that the American public demands of our military leaders. Second, initiate the announcement of the problem swiftly. Credibility, according to Wayne L. Pines, is enhanced if bad news is announced by the unit that is potentially most apt to be blamed before it is made public by other means.136 No matter what the damage may be, it is always better to control the tempo of that story by being first and forthright; it is counterproductive to wait for someone else to break the story and then to react. That approach results, unfortunately, in defensive, incomplete information reaching the public. Finally, when a crisis occurs, Pines writes, "don't try to minimize the problem in the press release. It isn't credible. The problem has to be described fully and accurately." He emphasizes the importance of getting it right and complete the first time when he writes, "don't dribble a story out. If a crisis exists, try to tell the entire story at once, rather than keeping it alive in the media while additional facts are being announced." Several small negative stories will have a greater impact on public opinion than will one large negative one.137 Train the Troops. The media have no obligation to speak to or quote the spokesperson designated by the command. In fact, in a recent two-week period, Washington Post articles covering active MOOTW in Somalia and Haiti contained more substantive quotes from random enlisted and staff officers than from official spokesmen or commanders.138 Operationally then, the commander must ensure his individual force members are trained to respond to media inquiries. Other than restrictions on current operational information and classified material, the commander need not dictate what can and cannot be said by his forces. Rather, the larger context of the commander's intent must be understood by all involved in a MOOTW. Much of the information the troops need in order to reach this level of understanding could be disseminated with the rules of engagement (ROE). An explanation of the "why" behind the "what" of ROE will arm the troops with the thought process of the commander and the overarching legal and moral umbrella under which the operation receives its credibility and legitimacy. Both of these are key principles of "selling" MOOTW.139 Both the commander and the Marine in the field can be sure the reporter asking the questions is probably tuned more to the political reasons for, rather than the military realities of the operation. In educating the members of a MOOTW force as to appropriate responses to media inquiries, the commander would do well to remember what General Erwin Rommel said: "The ordinary soldier has a surprisingly good nose for what is true and what is false."140 In MOOTW in particular, it is essential that a rose-colored version of a story is not fed to the troops in the hopes that when asked, they will regurgitate the same to the media. The truth the media is in search of must be shared with the spokespersons--all the members of the military involved in MOOTW. Participating MOOTW members must be made to appreciate the fact that the media--the prime conduit to the American people--has no obligation to give balance. The media is driven by two overarching desires. First, as the guardians of the first amendment, they view themselves as the last line of defense in the battle for the "truth." Second, they are businesses, with bottom lines and payrolls to meet. Media competition is intense. Being "first" with the "most" translates to greater profit margins for a news organization. The operational commander, in particular, must recognize these motivations if he/she is to understand their needs. Access, to a member of the press, equates to "product" which results in satisfying both needs--telling of the "truth" and competitive business profit margin. When both of these conditions are met, the commander and the members of the media will be able to build a relationship of trust based on open lines of communication. MOOTW and the Media. MOOTW provide little opportunity for isolation or pooling of the press once the latter do arrive in the operational area. Generally, the nature of the MOOTW threat will not support these restrictive measures. The media pool system used successfully in Grenada, for example, would actually have been counterproductive in a relatively benign MOOTW scenario. Media personnel would resent their incorporation, and violations would lead to less cooperation and actually a more dangerous situation for press members. The theater commander is wise to garner the respect and cooperation of the media--they tell the story to the American public. Unlike a war zone, a MOOTW area of operations rarely requires members of the press to depend upon military forces for their entry. In fact, they will often be there to report on the off-load. This is a critical time because public relations are often built or destroyed on the foundation of the public's first impressions of the MOOTW's execution. Militarily, this phase is often confusing and can appear disjointed. Neither of which is the image a MOOTW commander wants satellite down-linked to the American public. For these reasons, the story has to be developed initially at the national rather than theater level. Once the story outline exists, the theater commander must maintain the momentum and "write the copy, not edit it."141 Simply stated, the operational commander must understand the NCA's public relations intent and support it in word and deed. Unlike the NCA, however, the theater commander has no direct conduit to the American people. He must depend on communication vehicles that present themselves as targets of opportunity. The most common of these is satellite-fed television. The ideal situation is to have the press act as a public relations campaign conduit from the area of operations. The media will always be a major player in every MOOTW. The Commander that treats the media as a foe is asking for trouble.142 "The media" are not monolithic entities. They are many different businesses. Each employee is an individual driven by his or her own ethics and ambitions. Valerie A. Elbow writes: "Most media representatives are professional and honest in their approach. Unfortunately the few bad apples stand out."143 Wargame Public Relations for MOOTW. Marines have a good habit of putting a sharp staff officer in a "red hat" and requiring him to act as the enemy commander. For each tactical move the U.S. operation plans call for, the designated officer attempts to predict the enemy's reaction. Armed with this countermove he "plays" it against the U.S. plan. Holes and weaknesses, if any exist, are made transparent in this forum rather in the face of the enemy. Similarly, prepared public relations "copy"-- announcements, press releases, etc.--should be wargamed. A senior officer, perhaps a PAO, who has not been involved in the preparation of the copy should put on a "press hat." He/she should then attempt to simulate the public's likely reaction to that copy. Before that information or copy is released, however, it is crucial that the content be evaluated from as many different "takes" as possible to ensure that the advertising -based public relations elements are nested within the NCA's public relations intent. The inherent "filtering" the media will apply must also be considered. Spokesmen should also be "grilled" by the "press hat" as if they were appearing in the harsh glare of a press conference--before they do. Future MOOTW Communications Rules of Engagement. MOOTW rules of engagement (ROE) should be written more by Public Affairs Officers and less by Military Lawyers. The commander should use the ROE to express his intent and his vision for the operation. It would then become the primary communication means that ensures the public relations thread is woven from the NCA to the operational commander to the Marine on the scene. He/she will find it extremely important to have all members of the force understand his overall goals and the way he expects them to conduct themselves. Because the media will be there, as they have been in past MOOTW, to show the American people the actions of their citizen-soldiers, the ROE will be the prime tool to ensure those images are in line with the advertised mission. Information Superhighway. Future advertising of MOOTW will take place on communication conduits that are faster and potentially more biased than those of today. The first indications of this are the constantly widening web of the "internet." As the cable, direct TV, network TV, talk radio, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting compete with emerging on-line computer-based communication systems, the diffusion of a MOOTW will become more likely. The security strategy will reflect the need to engage not only the governments of the world, but the people of the United States. The communications superhighway will tend to blur the lines between American public opinion and international public opinion. To properly advertise MOOTW, the U.S. government will tap into this emerging conduit to the attentive public. This type of engagement is called strategic public affairs and, as a part of public diplomacy, will play a major role in overcoming the obstacles discussed in Chapter Three. The Military's CNN. The American military took its first tentative step in early 1995 to truly compete with CNN for "firstness." In Haiti, miniature video cameras were fitted on the rifles of American soldiers.144 This innovation will allow the NCA to take back control of the tempo of advertising-based public relations. Rather than defensive question answering, the NCA will pose the questions, thus, allowing the NCA and the supporting departments to frame proactive solutions for the American people via the press. Advertising-based public relations will depend on innovations such as the one described above. Just as surely, MOOTW will require the support of the American people acquired through the honest application of public relation principles within a strategic framework defined by the NCA. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION A major tool of the United States' National Security Strategy (NSS), MOOTW are likely to remain one of the most important and visible missions. With those visible missions come a requirement to educate and persuade the American people. Advertising-based public relations for MOOTW is a means to that end. After participating in the negotiations with General Cedras in Haiti, General Colin Powell said: The image that we were all afraid we would see sometime this week has been avoided. And that image was of American youngsters killing Haitian youngsters and Haitian youngsters killing American youngsters. Instead, what we see on our television screens this morning are tentative beginnings of the new relationship....145 It was not the death of the youngsters he said he was afraid of, but rather "the image" of those deaths on American "television screens" that scared him. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not being callous, rather, he was merely acknowledging the power of public opinion while conducting MOOTW. When engaging the world with our military in operations other than war, the United States government must achieve the support of the American people. Only by convincing the American people of MOOTW's favorable cost/benefit ratio can the necessary commitment to "our active engagement abroad" be attained.146 Without the support of the American people, the NCA may be able to order presence of forces to a MOOTW, but will not be granted the patience or persistence to complete many of them. The failure to convince the people of MOOTW's positive cost/benefit ratio has been in part due to the less than adequate effort, at the national level, to overcome the obstacles created by the juxtaposition of military forces involved in operations "other than war." When conducted in the context of our communications-rich, post-Cold War world, it is clear that a strategic approach to advertising-based public relations is required. Advertising techniques, applied within the framework of a strategic-to-operational public relations, are crucial to unlocking the psychological element of national power--the will of the American people. This is accomplished by borrowing effective methods from the commercial advertising world and applying them to the strategic and operational public affairs considerations necessary to garner the people's support for MOOTW. NOTES 1. William Clinton. A National Security of Engagement and Enlargement (The White House, U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994), ii. 2. Clinton, ii. 3. Clinton, ii. 4. Colonel Kenneth Allard, Lessons Learned Somalia: A First Look (Washington, DC, National Defense University, undated draft), 33. 5. Christopher Bassford, "Clausewitz and His Works," in Theory and Nature of War Readings, vol. 1 (Quantico: Command and Staff College, 1994), B-29 6. Bassford, B-17. 7. Patrick M. Cronin, "America's Role in the New World Order," in Strategic Level of War Readings, vol. 2 (Quantico, Command and Staff College, 1994), D-435. 8. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973), xxii. 9. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1966), 184. 10. "Security Assistance and Low Intensity Conflict," in Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) Papers (Langley, VA: Army-Air Force Center Low Intensity Conflict, 1987), 1. 11. Edward L. Bernays, The Engineering of Consent (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), 3. 12. Bernays, 4. 13. Eric Clark, The Want Makers (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1988), 30. 14. Warren Christopher, "The Importance of American Engagement," Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Washington, DC, July 28, 1994). 15. Clark, 31. 16. Clark, 16. 17. The American Heritage Dictionary. New College Edition. Under the word "advertising." 18. The American Heritage Dictionary. Under the word "business." 19. Clark, 150. 20. Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Age of Propaganda (New York: W.H. Freema
