The
Combat Utility Helicopter: What Will
Meet Marine Corps Needs Into
The
21st Century?
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:
The Combat Utility Helicopter:
What Will Meet Marine Corps Needs Into
the 21st Century?
Author:
Major Kenneth G. Inhoff, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:
The Marine Corps should upgrade its combat utility helicopter with the 4BN
system--the
UH-1 version of the proposed AH-1W four-blade system upgrade--to achieve
component
commonality and give it the capability to meet "over the horizon" and
"high-altitude/hot-day"
future mission demands.
Background: There is little doubt that the Marine
Corps' combat utility helicopter needs
replacement
or improvements to increase its maintainability and meet mission demands.
However,
controversy still exists over how this should be done.
Ongoing communication, navigation, and
survivability improvements to the UH-1N will
provide
the Corps with a technologically advanced system capable of meeting night,
all-weather,
and
"high-tech" battlefield requirements into the future. These
improvements meet the
warfighting
modernization efforts described by Marine Corps Commandant, General Al Gray, in
his
"Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress" in 1991.
Yet, the added weight of survivability and
mission equipment coupled with the aging
airframe
and drivetrain are straining maintainability, and put the UH-1N at mission
performance
risk.
Several alternatives exist to solve these problems. Buying new CH-6OMMs would
provide
the
Marine Corps with a capable utility helicopter, but its excessive cost and
size, and its
maintenance
intensiveness offset its benefits. Replacing the UH-1N with a new Bell Model
412
would
provide no additional performance capability, and at a higher cost, than the
UH-1N 412
Mid-Life
Upgrade-the current proposed option. The "off-the-shelf" 412 Mid-Life
Upgrade is
the
lowest cost alternative that will improve maintainability and restore the
UH-1N's lost
performance,
but it does so with old technology that achieves no component
commonality--critical
to improved maintainability, reduced maintenance and aircrew workload,
and
lessening the strain on the aircraft supply system--and will not meet expected
mission
demands.
The
4BN is the only option that achieves maximum component commonality, and meets
"over
the horizon" and "high-altitude/hot-day" mission demands
expected on the future
battlefield.
Although it costs more than the 412 MLU, investment in the 4BN provides
substantial
savings over sustainment of the current UH-1N. Additionally, cost and
operational
effectiveness
analysis calculations show distinct benefits for the 4BN, while disregarding
others
that
mislead budget planners in the cost-versus-demands dilemma.
Recommendation: The Marine Corps should fund the 4BN upgrade
to the UH-1N. It is the
only
alternative that will achieve the greatest degree of component commonality, and
will meet
"over
the horizon" and "high-altititude/hot-day" mission demands
expected on the future
battlefield.
THE
COMBAT UTILITY HELICOPTER: WHAT WILL MEET MARINE
CORPS
NEEDS INTO THE 21ST CENTURY?
"Twenty-two years of mission system
growth has resulted in almost 1000 pounds of
lost
payload. Operations at maximum gross weight with little-to-no...power margins
have
been commonplace. Improved performance is critical to meeting required mission
profiles
for safe/successful completion of current and future missions."1
The preceding observation is reiterated in
similar debates regarding a necessity for
improving
the Marine Corps' combat utility helicopter capability. There is little doubt
that
the UH-1N needs replacement or improvements to increase its maintainability and
meet
mission demands. However, controversy still exists over how this should be
done.
It will be 25 years before a replacement
utility aircraft is fielded. Until that time, the
utility
mission must be filled with a cost and mission effective aircraft.
This paper will highlight ongoing
communication, navigation, and survivability
improvements
to the UH-1N that will provide the Corps with a technologically advanced
system
capable of meeting night, all-weather, and "high-tech" battlefield
requirements
into
the future. It also will look at several controversial utility helicopter
new-purchase
and
upgrade alternatives that attempt to improve maintainability, and meet
"over the
horizon"
and "high-altitude/hot-day" mission demands. The conclusion will
offer a
solution
to the debate on what will meet Marine Corps needs for an effective combat
utility
helicopter into the 21st century?
BACKGROUND
The UH-1N is a 1960's design that has not
been significantly improved since its fleet
introduction
in 1971. Production of the UH-1N ended in 1976. Several significant
structural
and dynamic component deficiencies limit its service life, increase its
operating
and maintenance costs, and reduce its mission performance. Additionally, at
current
usage, the majority of the UH-1Ns will reach their service life limit by the
year
2000.2
Recent funded upgrades, many currently in
operational test phases, will
technologically
advance the communication and navigation capabilities, and survivability
of
the UH-1N. These upgrades will push the Huey into current decade technology.
But
the
added weight of survivability and mission equipment coupled with the aging
airframe
and
drivetrain are straining maintainability, and put the UH-1N at mission
performance
risk.3
A service life extension from 10,000 hours
to 17,500 hours would extend UH-1N
airframe
life until replacement, but would do nothing to increase its maintainability,
nor
speed,
range, and payload performance.
Various solutions to these problems have
resulted in controversy over what will meet
Marine
Corps demands. The most viable are buying a new CH-6OMM Blackhawk or the
commercial
Bell Model 412 (with modifications); or using the current UH-1N with
proposed
AH-1W engines, drivetrain, and four-blade rotor. The proposal for a Bell
Helicopter
Model 412 "variant" of the UH-1N, the currently funded 412 Mid-Life
Upgrade
(MLU), also has gained support over other viable options. Which of these
alternatives
will meet future demands?
CURRENT UH-1N TECHNOLOGY UPGRADES
General A. M. Gray's "Annual Report of
the Marine Corps to Congress" for 1991
outlines
the Corps's direction in technological advancement. His intent has a direct
influence
on today's aircraft improvements.
Our priorities in research and
development, and acquisition programs are based on
the procurement of systems necessary
for projecting forces from the sea, onto the land,
to...navigate and communicate at night
in adverse weather conditions. We are also
upgrading our command, control, and
communications...systems to enhance our ability
to exchange secure, near real-time
tactical information.
Recent
funded upgrades will provide the UH-1N some capability to meet the warfighting
modernization
effort described by General Gray four years ago.
For example, a new communications suite
with three multiband ARC-210 radios will
provide
UH-1N pilots and an airborne ground commander with access to VHF and UHF
frequencies
in AM and FM modes, including satellite communication (SATCOM). The
ARC-210
is equipped with "Havequick" and Single Channel Ground and Air Radio
System
(SINCGARS) jam resistant modes, and is KY-58 secure voice capable.
A Marine Corps Gazette article on maneuver
warfare summed up the need for such a
capability.
The MAGTF commander's area of influence
is several hundred miles beyond the
forward edge of the battle area...[and]
the Air Combat Element's power must communicate
with the Ground Combat and Combat
Service Support Elements in order to synthesize
their individual combat power.4
Battle Assessment Team Aviation reports
from Southwest Asia also identified the
ineffective
tactical communication, unreliable high frequency radios, and the large
theater
of operation as being nearly "communication show stoppers."5 The
recommended
top
priority was SINCGARS.
This communication suite provides the UH-1N
with an internal, state-of-the-art,
airborne
command and control mission capability. It provides for transmitting jam
resistant
secure voice information to air, ground, and shipboard forces beyond the range
of
current line-of-sight radios.
The Fleet Operational Needs Statement
(FONS) for an ASC-26 Airborne Command
and
Control Package also identifies that the "increased demands of the
tactical
commander
to effectively communicate with widely dispersed, highly mobile forces,
operating
beyond line-of-site is paramount to successful mission accomplishment."6
Development
of this UH-1N compatible radio package will provide a greater capability
in
command and control, and radio relay.
Experience gathered from recent operations
likewise affirms Marine Corps needs for
a
night and all-weather navigation capability in its combat helicopters.
Southwest Asia
Battle
Assessment Team Aviation studies document Marine Aircraft Groups -16, -26, and
-50
command elements universal in their recommendation that all helicopters be
retrofitted
with a global positioning system.
The need for a reliable navigation
system in featureless terrain is crucial for successful
employment of modern aircraft. The
global positioning system (GPS) provides rotary wing
aircraft with a basic capability.7
Lieutenant General Pitman's "Aviation
Posture Statement" for fiscal year 1991
additionally
highlights that "successful mission execution depends heavily
on..effective
use
of environmental factors such as darkness and weather to our advantage."8
Funded UH-1N upgrades provide these
advanced capabilities, now necessary on the
modern
battlefield. The UH-1N is scheduled to receive the miniaturized airborne global
positioning
system receiver (MAGR) and the APN-217(V)6 VECP Doppler radar
providing
a navigation capability not tied to inaccurate ground-based transmitters.
To complement the navigation system with a
night vision and marginal weather
capability,
an AN/AAQ-22A Navigational Thermal Imaging System provides high
resolution
forward looking infrared radar (FLIR) imagery.
UH-1 pilots will also use the AN/AVS-7
night vision goggle monocle head up display
(HUD),
adding an additional margin of safety to the night fighting capability. In
conjunction
with the navigation system, the HUD provides position, airspeed, heading,
altitude,
and bearing and distance to a selected waypoint without necessity for
pilot-monitoring
inside the cockpit.
To further enhance navigation and night
fighting capabilities, a FLIR laser range
finder
allows for target identification with precise location information derived
through
the
positioning system and onboard computer. This system increases the accuracy of
the
UH-1N
in its supporting arms control platform role. Projected installation of a laser
designator
will provide the capability to designate those targets during attack.
Additionally, three multi-function, color
displays will provide the pilot, copilot, and
airborne
ground commander with selections of aircraft flight instruments, moving map,
FLIR
imagery, and various tactical mission task and information presentations. These
displays
will greatly reduce the high aircrew workload, especially in the multi-mission
night
fighting combat utility role, and provide the airborne commander a new look at
the
battlefield.
Another warfighting modernization effort is
a UH-1N upgrade for aircraft and crew
protection
from enemy missile threat. An integrated electronic warfare suite will
encompass
the AAR-47 Missile Warning System and APR-39A(V)2 Radar Signal
Detecting
Set for detection and identification of search, acquisition, and missile track
radars;
and the AVR-2 Laser Detecting Set. The suite also passively detects homing
missiles,
and it automatically dispenses countermeasures against detected threats.
Together, the night and all-weather
capability, and increased survivability for the
utility
helicopter are progressing in accordance with General Gray's advanced
technology
visions,
required to operate effectively on the modern battlefield.
Yet, despite the extensive and ongoing
technological upgrades for the UH-1N,
controversy
remains over how to improve the utility helicopter's maintainability,
"over
the
horizon" capability, and "high-altitude/hot-day" performance,
until its replacement is
fielded.
Increased flight demands, increased weight from numerous airframe changes
and
equipment additions, and its aging engine and drivetrain, combine to strain
UH-1N
maintainability
and jeopardize mission performance.
A report from OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
indicated that at 38 degrees and
an
operating altitude of 2000 feet, the UH-1N was ineffective for any mission that
required
lifting a payload or ordnance and was limited to a basic load and crew.9 This
constraint,
demonstrated in a "real world" mission, is indicative of the problems
the
Marine
Corps' combat utility helicopter faces.
ANALYZING THE ALTERNATIVES
The current proposed solution to these
problems is the UH-1N 412 Mid-Life Upgrade
(MLU)
scheduled for fiscal year 1997 funding. The 412 MLU incorporates a four-blade
rotor
system, increased internal fuel capacity, and uprated transmission and tail
drive
system
from the existing commercial Bell Helicopter Model 412. These, in conjunction
with
an uprated engine package will improve UH-1N maintainability and restore its
lost
performance.
Additionally, the Bell Model 412 is
operating throughout the world with proven
success.
This assurance, in conjunction with limited modifications required to install
the
412
MLU in the UH-1N aiframe, make it a relatively risk-free choice.
Buying an off-the-shelf upgrade for the UH-1N
also meets current non-developmental
acquisition
desires. Off-the-shelf buys greatly reduce costs for research and development
and
can still meet stringent military standards, resulting in a lowest cost
alternative.
However, despite the benefits offered by a
412 MLU over current UH-1N shortfalls,
other
new-purchase and upgrade options being considered offer some important
benefits.
One of the new-purchase arguments that
continues to rise in professional discussions,
is
replacing the UH-1N with a new procurement CH-60MM The U.S. Army replaced its
combat
utility Huey fleet with the UH-60 Blackhawk and the Navy already uses the
Seahawk
variation of the H-60.
Preliminary Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis estimates show some
"high-altitude/hot-day"
range and payload advantage with the CH-60MM over the UH-1N
412
MLU.10
The CH-6OMM also provides significant
benefits in survivability compared to other
alternatives.
The Blackhawk is nearly ballistic invulnerable up to l2.7mm and much
more
survivable against the 23mm.11 The H-60 is also more crashworthy than the H-1.
Additional effectiveness would be attained
through some commonality of
components.
A similar Army and Navy helicopter supply system and similar
maintenance
procedures throughout the Department of Defense would reduce parts
redundancy
and increase the "pool" of trained mechanics. Although hard to
quantify,
such
concepts become especially beneficial in joint operations.
The obvious drawback of a new procurement
CH-60MM is its cost. Initial funding for
outfitting
light/attack squadrons is too much to absorb in the short time associated with
fleet
introduction requirements. Additionally, at a 43 percent higher life cycle
cost, the
CH-60MM
option is not a high contender.12 Since wartime attrition costs are not figured
into
the totals, and any wartime losses would account for high figure replacement,
the
option
is less acceptable. Total cost for replacement with the CH-60MM is over three
times
the cost of the UH-1N 412 MLU.
A minor additional drawback is the
development and operational testing involved
with
introduction of a "highbred" H-60. Simply put, the Marine Corps
version of the
H-60
would be a mix of the Army and Navy variants, with shipboard compatibility
characteristics
of the Navy aircraft, and cabin configuration similar to the Army's.
A less evident objection to replacing the
UH-1N with the CH-60MM is the increased
size.
With amphibious assault shipping and air transport at critical limits, a
significantly
larger
utility helicopter would prove harder to deploy, employ, and sustain in combat
Deck
spotting for stowage, launch/recovery, and refuel is already limited,
especially on
smaller
deck ships called on to carry task organized contingents. Such was the case for
the
USS Trenton in 1988, charged with sustaining a task-organized helicopter
squadron
for
ship escort operations. Likewise, UH-1Ns occupy less of the critical space
aboard
C-5,
C-141, or C-17 transports, than CH-60MMs, should the need arise to airlift
utility
mission
helicopters as part of an Air Contingency Force.
Given the argument that one CH-60MM can
carry as much as two UH-1Ns, it would
appear
that less overall airlift and deck spotting would be needed to deploy the
required
H-60s.
But this reasoning disregards the fact that rarely is a lone aircraft flown
into
combat.
Realistically, the same number of H-1 and H-60 helicopters would be needed to
perform
any assigned utility mission. Additionally, a section of H-1 helicopters
certainly
will
perform required missions at less cost per flight hour than a section of
CH-60MMs.
Finally, the CH-60MM is more maintenance
intensive than the UH-1N. Any
additional
personnel requirement violates a Mission Need Statement constraint.13 More
maintenance
hours equals more aircraft down time, or increased squadron manning level,
neither
of which is acceptable with expected deployment tempo and personnel
constraints.
Another new-purchase, although less viable,
option is replacement of the current
UH-1N
(Bell Model 212) with the slightly newer technology, four-blade Bell Model 412.
In
fact, the UH-1N 412 MLU would receive key components from the 412.
The obvious drawback here is the illogical
purchase of a completely new aircraft
when
an existing airframe can be upgraded to like-performance at less cost.
Besides purchase cost, a new airframe must
meet higher survivability demands, in
ballistic
tolerance and crashworthiness, than does an existing aircraft upgrade. The
additional
price for such requirements, including research and development costs, make a
new
Bell Model 412 purchase option less logical.
Another option, offering a tradeoff to the
412 MLU and gaining attention, is
upgrading
the UH-1N with the proposed AH-1W 4BW system--called the 4BN. This
option
offers two critical benefits at reasonable cost that other alternatives do not.
First,
the
4BN achieves substantial increase in component commonality with the AH-1--its
sister
aircraft in the Marine light attack helicopter squadron. Second, the 4BN meets
mission
performance demands for expected "over the horizon," and
"high-altitude/hot-day"
operations of the Corps' combat assault support helicopters.
A closer analysis of these critical benefits
makes the argument against the UH-1N 412
MLU
more evident.
An increased degree of AH-1 and UH-1
aircraft component commonality has been
pursued
by Marine light attack helicopter squadron commanders and acquisition planners
since
the compositing of the attack and utility squadrons in 1982/83. In fact, the
Marine
Corps
Master Plan calls for reduction of different type, model, and series aircraft
in the
Marine
Corps' inventory to more capable multi-mission aircraft. Anticipated
replacement
of the AH-1W, UH-1N, and retired OV-10, with a single type "vertical
takeoff
and landing attack/observation" (VMAO) aircraft, shows an effort toward
this
goal.
Likewise, AH-1 and UH-1 avionics will achieve 68 percent commonality with
planned
upgrades.
In the interim, the forecasted 4BW upgrade
of the AH-1W offers the Marine Corps an
opportunity
to install common rotor, engines, transmission, and tail drivetrain in the
AH-1
and UH-1 helicopters. Even cursory analysis reveals the logic of having similar
parts and maintenance procedures for attack and utility versions of the H-1.<
