Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile Development

Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile Development - Employment

And The Cost Of Global Presence

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy

MILITARY ISSUES PAPER

CONVENTIONAL AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

DEVELOPMENT - EMPLOYMENT

AND THE

COSTS OF GLOBAL PRESENCE

Major Stephen R. Hess

Marine Corps University

Command and Staff College, Conference Group 10

18 April 1995

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii

DEVELOPMENT 2

EMPLOYMENT 10

TRAINING 10

OPSEC 13

COSTS OF GLOBAL PRESENCE 16

CONCLUSION 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY 22

END NOTES 24

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile: Development -- Employment and the

Costs of Global Presence

Author: Major Stephen R. Hess, USAF

Thesis: The development of the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in the late 1970's

initiated a technological revolution that changed the way America projects power. This

capability is continuing to mature as follow-on generations of conventional stand-off

precision munitions are being acquired and fielded by the U.S. military.

Background: The initial decision to acquire ALCM's came at the cost of canceling the

B-1A bomber in January 1977 by President Jimmy Carter. The reason was twofold: first,

cruise missiles deployed on existing platforms (the B-52s) came out as more cost effective;

and second, the estimates of the air defenses of the time allowed a large number of

ALCM's to strike their assigned targets--thus allowing follow-on generation cruise

missiles to be fielded in time to counter any advance in enemy air defense capabilities.

Interest for a conventional variant of the nuclear ALCM stemmed from the rash of

terrorist attacks aimed at American citizens in the late 1970's and 1980's. In May 1986,

USAF tasked Boeing Aircraft Company to determine the feasibility of converting the

nuclear-tipped ALCM with a conventional blast fragmentation warhead. Thus began a

"black" development, acquisition and testing process that eventually led to the fielding of

the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) in time for use in Operation

DESERT STORM. Security constraints of the weapon mandated a very small cadre of

crewmembers and staff have access to the system. The tight security requirements and

limited man power strained training and Operational Security (OPSEC) procedures

considerably. Since the Gulf War, the roles and mission of the various U.S. military

branches have undergone close scrutiny--a peace dividend. As a result, the forward

presence of all branches of the military continues to be reduced as the force structure

draws down. The most economical means to fill this gap is through the "global presence"

offered by the CALCM and other stand-off weapons.

Recommendation: The traditional "man-in-the-loop" approach to target destruction has

a stand-off option that needs to be emphasized, funds allocated, additional weapons

procured, and training priority elevated.

CONVENTIONAL AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

DEVELOPMENT - EMPLOYMENT

AND THE

COSTS OF GLOBAL PRESENCE

The air launched cruise missile (ALCM)... has a technology with

tremendous growth potential, and we see embarking on technology work

that is going to lead to a second, third and fourth generation air-launched

cruise missile which 20 years from now will have a tremendous impact on

how we maintain our national security.1

This quote from Thomas Reed, the Secretary of the Air Force in 1976, clearly

delineates the decisive role that cruise missiles were about to play in the balance of power

in the nuclear arena. Soon after Secretary Reed spoke these words, the increased reliance

on the developing cruise missile came into sharp focus. Shortly after Jimmy Carter

became President in 1977, he canceled the B-1A bomber program.2 The reason was

twofold: first, cruise missiles deployed on existing platforms (the B-52s) came out as more

cost effective; and second, the estimates of the air defenses of the time allowed a large

number of ALCM's to strike their assigned targets--thus allowing follow-on generation

cruise missiles to be fielded in time to counter any advance in enemy air defense

capabilities.3

The world has undergone dramatic changes from the height of the Cold War; the

monolithic Soviet threat has all but disappeared, the Warsaw Pact has been dismantled,

and numerous smaller regional contingencies now strain the limits of the U.S. military.

The basic premise of Thomas Reed's vision in 1976 is just now coming to fruition, only

not with the threat of mutual Armageddon looming, but with the advent of economical

employment of next generation conventional long range precision guided munitions

(PGM's).

The "next generation" cruise missile is primarily a modification of the nuclear armed

AGM-86B, a system that underwent considerable testing and flight verification before

becoming operational in 1982.4 Interest for a conventional variant of the nuclear system

stemmed from the rash of terrorist attacks aimed at American citizens in the late 1970's

and 1980's. This paper will discuss on the post-1986 development of the AGM-86C

(Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile/CALCM), operational considerations for the

employment of this weapon during DESERT SHIELD-DESERT STORM, and will

conclude with an economic analysis of the use of precision stand-off weapons as it applies

to the evolving military strategy of "GLOBAL PRESENCE."

DEVELOPMENT

The arrival of the cruise missile emerged dramatically on

June 13, 1944, when the first of more than 10,000 German V-1's

were launched against England. The United States was quick to

emulate the Germans. Thus ensued a series of development programs to field a viable

long-rang cruise missile5--all of which lacked desired reliability and accuracy. The

CALCM program began in earnest after the United States raided Libyan terrorist facilities

and training camps in April 1986. Operation EL DORADO CANYON, though successful

in retaliating against terrorist attacks on Americans in Europe and effectively deterring

further terrorist activities6 for some time, proved to be an extremely expensive and

complicated mission. EL DORADO CANYON took considerable time to plan and

coordinate, required the movement of two aircraft carriers,7 involving dozens of fighters

and air refueling tankers, and complicated further by France and Spain's refusal of to

allow overflight of their countries. "When it was all over, an F-111 and its crew had been

lost, and some errant bombs had injured or killed civillians."8 In the wake of this mission,

the Air Force senior leadership reaffirmed the necessity of a long range, conventionally

armed weapon that was capable of surgical precision--a weapon that would not require the

"shooters" to overfly their targets.

In May 1986, USAF headquarters contracted Boeing Aircraft Company, the original

contractors for the ALCM, to determine the feasibility of converting the W-80 nuclear

tipped missile with a conventional blast fragmentation warhead. The specifications called

for a weapon with a large enough warhead to produce desired effects, while limiting

undesirable collateral damage. The end result gave the CALCM the blast "effect" of a

2000 pound bomb using less than 1000 pounds of explosive. The Air Force also

requested modifications to improve the accuracy of the missile. The replacement of the

digital terrain correlation and mapping functions of the original missiles inertial navigation

set with the emerging technology resident in the Global Positioning System (GPS)

accomplished this specification, thereby giving the weapon pinpoint accuracy.

A classified number of weapons (eventually given the designation of AGM-86C or

"CALCM") were modified at a cost of $380,000 (FY 90 dollars) each.9

The entire program was under the protection of a "black-world" cloak of secrecy, and

so closely guarded that "less than 20 people in the Pentagon and Capitol Hill knew of the

weapon until just prior to DESERT STORM."10 The Air Force wanted these weapons to

be a complete surprise for two reasons; first, externally they were nearly indistinguishable

from their nuclear tipped counterparts11 and might complicate pending arms control

negotiations with the former Soviet Union; and second, only a few GPS satellites were

operational in the late 80's; therefore, a potential adversary could easily know when these

navigation satellites were in optimum position to insure highest accuracy, making the time

of arrival of these weapons predictable.12

The "black-world" cloak of secrecy was also required to satisfy the operational need to

get a limited number of CALCM's ready within one year. This "black" status allowed

action officers to invoke senior authority to open doors and slip past routine bottlenecks.

Armed with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), the Chief of Staff

(CSAF) and the Commander of the Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), officers in

charge of the CALCM were able to move ahead with little, if any, delay from the

otherwise normal bureaucratic processes. The power that this "cloak" provided brought

with it the necessity for the handful of people associated with the program, both Air Force

and Boeing contractors, to work 16 to 18 hours a day to fulfill the CSAF's requirement to

have a limited capability by early June 1987.13

Considerable debate revolved around what base was going to get the mission of

employing the CALCM. From an operational prospective, basing the CALCM at a B-52H

wing would optimize the better fuel efficiency inherent in the turbofan engines of the H

model. However, these initial basing considerations were not supportable, for then, the

B-52G was evolving into a "conventional only" role, and the B-52H's were concentrating

on a larger role in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The option to allow

potential CALCM missions to be executed by the more fuel efficient B-52H's were

recommended by then Eighth Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Peek--an option

that would resurface in August 1990. Hence, the decision to base the CALCM at the 2d

Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB Louisiana, revolved around three main reasons, First, there

were two bomb squadrons assigned to the wing that would provide aircraft and trained

crews. Second, adequate room in the weapon storage facility existed for these sensitive

weapons. Third, this base was the home of the 49TES (Test and Evaluation Squadron),

which was responsible for initial testing and integration of the ALCM (and the CALCM)

into the Strategic Air Command, thereby provided an excellent cover story for testing.

The first test, scheduled for April 1987, was postponed until May 1987 due to

technological growing pains associated transmitting mission data to the CALCM by the

bomber carrier aircraft. Once this was resolved, the first operational flight of the CALCM

produced outstanding results-locking onto four GPS satellites and landing within

tolerances to the target. The second test, later in May 1987, lasted less than two minutes,

when the missile failed to attain powered flight. Failure of the separation pin switch on

release caused the missile's engine not to start. A correction to the problem was

engineered and incorporated into the remainder of the weapons procured.14

The third test, at the start of July, showed much better results. The missile, containing

a conventional warhead, was fired from 30,000 feet. The missile flew the entire pre-

programmed navigation profile and detonated near the target. The target was "extensively

damaged." This test persuaded General Welch and the AFCS to extend the CALCM test

program that otherwise would have concluded in October 1987 with the fourth flight.

General Welch directed two more tests be performed to build a "higher level of

confidence." Though successful in its own right, this test pointed out the need for

additional flight testing to determine a consistent altitude computational error, and

demonstrate greater accuracy inherent with GPS guidance.15

The fourth test, set for mid-October 1987, was the first "operational end-to-end flight,"

and saw the CALCM display improved accuracy only to display some old and new

difficulties. Much of the test went as planned, with the missile demonstrating the ability to

navigate the entire pre-programmed flight profile. However, the altitude computation

error manifested itself in a new way--the warhead failed to detonate. Later analysis

indicated that an interface unit and warhead fuzing could be to blame. While no precise

cause was determined, this failure prompted General Welch to recommend further

"confidence tests" in the future.16

Two tests in December 1987 completed the initial round of test flights and confirmed

the operational viability of the CALCM. On 1 December, the testing arena was moved to

the Pacific Missile Test Center at Point Magu Naval Test Range, California, in order to

take advantage of greater operational realism offered by the location on the West Coast.

The first test was cut short when range safety officers aborted the test 30 seconds from the

target due to an erroneous display in the mission control center. The display indicated a

violation of the safety corridor. After correcting the display problem, the "ideal test"

followed on December 4. After flawlessly executing the navigation profile, the missile

destroyed the target with a terminal accuracy consistent with the GPS guidance system.17

CALCM gained initial operational capability status in January 1988, providing the

capability to employ conventional cruise missiles. Security considerations dictated that

only two flight crews, a handful of maintenance personnel, and a limited number of staff

planners were allowed access into the system. Twenty-one months from the initiation of

the CALCM program, trained crews and support staff awaited execution of another

Libyan type raid, or even larger operation, thus fulfilling the capability that General

Gabriel envisioned after Operation EL DORADO CANYON.18

The CALCM program experienced sudden failure in October 1989 when during a test

mission the missile crashed three minutes into flight over the Utah Test Range.

Investigation revealed that the weapon exploded shortly after reaching its first navigation

point, and was directly linked to premature fuze detonation. The investigation further

revealed that the power requirements of the missile were incompatible with the power

requirements of the fuze. The fix would require a phase in period of 90 days to fix the

power and fuze computability problems.19

The following test in May 1990 also ended in failure. Designed primarily to test the

viability of the fixes from the October test, specifically the fuzing and power stability, a

new missile receiver hardware/software combination was also included in this mission.

While this failure was frustrating, it was not a catastrophic setback. The probable cause

for this failure was an electrical short associated with the basic airframe--a problem

identified on a ALCM test in late December 1989. The correction was not incorporated

into the missile in time for this CALCM test.20

The real dilemma that faced the CALCM team was the perceived unreliability of the

system. This perception prevented SAC from offering up the CALCM as an option to be

used during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As a result of this concern, the Acquisition

Division of the Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/AQ) created a "Tiger Team" to determine

what went wrong with the missile and how it could be repaired. SAF/AQ recommended

an unprecedented "double launch" on August 21, 1990, to verify the fuze fix and test

procedure, but more importantly to increase the commands' confidence in the weapon.21

The double launch was a test and evaluation first--never before had SAC launched

more than one cruise missile on any given test. These launches were "100 percent

successful" and achieved accuracy well within the parameters established for GPS. The

elation of the success did not last for long. Immediately after the launch, SAC test

officials were tasked to launch a CALCM from the B-52H's internal common strategic

rotary launcher (CSRL), a feat that had never been performed. The challenge was further

complicated by the mandate it be performed within three days!

The process of compressing four months of preparation into three days began. The 7th

Bomb Wing from Carswell AFB, Texas, deployed a crew and aircraft. A CSRL specific

mission tape was cut, and the test was flown on August 24, 1990. Again with a "100

percent successful" launch and an accuracy consistent with the test on August 21,22 and

just in time. For this test validated the ability of the CALCM to perform within an

acceptable reliability actor and justified SAC placing five B-52G's on alert at Barksdale

AFB, Louisiana, on August 18, 1990--targeted against critical elements in Iraq.

The development of the CALCM, the reason for the abbreviated acquisition time, and

the need for extreme security measures were all actors surrounding the intended

"surprise" use of this weapon. The technological advantage in accuracy inherent in GPS

guidance, the relatively small radar cross section (stealth characteristics), and the ability to

destroy an objective in "less than a day...on any spot on the globe"23 gives the CALCM

this high degree of surprise. The normal "long and leaky process of the weapon

acquisition"24 was bypassed during the development and testing of the CALCM through

the use of compartmentalized "black" access to the system. Clausewitz's statement that

"the two factors that produce the highest degree of surprise are speed and secrecy"25

embodies the rational for the level of security and secrecy surrounding the procurement of

the CALCM.

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EMPLOYMENT

The five months following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

allowed the Air Force to prepare for the eventual launch

of the CALCM strike from Barksdale AFB. During this

time two areas of the mission were identified as critical to

its success-training, and operations security (OPSEC)

requirements.

TRAINING

The training of the crews required a considerable undertaking. Due to the security and