De-Fanging The Cobra: Staking The Future On Unproven Weapons

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: DE-FANGING THE COBRA: STAKING THE FUTURE ON UNPROVEN

WEAPONS

Author: Major Scott P. Haney, United States Marine Corps

Problem Statement: The Army and the Marine Corps are "jumping the gun" by

canceling future buys of the Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided Missile

(TOW), without ensuring an adequate replacement missile exists.

Discussion: Allowances are not being made by the Army and the Marine Corps for the

possibility that the Joint Advanced Weapon System (JAWS), the missile planned to

replace TOW and possibly Hellfire, may not satisfy the requirements and needs for the

Marine Corps' attack helicopters. TOW has a shelf life of 10 years. Planned operational

fielding of the JAWS missile is 2005, but the last planned purchase of TOW missiles for

the Army and Marine Corps has already taken place.

There is a trend in the military services due to diminished procurement fluids to have

each weapon system perform a myriad of tasks. By performing multiple missions, there

is a risk that the performance of the weapon system may be degraded. While TOW and

Hellfire are very good at destroying point target and armor targets, the JAWS missile's

capabilities may be lessened by tasking it to also perform as an air-to-air missile.

Lastly, if the JAWS missile does not perform as planned in testing, it will be too late

to turn the TOW production line back on, as the vendors and expertise will have

disappeared.

Conclusion: The TOW missile should be retained and the production line kept open until

JAWS or another precision guided missile proves to be superior to TOW.

CONTENTS

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTACK HELICOPTER 7

Vietnam, 12

The Precision Guided Missile, 19

Post Vietnam, 20

3. DOCTRINE/TASKING 24

The Weapons, 26

Tactics/Weapons Matching, 28

Guidance Theory, 31

MCLOS Guidance, 31

SACLOS Guidance, 32

4. WEAPONS DESCRIPTION, ANALYSIS, AND TACTICS 38

TOW Missile, 38

Hellfire Missile, 43

Weaknesses of Existing Precision Guided Missiles, 46

Research and Development, 48

Joint Advanced Weapon System (JAWS) Background, 49

Mission and Threat Analysis, 52

4. CONCLUSION 56

Bibliography 58

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Wing Stores Stations 27

2. TOW Missile 39

3. Hellfire Missile 43

4. JAWS Missile 50

CHAPTER 1

The use of precision guided munitions by the United States military is a practiced

and expected way of waging war, and of operations other than war (OOTW).

Desert Storm is the first image that typically comes to mind when the subject of

precision guided munitions is discussed. One imagines precision strikes by fixed wing

aircraft bombing Baghdad or Kuwait using laser guided bombs, or attack helicopters

carrying precision guided missiles to destroy Iraqi tanks with first round hits.

Operations other than war (OOTW) such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in

Somalia will probably account for the majority of conflicts in the near future. OOTW

operations require very close integration between the infantryman on the ground and the

aircraft supporting him. With television cameras glaring, the commander on the ground

can not afford the collateral damage that may occur with free fall iron bombs or aerial

unguided rockets.

Indeed, precision guided munitions give the commander a capability that comes

close to guaranteeing a surgeon-like ability to cleanly and antiseptically destroy the

enemy's ability to fight without the collateral damage that a commander would accept as

a given in prosecuting past wars or conflicts. The statistics for Desert Storm showed

precision guided missiles fired from attack helicopters approaching an accuracy rate for

hitting the correct target of 95%1.

This capability that precision guided munitions have afforded the military

commander and planners is a double edged sword. This double edged sword consists of

a technological increase in capability and effectiveness on one side countered with an

increased (sometimes unrealistic) expectation of mission success regardless of the

situation on the other side.

Desert Storm highlighted the successes of the military procurement/acquisition

system in preparing for war by fielding modern weapons. However, there were

notable failures in the procurement system. The last of the Marine Corps' reconnaissance

squadrons, VMFP-3, retired just days before the Iraqi's invaded Kuwait, leaving the

Marine Corps practically blind. VMFP-3 was an RF-4 Phantom squadron whose sole

purpose was to provide timely tactical reconnaissance. The squadron deactivated with

the promise that the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) pod

would be fielded soon, providing a fixed-wing tactical reconnaissance (TAC-RECCE)

capability to the F/A-18 Hornet. The Marine Corps and Navy are still waiting to field

the ATARS system, and still do not possess a tactical reconnaissance capability.

The very things that make the attack helicopter attractive to the battlefield

commander are its ability to perform a varied number of tasks on the battlefield. No

other aircraft can fly, land, shutdown, and brief face to face with the ground forces where

they live. No other aircraft can provide the Ground Combat Element with two hours of

on-station time, 8 precision guided anti-armor missiles, and its own suppressive fire.

Underneath the smoke clouds caused by the burning oil fields in Southwest Asia, it was

the Supercobra providing the Ground Combat Element with precision guided anti-armor

weapons.2

To satisfy these requirements a number of different types of ordnance must be

available to the attack helicopter to ensure that it can adequately meet these different

tasks without compromising effectiveness due to a shortfall in weapons capability.

This paper will argue that the Army and Marine Corps are "jumping the gun"

by canceling future buys of the Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wired guided missile

(TOW) without ensuring an adequate replacement exists. The Marine Corps and Army

are not making allowances for the possibility that the Joint Advanced Weapon System

(JAWS) may not satisfy the requirements and needs for Marine Corps attack helicopters.

These requirements are being met by TOW and Hellfire, the presently fielded precision

guided missiles.

The ability to use one round of ammunition that costs a few thousand dollars to

destroy a tank that costs a few million dollars, to hit and destroy a target with little or no

collateral damage, dramatically increases the military's effectiveness in some areas that

would have been unimaginable a few years ago. This technological improvement in

accuracy and firepower occurs without a resulting spread in the collateral damage.

However, this improvement in capability has also has a down side. The media and the

military may second guess how a target should be destroyed and by what type of

weapon system. Presumptions and expectations have increased as a result of the

successes that precision guided munitions afforded the military in the past two decades.

The media and the American people have come to regard precision guided munitions as

the panacea for all types of military targets, and that fratricide should be a thing of the

past. Collateral damage to buildings, non-combatants, or civilians on the periphery of

an attack or conflict is completely unacceptable. One can understand why a

commander, with CNN filming the event, and presented the choice of his attack

helicopter firing a TOW or Hellfire missile at an enemy building or tank rather than

unguided rockets, chooses the Hellfire or TOW.

This relationship between technology, the commander, and the media has resulted

in a new term, the Revolution in Military Affairs, or what a study by the Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) termed the "Revolution in Warfare".

In 1993 the CSIS devoted an entire report to the revolution, "a fundamental

advance in technology, doctrine or organization that renders existing methods of

conducting warfare obsolete."3 Is the post-Gulf War US military being driven by the

belief in technology, this so-called Revolution in Military Affairs?

The United States Army and Marine Corps have canceled future procurement of the

TOW missile for their attack helicopters. TOW was one of the first success stories in

employing precision guided munitions.4 TOW, and possibly Hellfire (and probably

Stinger missile for the Army), are planned for replacement with the Joint Advanced

Weapons System that has yet to be tested or produced. Planned operational fielding of

the JAWS missile is 2005. TOW has a shelf life of 10 years, but the last planned

purchases of TOW for the Army and Marine Corps have already taken place.

There is a trend in the military services, due to diminished procurement funds, to

have each weapon system perform a myriad of tasks. The logic is that less money

requires a reduction in the number of weapon systems that can be procured. This study

will examine if this reduction will result in a less capable, less versatile attack helicopter

for the Marine Corps.

NOTES

1 LtCol. Barry M. Ford, USMC, "The Future is Attack Helicopters" Parameters,

No.9, (September 1994): 54.

2 Capt Mike Rocco, USMC, Supercobra, Superdeal, (Quantico, Va: Writing

requirement for the Writing Program at the Amphibious Warfare School), Feb. 1993.

3 Dr. David Jablonsky, Colonel, USA (Ret.), "US Military Doctrine and the

Revolution in Military Affairs" Parameters, No.3, (Autumn 1994): 19.

4 Maj. J.C. Burns, USA, "XM-26 TOW: Birth of the Helicopter as a Tank

Buster" Master of Military Studies AY:1993-94 Command and Staff College Marine

Corps University.

CHAPTER 2

In tracing the development of the attack helicopter, one must look to the United

States Army as the real impetus for the development of this type of aerial gun platform.

During World War II, the United States Marine Corps, the other service besides the

Army with ground combat troops, enjoyed the luxury of possessing its own fixed wing

aircraft with the primary mission of close air support, or CAS. Close air support is

defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as, "Air action against hostile targets that are in close

proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with

the fire and movement of those forces."1 The Army was dependent on the Army Air

Corps for its close air support, a mission that Air Corps conventional wisdom and

leadership did not enthusiastically embrace.

Dating back to Douhet and Mitchell, the Army Air Corps' mindset was that strategic

and interdiction bombing was a much more effective way to wage war than by using

these aircraft for close air support. In 1937 the differing attitudes between the US Army

fliers on one hand and the US Navy and Marine Corps fliers on the other, were summed

up in this manner.

Low altitude dive bombing from scout and observation airplanes armed

with light fragmentation bombs was practiced by the Marine Corps in some of

their small wars operations as early as 1927. Naval aviation began experiments

with dive-bombing fighters about the same time. The present development of

high altitude, high speed dive bombing began, however, with the advent of the

Curtiss Helldiver in 1930. This airplane was the forerunner of the present type

heavy dive bomber, and was instrumental in the formulation of dive-bombing

technique and tactics, as practiced by (American) naval aviation today.

The (Army) Air Corps has conducted some dive bombing experiments with

pursuit airplanes in recent years, but has never evolved any tactics for the

employment of dive bombers as a class. At present there are no airplanes

within the army air forces capable of being used as dive bombers. At the end

of World War II, despite the 1945 publication of the US strategic bombing

survey, which clearly illustrated the shortcomings of massive bombing raids on

Axis nations, the Air Force clung to its belief in the effectiveness of strategic

bombing.2

Military historians remember the National Defense Act of 1947 as the Air Force's

emancipation document. However, the NDA of 1947 and the subsequent Key West

Agreement of 1948 set forth clear obligations for both the Army and the Air Force. The

Air Force tasks were to:

furnish close combat and logistical air support to the Army, to include airlift,

support, and resupply of Airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical

reconnaissance, and interdiction of enemy land power and communications.3

The realities of fighting a ground war in Korea forced the Air Force to shift its

priorities from the strategic targeting and bombing of North Korea (as there were few

strategic targets) to concentrating on interdiction and close air support. Although this

was not the way the Air Force preferred to fight, Air Force close air support probably

prevented the Allied forces from being overwhelmed at the Pusan perimeter.

During the Korean War the Army was not satisfied with the lack or perceived lack of

close air support that they received from the Air Force. The Air Force, on the other hand,

stated that in the first seventy five days of operations in Korea, close air support had

consumed two thirds of the total sortie capability of the Far East Air Forces. Some in the

Army also believed that jets were a less efficient platform to provide close air support

than had been the propeller driven aircraft.4

The performance of the Marines in Korea with their own organic aviation support only

confirmed what many Army leaders already had come to realize as a result of their

experiences in World War II. One of the believers in the importance of aviation to

ground forces was Major General Howze. General Howze had been with the 1st

Armored Division in World War II and had fought in North Africa. One battle in

particular, Sidi-Bou-Zid, where the Germans had beaten the Americans, made a lasting

impression on General Howze.5 In this battle, air superiority played a significant role in

the Axis victory.

The contrast between the methods of the Marine Corps fliers and those of the Army

was given voice by ground troops. Air Force Magazine quoted three anonymous press

reports:

July 1950: "What was needed of course, was a couple of old fashioned Marine

Divisions with their integrated Air Force." 19 August 1950: "We want no more

of these jet jockeys. They don't have enough fuel to stay in our areas long enough to

find out where we are having trouble. And they don't have enough fire power to do

any real good. Give us those Marines." 26 November 1950: "A lot of GIs in

Korea are wishing for a big "umbrella" like the one "issued to the Marines when

they go out in a storm."6

The Marine Corps was fortunate enough to have kept its air arm after the National

Defense Act of 1947, and this air arm was oriented to supporting ground warfare.

Marines who fought in Korea recall that the Army loved having their close air support

come from Marines flying Corsairs. The Army understood that, unlike the Air Force,

CAS was Marine aviation's primary mission, not something Marines did when other

missions allowed.

With the election of Eisenhower as President, and the end of the Korean War, the

U.S. entered an era of military fiscal restraint. Nuclear weapons delivered by the Air

Force and Strategic Air Command (SAC) anywhere in the world promised "more bang

for the buck" for the American taxpayer. SAC believed these weapons of mass

destruction to be infinitely more cost effective than the old pre-nuclear weapons of

infantry, armor, and artillery. Strategic air power continued to hold the dominant

position in the Air Force, with the Eisenhower Administration supporting the Air Force

and SAC.

The Army perceived the Air Force as lacking interest in providing Close Air

Support to the Army. The Air Force prevented the Army from flying any but the most

benign types of fixed wing. For these reasons, the Army began to experiment with

helicopters in the armed role. In 1950 the Army and Bell Helicopter collaborated on

experimentally arming the OH-13 observation helicopter. It was the US Army in

Korea that first used the armed helicopter in combat. The French also tried a variety of

armament on helicopters in their futile attempt to hold onto Algeria.7

In 1956, Brigadier General Carl Hutton, the first commandant of the Aviation School

at Camp Rucker, and a proponent of armed helicopters, was determined that the Army get

back into the air, supporting their own troops. General Hutton directed Colonel Jay D.

Vanderpool, the first director of combat developments for the Aviation School to form a

prototype unit of armed helicopters. Vanderpool's first efforts resulted in the successful

arming of helicopters with rockets and .50 caliber machine guns. The outcome of these

trials was very positive. Perfecting an anti-tank weapon for the helicopter interested

Vanderpool even more.8

The Continental Army Command (CONARC), the new name of Army Ground Forces,

was also trying to find a weapons system that would allow helicopters to kill armor.

CONARC instructed Fort Rucker to obtain the French SS-10 antitank missile and test it

from a helicopter. Two OH-13 helicopters selected for the test were installed with SS-10

airborne launching and guidance instruments. Although the results indicated poor system

performance, Vanderpool recalls their being better than any other existing antitank

systems.9 The Army did not adopt the SS-10 system. This left the Army searching for

a future missile with which to arm their helicopters for an anti-armor role.

While the anti-armor role for helicopters interested Vanderpool and CONARC,

Vanderpool also experimented with the airmobile and assault division concept Colonel

Vanderpool took his lead from General Hutton, who started out his concept of "Sky

Cavalry" by borrowing from the Duke of Wellington's ideas on cavalry, in which the

cavalrymen fought from mounts, the dragoons dismounted to fight as infantry, and all

were supported by horsemobile artillery. Formed in March of 1957, this unit was the