Can Too Much "Jointness" Disjoint The Marine Corps CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Can Too Much 'Jointness' Disjoint The Marine Corps? Author: Major Randall A. Hodge, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps' current focus on 'MEF Warfighting' and 'Service Componency' in joint operations poses a threat to the continued survivability of the Corps as an independent military service. Background: U.S. Marines have one of the finest 'warrior' reputations in the world, yet the Corps has struggled for more than two centuries to maintain its relevance in the U.S. national defense. History clearly attributes the Marine Corps' survival to its naval and expeditionary character, coupled with its unique application of combined- arms tactics. Marines have enjoyed unparalleled battlefield success during major U.S. wars at the tactical level under the operational command of Navy and Army forces. Over the past several years, the Marines have 'crept' into the realm of operational level warfighting. Marine forces are routinely participating in Joint Task Force (JTF) operations around the globe and in many cases have assumed JTF leadership. The excitement of playing in the 'Big League' has thrust the Corps' warfighting philosophy beyond its capability to function effectively and efficiently as a tactical warfighting organization. As the Marine Corps prepares itself for the 21st century, it is training more like an Army Corps than an integral element of the Navy-Marine team. Recommendation: To survive as an institution, the Marine Corps must remain faithful to its traditional roles in the U.S. national defense. America still needs a force in readiness that is naval in character and expeditionary in nature. CAN TOO MUCH 'JOINTNESS' DISJOINT THE MARINE CORPS? For more than two centuries, U.S. Marines have eagerly embraced those missions, functions and warfighting concepts that offered the best prospect of an enduring role in the national defense. "The Marine Corps has never surrendered a major function or had one stripped from it."1 Innovation, adaptation and reliable performance embellish the Corps' history; however, it is chiefly our naval characteristic and combined-arms prowess to which we owe our institutional survival. In today's rapidly changing global environment, all branches of the U.S. military are making necessary adjustments to maintain their relevance. The Marines however, are exhibiting an especial propensity for overindulgence in the joint and combined warfare arena that threatens the very existence of our Corps as a separate service. This paper will briefly explore the Marines' historic struggle for survival, followed by an analysis of current trends and issues. The Marines' Forte - Soldiers of the Sea Marines were created to serve as soldiers of the sea and throughout history have 'specialized' in the conduct of military operations from the sea Although Marines served gallantly on land and at sea in every action called upon during the late 18th and 19th century,2 it wasn't until the early 1900s that the Marine Corps finally latched on to a function of enduring value. Following the Spanish-American War, the Navy's war strategy underwent significant evolution in order to protect America's overseas empire, as well as the continental United States from possible invasion. The Navy's solution to the preservation of this maritime domain was the establishment of advanced naval bases at strategic outposts, which necessitated the creation of an advanced base force to defend those installations. In a 1916 Marine Corps Gazette article, Colonel John A. Lejeune described the impact of the Marines' new enduring function: If...the Marine Corps can be utilized as an Advance Base organization, it would have the opportunity to share with the Navy the glory always resting on those who strike the first blows at the enemy, and it would also have the satisfaction of feeling that it had an important, semi-independent duty to perform and that on the manner of its performance would largely depend the success or failure of the fleet.3 Marines continued to serve in their primary capacity as soldiers of the sea until the eve of U.S. involvement in World War I. Since the war in Europe was not envisioned as one of major naval confrontations, the Marines would serve, in the words of Colonel Lejeune, "as the Advance Guard of the Army." The Corps grew significantly during World War I and for the first time it participated in sustained land combat directly under a U.S. Army commander.4 Ironically, WW I experiences marked the beginning of Army- Marine rivalry following the U.S. victory at Belleau Wood, for which the Marines were publicly given all the credit. The inter-war years between World War I and World War II found the Marines again searching for an enduring mission, one that would distinguish them from the U.S. Army and guarantee their future relevance. The Marines found their niche in amphibious operations under the leadership of their new Commandant, now General Lejeune.5 World War II history is largely written in terms of amphibious landings. Allied decisive victories in North Africa, Sicily, Europe, and throughout the Pacific were all made possible by operations from the sea. Factually, the U.S. Army conducted more amphibious landings than did the Marine Corps during World War II; however, it is important to note that those landings were based upon Fleet Marine Force doctrine developed during the inter-war years.6 Also, many Marines served on the staffs of those Army units participating in amphibious operations. The Marines had once again embraced a function of lasting value to their role in the national defense. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, commenting upon the flag-raising on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, February 23, 1945, made clear his opinion of the Corps' future relevance when he stated: "This means there will be a Marine Corps for the next 500 years."7 Marine tactical innovation again flourished during the Korean War. The combined-arms style of warfighting employed by-the First Provisional Marine Brigade8 at the Pusan Perimeter, validated the lethality of a new organizational and force employment concept the Marines would later refer to as the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Furthermore, the successful operations conducted by the 1st Marine Division at Inchon, as an element of the U.S. Army's X Corps, lent further credibility to the employment of amphibious forces at the operational level of war to achieve decisive victory. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea, had this to say about the Marines shortly after the landings at Inchon: "I have just returned from visiting the Marines at the front, and there is not a finer fighting organization in the world."9 The performance of Marine units during World War II and the Korean War earned the Corps a seemingly permanent role in the nation's defense, as the organization of the Marine Corps became public law. The Corps' organization as prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947, and as amended in 1952 by Title 10, U.S. Code, states that the Marine Corps shall be organized to include - ...not less than three combat divisions, three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein...and [to] provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign ....[and to] Develop, in coordination with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations....In addition, the Marine Corps...shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.10 The intent of the 82nd Congress in its passage of this law is clear -- America needs a force in readiness that is naval in character and expeditionary11 in nature. The Marines' primary role as set forth above is to provide forces of combined arms for service with the fleet. The final caveat "...shall perform such other duties as the President may direct" left open a wide range of possibilities for employment of Marine forces in the future. Drawn from historical precedence, Marines embraced secondary roles to serve as the nation's military instrument for international conflicts short of war, and to remain prepared for involvement in land warfare during major wars. The Vietnam war became the Marines' ultimate test for survivability. The principal Marine air-ground team in Vietnam, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), became the largest U.S. Marine command ever employed by the Army in combat up to that time. Similar to Marine exploits of the Korean War, Marine successes during Vietnam were directly linked to their amphibious and expeditionary capabilities. General William Westmoreland's12 decision to employ Marine Forces at Da Nang in March 1965 was predicated by the fact that Da Nang could only be safely supplied from the sea. A Navy-Marine operation to secure Da Nang airfield13 simplified command relationships and enabled Marine aircraft to operate from both afloat and ashore bases in support of the ground troops. Furthermore, the designation of predominantly coastal provinces as Marine zones of action facilitated the effective employment of Marine Special Landing Forces (SLF). These SLFs, task-organized around elements of the 7th Marine Regiment embarked aboard 7th Fleet amphibious ships, conducted numerous raids into the coastal regions of Vietnam. Operations such as 'Starlite' and 'Piranha' exemplified the potent combat power derived through the combined application of vertical envelopments, naval gunfire, close air support, and aggressive infantry tactics. During their six year (1965 -1971) involvement in Vietnam, the Marines were never defeated in battle. Commenting on the Marine Corps' operations in Vietnam, General Westmoreland, had this to say: "Its military feats will go down in history." The Marines had once again earned the Army's respect for their unique combined-arms style of warfighting. The Corps' MAGTF doctrine had been refined and serves as the foundation for the employment of Marine forces up to the present day. During the post-Vietnam era, America's Cold War strategy shifted from 'global containment' to an orientation on the defense of Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. In the wake of intense congressional skepticism concerning the relevance of amphibious assaults in a Western Europe contingency, Marines continued to defend their amphibious orientation. Marine strategists, struggling to promote the Corps' relevance, successfully argued that American interests abroad could not be adequately safeguarded through a singular focus on Western Europe. "Amphibious ready forces, backed by undeployed FMF units, gave the United States a unique instrument unaffected by the complexities of base rights, overflight rights, and inter-allied diplomacy."14 Hindered by the declining availability of amphibious ships, as the Navy prioritized funding to its 'blue water' capabilities, the Marine Corps sought to develop an alternate force deployment option which would diminish its reliance on amphibious shipping. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) concept, built around forward deployed logistics and equipment-carrying ships and air- transportable Marine units, fulfilled the force deployment needs of the Corps while retaining the integrity of the Navy-Marine team.15 Although the MPF concept was applied in numerous operations other than war during the 1980s, it wasn't until Operation 'Desert Shield', in 1990, that the strategic value of MPF as a rapid force deployment option was truly recognized. The MPF concept had enabled the Navy-Marine team to provide an immediate and credible response to a major regional crisis. During Operation 'Desert Storm', the U.S. led coalition offensive campaign of the Persian Gulf War, Marine forces were employed both ashore and afloat. Afloat forces, under the operational control of the Navy, never made an amphibious assault; however, the mere threat that such an operation could take place kept scores of Iraqi armored formations tied up in defensive positions along the Kuwait coast. Marine forces ashore, under the direct operational control of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in- Chief, U.S. Central Command, executed a flawless supporting attack into southeastern Kuwait. Speaking to the group of Marine commanders assembled during the 'Desert Storm' debrief, General Schwarzkopf summarized his affections of Marine performance during the war by saying: "You absolutely executed superbly...You did everything I thought you were going to do, and more."16 Marines had once again proven their relevance as an essential contributing force during our nation's major wars. Historical Conclusion While many conclusions can be drawn from the Corps' long and illustrious history, the recurring theme to which we owe our survival as an institution is our continuous and faithful service with the fleet. The Navy-Marine team provides the United States with an amphibious force in readiness that is expeditionary in nature and possesses the unique capability to engage in the air, on land and at sea The Advent and Implications of 'Jointness' As our history substantiates, Marines are no strangers to joint warfare. In the strictest sense of the term17, Marines have operated within a joint environment since inception alongside Navy forces. In fact, joint operations involving elements of all services have made significant contributions to the conduct of every war fought during the twentieth century. So what then is so novel about joint warfighting? Most military members attribute today's growing pains regarding joint operations with the passage of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols), which came about on the heels of joint service debacles such as Operation Desert-One and Grenada. However, few would argue that the basic philosophy of 'jointness' is unsound. When properly applied, the implications of 'jointness' benefit the nation as a whole, as well as each individual military service. Joint requirements and doctrine developed through inter-service collaboration uses defense resources wiser and logically result in improved military operations. Greater coordination and cooperation among the services is unquestionably positive. The recurring theme throughout the Goldwater-Nichols Act is the attainment of service interoperability, not service [element] interchangeability. "Jointness, properly understood, is the art of taking highly trained functional capabilities and combining them to provide the most effective operational package. When the concept is perverted for political purposes, functional capabilities are combined inappropriately, to provide a role for everybody."18 "The 'Era of Jointness' created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act was not intended for every Service to share everything jointly. The idea was for each Service to contribute based on its unique capabilities as required to accomplish the mission."19 'Jointness', the way we have seen it repeatedly applied in recent years, violates a fundamental principle of war - simplicity. Marines Enter the Big League Marines habitually insist upon having an equal voice at the table. Perhaps this is due to a paranoia of being misunderstood or improperly employed, or possibly just a natural desire to feel equal in importance to our sister services. Ever since the Marine Corps Commandant earned his seat amidst the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Marines have fully embraced the joint operations concept. The Corps' record of participation in joint operations over the past 15 or so years is unmatched by any other service. According to a 1993 Center for Naval Analyses report, Marines participated in 21 of the 32 Joint Task Force (JTF) operations conducted during the preceding 15 year period; and of those 21, Marines commanded in 6 operations.20 Nothwithstanding our 'jointness' record, during the latter part of 1992 the Marine Corps deemed it necessary to establish component commands which now serve directly under the unified commanders-in-chief (CinCs). While this action has been billed by the Corps as being in consonance with the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act21, it may well have been the final break in the long-standing close association between Navy and Marine forces. As a direct result of establishing component commands, Marine Forces are currently finding themselves 'thinly stretched' between service with the fleet and participation in joint operations as a separate service component. Furthermore, no longer is it assured that a CinC or Navy Fleet commander will look only to the Marines for amphibious forces, as we have recently seen with Army-Navy operations in Haiti.22 Perhaps the most drastic change Marines now experience, as a result of having established component commands, is the requirement to field yet another headquarters whenever a Marine operating force participates in a joint operation. While the Marine Corps is well aware of the vast responsibilities associated with fulfilling the service component role, it is hardly capable of meeting those requirements without task-organizing ad hoc headquarters elements at the expense of the operating forces. The traditional organization of JTFs was relatively simple -- functional component (air, ground, maritime) commanders reporting to a common commander. Marine forces, so long as the MAGTF remained intact, fit nicely into either the maritime or ground component depending upon the mission or phase of the operation. Marine liaison or augmentation cells would be assigned to serve on the functional component staff to ensure the proper employment of Marine Forces and to work the Marine issues and requirements. Of course, this model does not rule out the possibility of a Marine commander and his staff forming the nucleus of a functional component headquarters or that of the JTF. The current trend seems to be following the service component model of JTF organization, wherein each service is represented under the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Service componency is increasingly more common, especially for operations of extended duration. As previously alluded to, the service component model for JTF organization imposes an unnecessary requirement for the Marines to layer in another headquarters and normally does not eliminate the need for liaison and augmentation cells. So where do we come up with the necessary staffing and equipment to create these component headquarters? My recent tour of duty within III MEF (1991 - 1994) revealed that Marine Forces Pacific (MarForPac) was seldom available to fulfill the service component role. Component headquarters were usually established by assembling staff officers from each of the major subordinate commands of the MEF -- the Marine Division, Marine Air Wing, and the Force Service Support Group. This practice routinely occurred for such major exercises as 'Cobra Gold' in Thailand and 'Yama Sakura' in Japan. In a recent 'Yama Sakura' exercise, conducted in early 1994, a subordinate command staff (1st MEB) was assigned to fulfill the role of the Marine Force Component to the JTF so that the MEF staff could focus on fighting the MEF. When these type of situations occur, we have done little more than create a temporary organization which possesses no cohesive unit experience in the execution of the service component role within the JTF. Furthermore, we have degraded the capability of those subordinate commands to function efficiently in the execution of their daily operational missions. On occasions when a MEF commander is designated as the JFC, and his staff forms the nucleus of the JTF staff, the componency issue is further complicated by the additional requirement to redesignate a MAGTF commander and staff. For many years we have preached to our sister services that Marines are always employed as MAGTFs; however, in a pinch we are willing to 'dual-hat' one of the MEF's major subordinate commanders and his staff to fulfill the MEF role. The organization of the Marine forces initially deployed for Operation 'Restore Hope' (Somolia, 1993) exemplified this practice, wherein the 1st Marine Division commander and his staff were assigned additional duties as I MEF commander and staff, while the standing I MEF commander and staff assumed Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) responsibilities. This practice violated Marine Corps force employment doctrine, reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of the MAGTF, and undermined the Corps' emerging 'Primacy of the MEF' warfighting philosophy. An alternative to the preceding scenario is to have the JFC and his staff continue acting in their capacity as the MEF, in addition to fulfilling their CJTF responsibilities. This practice has been applied in past years during the annual 'ULCHI FOCUS LENS' exercises in Korea, wherein a MEF commander exercises command of an Army Corps-sized CJTF, formerly known as the Combined Marine Expeditionary Corps (CMEC), while retaining his warfighting command over the subordinate MEF. Are Marines prepared to accept another service commander, acting in the capacity of Commander, CMEC, to 'dual-hat' himself and his staff as the MAGTF command element by exercising operational control directly over the Marine division, wing and FSSG? I think not! Our saving grace to this 'hallow argument' will always rest upon the fact that Marines are employed as MAGTFs and the integrity of that MAGTF is maintained by the MEF Command Element. The current Korea contingency plan provides the best example of Marine componency gone astray. As reported in a recent issue of "Marines" magazine, there now exists a new combined (ROK-US) service component headquarters -- Combined Marine Forces Command (CMFC). CMFC, commanded by the CG, Marine Forces Pacific, is charged with the same responsibilities as the Ground Component Command (GCC), Air Component Command (ACC), and Naval Component Command (NCC); however, it maintains operational control during employment phases over a very insignificant number of forces. The preponderance of Marine forces, during employment, remain under the operational control of either the GCC or NCC because that is where they are best integrated into the CinC's overall plan. In addition to CMFC, there are headquarters/command element requirements for a U.S. Marine Forces Korea component, a landing force command element, and a Combined Marine Expeditionary Force (CMEF).23 CMEF is best described as a CJTF because it has multiple nation and service forces within its organization. Here again, the CMEF Commander must decide whether to fight the MEF himself (in addition to the other forces within CMEF); delegate MEF warfighting to one of his subordinate Marine commanders (e.g. Division or Wing); or create yet another Marine headquarters by establishing a MEF CE to fight the MAGTF within CMEF. 'MEF Warfighting' versus '...From the Sea' The future of the Marine Corps is currently traveling along two very divergent paths which are linked to the concepts known as 'MEF Warfighting' and '...From the Sea'. MEF Warfighting has its roots in the draft Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-1, entitled "Fighting the MEF", which was initially released for comment in October 1992. Just one month earlier (September 1992), the Navy-Marine Corps team published "...From the Sea" which outlined a fundamental shift in the operational focus and priorities of the Naval Service into the 21st century. More recently, "Forward...From the Sea" was published to update and expand upon the concept articulated in the September 1992 document. These two concepts are currently in fierce competition with one another in Marine circles with respect to their emphasis during formal education, unit training exercises, and real-world military operations. As a logical reaction to the difficulties experienced by Marine Forces during Operations 'Desert Shield' and 'Desert Storm', FMFM 2-1 (Draft) is a noteworthy effort aimed at focusing the Corps' leadership attention on our deficiencies in the conduct of warfighting at the MEF level.24 However, I would argue that the greatest impediment to the effectiveness of the I MEF Command Element, during the initial stages of the Gulf War, was that Lieutenant General Boomer served as both the Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command (MarCent) and Commanding General, I MEF. While FMFM 2-1 (Draft) addresses both issues (warfighting and componency), it fails to adequately address the interrelationship between the warfighter and the component commander. Furthermore, this document completely ignores the inherent limitations of the MEF in fulfilling either function.25 My criticism here is not centered on the structure or content of the document, but rather upon the notion that the Marine Corps must drastically change its warfighting philosophy and organizational structure to maintain its relevance into the 21st century. The obvious omission from FMFM 2-1 (Draft) is the traditional recognition that the Marine Corps is a partner in the Navy-Marine team -- the global force in readiness that doesn't depend exclusively on fixed land bases and strategic airlift to accomplish a wide range of military missions. On two separate occasions, FMFM 2-1 (Draft) addresses the Marine Corps' position on the componency issue -- that the JTF commander's interests are best served when the JTF is organized along service lines. On the first occasion, service componency is said to maximize doctrinal and unit training similarities; while later it is necessary due to logistical, manning and throughput considerations. 26 This document further expounds upon the various command relationship scenarios in which a MEF may function during a joint force operation. The first three scenarios portray the MEF as a robust organization analogous to an Army Corps, a numbered Fleet, or numbered Air Force. These three scenarios are accompanied by wire diagrams of 'notional' command relationships to include: The MEF as a warfighter for the CinC, the MEF as a warfighter and force headquarters in a JTF, and the MEF as a CJTF and warfighter for the CinC. The last two scenarios portray the role of the MEF in a JTF organized by functional components and the detachment of MEF elements for other operations. These last two scenarios, albeit the most suitable for the MEF in my opinion, are down-played as possible but not probable situations within which a MEF commander may find himself. There are no wire diagrams to support these last two scenarios, presumably because they are the least desirable from a Marine Corps viewpoint. What we seem to have forgotten is that the auspiciousness of Marine Corps operating forces has historically been most prevalent while serving under the cognizance of another service, without the added bureaucracy or burden of fielding a Marine Service Component. "...From the Sea", in stark contrast to FMFM 2-1 (Draft), is premised upon the role and capabilities of U.S. naval forces (Navy and Marine Corps). This document accurately captures the primary purpose of U.S. naval forces as: "...to project the power and influence of the nation across the seas to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war." The Navy is shifting its operational focus for the future in response to the changing strategic landscape around the globe; not solely based upon deficiencies uncovered during the last war. As has always been the case, the Navy depends upon the Corps to provide the combat forces necessary to influence events ashore. The MEF is an integral component of the evolving naval expeditionary force concept envisioned by "...From the Sea". On the issue of joint and combined operations, "... From the Sea" recognizes the interoperability gains and the enhanced combat power produced through 'jointness', but stops short of taking a position on the service versus functional componency aspect of the issue. Conclusions - Enduring or Dying Corps As we enter into the 21st century, we must shed ourselves of the notion that the survival of the Corps is somehow linked to our competitiveness in the 'big league' of service componency. Historically, the survival of the U.S. Marine Corps as an institution is attributable to our faithful association with the U.S. Navy and our unique combined-arms style of warfighting at the tactical level of war. If we continue to lobby for service component equality around the joint forces table, we are certain to lose that peculiar identity which has for many years distinguished us from the U.S. Army. When called upon to participate in our nation's wars, the Marines can best serve a CinC by providing a complementary capability to the sea, air, and land 'functional' components. "In deciding the future role for the Marine Expeditionary Force, the Marine Corps should stick to what it does best -- amphibious and expeditionary warfare in the world's littoral regions."27 To this end, our training, education, and procurement focus must remain on amphibious and expeditionary warfare. If we continue to emphasize sustained land combat training (MEF warfighting) ahead of amphibious and expeditionary warfare (...From the Sea), the Marine Corps will find itself headed down a path of self destruction. America desperately needs a force capable of "Warfighting...From the Sea", but it does not need and will not pay for a second land army. Endnotes 1. Allan Millett, Semper Fidelis - The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1980), p. xv. 2. U.S. Marines fought in the following conflicts during the 18th and 19th centuries: Revolutionary War (1775-1783), Quasi-War with France (1797-1800), Barbary Expeditions (1805-1801), War of 1812, Creek-Seminole Wars (1836-1841), Mexican War (18461848), American Civil War, Spanish-American War (1898), Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902). 3. Millett, p. 265. 4. Thomas Siefring, History of the United States Marine Corps (London: Bison Books, 1979), p. 50. During WW I, the Marine Corps grew from 13,000 to nearly 17,000 men. Marine forces participated in combat operations as part of General John Pershing's American Expeditionary Force. 5. General John Lejeune served as the Marine Corps Commandant from 1920 - 1929. Lejeune was highly regarded as a leader who fought for the welfare of his men, but perhaps his most notable achievement was the firm foundation he established for future amphibious operations. The visionary efforts of Lejeune were largely responsible for the preservation of the Marine Corps through those trying years after World War I. 6. Four U.S. Army divisions were specially trained by Marines in amphibious operations: 1st, 3rd, 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions. These divisions were major participants in operations at Oran, Sicily, Casablanca, Anzio, Attu, Kiska, Kwajalein, Leyte, Okinawa, Port Lyautey, and Normandy. 7. Millett, p. 265. 8. At the request of General Douglas MacArthur, the First Provisional Marine Brigade landed at Pusan, Korea on 2 August 1950. The principal units comprising the brigade were the 5th Marines and Marine Air Group-33. The 1st Brigade was a major factor in stopping the North Korean invasion and securing the Pusan Perimeter. On 13 September, the Brigade was deactivated and absorbed into the 1st Marine Division for action at Inchon. 9. Siefring, p. 164. 10. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 2-12, Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991), p. 11. 11. The term 'expeditionary' refers to the capability of operating on foreign soil, without U.S. bases or facilities, for a limited period of time. 12. General Westmoreland served as the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) and was the principal advisor to the U.S. President on military strategy during the war. 13. Da Nang Airfield was a key base for the U.S. Air Force during its prosecution of Operation 'Rolling Thunder', an extensive air campaign conducted against North Vietnam. 14. Millett, p. 609. 15. For a comprehensive explanation of the MPF concept, refer to Chapter 1, FMFM 7-6, MPF Operations. 16. Colonel Charles Quilter II, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990 - 1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), p. 111. 17. Joint warfare, joint operations, joint environment, joint arena, and 'jointness' are frequently used terms, often interchangeably, to denote military operations conducted by elements of more than one branch of the services, acting in harmony, under a common commander. 18. Colonel John Greenwood, "The Jointness Challenge." Marine Corps Gazette (October 1994), p. 2. 19. LtCol Kent Leonhardt, "Focus on Capability." Marine Corps Gazette (October 1994), p. 22. 20. Major John Ballard, "Marines Can Be Joint to the Core." Proceedings (November 1994), p. 31. 21. "Corps Establishes Component Commands." Marine Corps Gazette (March 1993), p. 7. 22. As a test case for an emerging joint task force concept known as 'Adaptive Force Packaging', U.S. Army helicopter units deployed to Haiti in September 1994 aboard the USS Eisenhower (CVN-69). 23. CMEF, formerly known as CMEC, was presumably renamed at the insistence of senior Marine officers to connotate its Marine leadership. 24. See Quilter, "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990 - 1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," for a complete accounting of Marine Corps experiences in the Persian Gulf War. 25. A convincing argument which highlights many of the deficiencies in the current MEF to fulfill the 'Warfighter' role is made by Major Robert Brennan, "The MEF as a Warfighter?" Proceedings (November 1994), pp. 36-38. 26. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-1 (Draft), Fighting the MEF (Quantico, Va.: Doctrine Branch, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1992), pp. 2-2 and 4-11. 27. Brennan, p. 36. Bibliography Ballard, John. 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