'Gators: An Endangered Species?

'Gators: An Endangered Species

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: 'Gators: An Endangered Species?

Author: Lieutenant Commander John P. Higgins, United States Navy

Thesis: Does the United States Navy currently have enough amphibious shipping to

meet the requirements of our National Military Strategy? Will future construction and

replacement programs be adequate with the expanding amphibious missions?

Background: The Navy currently has 39 amphibious ships in the fleet with only 7 new

ships scheduled for commissioning by the year 2000. By 2010, the number will drop to

approximately 32. The result of these actions is an amphibious fleet that is rapidly

reaching the end of its effective service life. We can currently meet the 2.5 MEB assault

echelon requirements however; when forward presence, assault follow-on echelon

requirements, crisis response (Haiti, Somalia), and peacekeeping operations are factored

in, meeting the requirements will become increasingly difficult.

Recommendation: We need to remove the two year procurement delay on the LPD-17

program and initiate a well-structured construction program that will deliver 12 new

LPD-17's by 2010. Additionally, we should preserve the current construction plans for

the LHD's and LSD-41 class.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. Present Amphibious Capabilities and Requirements

III. Future Amphibious Capabilities and Requirements

IV. Can We Get There from Here

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

In 1945 the United States Navy possessed 1,728 amphibious ships, which constituted

40 percent of the fleet and enabled the US to project 13 combat divisions. By 1979 this

capability had diminished to its lowest level since the pre-Korean War period.

Comprising only 14 percent of the fleet, the 65 amphibious ships in active service could

lift the assault echelons (AE) of only 1.15 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF),

approximately 37,000 marines.1 Today, 39 amphibious ships remain in the fleet with

only seven new ships scheduled for commissioning by the year 2000. By 2010, the

number will drop to approximately 32. The result of these actions is an amphibious fleet

that is rapidly reaching the end of its effective service life.

Amphibious lift is the critical factor in expeditionary warfare to support national

security objectives. Forward presence and crisis response are two of the pillars on which

national security strategy is built. The Navy/Marine team has based lift on USMC

warfighting requirements that translate to having the capability to lift 2.5 MEB. This 2.5

MEB lift does not factor forward presence into the equation. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs

of Staff (CJCS) has dictated a 12 ARG requirement to support Marine Corps warfighting

requirements and forward presence. This translates into a 3.0 MEB lift equivalent. The

Navy has rightly brought forth the point that it would be difficult to meet the 3.0 MEB

requirement within present financial constraints. The solution in meeting the 12 ARG

requirement was using large deck amphibious ships (LHA and LHD) currently in the fleet

or under construction.

While our current war plans require amphibious lift for the assault echelons of two

marine expeditionary forces, funding can only support a 2.5 Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (MEB) assault echelon, the nation's minimum requirement. This 2.5 MEB lift

would meet current requirements for forward deployed naval forces and still provide

adequate surge capability to lift the assault echelons of a MEB in the Atlantic and Pacific

theaters.2

The amphibious mission is key to our national defense, and surface forces are essential

to fulfill this mission. As General Alfred M. Gray put it in April 1988 testimony before

the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Amphibious shipping is this country's only

means of sustainable power projection. Amphibious ships provide us the capability of

forcible entry."3

The noted British historian B.H. Liddell Hart eloquently stated why an amphibious

capability for forcible entry is important to national security: "The history of warfare

shows that the basic strategic asset of sea-based peoples is amphibious flexibility. In

tackling land-based opponents, they can produce a distraction to the enemy power of

concentration that is advantageously disproportionate to the scale of force they employ

and the resources they possess."4

In 1992, the Navy's white paper "From the Sea" announced a shift in strategic focus

away from the blue-water warfare "on the sea" to a primary warfighting emphasis in

brown-water, or littoral warfare, conducted "from the sea". This focus on brown-water

warfare presents a radical departure from previous maritime doctrine and aligns maritime

strategy with current national security priorities.

The recently published "Forward ... From the Sea" states that "It is the world's littorals

where the Naval service, operating from sea bases in international waters, can influence

events ashore in support of our interests. Forward deployed naval forces will provide the

critical operational linkages between peacetime operations and the initial requirements of

a developing crisis or major regional contingency." It fiber states that 50 percent of our

basic presence building blocks will be the Amphibious Ready Groups with special

operations capable marine expeditionary units.5 Additionally, two of the five fundamental

and enduring roles in support of national security strategy involve amphibious shipping,

projection of power from sea to shore, and forward naval presence.

Forward presence is the mainstay of America's diplomacy. It lends credibility to our

formed alliances and contributes to conflict resolution and prevention. As the global

security environment changes, additional changes in forward stationed forces may be

appropriate. However, if forward stationing decreases, forward presence operations will

increase in importance.6

History suggests the futility of attempting to predict exactly when, where and how any

potential foreign threat will challenge our national interests. History also compels us to

assume that some threat will eventually arise and most probably on short notice.

For the Navy, this new security environment has meant that its blue-water maritime

strategy is no longer applicable to its likely future missions. Most of the areas of

instability and social strife today are in major third world cities and urban areas most

easily accessed by seaward approaches. In fact, 60 percent of the politically significant

urban areas around the world are located within 25 miles of the coastline; 75 percent are

located within 150 miles.7

The Navy and Marine Corps team is increasingly called upon to carry out operations

other than war such as crisis response, humanitarian relief, forward presence, maritime

sanctions and embargo enforcement, migrant interdiction, drug operations, peace

enforcing, peacekeeping, and non-combat evacuation of allied and US citizens.

Operations Earnest Will (Persian Gulf), Eastern Exit (Somalia), Sea-Angel (Indian

Ocean), Provide Comfort and Promise (Middle East), and Support Democracy

(Caribbean) are just a few recent examples that confirm this intensified operational trend.

Although the US has forces stationed in peacetime in many areas of the world, there

are significantly more places where it does not. The advantages in the use of sea-based

amphibious forces compared to shore-based forces include independence from basing

agreements and host nation support and overflight rights, the ability to loiter off the coast

almost indefinitely, an inherent logistics support capability, and the ability to reposition

quickly without media knowledge or coverage.

The key to littoral warfare will be to obtain and maintain battlespace dominance near

the coastline and 150 miles inland so that expeditionary forces can be introduced rapidly

and decisively.8

Ultimately, global and regional situations will continue to arise which call on naval

forces as a key element in joint and combined efforts during crisis. We are a maritime

nation, and our national strategy recognizes the necessity for us to control vital sea lanes

of communication through naval superiority.

Amphibious forces contribute to the mission of maintaining a peacetime presence. They

are used as a show of force to provide diplomatic leverage and to display US intentions or

interests. The presence of naval forces globally is a continuous reminder of the certain

costs of aggression to potential adversaries. Additionally, naval forces provide our

leadership with numerous capabilities to deal with unexpected contingencies. In the years

since World War II the United States has employed military force as a political

instrument some 200 times. Of these, four out of five involved naval forces, and the

majority of naval efforts included marines embarked on amphibious ships.9

Amphibious forces provide presence and crisis response in support of our national

security strategy. The visible presence of military forces in regions vital to national

interest is key to averting crisis, preventing conflict and demonstrating America's interest

in global affairs. Amphibious forces, because they are forward positioned and

expeditionary in nature, have frequently been the first called to respond to a national

security crisis. Therefore, the United States must maintain amphibious forces of sufficient

size and capability to meet the nation's forward presence and crisis response needs.

Amphibious ships perform a variety of missions from forward presence in peacetime, to

crisis response in hot spots near the coastline, to introduction of expeditionary forces for

sustained operations ashore. Within the new strategic requirements Amphibious forces

may also conduct such missions as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,

counter-terrorism, and political stability operations such as peacekeeping, civic action and

nation building.

II. Present Amphibious Capabilities and Requirements

The unique capabilities of the naval amphibious forces make them ideal for providing

the initial "enabling forces" very often required in most regional crisis. An enabling force

supplies the means and opportunity to insert Marine forces into a crisis to initially

stabilize the situation that allows follow-on joint forces ample time to mobilize, employ,

and intervene. Quick response of a credible armed force in a given crisis can make the

difference in stabilizing the situation.10 Additionally, this armed force must be fully

capable of operating in a joint environment for ease of integration into the unified

commanders joint force if the crisis proves to be of such magnitude as to require a much

larger force. Focusing on the littoral area, the Navy and Marine Corps, as the enabling

force, can seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow the

entry of heavy Army or Air Forces. An amphibious force located 400 nautical miles from

shore is able to launch an amphibious assault against any point along more than 1,000

miles of coastline within 24 hours.

The US Navy interprets the amount of amphibious shipping required to meet the

current US Defense policy based on Marine Corps requirements, and studies such as the

Department of the Navy Long Term Amphibious Lift Requirement and Optimum Ship

Mix Study Validation of 1990. To meet the "Forward... from the Sea" political and

military requirements for forward presence and crisis response, the US must maintain

enough amphibious lift to transport the assault echelons of at least 2.5 MEB. That

requires the transport of approximately 45,000 troops, 1,077 thousand square feet of

vehicle stowage, and 2,490 thousand cubic feet of cargo stowage.

The Navy currently attempts to meet this requirement by steaming 38 Amphibious

Warfare ships. Many of these ships are approaching the end of their original service life

and must be extended on active duty to cover commitments.

There are currently two Amphibious Command and Control ships (LCC) in our

inventory. Capable of carrying 700 troops and three to five landing craft personnel

(LCP/LCVP), these post second World War design ships provide integrated command

and control facilities for sea, air, and land commanders in amphibious operations. Both

ships are scheduled for decommissioning in FY 95.11

The Wasp class Amphibious Assault ships (multipurpose) (LHD) were designed to

carry the amphibious fleet well into the 21st century. There are currently four ships in

service, three under construction and one planned for delivery in 2007. Capable of

carrying 2,074 troops, 12 mechanized landing craft (LCM6) or three landing craft

air-cushion (LCAC), and four landing craft personnel (LCPL) these workhorses provide

significant lift capability to the ARG. The Wasp class contribution to the air picture is

formidable. Each LHD has the capacity to carry 6 to 8 AV-8B Harrier fixed-wing aircraft

or up to 20 in secondary roles. Rotary wing capability includes 42 CH-46E Sea Knight,

but can support AH-1W Super Cobra, CH-53E Super Stallion, CH-53D Sea Stallion,

UH-1N Twin Huey, AH-1T Sea Cobra, and SH-60B Seahawk helicopters. A typical

compliment of aircraft would include a mix of 30 helicopters and six to eight Harriers.

Fitted with a 600 bed hospital and six operating rooms this multipurpose platform

provides exceptional mass casualty treatment capability. The LHD's advertised service

life is approximately 40 years.12

The Tarawa class Amphibious Assault ships (multipurpose) (LHA) comprise the

second class of the "big deck" amphibious ships. There were only five ships of this class

built and all are still in service. All five ships will be decommissioned between 2011 and

2015. Capable of carrying 1,703 troops, four utility landing craft (LCU) type 1610 or two

LCU and two LCM-8, or 17 LCM-6, or 45 LVT tractors, it also contributes a significant

amount of lift. Additionally, it is capable of carrying one LCAC and four LCPL. The

LHA's air capabilities include 19 CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters or 26 CH-46D/E Sea

Knight. Harrier AV-8B VSTOL aircraft may be carried in place of some helicopters as

required. The LHA flightdeck can operate a maximum of nine CH-53D's or 12

CH-46D/E's or a mix of these and other helicopters. With some additional modifications

it can effectively operate at least six AV-8B's. Extensive medical facilities include

operating rooms, x-ray room, hospital wards, isolation wards, laboratories, and

pharmacies.13

The Iwo Jima class amphibious assault ships (LPH) were designed to carry a Marine

battalion landing team, its guns, vehicles, and equipment, plus a reinforced squadron of

transport helicopters and various support personnel. Only three of a total of five built

remain on active duty with scheduled decommissioning between 2000 and 2003.

Specifically, the LPH can carry 1,746 troops, two LCPL's, 20 CH-46D/E Sea Knights or

11 CH-53D Sea Stallions, and four AV-8B Harriers in place of some helicopters. Medical

facilities include the same make-up as found on the LHA.14

The Austin class Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD) currently make up the largest

ship class of the amphibs with 11 on active duty. Their extended service lives will end

between 2000 and 2006. Each ship is capable of carrying 930 troops, nine LCM-6 or four

LCM-8, two LCAC or 20 LVT's, and four LCPL/LCVP. Up to six CH-46D/E Sea Knight

helicopters can be carried, but only one can be hangered. A typical operational load might

include one Seahawk, two Sea Knight, two Twin Huey, and four Sea Cobra. LPD's are

capable of landing two AV-8B Harrier aircraft.15

The Whidbey Island class Dock Landing ships (LSD-41) make up the majority of the

smaller deck amphibs with eight currently on active duty. Scheduled decommission will

occur between 2025 and 2032.

The LSD-41 is capable of carrying 450 troops, four LCAC's, or 21 LCM-6, or three

LCU's, or 64 LVT's, and two LCPL's. It has limited air capability, being able to land only

two CH-53 series Stallions.16

The Anchorage class Dock Landing ships (LSD-36) are the oldest of the small deck

platforms. All five that were constructed are still on active duty with decommissioning

scheduled to begin in 2004 to 2008. They are capable of carrying 366 troops, three LCU's

or three LCAC's, or 18 LCM-6, or nine LCM-8, or 50 LVT's, and several

LCM/LCPL/LCVP's on deck. It serves as a helicopter platform only.17

There are only four Newport class Tank Landing ships (LST) left in our inventory. Of

these, two are scheduled for decommissioning in 1995 and two have been transferred to

the Naval Reserve fleet.

When the last LST is retired, the US Amphibious force - for the first time since early in

World War II - will not have a ship that can beach itself and offload troops and vehicles

through or over the ship's bow.

One of the most serious deficiencies the amphibious force faces today involve the lack

of offensive and minimal defensive capabilities as they proceed to the AOA. To conduct

enhanced over-the-horizon (OTH) assaults against well-defended objectives, ARGs

would need OTH air assault platforms, OTH armored assault craft, advanced early

warning aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft with data-link, ASUW/AAW stand-off

weapons, and some type of basic ASW weapon.18

III Future Amphibious Capabilities and Requirements

The amphibious force of the 21st century, which will be designed to lift the assault

echelons of 2.5 MEBs, will be made up of eight WASP class LHDs, five Tarawa class

LHAs, eight Whidbey Island LSD-41s, four Harpers Ferry class LSD-49s, and a yet to be

determined number of LPD-17s.

The future amphibious force with the LPD-17 and the seventh LHD will provide a

minimum of 12 deployable ARGs with a surge capability to lift 2.5 MEB AEs. The

centerpiece of these ARGs are the 12 "big deck" LHAs and LHDs. The LPD-17 design

will allow uniform ship pairings and force packaging when forming MAGTFs with an

LHA or LHD, LSD-41 or LSD-49.

If the aged amphibs are replaced with new, well-designed ships, fewer ships will be

needed to achieve the 12 ARG objective. The LPD-17 class is designed to provide

adequate space for equipment, troops, aircraft, and supplies to support the configuration

of a three ship ARG. If only 12 LPD-17s and 1 LHD are built to replace the 45 ships

reaching block obsolescence an amphibious fleet of 36 ships can be maintained. This

would support the 12 ARG objective with a minimum expenditure of funds. Each ARG

would consist of a LHD/LHA, LSD, and LPD-17.

There was little real interest in developing a modern workhorse amphibious ship until

planners realized that the LPD-17 would be the only amphibious ship built until the

Tarawa (LHA-1) class replacements began arriving in the second decade of the 21st

century.

The LPD-17 must be delivered just after the turn of the 21st century to contribute its

share of the wartime amphibious lift goal as well as support the forward deployed naval

presence mission.19

The Harper's Ferry class Dock Landing ships (LSD-49) are under construction at this

time with two ships being commissioned in 1995, one in 1996, and one in 1998. These

ships are designed to be a cargo carrying variant of the Whidbey Island class and expect