Mobility For The Soldiers Of The Sea CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting MOBILITY FOR THE SOLDIERS OF THE SEA by Major T. B. Galvin USMC Military Issues Paper submitted to the Faculty Advisor Conference Group 5, Command and Staff College Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia 22134 FINAL PAPER 10 APRIL 1995 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Mobility for The Soldiers of The Sea Author: Major T.B. Galvin, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps requires a new multi-role armored surface mobility system to close a significant gap in MAGTF tactical and operational mobility in order to facilitate movement and maneuver. The solution to this mobility gap is the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Fast (AAAV(F)). Background: The United States Marine Corps possesses the perfect instrument; the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and war-fighting doctrine; maneuver warfare, at a time when the 1995 National Military Strategy requires these very attributes. Maritime focus on littoral regions, forward presence missions and power projection as a tool of national policy, requires a credible and flexible force. The Marine Corps' ability to accomplish these missions is rapidly diminishing due to the decline of tactical surface mobility means. Left unchecked, this decline in capability will degrade the combat power credibility of the MAGTF. Since 1989, a system has been available to solve this mobility problem; the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). Lack of consensus within the Marine Corps concerning procurement priorities, deployment and employment concepts, and fiscal austerity, pushed the development decision for the AAAV into 1994. In 1995, renewed budget cutting has started an erosion of development funding for the AAAV. As the highest cost Marine Corps procurement program, a professional debate has started yet again regarding the need for the AAAV. Wavering of institutional support for the acquisition of the AAAV places the program in jeopardy and the Marine Corps' future operational relevance in question. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should secure full funding from Congress for the development, procurement, and fielding of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Fast (AAAV(F)) in order to retain tactical mobility for the MAGTF and capitalize on the potential of a fully integrated capability of operational maneuver from the sea. CONTENTS Section Page 1. A STRATEGY BASED ON MOBILITY 1 Amphibians are The Answer,1 A Short History,2 Current Technology, 3 2. HOW MOBILITY FITS IN THE MAGTF 4 Mobility Requirements, 5 The Mobility Gap,6 Amphibious Operations, 7 Mechanized Operations, 9 Maritime Operations, 10 3. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES 11 Slow Speed Amphibians,12 High Speed Amphibians,12 Non Amphibians,13 Non Vehicles,15 4. THE MOBILITY SOLUTION 15 Functional, 17 Survivable, 17 Sustainable, 17 5. THE CHALLENGE 18 The Pay Off,19 Credibility of The Force,19 Bibliography 23 MOBILITY FOR THE SOLDIERS OF THE SEA A STRATEGY BASED ON MOBILITY The whirlwind of change, both realized and approaching, in the structure and focus of the United States military, has presented each of the military services with challenges and opportunities. Successful responses to the challenge of down- sizing and reorientation on new less well-defined threats may fundamentally alter the level of the Marine Corps' contribution to the national defense. Emphasis on compact, flexible and credible force packages as the response choice of the National Command Authority raises the utility of the Marine Corps' capabilities to a new high. The foundation for the Marine Corps' success in this new national security environment is the fully integrated combined arms team, the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Expeditionary in character, this flexible forward deployed force achieves strategic and operational mobility by embarking in the ships of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF). Tactical mobility in support of tactical maneuver is provided by the Corps' organic surface and air delivery systems. Decreasing capabilities in tactical surface mobility; block end of service life and anti-armor technology improvements, will degrade the MAGTF's ability to conduct maneuver warfare. The end result of this creeping degradation is a MAGTF which is a less than credible modern force. Amphibians Are The Answer In recognition of a new and maturing naval strategy contained in Forward...From The Sea, and as a response to the service challenge to provide relevant and credible MAGTFs in this new environment, the Marine Corps requires a new multi- role armored surface mobility system to close a significant gap in MAGTF tactical and operational mobility in order to facilitate movement and maneuver. The solution to this mobility gap is the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Fast (AAAV(F)). This system will deliver credible lethality, survivability, fit within reduced maritime strategic lift, and expand the options of the commander for deployment and employment of expeditionary forces along the world's littoral regions. The AAAV(F) has the technology base, capabilities and designed-in flexibility to provide the mobility on land and in the water that fills the Corps' mobility requirements for the Twenty-First Century. Resolute commitment of resources, in spite of the institutional risks in a time of budget cutting, is mandatory if the Marine Corps is to retain tactical mobility and operational relevance. A Short History Since the inception of mechanized warfare the Marine Corps has grappled with seemingly unreconcilable requirements. Mechanized warfare is characterized by mass formations of armored vehicles and an extensive logistical structure that is required to sustain these formations. The unique maritime environment from which the Marine Corps achieves strategic and operational mobility places a premium on vehicle, equipment and logistics density. Balancing of these competing requirements is the key to the Corps' past success as a credible amphibious expeditionary force. Innovation in equipment, tactics, and doctrine during the 1930s produced a vehicle, the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT), and an offensive amphibious philosophy, doctrine, and tactics used in World War II. Success in combat, coupled with continued innovation and refinement in equipment, tactics and doctrine, has built a credible capability which capitalized on maritime strategic and operational mobility. The LVT provided the critical bridge from amphibious surface assault to armored mobility ashore. The multi- role characteristics of the LVT reflected the unique maritime requirement for adaptable systems to meet a spectrum of deployment and employment environments. Current Technology. The Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7A1 (AAV7A1) is the current family of amphibian vehicles providing the Marine Corps with armored tactical surface mobility for the MAGTF. This family of vehicles was introduced into the Fleet Marine Force in 1970 as the Landing Vehicle Tracked 7 (LVT7). LVT7 vehicle systems and capabilities are based on 1960s technologies addressing the anti-armor threats of that period. The design of the LVT7 was based on a ten-year service life. The mission profile of the LVT7 had a stated requirement for eighty percent of operating time in water and only twenty percent of operating time on land.1 In 1977 the LVT7 was renamed the Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7 (AAV7) and the mission profile for the vehicle was reversed; twenty percent of the operational time in water and the remaining eighty percent in land operations.2 In the 1980s the AAV7 underwent a major service life extension effort since a new replacement vehicle was not available. This extension of service life was followed by a product improvement program which tried to address some of the most critical tactical vulnerabilities and deficiencies of the vehicle. These improvements were intended to extend service life ten to fifteen years. The improved AAV7 was designated the Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7A1 (AAV7A1) .3 Retirement of the AAV7A1 from the Fleet Marine Force is scheduled to commence in 2005.4 In the modern battlespace, the AAV7A1 suffers from antiquated technology and concept of design. At the time of scheduled retirement from service, tactical surface mobility for the MAGTF will have been provided by a vehicle system that is over thirty years old. The mission of this vehicle is completely opposite the design criteria used for its development. Lethality of modern anti-armor weapon systems and their universal availability are a significant threat to AAV7A1 survival in combat. Recent Marine Corps and Navy procurement of modern armored weapon systems and tactical transport systems with capabilities superior to the AAV7A1, raises significant deployment and employment issues. These differences in capabilities are exacerbated by adoption of employment concepts for the MAGTF and the NEF that are outside the AAV7A1 performance envelope. The net result of this situation is a MAGTF lacking the surface mobility to exploit its' current technological advantages and unable to effectively execute its warfighting doctrine. HOW MOBILITY FITS IN THE MAGTF Evolution of the national security strategy in the post Cold War era can be characterized as a shift in focus and the threat from global to regional. Steep decline in resources allocated for force structure and force maintenance are part of this new environment. Reorientation of the military on regional crises has challenged the validity of the traditional missions of some services. The Navy-Marine Corps team's response to this evolving environment is based on the relevance and credibility of the forward deployed combined arms team as an integral part of a NEF. Department of the Navy (DON) strategy for the new security era was published in September of 1992 in the White Paper " ...From The Sea". The concept presented was one of focus on littoral regions, power projection and forward presence.5 Publication of the new DON White Paper "Forward...From The Sea" refines the 1992 strategic concept by placing further emphasis on the strategic imperative of credible and capable forward presence, crisis response, and effective utilization of forward deployed MAGTFs as an enabling force to exploit littoral battlespace.6 Execution of this naval strategy is based on the operational concepts of: Operational Maneuver From The Sea, Power Projection, Ship To Shore Maneuver, and Sustained Operations Ashore.7 Mobility Requirement. The Marine Corps derives its purpose and mission from Title 10, United States Code: The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign... Clearly, the new naval strategy supports the mission assigned in public law. Review of this strategy reveals a requirement for a force that can provide swift response to crises in distant lands. Inherent in this response capability is the requirement for the means to build power ashore and sustain this power for extended periods once there. This robust capability is the central element of our nation's forward presence and crisis response. The key concepts that are the essence of the application of this strategy are Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) and Power Projection. OMFTS can be described as the application of the tenets of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations using sea, air, and land as one maneuver space.8 Power Projection is the capacity to develop sustained and lethal power rapidly at the time and location of our choosing.9 Both concepts demand a force that is structured for and capable of rapid adaptation to the requirements of the mission. Imperative to success in this environment is a force which is strategically, operationally and tactically mobile; the means that facilitate a style of warfare based on movement and maneuver. The Mobility Gap The premise of the argument for a new armored surface mobility system is based on my belief that the MAGTF requires this type of mobility as one of a number of capabilities with which maneuver warfare can be executed. Review of post World War II military history makes a compelling argument for the use of surface and air mobility systems to achieve maneuver and movement on the modern battlefield. Mission Area analysis of current surface mobility systems in the Marine Corps identified this area as deficient.10 The question then becomes what capability and from what system(s) does the Corps require to correct this deficiency? Amphibious Operations. Strategic mobility for the MAGTF is provided by the amphibious ships of the ARG. These ships are one of the means by which the commander achieves operational mobility within the Amphibious Objective Area when the mission requires power to be projected ashore. Maneuver and movement of the MAGTF from a sea base to the shore; an amphibious operation, is based on tactical surface and air delivery systems. Assault echelons are sent ashore in helicopters and in AAV7A1s. The relatively short operating range of the AAV7A1 dictates a short stand-off distance from the shore for the ARG. Slow water speed equates to a slow closing speed for the assault waves in AAV7A1s. Poor waterborne performance exposes both the ARG and the assault echelon to direct and in-direct fire weapon systems on the beach. Lethality of these weapon systems poses a significant risk to the MAGTF and the NEF in an amphibious operation if the assault is directed against a hostile defended shore. The effect of the performance and capability gap in MAGTF surface mobility during the assault causes the related problem of combat power build-up ashore. Power projection in an amphibious operation means the placing of power, combat power, in an area where none had previously been located. Building combat power up from zero becomes a function of throughput; the size of the force, its capabilities and the time that is required to accomplish this action. Time as the key component governing combat power build-up ties the surface assault forces to the speed of the AAV7A1, 6 to 8 knots, and the size of the force carried in the assault echelon. The size of the force carried in each of the waves of the assault echelon is limited by the number of AAV7A1s employed. The maximum number of AAV7A1s used in the assault is dictated by the type and number of amphibious ships in the ARG and the size of the MAGTF. The Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) and other surface craft of the ARG provide other means to land the surface assault. Both of these options fail to provide ballistic or NBC protection to the embarked force. Mobility provided by these craft stops at the high water mark of the beach; leaving the issue of mobility for the unit left ashore to be addressed. LCAC waves used to deliver artillery and tanks to the beach would be delayed until the assault wave had returned for back loading. This scenario costs time; the key component in the equation for building combat power ashore, and acts as an obstacle to synchronization of combined arms at the decisive point and time. Assigning additional missions to LCAC will delay the echelonment of force infrastructure and sustainment throughput ashore. High transit speeds and extended operating ranges of the LCAC provide this craft a level of security and survivability. The pay load capacity coupled with speed and range make the LCAC an essential mobility system for delivery of combat power multipliers such as tanks and artillery to the beach. The two limiting factors in the use of LCAC in amphibious assaults are; the small number of LCACs in service, and the large space claim they take when embarked aboard amphibious shipping. Given the parameters of limited numbers and sea lift footprint, transport of the assaulting infantry is not the high payoff result sought in the exploitation of this valuable asset. Mechanized Operations. Traditionally, the Marine Corps has created mechanized forces by cross attaching infantry mounted in AAV7A1s with tank units. Procurement of the M1A1 tank has raised the lethality and mobility potential of the Corps' mechanized force. This state of the art weapon system is, however, dependant on the support of the other vehicles in the mechanized force to develop the synergy of an integrated force. The other component of this force, AAV7A1 mounted infantry, is limited by the AAVs land speed, cross country mobility, and ballistic protection. The AAV7A1 substantially under performs the M1A1 in all areas of land combat vehicle performance. These different levels of performance degrade the key mobility advantages of the M1A1 when both of these vehicles operate together as part of a mechanized force. The AAV7A1 is the only vehicle organic to the MAGTF that can provide a true mechanized infantry force. Motorization of infantry as a means of achieving increased surface mobility cannot be accomplished with the organic assets of the MAGTF. Motorized infantry do not have the cross country speed, mobility, or survivability of the AAV7A1. Light armored wheeled vehicles in the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (LAR BN) do have the speed, mobility and agility that is comparable to the M1A1. However, these vehicles are not configured to carry infantry units and are primarily tasked with essential security missions. Survival of these light armored vehicles depends upon their speed, agility, mobility, and tactics rather than ballistic protection. This condition makes these vehicles a marginal means to transport infantry as part of a mechanized force. Maritime Operations. The ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) coupled with airlift support from Transportation Command provide strategic mobility to the MAGTF for rapid buildup of forces using facilities in a benign environment for the build-up of combat power. Deployment of MAGTFs, using the Maritime Prepositioning Force, provides a unique flexible and responsive strategic mobility option. Two methods are used to off-load of MPS, pier side and in-stream. The AAV7A1 does add flexibility to in- stream off-load because of its amphibious capability. Once the shift from deployment to employment of the MAGTF is made, the same tactical surface mobility limitations are present. Subsequent amphibious and mechanized operations of the MAGTF are constrained by the same performance characteristics of the AAV7A1. A style of warfare; maneuver, and an institutional ethos of flexibility and adaptation that support a military strategy of credible and sustainable forward deployed combined arms forces, are relevant only insofar as strategy can be translated into tactical and operational success. Mobility is the foundation for maneuver and movement in the modern battlespace. The AAV7A1 is the system that provides surface mobility to the MAGTF in order to facilitate maneuver and movement. Clearly, the AAV7A1s limitations are so significant that it no longer supports the style of warfare, nor the military strategy that sets the parameters for employment of the MAGTF. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES What systems can the Corps use to close the mobility gap in MAGTF capability? The first step in the process to determine a new mobility system took place on 21 March 1994, when the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the Operational Requirements Document for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) (NO. MOB 22.1).11 Approval of this latter document was based upon a series of Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEA) conducted to determine the most effective way to accomplish surface mobility for the MAGTF.12 Twelve possible alternative mobility systems were evaluated. Essential in this evaluation was the sea lift space claim (footprint) of each candidate. This footprint was based on moving equivalent numbers of Marines ashore as part of the assault wave.13 The reason why foot print is a key determinant in this evaluation is the overall reduction in, and configuration changes, to the composition of the ARG caused by fiscal pressures. Alternatives which require procurement of additional amphibious shipping are not viable. COEA analyses centered on four general types of systems: slow speed amphibian vehicles, high speed amphibian vehicles, non amphibian vehicles, and non vehicle systems.14 The following paragraphs summarize the capabilities and limitations of each of these systems. Slow Speed Amphibians Three slow speed candidates were evaluated. These amphibians included the AAV7A1, a conceptual vehicle identified as the AAV7A2(S) which is an enhanced AAV7A1, and the AAAV Slow (AAAV(S)) which is a slow water speed variant of the AAAV. All of these candidates suffered from the same limitation; extended time for waterborne transit and short waterborne operating range, due to slow water speed. Limited ballistic protection is a shared limitation for the AAV7A1 and AAV7A2 (S). The AAV7A2 (S) does have increased firepower over the AAV7A1; a 30 mm canon vice two machine guns. The AAAV(S) has the same mobility and speed ashore as the AAAV(F) .15 These vehicles do not require an increase in the inventory of amphibious shipping since they use the existing footprint of the AAV7A1 and carry the same number of infantry, eighteen combat loaded Marines. Slow water speed amphibians place the assault echelon and amphibious shipping at risk during the assault. Their performance in the water does not support the concept of over the horizon amphibious assault or operational maneuver from the sea. The AAV7A2 and AAV7A1 have essentially the same deficient levels of performance on land and in the water. AAAV(S) is the most capable system of these candidates once ashore in terms of survival, mobility and firepower on the modern battlefield. High Speed Amphibians Two vehicles were evaluated for the high speed amphibian solution to the mobility problem. The AAAV Fast (AAAV (F)) and the AAV7A2 Fast (AAV7A2 (F)). These vehicles use the same power plant and drive systems to attain high water speeds; twenty to twenty- five knots. High transit speed and extended operational range, due to water speed, facilitate the use of over the horizon employment concepts for the amphibious assault. Both the AAAV(F) and the AAV7A2(F) use the same weapon systems as those in the slow speed versions of these vehicles. The AAV7A1 hull, with performance enhancements, is used for the AAV7A2 (F). As a result of this design compromise troop carrying capacity is reduced; down from eighteen to nine Marines. This reduction in troop lift requires more vehicles to lift the assault wave, or a longer period of time to complete the assault because multiple trips are necessary. More vehicles in the assault wave raises the issue of more sea lift foot print.16 The AAAV(F) does carry eighteen combat loaded Marines. Mobility of the force once ashore is of equal importance. The Marines left on the beach by the AAV7A2 awaiting the landing of the remainder of the assault wave are left foot mobile. Once the assault is complete only a portion of the assault force can be mechanized for continuing operations. The AAAV(F) land performance characteristics are similar to those of the M1A1.17 The AAV7A2 does not match this performance which negatively impacts the mobility of the force. Non Amphibian Vehicles Five non amphibian vehicles were evaluated. Movement of the assault wave mounted in these vehicles requires they be embarked on LCACs in order to achieve rapid build-up of combat power ashore. Four of the candidates considered are tracked vehicles; APX, M113A3, M2A2, and the Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV). The fifth candidate considered was the light armored wheeled vehicle, LAV 25 of the LAR BN 18. The APX is a concept vehicle with the same land performance as the AAAV.19 The M113A3 is a tracked armored personnel carrier that has been used by the US Army for over thirty years.20 M2A2 is the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which is a heavy tracked vehicle used by the US Army for more than twenty years.21 FIFV is a concept vehicle which is part of the Army's Armored Systems Modernization program.22 All five of the non amphibian candidates require more vehicles than the AAV7A1 in order to lift the same number of Marines. This increase in vehicles has a direct impact on sea lift footprint of the force. Related to the issue of mechanization is unit integrity of the force.23 The AAV7A1 carries the eighteen combat loaded Marines of the infantry squad; the basic infantry tactical unit. These candidates are not configured to carry an infantry squad which raises issues of unit cohesion. Using the Army Weighted Effectiveness Indices/ Weighted Unit Values, the FIFV and M2A2 are identified as having the greatest effectiveness once ashore.24 However, relative combat power build-up ashore takes much longer for both of these vehicles than for the AAAV(F) .25 Both the M2A2 and FIFV require five hundred seventy-four LCAC loads to move the force ashore.26 Non Vehicles Two Non vehicle systems were evaluated; LCAC and helicopters. The LCAC appraisal focused on assault wave transport using a Marine Corps Expeditionary Shelter System (MCESS), which carries one reinforced infantry rifle company.27 Air delivery was based on the CH 60 helicopter, a potential medium lift replacement candidate.28 Use of the LCAC or CH 60 as the principal means of mobility for the surface assault has a negative impact on overall MAGTF capability and structure. First, they fail to provide a platform to facilitate mechanization once ashore. Secondly, the current primary use of both these systems is for mobility of other weapon systems, equipment and/or force sustainment throughput. Using them for assault echelon mobility delays execution of the other missions assigned to these platforms. Third, both systems require additional amphibious shipping or radical reconfiguration of existing shipping to accommodate them with increased footprint. Finally, the CH 60 requires ninety-six sorties and one hundred ninety LCAC loads to move the assault force and its' equipment ashore. The AAAV(F) moves the same force ashore with one hundred eighty-six LCAC loads. 29 THE MOBILITY SOLUTION Operational Maneuver From The Sea is the operational concept that the NEF uses for forward presence and power projection missions. Mobility for strategic, operational and tactical maneuver and movement is the capability that facilitates this strategy of forward presence and power projection, and provides credibility to its conceptual basis; Operational Maneuver From the Sea. The critical link in this strategic equation is the mobility of the force that establishes the presence and projects power. The discussion surrounding MAGTF mobility afloat and ashore has highlighted the growing performance gap in surface mobility and presented an array of potential systems that could be used, with varying degrees of success, to close this gap. Other areas and systems which provide essential mobility to the force afloat have been significantly upgraded. Use of LCAC and the decision to procure the MV 22 aircraft will dramatically expand the operational reach of the MAGTF commander in the projection of power ashore. Both of these systems reduce the time, the key component for build-up of combat power, while increasing the range from which power is projected. Having a surface mobility capability that supports this extension of operational reach is a logical step in alignment of capability. Aside from service pride in procuring a capable and unique Marine Corps weapon system, why should the Corps buy the AAAV(F)? The M2A2 and the FIFV both have significant survivability and firepower systems that allow them to operate with tanks. The LCAC has superior speed and range. The MV 22 operates over water and land with equal speed and range. What specific capability does the AAAV(F) give the Marine Corps that these other systems do not? The answer is in the requirement for a highly flexible system that fits within tight lift, logistics, and system cost parameters but is adaptable to a multitude of environments and provides the commander employment options. AAAV(F) delivers in one system three vital capabilities; functional mobility, survivable mobility, and sustainable mobility, that the MAGTF requires. Functional Linking the operational level of war; movement and maneuver, to the tactical level is what the AAAV(F) delivers. Self-deploying once in the amphibious objective area, the AAAV(F) links maneuver of the NEF to the maneuver of the MAGTF in one seamless operation. Transition from the high water mark on the beach face to the inland objective area becomes one continuous flow of combat power that builds tempo as the force progresses. With one lift the entire assault wave maneuvers from the sea to inland objectives. The range of the AAAV(F) grants freedom to the MAGTF commander in terms of maneuver options by exposing more littoral area within the objective area to amphibious penetration. Survivable The range and speed of the AAAV(F) furnish protection to ships of the ARG since they remain over the horizon during the amphibious assault. The Marines in the assault wave are protected from fire from shore by the speed and low visual signature of the AAAV(F). Speed, firepower and ballistic armor protect the mechanized force as the beach is cleared and link- up with M1A1 tanks, delivered to the beach by LCACs, is made. Swift, decisive maneuver by this mechanized force culminates with dismounted infantry assaulting in- land objectives under direct fire support from AAAV(F)s and M1A1s. Sustainable The AAAV(F) is a sustainable mobility system because it places no new or additional requirements on the; MAGTF commander, NEF commander, or on the institutional resources of the Marine Corps. AAAV(F) uses the same amphibious sea lift footprint as the AAV7A1. Therefore, additional sea lift is not required in order to deploy a MAGTF equipped with this vehicle. As a true amphibian, the logistical structure for the AAAV(F) remains at the current level. Other mobility systems require a logistical structure that supports two distinct systems to match the AAAV(F)s operational reach; one waterborne system and one land system. Finally, personnel structure and training and support establishment infrastructure are already present to support the fielding and maintenance of the AAAV(F). THE CHALLENGE Since 1980 the Marine Corps has needed a new more capable surface mobility system to replace the AAV. Strategy, doctrine, technological risk and professional consensus did not mature to the point that a positive development and procurement decision on a surface mobility system could be made until 1990. Declining budgets, uncertain force structure, and competing procurement requirements have raised the level of institutional risk for the AAAV(F) program and the Marine Corps. Approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the Corps' number one ground procurement program, the AAAV program has already been cut funding for its development phase. Producing state of the art weapons system technology that is functional and sustainable can not be done on the cheap. Near term savings on the development of a new weapon system is a gamble when this system represents the surface mobility means for the MAGTF. The AAAV program represents a significant expansion of the MAGTF's mobility and power projection capability in littoral warfare. The Pay Off The Navy's on-going efforts to revitalize their shallow water mine capability will significantly expand access to assailable littoral regions in spite of potential measures to deny entry. The LCAC and the MV 22 Osprey provide the MAGTF commander with the operational reach to exploit forward presence. AAAV(F) is the logical system to meet the surface mobility need. These three systems form a capability tripod which the MAGTF of the Twenty- First Century exploits in order to achieve operational and tactical maneuver and movement. The revolutionary dimension of this unprecedented mobility translates into a seamless projection of power by linking maneuver of the NEF and the MAGTF in amphibious operations. Credibility of the Force Relevance of the Marine Corps as a significant contributor to the national defence is based on a credible expeditionary presence. Forward deployment of the MAGTF as an integral component of the NEF requires flexibility and credibility in deployment and employment options. Failure to maintain the mobility and survivability of the ground force diminishes the Corps' tactical and operational impact in modern warfare. Capitalizing on strategic lift and operational mobility from the sea loses meaning if force projection extends only to the high water mark on the beach. A MAGTF without a mechanized capability ashore, but to heavy for traditional light infantry roles, is a redundant force which lacks the flexibility that modern battlespace demands. Procurement, operations and maintenance budget austerity leave little doubt as to the logical answer to the question of how to achieve tactical surface mobility for the MAGTF. Integration of operational concepts of maneuver and power projection with the overall military strategy mandates the requirement for the MAGTF to have tactical surface mobility. The question that remains to be answered is whether the Marine Corps has the resolve to stay the course and develop the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Fast. Reconciliation of the amphibious lift paradox was answered in the 1930s with the LVT, revolutionary doctrine and evolutionary tactics. The answer for the Twenty-First Century surface mobility requirements for the MAGTF remains an amphibian, the AAAV(F), and the revolutionary concept that maximizes this platforms capabilities is Operational Maneuver From The Sea. Failure to ensure the success of the AAAV(F) maybe a loss of capability that the Corps might not be able to recover from in an era of scrambling for roles and missions. NOTES 1. David Brenner and George Akst, Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) Program Cost and Effectiveness Analysis (COEA): Ship-to-Shore Analysis, Center For Naval Analyses, CRM 90-96/ July 1990, 1. 2. Ibid, 1. 3. U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) FOR THE ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE (AAAV) (NO. MOB 22.1) (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps MCCDC, 24 March 1994), 2. 4. ORD FOR ADVANCED ASSAULT VEHICLE, 6. 5. John H. Dalton, The Honorable, J.M. Boorda, Admiral USN, and Carl E. Mundy, General, USMC, Forward...From The Sea, (Department of the Navy, Washington D.C., October 1994), foreword. 6. Ibid, 1. 7. Ibid, 2 - 8. 8. Terry Pierce, Commander, USN, "Operational Maneuver From The Sea", Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1994, 31. 9. Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, 64. 10. ORD ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE, 7. 11. Ibid, cover. 12. Brenner and Akst, 1. 13. Ibid, 3. 14. Ibid, 5. 15. Ibid, 10. 16. Ibid, 11. 17. U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Direct Reporting Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault, "ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE (AAAV) OPERATIONAL MODE SUMMMRY/MISSION PROFILE, 1-3. 18. Brenner and Akst, "Ship-to-Shore Analysis", 13. 19. Ibid, 12. 20. Ibid, 13. 21. Ibid, 13. 22. Ibid, 14. 23. George Akst, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development and Acquisition," COEA Update Briefing", Center For Naval Analyses, (CNA) 94-1235/ 27 June 1994, 1. 24. Brenner and Akst, "Ship-to-Shore Analysis", 32. 25. Ibid, 27. 26. Ibid, 19. 27. Ibid, 15. 28. Ibid, 15. 29. Ibid, 19. BIBLIOGRAPHY Akst, George, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development and Acquisition, (CNA) 94- 1235/, subject: "COEA Update Briefing," 27 June 1994. Brenner, David, and Akst, George, Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) Program Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA): Ship-to-Shore Analysis, Center For Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, CRM 90-96/ July 1990. Dalton, John L., The Honorable, Boorda, J.M., Admiral, USN, and Mundy, Carl E., General, USMC, FORWARD...FROM THE SEA, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., October 1994. Gray, Alfred, General USMC (Retired), Naval Expeditionary Forces and Strategic Planning: Enhancing Options Available to the National Command Authority, Perspectives on Warfighting, NO.2, Vol. 1, 32-35. Lind, William, Maneuver War Handbook, Westview Special studies in Military affairs, Co. 1985. Pierce, Terry, Commander, USN, The Naval Expeditionary Force, Naval institute Proceedings, November 1993, 32-35. Pierce, Terry, Commander, USN, Operational Maneuver From The Sea, Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1994, 30-34. Skinner, Douglas W., LCAC Troop Carrying Capability; The Marine Corps Expeditionary Shelter Systems, Center For Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, January 1990. Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) Operational Mode Summary/ Mission Profile, Direct Reporting Program Manager, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Advanced Amphibious Assault Department of the Navy, Integrated Amphibious Operations and USMC Air Support Requirements Study, Washington, D.C., April 1989. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare. Norfolk, VA: Naval Doctrine Command. March 1994. Operational Handbook (OH) 6, Marine Ground Combat Element. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command. April 1986. Operational Handbook (OH) 6-1, Ground Combat Operations. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command. January 1988. BIBLIOGRAPHY Operational Handbook (OH) 6-11 DRAFT, Mechanized Operations. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command. November 1988.
