Military

Making A Better Reserve

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

 

 

 

                        MAKING A  BETTER RESERVE

 

 

                                 OVERVIEW

 

      In its first real test, the Gulf War validated the key concepts underlying the

 

Total Force Policy which was formally adopted by the United States Department of

 

Defence (DoD) in 1973 as the cornerstone of its military defense policy. However,

 

events leading up to Operation Desert Shield/Storm also discredited the combat

 

readiness and thus the ability of the Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades--the

 

ARNG being the primary provider of Reserve Component (RC) combat forces to

 

the Army--to be deployed early in battle. As a result, RC combat units will now

 

serve as merely an augmentation and reinforcement pool for the Active Component

 

(AC) combat units, marginalizing their previous co-equal role under the "roundout"

 

concept.1  This paper attempts to show that this is unwarranted and that the

 

traditional rivalry between the Army and the ARNG as well as the former's

 

overriding need to preserve its force structure may have been the true underlying

 

reason for the leaving behind of the three ARNG "roundout" brigades. It points out

 

that should two near simultaneous major regional contingencies occur, RC combat

 

forces may have to deploy on short notice and operate at brigade and larger

 

formations because of a downsized U.S. military.  This paper suggests that the

 

combat readiness standards set for RC combat forces may be unnecessarily stringent

 

given the U.S.'s overwhelming military technological advantage and air supremacy

 

as was amply demonstrated by the rout of the Iraqi land forces in under 100 hours!

 

It proposes that the ARNG should adopt some of the staffing and training practices

 

of the USMC Reserves (USMCR) to minimize the need and duration for post-

 

mobilization training. This paper also attempts to show parallelisms between the

 

USMCR and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) models, both being forces with proven

 

track-records, to strengthen the case for the proposals. Finally, it suggests that the

 

ARNG has adequately addressed its previous shortcomings and should be given a

 

fair chance to prove itself.

 

 

 

                           BACKGROUND

 

      The Three ARNG Brigades Debacle

 

      In the Gulf War, the Reserve Component played a major and crucial role in

 

the successful prosecution of the war. About 245,000 Reservists were ordered to

 

active duty in support of the crisis, with about 106,000 actually deployed to

 

Southwest Asia where they accounted for nearly 20 percent of all U.S. forces

 

deployed in the Gulf. Thus, the Total Force Policy had seemingly been validated

 

--except for the unfortunate fact that none of the Reserve combat units which were

 

mobilized actually joined in the fighting of the war! Although there were numerous

 

mitigating circumstances, by the time the three Army National Guard (ARNG)

 

combat brigades--Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade, the Mississippi's 155th Armor

 

Brigade and the Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)-were certified

 

combat ready or were on the verge of being so, the Gulf War was already ending!

 

 

 

      Thus when the first test came, the Reserve Component (RC) combat forces,

 

which were led to believe that they would deploy together with their Active

 

Component (AC) sister units and to fight alongside them under the "roundout"

 

concept were soon disabused of it. Unfairly or otherwise, this has given rise to the

 

false public perception that the Reserves "cannot cut it as combat maneuver units"

 

and are best assigned only combat support and combat service support roles.

 

Although not articulated as such, the quiet reorganization of the Army's active

 

divisions into "filled" divisions from the previous "roundout" concept structure would

 

indicate this to be also the Department of Defense's (DoD) position.

 

 

 

      Total Force Policy Aid The Roudout Concept

 

      When General Creighton Abrams was appointed Chief of Staff of the U.S.

 

Army late in the Vietnam era, he was determined not to repeat the mistake of

 

failing to gain the support of the American people in fighting a war abroad.

 

Entrusted with the responsibility for reshaping the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War,

 

he set about reorganizing the Army's structure in such a manner that it could not be

 

committed to sustained combat without mobilizing the reserves--the cornerstone of

 

the Total Force Policy.2  Concomitantly introduced with that policy was the

 

"roundout" concept which, in effect, made the RC coequal partners to the AC. The

 

dropping of the "roundout" concept signals another evolution in the role of the

 

Reserves: from the traditional expansion and sustainment base role in total and

 

prolonged mobilization (up to the Korean War era) to the quick response/surge base

 

role for use in the successive "massive retaliation" and "flexible response" security

 

strategies of the U.S.3 and finally to the present situation where, to paraphrase

 

Lewis Sorley,"... Reserve forces will in the main, go back to being just that--forces

 

held in reserve, to be committed to supplement active forces when the scope or

 

duration of combat exceeds the regulars' unreinforced capabilities .... with the

 

exception that selected combat support and combat service support forces will be

 

committed early on to provide capabilities .... not economical or necessary to

 

maintain in the active component."4

 

 

 

      An Army Conspiracy?

 

      As can be expected, the ARNG resisted the changes and raised charges of a

 

conspiracy on the part of the military leadership to leave behind the "roundout"'

 

brigades so as not to weaken the AC's position in the impending post-Cold War

 

armed forces downsizing. This may not have been without basis--a general officer

 

on Pentagon duty was quoted as saying of General Colin L. Powell and General Carl

 

E. Vuono, "The Chairman and the Chief are of one mind on this. If we give up

 

force structure to the Reserves and they prove that they can do the job, then we'll

 

lose that structure to them."5 The Army, which was assigned the task of validating

 

the readiness of the "roundout" brigades, had taken a position that since these

 

ARNG brigades were not as yet urgently required in the theater; they could be made

 

to undergo a ".... period of deliberate readiness improvement."6 In the end, the post-

 

mobilization training program conducted by the Army at the National Training

 

Center to prepare them for deployment in Operation Desert Shield/Storm ".... did

 

add substantially more training days than planned for...."7. Furthermore, the after

 

action investigations established that no transportation plans were being made to

 

move the three ARNG brigades to the Gulf.  Not surprisingly, this raised the

 

traditional institutional rivalry between the Army and the ARNG to an almost

 

adversarial distrust.

 

 

 

      Therefore, while there might have been legitimate reasons for not deploying

 

the Army National Guard (ARNG) "roundout" brigades to the Kuwaiti Theater of

 

Operations, there is also reasonable evidence to suggest that the military leadership's

 

decision may have been influenced by the institutional rivalry between the Army and

 

ARNG. Certainly, had the ARNG brigades joined in the fighting and proved their

 

mettle, the Army's position would have been weakened in the impending post-Cold

 

War force downsizing bargaining.

 

 

 

      Reasons For Delay: Were Quite Legitimate

 

      Closer to the truth, there were legitimate reasons why the "roundout' brigades

 

could not achieve combat-ready certification in time. First, they were called to

 

active duty late--only after the 180 days statutory time limits on the use of the

 

Selected Reserves units which imposed artificial constraints on their employment was

 

temporarily extended by Congress.8 Second, the selective call-up for Operation

 

Desert Shield/Storm--for which prior mobilization plans failed to address9--resulted

 

in administrative chaos and delayed the commencement of post-mobilization training.

 

Some of these problems include lacking the authority to cross-transfer personnel and

 

equipment--which under a normal partial mobilization would have been

 

automatically granted--having personnel without proper dental fitness reports and

 

having personnel administratively assigned to military operational specialties (MOS)

 

within the affected units before having them properly qualified.  Finally, the

 

Secretary of Defense had decided to increase the readiness standards required of

 

combat units deploying to the Gulf War, neccessating even more training to meet the

 

new and higher requirements.

 

 

 

MARGINALIZING THE RC COMBAT FORCES IS SELF-DEFEATING

 

      I venture that discounting the value of the ARNG is both fool-hardy,

 

potentially dangerous and self-defeating.  Firstly, the Army National Guard and

 

Army Reserves, less combat ready as they may be, are an integral part of the Total

 

Force Policy concept.  With the current military downsizing, the increased

 

importance of the RC to the Army in all contingencies should have been obvious.

 

According to the 1995 report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and

 

Congress, detailed analysis of the possible future MRCs suggests that the U.S. will

 

require 5 Army divisions, 10 Air Force fighter wing equivalents, 100 Air Force heavy

 

bomber, 4-5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups, 1-2 Marine Expeditionary Forces and

 

Special Operations forces to win just one MRC10. Current plans list the U.S. Army

 

as having 10 AC divisions, augmented by 15 enhanced readiness ARNG combat

 

brigades as a ready land force.11 This means that fully one half of the Army's AC

 

divisions will be required to tackle just one MRC! Surely, the Army can see that

 

without calling up the Reserve combat forces, it will be already be hard-pressed in

 

tackling just one MRC, what with having to still fulfill its overseas presence

 

obligations. A two MRC situation would therefore, in all likelihood, overstretch it

 

 

 

      Secondly, a dismissive attitude undermines the RC combat forces' commitment

 

to maintaining a high state of force readiness as it sends out a wrong signal that

 

Reserve combat forces are unlikely to ever deploy as first-line forces and therefore

 

will still have plenty of time to do post-mobilization training. The leaving behind of

 

the "roundout" brigades in Operation Desert Shield/Storm and the apparent

 

dropping of the "roundout" concept has undoubtedly been making it difficult for the

 

ARNG leaders to motivate their combat units to train and to maintain a high level

 

of combat readiness. The Enhanced Readiness Brigade concept12 which replaced the

 

previous "roundout" concept just does not generate the same enthusiasm especially

 

after the left-behind ARNG brigades debacle--"It was a devastating blow!

 

Commanders who had urged their soldiers on stressing that the active force could

 

not get by without them in any future conflict suddenly found themselves completely

 

undermined."13

 

      Finally, relegating the RC combat forces to being just strategic reserves

 

weakens the Reserves' roles as the link between the military establishment and the

 

American people--General Abrams' original intent in formulating the Total Force

 

Policy. While some may argue that the continued AC dependence on RC combat

 

support and combat service support forces necessary for projection of any sizeable

 

U.S. military force abroad fulfills this role, I would argue that the inherent lesser risk

 

that such forces face as compared to combat forces, dilutes this.

 

 

 

      In any case, with the filling out of the Army's previous "roundout" concept

 

divisions with active brigades, one wonders how the Enhanced Readiness Brigades

 

would be integrated, if they are finally called up and actually deployed. LtCol Mark

 

F. Cancian, in his Marine Corps Gazette article14, suggests that they will be used

 

mainly for augmentation of Army AC divisions or be given as second-choice

 

supporting units to active Marine and coalition forces. Is the Army passing the buck

 

and side-stepping the crucial responsibility of "bringing them up to speed"? Cynically

 

speaking, the AC has little incentive to improve the readiness of the RC combat

 

forces. To do so would undermine the AC's position in the constant battle for a

 

bigger piece of the defense budget.

 

 

 

                       ARE COMBAT-READY REQUIREMENTS FOR

                        THE RC UNNECESSARILY STRINGENT?

 

      The U.S. is the only superpower left in the world with unchallenged air-

 

supremacy and an overwhelming edge in military hardware and technology.  A

 

survey of the potential enemies that it could go to war against in the near future will

 

reveal them to be third-world regional powers such as North Korea, Iraq or Iran.

 

This is not to suggest that we should underestimate the military potential of third

 

world countries but rather that we do not overestimate them and impose unnecessary

 

requirements of friendly forces. The point being that after all the hullabaloo about

 

the combat-readiness of the ARNG brigades, the ground offensive turned out to be

 

a "piece of cake"s and took only 100 hrs! Perhaps it is time to reassess the combat-

 

ready requirement standards and to set them more realistically on a case-by-case

 

basis in future conflicts. I am confident that at the least, the ARNG is prepared to

 

trade-off the risks involved for a chance to get into the action. This is not to suggest

 

that bravado should be allowed to prevail over sober logic but unless you are

 

prepared to use the RC combat forces, you will lose them-in fighting spirit at the

 

least.

 

 

 

      Although it is preferable that all components of the Reserve maintain a high

 

standard of readiness at all times, the relatively short total annual training time

 

available to RC units are serious impediments to this, especially for the combat

 

maneuver units. The typical RC unit has only 39 days a year available for collective

 

training.15 Generally this is sufficient for RC combat service support units which

 

perform functions such as transportation, medical, civil engineering and stevedoring

 

as often their members do very much the same in their everyday civilian lives.

 

However, the combat maneuver and combat support units need more time and

 

intensive training to get combat ready due to the complexities of combined arms

 

fighting and maneuver warfare.  Furthermore, the ARNG combat forces are

 

expected to accomplish the same individual, crew and collective training Army

 

Training Evaluation Package (ARTEP) standards required by their wartime missions

 

as that for active units who have about 240 days to do the same. It is not surprising

 

that with their longer, progressive, sequential and repetitive program, the AC forces

 

are generally more combat ready. Is the current training program for RC really

 

necessary or realistic?  I would venture otherwise and will elaborate on this

 

subsequently.

 

 

 

                     THE NEED TO MAINTAIN RC COMBAT FORCES

                               AT HIGH-READINESS

 

      Despite the problems mentioned, the Reserves still have to be maintained at

 

a relatively high level of readiness for the following reasons:

 

 

 

      They Are An integral Part of Total Force Concept

 

      The Reserves bring force generation, sustainment and most importantly, the

 

support of the nation with them. The Gulf War enjoyed mainstream America's

 

support because the mobilization of the Reserves, ".... focused the minds of `Main

 

Street America' on its sons and daughters who were deploying, not only in the active

 

components but from local armories, air bases and reserve centers.16   It has been

 

widely accepted that the war could not have been won without the help of the

 

Reserves who supported, augmented, reinforced, backfilled and fought alongside

 

their AC brethren. Another point often overlooked is that while the ARNG brigades

 

were late in getting combat ready, they had either been certified as combat ready or

 

were just about to be so, soon after ground operations commenced17. These units

 

would have proven to be invaluable for the sustainment of the offensive had the war

 

gone on for much longer or if the casualty rates had been as high as was originally

 

anticipated. In Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the U.S. fought a ground war against

 

an enemy that had been decimated beforehand by overwhelming U.S. air-power.

 

The U.S. military believes that this formula will continue to be successful for all its

 

wars in the near future. I suggest that we consider a scenario where American

 

hostages/ prisoners of war are deliberately used as human insurance/ shield to

 

protect them from air-power--quite plausible given the situation in the Korean

 

Peninsula. It is not unreasonable in such a case, to expect U.S. troops to have to

 

"slug it out" the old fashioned way, supported by tanks and artillery. The importance

 

of having a large pool of ready reserves then becomes obvious.

 

 

 

      Reserves May Have To Deploy With Little Warm-up Training

 

      The Bottom-Up Review suggests that the U.S. must be prepared to fight and

 

win two major regional conflicts (MRCs) "-nearly simultaneously"'.18 The two most

 

likely scenarios proposed are:  a) in an effort to use force to unity the Korean

 

Peninsula, North Korea launches a surprise strike against South Korea and b) Iraq

 

re-emerging once again to threaten the oil-fields of Saudi Arabia.  Robert L.

 

Pfaltzgraff suggests a third possibility-that Iran and not Iraq is clearly the emerging

 

regional power of geo-strategic importance based on its efforts to modernize its

 

conventional warfare capabilities and its potential of controlling the Straits of

 

Hormuz, through which much of the world's oil is shipped.19 A 1992 Joint Military

 

Net Assessment crisis response study showed that if the U.S. had to respond to two

 

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, mobilization of National Guard or

 

Reserve force will be necessary.20  It would be irresponsible, therefore, not to

 

ensure and insist that the Reserve Combat Units be more combat ready. Those who

 

believe that RC combat forces cannot rise to the challenge and perform well as first-

 

liners should take a look at the widely publicized sterling performances of the U.S.