"USMC
Close Air Support Must Be Complementary, Not Competitive"
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
Executive Summary
Title: "USMC Close Air Support Must Be
Complementary, Not Competitive"
Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Gibson, USMC
Problem: The Marine Corps has traditionally viewed
close air support (CAS) as a solely
fixed-wing
endeavor, and has neglected the capabilities of the attack helicopter to assist
in
the
CAS mission. Current CAS training involves segregated, vice integrated CAS
attacks.
Discussion:
The Marine Corps trains and equips its forces to perform CAS with
distinction
because it must have CAS to win on the modern battlefield. Both recently and
traditionally,
Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) have come to the battlefield
from
the sea. As a seaborne "expeditionary" force, they are organically
lacking in
firepower
in the form of armor, long-range artillery, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems,
tactical
missiles and other weapons systems found in the U.S. Army. Marine Air
compensates
for this shortfall. Both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft deploy with MAGTFs
to
provide the commander with the tools to shape his battlespace. Employed
separately
they
are not as effective as the ground commander needs them to be. Weather,
geography
and
threat make single-platform or segregated CAS insufficient. The White
Commission
on
Roles and Missions is currently evaluating the demands of the CAS mission, the
capabilities
of all the Armed Services' various CAS delivery platforms, to include both
fixed
and rotary-wing, and several provocative proposals purportedly aimed at
optimizing
the
end product -- close air support. New ways must be found to maximize USMC CAS
synchroneity.
The bottom line is to discern what is best for the Marines on the ground.
Conclusion:
The historical evolution of CAS, its current direction and the latest
initiatives
of our "Sister Services" unmistakably point to a Marine Corps future
(1995-2005)
served by both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft operating in an integrated,
"complementary"
system. Marine Hunter-Killer (MarHuk) teams of F/A-18s and
AH-1Ws
in sufficient numbers should perform integrated, complementary CAS for
Marines
over the next decade.
CONTENTS
Page
Executive
Summary ii
Contents
iii
List
of Tables
v
List
of Figures
vi
CHAPTER
1: FORWARD 1
CHAPTER
2: PURPOSE 4
Background 4
CAS and Congress 6
Evolution Vs. Revolution
9
Every Marine a Rifleman (Even
Aviators)
13
CHAPTER
3: THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE 16
JFACC Vs. MEF Commander?
17
The Single Battle 18
Deep and Close -- Inseparable Parts of
the Single Battle 21
Air Force A-10s Cannot Replace Marine
F/A-18s 28
CHAPTER
4: LESSONS FROM THE NEAR PAST 32
The MAGTF and CAS in the `90s
33
Precision-Guided Munitions
38
Blast Vs. Lethality 40
Page
CHAPTER
5: THE BEST PLATFORMS FOR COMPLEMENTARY CAS (1995-2005) 42
Best "Bang For the Buck"
42
Fratricide 43
The Attack Helicopter
44
CHAPTER
6: JOINT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 50
Jointness and Control Measures
53
How Deep Is Deep? 56
Non-Linear Battlespace
58
The Marine Air Command and Control
System (MACCS)
62
The Threat (1995-2005)
66
CHAPTER
7: COMPLEMENT, NOT COMPETE 71
Complementary CAS 71
Marine Hunter-Killer Teams (MarHuk) 73
CHAPTER
8: CONCLUSION 81
NOTES
83
BIBLIOGRAPHY 92
LIST OF TABLES
Table
Page
Table
1. Service Refinements to the Joint Definition of CAS 2
Table
2. Summary of Special HASC CAS
Committee Findings (October 1965)
7
Table
3. The Six Functions of Marine
Aviation
45
Table
4. AH-1W Gulf War
"Boxscore"
47
Table
5. USMC CAS Aircraft Inventory (current
22 March 1995) 68
LIST OF
FIGURES
Figures
Page
Figure
1. Notional JFC/Marine Component
Commander's Area of Operations (AO)
55
Figure
2. Proposed British Battlefield
Layout
57
Figure
3. Potential Urban AO
61
Figure
4. Current USMC CAS Request System 63
"USMC Close Air Support
Must Be Complementary,
Not
Competitive"
CHAPTER 1
FORWARD
Part of the reason the Services view
CAS differently is due to their disparate
interpretations
of a common definition. For the purpose of this thesis, the JCS Pub 1
definition
of close air support (CAS) will be used. It defines CAS as:
"air action by fixed- and
rotary-winged aircraft against hostile targets which
are in close proximity to friendly
forces and which require detailed
integration of each air mission with
the fire and movement of those forces."1
While predominantly a tactical level
operation, CAS is closely connected to the
operational
level of war through the Commander-In-Chiefs (CINC's) joint apportionment
process.2
Though every United States Armed Service recognizes the same joint definition
listed
above, each further refines it to more adequately reflect its own particular
view of
CAS.
Understanding these differences is critical in the context of this thesis. In
the
following
descriptions of CAS, extracted from various Service publications, several
examples
of this practice are highlighted in Table 1:
United
States Marine Corps
"The Marine Corps fights using
maneuver warfare through the application of
combined arms. CAS is fully integrated
with other supporting arms to support the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
commander's plan. The MAGTF
commander uses CAS at the decisive
place and time to achieve local combat
superiority or take advantage of
battlefield opportunities. CAS is employed for
operational effectiveness and is used
to weight the main effort."3
United
States Navy
"CAS supports amphibious and land
operations with massed firepower, requiring
detailed integration with the ground
scheme of maneuver. CAS requires close
coordination during tasking, planning
and execution. CAS is a force multiplier,
enabling the supported commander to
mass combat power decisively.
Traditionally, the Navy has been a
provider of CAS, but can be a recipient of
CAS as well, in support of naval
operations."4
United
States Army
"CAS supports land operations by
providing the capability to deliver massed
firepower at decisive points and
attacking hostile targets in close proximity to
friendly forces with pre-planned or
immediate attacks. CAS can surprise the
enemy, create opportunities for the
maneuver or advance of friendly forces
through shock action and concentrated
attacks, protect the flanks of friendly
forces, blunt enemy offensives, and
protect the rear of land forces during
retrograde operations. Air Force, Navy
and Marine Corps aviation may be
required to provide significant air
support to Army forces during the entry stage
of force-projection operations."5
United
States Air Force
"CAS is the application of
aerospace forces in support of the land component
commander's objectives. At times, CAS
may be the best force available to
ensure the success or survival of surface
forces. Since it provides direct support
to friendly forces in contact, CAS
requires close coordination from the theater and
component levels to the tactical level
of operations. CAS should be massed to
apply concentrated combat power, and
should be planned and controlled to reduce
the risk of friendly casualties."6
United
States Special Operations Forces (SOF)
"Air Force SOF (AFSOF) AC-130s
train extensively for CAS in support of special
operations direct action missions.
Also, AC-13Os may provide CAS in support of
other component commanders. Special
operations helicopters provide limited
CAS to SOF land and maritime
units."7
Table 1. Service Refinements to the
Joint Definition of CAS
Each of these highlighted phrases is
key to understanding the evolution of CAS and
charting
a course for its Marine Corps future. While all the Services are charged with
providing
CAS and agree with the joint definition, it nevertheless means different things
to
the
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. How these differences have and will continue
to
impact
the future of CAS in the Marine Corps are addressed in this thesis.
CHAPTER 2
PURPOSE
The Marine Corps has been pursuing
close air support for more than 50 years.
During
that time, the platforms have changed and their targeting and delivery have
become
both
more accurate and more difficult to successfully accomplish. A dichotomy has
developed
between the highly volatile and mobile needs of the ground forces and the
abilities
of the aircraft that support them. CAS has become an intricately woven tapestry
of
threat and weather dependent support, tightly bound by a cumbersome, fratricide
conscious
command and control system. This thesis proposes a team concept of fixed and
rotary
wing aircraft best suited to provide the optimal close air support for the
Marine
Ground
Combat Element (GCE) over the next decade (1995-2005). Along with a look at
its
present status in the Marine Corps, a historical review of the roots of CAS is
critical to
show
the evolution of the "solution" each Service has deduced in providing
its version of
the
most effective CAS possible.
Background
Close air support has been the
hallmark, the defining factor of Marine Aviation
since
the first hand-held bomblet was dropped from a biplane in support of ground
Marines
in the "Banana Wars" of the 1920s.8 Fixed-wing CAS is a singularly "Marine"
endeavor.
No other U.S. Armed Service has its own fixed-wing aircraft dedicated to
support
its own troops in the close battle. The adage that "necessity is the
mother of
invention"
may have originated in the Marine Corps as well, for it certainly is valid in
the
CAS
arena. The use of aviators as Forward Air Controllers (FACs), collocated with
ground
units within small, mobile, communications-equipped tactical air control
parties
(TACPs),
are all Marine innovations.
Ever since the bitter infighting
between the Army and the newly borne Air Force
intensified
during the Korean War over whether CAS or deep interdiction held primacy,
there
has been an undercurrent of mistrust between the two services. Even today,
despite
the
overwhelming success of the Gulf War, many of the rank and file of the United
States
Army
question whether, when push comes to shove, the Air Force will fulfill its CAS
requirements.
This explains why for the past 30 years the Army has planned and built
fleets
of modern attack helicopters that rival the CAS capability of many Air Force
fixed-wing
craft, and has, in effect, created a "hip-pocket CAS" capability for
its
commanders.9
This is clearly evident in the two Services' CAS investment plans over the
next
five years (FY95-FY00). The Air Force plans to spend only $.6B on CAS upgrades
(no
new aircraft types), while the Army forecasts $44.9B on both upgrades and new
aircraft
(RAH-66 Comanche).10 When combined with the firepower of the Multiple
Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), it is
clear
the Army does not intend to have to learn the air support lesson the hard way.
As
has
often been the case, the Marine Corps is paying close attention to how the
"other"
land
Service, the Army, intends to ensure it gets the CAS it needs to win on the
battlefield.11
This includes doctrinal and procurement initiatives that do not necessarily
meet
with Air Force approval, such as the Comanche -- an advanced attack helicopter
designed
to function as a battlefield "general," directing the fires of the
Army's principal
CAS
aircraft of the future, the AH-64D Longbow Apache.12
CAS
and Congress
"...we feel that (the Air Force)
in its magnificent accomplishments in the wild blue
yonder, it has tended to ignore the foot soldier in the dirty brown
under."13
The problems the Army had with securing
enough effective CAS is chronicled in
Congressional
testimony, from which the above quote is extracted. From 22 September
through
14 October 1965, the Close Air Support Special Committee of the House
Armed
Services Committee, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY) represented the
first
unclassified testimony and report on the effectiveness of CAS during the infant
state
of
the war in Vietnam.14
These proceedings set the stage for
continued controversy between the Army and
the
Air Force over the role of each in CAS, and their impact was not lost on the
Department
of the Navy. The Navy/Marine team had foreseen these requirements much
earlier,
demonstrating the various capabilities in Korea, then carrying them forward
into
South
Vietnam. The war saw the first USAF transport aircraft configured for CAS in
limited
support of Marines with AC-47 "Puff" and AC-130 "Spectre"
gunships,
Korean-vintage
prop-planes pulled out of mothballs, new Forward Air Controller
(Airborne)
(FAC(A)) aircraft designed (OV-10 Bronco) and finally, the birth of the attack
helicopter.
The length of the Vietnam War allowed the Services time to try many
innovative
concepts -- some effective and some not. In South East Asia, necessity was
indeed
the mother of invention.
Some key findings of the proceedings
are included in Table 2:
1) The incompatibility of
communications equipment prevented Army units from
talking to either the Air Force
aircraft or the command and control agencies that
sent them to perform close air support.
This resulted in delays from 20 minutes to
several hours before "bombs on
target."15 Throughout the war, the only agency
that could consistently communicate
with ships and aircraft on Yankee Station,
USAF, USA and Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
aircraft was the Marine Air Control
Squadron at Marble Mountain.
2) The Air Force owned no aircraft
suitable for FAC(A) at the outset of the war,
even though the requirement was clearly
documented during the Korean Conflict.
(They ended up "borrowing"
Army L-19s to do the job.)16
3) The Air Force owned no aircraft
suitable to perform the CAS mission itself at
the time then-President Kennedy
committed US troops into the war. (Hence the
"borrowing" of Navy A-1s.)17
When the F-4s were modified for the CAS mission
most of the A-1s were transferred to
the RVN.
4) The bottom line in the report was
that the committee determined that the Air
Force had failed in its appointed
mission to provide CAS to the Army, and what
support it did give was too little, too
late and with "make-do" equipment (as of
1965).18 The result was radical changes
in aircraft design and mission capability
for the Air Force. From 1966-70
modifications and updates to aircraft such as the
F-100 and F-4 proved them to be much
more adept at the close air support
mission.
Table 2. Summary of Special HASC CAS
Committee Findings (October 1965)
Vietnam also saw the birth of the
helicopter gunship and its subsequent baptism
under
fire. The world's first true attack helicopter, the AH-1G Cobra, was developed
and
fielded
by the Army specifically for the Vietnam conflict. Though the Corps designated
the
attack helicopter mission as Close-In Fire Support (CIFS) to distinguish it
from the
more
understood fixed wing CAS, the Marines received close support from their own
Cobras
(borrowed from the Army) for the first time in 1965-66. During the 1983
Operation
URGENT FURY in Grenada, underpowered Marine AH-1Ts got their baptism
by
fire, suffering grievous casualties in gallant support of ground forces with
outdated
tactics.19
Though a hard lesson to learn, Marine attack helicopter tactics changed
virtually
overnight
in the early 1980s from the Vietnam-vintage high altitude diving fire to
terrain
flight
involving Army-pioneered nap-of-the-earth techniques, due to the demonstrated
vulnerability
of the former. In 1989 Army AH-64s, though brought to Panama in part to
make
a political statement, acquitted themselves as lethal night CAS platforms
during
Operation
JUST CAUSE.
The development of conventional CAS
continued however, unencumbered by this
quiet
rotary wing revolution until the first AH-64 Apache raids and AH-1W SuperCobra
CIFS
missions of DESERT STORM. It was primarily due to the resounding success of
these
two aircraft in that conflict that the term CIFS was discarded at the direction
of
General
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Joint Pub 1-02. The
Marine
Corps quickly followed suit when and the definition of CAS in FMFM 5-1 was
broadened
to include the operations of attack helicopters (Rotary-Wing CAS). These
definition
"adjustments," combined with the groundwork laid by the attack
helicopter from
Vietnam
to DESERT STORM, helped further the case for AH-1Ws as partners in the
author's
proposal of complementary CAS.
Evolution
Vs. Revolution
The evolution of close air support
proceeded along predictable paths, beginning
with
5 lb. bombs hand-dropped from biplanes over the trenches of WWI and ending with
the
first true rotary-wing CAS (RW CAS) missions of Operation DESERT STORM. The
desert
environment, coupled with emerging changes in the philosophy of prosecution of
the
Deep battle, the role of the JFACC, and indeed, of Marine Air itself seems to
dictate a
branch
or sequel in traditional CAS thinking.
Though not specifically close air
support, the revolutionary insights of early
proponents
such as Octave Chanute, Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell provided the
development
of the theory and practice of Airpower in general, and it was from these