Understanding Information Power And Organizing For Victory
In Joint
Warfighting
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
Executive Summary
Title:
Understanding Information Power and Organizing
for
Victory in Joint Warfighting
Author: Fred W. Gortler, III, Major, United States
Air Force
Research To develop a framework for understanding
information power so
Problem: the United States armed forces can organize
for victory in joint
information
warfighting.
Discussion: We
live in the Information Age, a time when information power is
transforming the world. In the US,
advanced civil sector technologies passed to the military offer quick,
off-the-shelf combat applications. Some
see this as a Revolution in Military Affairs; others say the US armed forces
have not begun to understand information power and its impact on modern
warfare. Meanwhile, as the US defense community debates the role of information
in warfare, new information-age threats and enemies are emerging. States, even individuals,
without traditional sources of military power, can threaten US global military
leadership. To confront this new potential, the US armed forces must understand
information power and how to organize for victory in joint warfighting. Perspective must shift from the Cold War to
threats and enemies of a new era.
These
are vexing challenges. How should the US define its role in
an info-world where military and
civilian issues blur, where enemies become amorphic, and where old structures
can't keep up with new technologies?
How must the US organize for victory in information warfare? This paper
explores information power in relation to US joint warfighting. It seeks to
advance the understanding of information power and proposes theater-level
organization for joint information warfighting: specifically, that responsibility for existing
tools of information power--command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence--should be functionally assigned to a single combatant commander.
Conclusion:
Information power is changing the American way of war. The United
States
armed forces must develop a better understanding of the
relationship between information power and modern warfare. The
United States can organize for victory in joint information
warfighting by assigning functional responsibility for
information
warfare to a single combatant commander. US Space Command is the
combatant command most suited for this assignment.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1
Background
4. The Gutenberg Analogy 5
Section I
7 Defining
Information Warfare
.A New Paradox 9
.Thinking About
New Threats and Enemies 11
.Military
Application 13
.Building on
Experience 16
Section II
19 The Electronic Umbrella
.The New
Migration 20
.Technological
Revolution in the US Military 21
.Integrating New
Ideas 23
.Obstacles to
Integration 24
Section III
27 Making the Most of Information Power
.The Mandate to
Pursue Information Power 27
.The Road Most
Travelled 29
.Redefining
Presence 30
Section IV
33 Leveraging Information Power in the Post-Cold War Era
.The Crossroads
33
.Contrasting
Nuclear and Information Power 34
.Meeting New
Challenges 35
Section V
36 Recommendations and Conclusions
.Innovating
Organizationally 37
.Innovating
Operationally 40
.Innovating
Doctrinally 44
.A Concluding
Parable 46
48 Bibliography
53 Abbreviations
54 Endnotes
Understanding Information Power
and
Organizing for Victory in Joint Warfighting
We live in
an age that is driven by information. It's an age which Alvin Toffler
has called
the Third Wave. The ability to acquire and communicate huge
volumes of
information in real time, the computing power to analyze this
information
quickly, and the control systems to pass this analysis to multiple
users simultaneously--these are the
technological breakthroughs that are
changing the
face of war and how we prepare for war.1
William Perry
Secretary of Defense
Introduction
Information
power is changing the American way of war. Secretary Perry spoke of
information's impact on how America fights, of how the
Persian Gulf War demonstrated
that "information operations can determine a
mission's success."2 The Pentagon's vision
of future battlespace is built on a cornerstone of
information power: soldiers "able to
draw intelligence about their adversaries quickly and
directly from continually updated
electronic displays, then fire weapons from over the
horizon without ever having to get
close to targets."3 Other visions are more
aggressive, expanding "traditional conceptions
of military presence to include not only the 'physical
merits' of air, land, and sea forces,
but also the 'vitural' advantage obtained with space
forces and information-based
capabilities."4
How must
America think of information power to organize for victory in joint
warfighting? This is a thorny issue. While most military
discussions reflect consensus
that information warfare is important militarily, little
agreement exists on precisely what
it constitutes. "[E]ach of the services has its own
definition; none are exactly alike; and
all are similar...."5 A coherent information
warfighting strategy is thus unlikely to
emerge. "US
leaders need a roadmap--an azimuth enabling all concerned to march
toward a common objective."6 At the national level,
the President of the United States is
considering a Presidential Decision Directive.7 But more
is needed. Since the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986, combatant
command, or warfighting authority, was assigned to the
unified commands; military
services organize, train, and equip the forces. The Joint
Staff's Unified Action Armed
Forces (UNAAF), JCS Pub-02, establishes these principles
for the armed forces.
Therefore, the US needs a theater-level commander to plan
and execute joint information
warfighting.
This paper explores
aspects of information power in order to foster a more precise
understanding of its relation to modern, joint warfare.
The paper proposes that functional
responsibility for existing tools of information
power--command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)--be
assigned to a single combatant
commander so this power can truly revolutionize the US
armed forces. Section I,
Defining Information Warfare, begins to make this case. It
defines information warfare
by presenting the best definitions offered by Department
of Defense (DoD) organizations
at the unclassified level, and introduces the reader to
new threats and enemies spawned
by information power.
Information
power is transforming modern societies. Why is this important to the
US Military? Section II, The Electronic Umbrella,
describes the effects of information
power on the civil sector which are, in turn, migrating to
the military. It explores the
concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and
seeks perspective for changes
the US military is now undergoing.
The Global
Information Infrastructure (GII), the systems of commercial grids and
telecommunications sub-infrastructures that comprise the
information superhighway,
gives life to the RMA. Section III, Making the Most of
Information Power, characterizes
the GII and opportunities it presents for US warfighting.
Equally important, this section
explains why information warfare is larger than the DoD,
more than just a military issue.
Information power
poses unique, organizational challenges for the US military.
Section IV, Organizing for Success in Information Warfare,
transitions the reader from
understanding information power to addressing how the US
must organize at the theater
level to succeed in joint information warfighting. To add
perspective, this section
contrasts information and nuclear power, and draws lessons
from the US military's past.
It also raises concerns about the fitness of our current
military organization to deal with
threats posed by hostile use of information power.
Section V
argues that the US armed forces are at the dawn of opportunity for
information power. Revolutionizing military affairs
through information power is the
sine qua non to global military leadership. Before it can
revolutionize, the US armed
forces must modify its military organization, as well as
its operational and doctrinal
approaches. This section concludes with a parable
underscoring the challenge of
changing one's perspective in order to consider new
constructs. Only in this way will
the US armed forces be able to understand information
power and organize for victory in
joint warfighting.
Background
Information
warfare has been a hotly debated topic since the Persian Gulf War.
Leaders from the highest levels of our government and
military, private industry, and
academia have called for the President of the United
States to articulate a national policy
on information warfare. Yet four years after the war, when
many glimpsed the potential
of information warfare for the first time, its relevance
to how America fights or her role
as an international leader remains unclear. As a result,
the concept of information
warfare is hazy, and even leadership of the US military
services offer divergent views.
Information
warfare--applying information-age technologies militarily--is generally
accepted to mean the competition between friendly and
hostile information-based
systems.8 The information revolution is transforming
warfare as it has nearly every
aspect of modern society. Secretary of Defense William
Perry calls it "the ability to
acquire and communicate huge volumes of information in
real time, the computing
power to analyze this information quickly, and the control
systems to pass this analysis to
multiple users simultaneously--these are the technological
breakthroughs that are
changing the face of war and how we prepare for
war."9 Yet little consensus exists on the
significance of these breakthroughs on warfighting. Those
who would diminish their
value argue the US military has long engaged in
information warfare activities, though
they were known by different names. For example, Allied
planners in World War II
relied on deception to adversely affect Hitler's
information processes in an action that
also provided protection for Operational OVERLORD's
landing. But the US must be
careful not to underestimate information power's
significance. Information-age
technologies hold the promise of revolutionizing our
weaponry and the very character of
war itself--but only if military organizations retool to
assimilate information power.
Viewed from this perspective, information warfare is not
just a new name for the
traditional military activities it encompasses; it is the
recognition of an Information Age,
a new era for both American society and its military, the
impact of which can now only
remotely be perceived and understood. This is why the
debate on information warfare
has raged without bringing critical issues into focus.
The Gutenberg Analogy
As we explore the information revolution and its
significance to modern warfare, it is
helpful to consider other breakthroughs that have
profoundly influenced whole societies.
By leveraging the mechanical power of a simple wine press,
Johannes Gutenberg
launched the first information revolution. His mechanized
printing press spread the
power of the written word--previously the domain of the
privileged--to ordinary people.
The result: mass education and literacy, first for Europe
and soon the New World.
Today Gutenberg's influence reaches nearly every corner of
modern life. Electronic
publishing takes Gutenberg's revolution to the next level,
with paperless operation as the
ultimate goal. Some doubt a paperless world is likely. Yet
explosive popularity of the
Internet, computer on-line services, and even the
computerized grocery check-out signal
the contrary. In a parallel sense, the Information Age
offers America's military new
opportunities to leverage the mechanics of warfare to
revolutionary proportions.
The advent of
the airplane is another breakthrough that ultimately redefined modern
warfare. When closely scrutinized, aerospace power and
information power share key
characteristics. Indeed, information warfare appears to be
aerospace power raised to an
exponential level. Offensively, information power, like
air power, can strike at targets
across the globe. Travelling through the medium called
cyberspace, information power is
unencumbered by events occurring on the earth's surface.
As aerospace power is
projected rapidly and flexibly, information power is
projected through cyberspace's
computers and telecommunications systems, connecting the
world's communities through
the GII. Immediate and relatively boundless, these are the
key characteristics of
information power.
If the armed
forces successfully revolutionize information power for military ends,
perhaps information power alone can create the kind of
effect we have traditionally
produced with fire and steel on target. In this way
information warfare promises to
leapfrog mechanical processes through system-to-system
interface. Warfare as we know
it is raised to the next level. Applying the Gutenberg
analogy, aerospace power can be
thought of as the mechanical level of information power,
just as the printing press was
the springboard to electronic publishing.
If aerospace
and information power share characteristics, then aerospace doctrine,
refined through a century of aerospace warfare, may
likewise apply to information
power. Aerospace axioms gleaned from early battles of
World War I, retried in World
War II, and validated over the jungles of Vietnam and the
sands of the Persian Gulf may
offer insight into how the US should organize its armed
forces to integrate new ideas
about information power into military operations.
Section I:
Defining Information Warfare
Before US armed
forces leadership can understand information power and organize
for victory in information warfare, they must be able to
define it. Yet, defining
information warfare has not been an easy task for policy
makers, perhaps because it
mixes elements as old as warfare itself, like deception
and psychological operations, with
new technologies and applications. Or perhaps the very
nature of information warfare is
partly to blame. Since information warfare requires
intensive peacetime intelligence
operations, the US government is understandably
circumspect in deciding exactly how
federal agencies will weigh intelligence needs with the
citizens' right to privacy. As a
result, the term means a variety of things to different
organizations.
The military
services have each forged their own vision of information warfare and
are aggressively seeking programmatic support within the
DoD. At the same time, the
military services and federal agencies, especially within
the DoD, have embraced
information warfare, and academic and scientific circles
have eagerly contributed to the
discussion. Even so, forging a joint definition or vision
of information warfare has
proved complex. Adding to the confusion, "other
terms, such as command and control
warfare, are used in related contexts, but they are also
interpreted in varying ways."10
Meanwhile, the
pace of information technology continues to outstrip information
warfare policy making. Here are some indications. The
Joint Staff's Department of
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,11
revised in March 1994, does not
contain an unclassified definition for information
warfare. In the CJCS' Joint Doctrine
for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Operations, Part
II--Terms and Definitions, a
definition for information warfare is deferred:
"information warfare: To be provided by
Joint Staff."12 The Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), which has been steadfast in
its efforts to build consensus on information warfare
among the services,13 is obviously
confronted by similar obstacles. More than two years since
OSD's Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (ASD/C3I) issued a
classified definition of information warfare,14 only a
"working unclassified definition" is
offered: "Actions taken to achieve information
superiority in support of national military
strategy by affecting adversary information and
information systems while leveraging
and protecting our information and information
systems."
Will all of this
discussion ever meld into an information warfighting strategy for the
combatant commander? Without consensus on a single
definition, it seems unlikely that
the military services will be able to fulfill ASD/C3I's
intent. Even less certain is the
prospect for information warfighting success at the US
combatant command level. Yet
while the US defense community may be hamstrung, advances
in civilian information
technology continue to migrate to potential adversaries,
yielding quantum changes in
both the character and focus of warfare. The Persian Gulf
War has heightened
expectations of the US military and the public for
military operations that are
accomplished rapidly, surgically, and with minimum
casualties. For success in
information warfighting, OSD envisions "the
exploitation and disruption of hostile
information systems, while protecting the integrity of
one's own information systems and
architecture. The objective of information warfare is to
gain an information advantage--
measured in time and space--to enable our forces to
quickly overwhelm the enemy
force."15 Like ours, the enemy's
observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loops are bounded by
factors of time and space (Figure 1 16). "When the US
effort can increase the friction, it
extends the time the adversary needs to observe, orient,
decide, and act. If this effort
simultaneously reduces friction and time for the United
States, the military effectively
will outperform an adversary in combat and will prevail in
an engagement, crisis, or
conflict."17 Failure of the US defense community to
organize for joint information
warfighting may place the US military in the same
vulnerable position that OSD
envisions the enemy will occupy.
Click here to view image
A New Paradox
This is not about
war by conventional means. This is about war by other means,
and those other
means do not wear a uniform, salute, pull a trigger, or even
appear for
muster.... Everything we ever learned about warfare, and especially
about the
difference between war and peace, between allies and enemies, between
combat arms and
supporting services, between CONUS and OCONUS, is out the
window.18
Robert
D. Steele
President, Open Source Solutions
Historian and
Congressman Newt Gingrich agrees with Steele. In a presentation to
senior Pentagon leadership in Summer 1994, Gingrich
offered that in the 200-plus years
since the American Revolution, such incredible changes in
military operations have
occurred that Washington and Schwarzkopf would find little
common ground.19 If Steele
and Gingrich are correct, the US military may require an
equally dramatic shift in
emphasis.
Combat in the
Information Age mandates that the US warfighting commander
contemplate issues never before associated with warfare;
information power poses so
many new opportunities and threats for the US military
commander. Unfortunately the
warfighting organization built for the Cold War and
adapted for success in Southwest
Asia is not equipped for these new threats. Information
power presents the US military
with a new paradox that must be considered if we are to
organize for new, relevant
strategies: As the US armed forces become more reliant
upon information-based systems,
its information infrastructure becomes more vulnerable
than ever before.
Information-age
technologies shrink the dimensions of time and space, conversely
expanding the US commander's battlespace to global
dimensions. Offensively, this
provides opportunities to strike global targets as if they
were nearby. Defensively, it
adds risk. The enemy is no longer confined to a
battlespace for which control is
completely within the purview of the warfighting
commander. That many warriors do
not readily accept this notion does not diminish its
significance. The warfighter, the
troops with GPS receivers, even our smart weapons share a
reliance on a high volume of
precise information. US forces in the Persian Gulf
minimized the fog of war for
themselves while maximizing it for the Iraqis. Should the
US fail to grasp the wartime
implications of the Information Age, it may find itself in
the same position as the Iraqis
in the next conflict.
Frederick Cohen
warns: "When the fog of war hits the information infrastructure, the
warfighter better be able to restore clarity in short
order." What does this mean for the
US commander? Absent a full range of concrete data,
telecommunications experts
provide estimates of the threat new enemies portend.
Consider that 95 percent of US
military communications transit commercial systems,20 and
that teenagers regularly take
control of these systems.21 Simple viruses have taken down
computer networks for
extended periods, and most military systems have the same
vulnerabilities.22 US
commanders must address the information warfare capability
of the opposing force and
also of "'information assassins' [who] are bringing a
new level of sophistication to
deliberate attacks. The FBI reports 57 countries are
targeting Silicone Valley alone."23
"The threat is not the rag-tag teenage hacker, but
rather well-organized and financed
groups with clear objectives detrimental to national
security...."24
Cohen provides
alarming estimates of US vulnerability to foreign information
warfare attacks. He estimates that ten people with
$100,000 to target the US Defense
Information Infrastructure could disrupt it for a period
of weeks. Twice the number of
information warriors and $1,000,000 could bring the US to
its knees for two to four
weeks. With 100 warriors and $30,000,000, Cohen estimates
the disruption to the total
US information infrastructure would require a recovery
period of several years. Since
anyone armed with a modem is a potential combatant, the
joint warfighting commander
loses control of weapons in a battlespace with a new
cyber-dimension.
The Information
Age brandishes a two-edge sword. The US armed forces must
define the threat, then organize for the opportunity.
Thinking About New Threats and Enemies
A popular cartoon hangs in several classrooms at the US
Marine Corps University. A
sketch shows the giant Goliath laying flat on the ground,
while the much smaller David
looks on, slingshot in hand. Inscribed are the words
"He who thinks...wins."
The US must
muster all with a stake in information power, military and non-
military, to harness the collective thought capability if
it hopes to win the information
war. So many factors critical to victory in information
warfare are beyond the
commander's traditional forces and capabilities. When
faced with new challenges,
organizations, like the people that comprise them, are
often tempted to turn to
comfortable solutions. The services continue to think in
terms of a battlespace defined
by dimensions of time, space, and height. Yet, as Steele
asserts for information warfare,
"it is counter-productive to limit our discussion to
arcane issues of 'space and electronic
warfare' or 'offensive command and control.' The enemy is
not just inside the gate, there
is no gate, there are no perimeters, nothing is
sacrosanct."25
The US armed
forces traditionally operate best when the threat is defined and
structured. Threat drives acquisition, training, force
build, nearly everything. Yet a
vision of a defined threat--or even clear sight of the
enemy--is growing increasingly
elusive. With information power, the threat is less
defined, less organized, and
consequently, far more dangerous. The critical question
then is whether the US armed