Military

The Utility Of Expanding The United Nations Permanent Military Force
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
                          UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
                           COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
                                 MASTERS PAPER
             THE UTILITY OF EXPANDING THE UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT
                                MILITARY FORCE
                                      by
                               MAJOR A.W. GUNDER
                                AUSTRALIAN ARMY
                                 18 APRIL 1995
                           COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
                              QUANTICO, VA. 22134
                       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:   The Utility Of Expanding The United Nations
         Permanent Military Force
Author:  Major A. W. Gunder, Australian Army
Thesis:    The  United  Nations  (UN)  permanent  military
capability requires reform to meet the new challenges in the
global security environment.   Is the establishment of a
standing UN army appropriate?   If not,  what  reform is
suitable  to  improve  the  UN's  credibility  in  peace
operations?
Discussion:   Since the inception of the United Nations,
debate has surrounded the limitations to its power.   A
number  of  Secretary-Generals,  academics,  and  military
professionals  have  advocated  the  establishment  of  a
permanent UN army.
     During the Cold War, this concept did not materialize
due  to  the  paralysis  of  the  Security  Council,  the
unwillingness   of   member   nations   to   expand   the
Secretary-General's power, and the pragmatic objections to
the utility of a UN army.
     Since the Cold War, the concept has been advanced on
the basis that the obstacles to its establishment have been
removed.   However, an analysis of both the present global
trends and the current operational utility of a UN army
indicates that significant challenges remain to be overcome.
Currently,  the  international  community  lacks  sufficient
enthusiasm and imagination for the task.
     Important   reform  is   achievable  within   the   UN
Secretariat.   The establishment of a permanent military
staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
would greatly improve UN performance in peace operations.
This   reform  poses   challenges   and   faces   determined
opposition.  The reward for its adoption would be a robust
UN capability to prepare and manage peace operations that
would be respected by the international community and help
to restore UN credibility.
Conclusion:   The enlargement of the DPKO permanent military
staff should proceed in the areas of command and control,
training and doctrine, logistics management, communications,
and information management.
                          CONTENTS
Chapter                                                Page
  1.  INTRODUCTION                                         1
  2.  HISTORY OF THE UN ARMY DEBATE                        3
  3.  PRESENT GLOBAL TRENDS                               15
  4.  THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF A UN ARMY                23
  5.  MILITARY REFORM FOR THE UNITED NATIONS              31
  6.  CONCLUSION                                          52
Notes                                                     55
Bibliography                                              61
                         CHAPTER 1
                       INTRODUCTION
     This is a time when the world community is working to
decide the future role of its UN instrument.   The global
security environment, once threatened by nuclear holocaust,
is now faced with threats of unknown quantity and nature.
It  has  witnessed  a  dramatic  increase  in UN peace  and
security activities.    The  quantitative  change has  been
enormous over the last seven years:
     -   UN  involvement  in  preventative  diplomacy  or
peacemaking has grown from eleven disputes to thirty.
     -   the number of new UN peace operations deployed has
more than tripled to  sixteen.    The number of military
personnel deployed has risen from 9,570 to 62,333 and the
number of civilian police has jumped from 35 to 1169.
     -   the number of member nations contributing military
and police personnel has risen from 26 to 74 and the annual
budget for UN peace operations has increased twelve-fold to
$3.6 billion.1
     Beyond quantitative change, there have been qualitative
changes of even greater significance.   Most of today's
conflict  takes  place  within  states.    Demands  for  UN
intervention go well beyond traditional peacekeeping.  Many
member nations now consider Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
to be  an  important  part  of  their  security  strategies.
Frustratingly,  the impact of these new conflicts on the
global security environment remains unclear.  What is clear
is that the UN is still the only world organization with the
legitimacy  to  tackle  these  dilemmas.    There  are  many
diplomats,   academics,   and   politicians   who   advocate
increasing the UN's military options in order to deal with
these problems.  This concept has frequently offered unique
but   untested  methods   to   resolve   conflict   in   the
international arena.
     The purpose of this analysis is to explore the utility
of expanding the UN's military capability.  It will analyze
the proposal to establish a permanent UN army, how this
proposal fared in the past,  and its applicability to the
current global situation.   It will also investigate the
expansion of the permanent UN military staff, and explore
the advantages and disadvantages of such a reform.   The
analysis  combines  a  rich  history  with  a  number  of
controversial  ideas.    It  challenges  the  well  meaning
arguments  of  UN  army  adherents  but  also  offers  an
alternative  approach  for  improving  the UN's  ability  to
manage UN peace operations.
                      CHAPTER 2
            HISTORY OF THE UN ARMY DEBATE
     Article 43 of the UN Charter describes the collective
responsibility to provide military muscle to the UN:
     All  Members  of  the  United  Nations,  in  order  to
     contribute to the maintenance of international peace
     and  security,  undertake  to  make  available  to  the
     Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
     special  agreement,   or  agreements,   armed  forces,
     assistance, and facilities, including rites of passage,
     necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
     peace and security.
     Under Article 47, the establishment of a Military Staff
Committee (MSC), consisting of the Chiefs of Staff, or their
representatives,  from the five permanent members of the
Security Council provides the international mechanism meant
to facilitate this commitment.  The MSC is responsible for
the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the
disposal of the Security Council.   The intent of these
provisions, deliberated at the end of World War II, was to
create for the UN continued access to the enormous Allied
forces.  Although this concept was noble in vision, it was
soon apparent that the global political trend after World
War II would cause significant difficulties in realizing the
agreements necessary to assemble a coalition when required.
The Secretary-General started the debate for the creation of
a  permanent  UN  force  to  overcome  this  uncooperative
attitude.   This chapter reviews previous proposals for a
permanent UN army and examines the obstructions that they
faced in the Cold War.
     The five permanent members of the Security Council had
differing views on the nature of a UN army from the start.
The U.S., confident of its primacy in future UN affairs,
advocated that the UN needed "a mobile force able to strike
quickly at long range and bring to bear, upon any given
point in the world where trouble may occur,  the maximum
armed force in the minimum time."2  The U.S. predicated its
model on strike weapons delivered by strong air and naval
forces.   The model's strength rested on a force of 3,500
combat aircraft and two hundred capital warships, half of
which were  submarines.3   The USSR,  on  the  other hand,
unwilling to support a force which could complicate its
hegemonic plans, advocated an organization roughly half the
size of the U.S. model.4  The UK, China, and France also
favored a smaller force to preserve the influence of their
own  contributions.5
     In the period preceding the Korean War,  it became
obvious that negotiations conducted by the MSC would not
result in the ratification of the agreements specified in
Article 43.  Moreover, failure of the Security Council to
agree on principles governing the conclusion of agreements
under Article 43 made it impossible for the MSC to make any
progress  toward establishing  levels  of  strength of  the
national contingents to be made available to the Council.
Disagreements over member force contributions, force roles
and missions, command and control arrangements, and criteria
for disengagement produced a stalemate.6  Thus, the Security
Council had no armed forces that would enable it to exercise
power under Chapter VII of the Charter, and a central part
of the peace-enforcement system failed to become operative.
     In  1948,  in  an  effort  to  circumvent  the  impasse
surrounding     the   Article     43    negotiations,     the
Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie, proposed a plan for a UN
Guard.  Mr. Lie described this as a force, internationally
recruited by the  Secretary-General,  under his  immediate
direction, and at the disposal of the Security Council.  It
would have truce and plebiscite functions, be lightly armed,
and equipped with organic transport and communications.  In
addition it would afford:
     security to a field mission's members,  secretariat,
     premises, archives, and other property;   furnish such
     transportation, communication, and supply as might be
     necessary to supplement services available to a mission
     in the  field;   maintain order during hearings  and
     investigations  of  United  Nations  missions;  patrol
     points or guard objectives neutralized under truce or
     cease-fire orders of the United Nations; and exercise
     supervisory and observation functions at polling points
     during the conduct of referendums conducted under UN
     auspices.
     The Secretary-General argued that the Guard did not
constitute   an   international   army,   and   that   its
constitutional authority existed in Articles 97 and 98 of
the  Charter,  provided  that  the  General  Assembly  gave
budgetary  approval.    He  contended  that  under  his  own
authority he  could  recruit  the  force  and,  pursuant  to
Articles 97,  98,  100,  and 101,  that he could deploy the
Guard  to  fulfill  the  needs  of  United  Nations'  field
missions.8  He politically downplayed the nature, functions,
and organization of the Guard by emphasizing that it would
be  `entirely non-military'  in character,  have only light
small  arms,  some  transport  and  communications,  and  be
organizationally  incapable  of  aggression.    The  Guard's
powers  did  not  include  powers  of  arrest,  quelling  of
insurrections, or functions implying the use of force for
other   than   personal   protective   reasons.       The
Secretary-General estimated that an 800-man Guard, composed
of both active and reserve components, would cost $4 million
dollars per year.9
     Even  the  proposed  establishment  of  this  meager
bodyguard met with strong opposition.   The Soviet Union,
suspicious of Western motives, argued against the Guard on
the grounds that the Secretary-General could not legally
recruit it, or control it.   The Soviets also claimed that
the force was military in character and capable of expansion
into the Article 43 army that they already opposed.10  Other
nations challenged the cost of the Guard and forecast that
its  establishment would exceed the UN budget.    France,
China,  and  the  UK  all  raised  objections  doubting  the
practicality of  the  Guard.    They  claimed  that  it  was
incapable of achieving even a protective role.11
     The  recruitment  of  the  force  faced  obstacles  in
language, religion, and training, and morale problems were
considered likely.  Overall, most nations shared the concern
that  the  force  had  a high probability of  acquiring  a
paramilitary nature as it matured, leading to a tendency for
non-conventional expansion, and a corresponding burgeoning
budget.
     Although the General Assembly voted to study the Guard
concept further, the Secretary-General resolved to explore
other avenues through which to bolster his powers.   He
stripped the Guard of its truce and plebiscite functions,
reduced its arms and numbers,  and renamed it the Field
Service.     The  Secretary-General  managed  to  have  the
international community adopt the Field Service in 1949.12
This Field Service of some 300 uniformed men became part of
the Secretariat and provided transport and communications
for missions.  It also guarded UN premises, and maintained
order during meetings, hearings, and investigations.  Except
in isolated circumstances, the Service was unarmed.  The UN
Field Service gradually became an integral part of the
Secretariat and its powers remained strictly limited.
     The collective response to the Korean War encouraged
the Secretary-General to advocate the establishment of a UN
instrument of coercive policing.  In 1952, he proposed  that
member  nations  not  only  quickly  establish  the  special
agreements required for Article 43 forces but also accept
the establishment of a UN Legion.  The Legion was to consist
of  volunteers  drawn  mostly  from  countries  unable  to
contribute to the Article 43 forces.  Again, the Legion was
to be at the disposal of the Security Council and the
General Assembly.  Under the Legion proposal, the UN would
recruit some 60,000 volunteers through the existing national
military establishments of the participating states.   The
proposal asked these states to meet the costs of recruiting,
equipping, and training UN volunteer reservists as part of
their advance contribution to collective security under the
UN.  In return, the UN would "elastically" arrange command
and control of the  force to preserve its  international
flavor.13
     Not surprisingly, debate in the General Assembly was
very negative.  The Secretary-General concluded that:
     the  creation  of  any  supra-national  self-contained
     standing force, internationally recruited for a fixed
     period of full-time service and subject, not to the
     control  of  any  national  government,  but  to  a
     self-contained    United    Nations    command,    was
     administratively,    financially,    and    militarily
     impractical at the present time.14
     Ultimately, the Secretary-General's pessimism and the
lack of  interest of both the General Assembly and the
Security Council doomed the Legion to go the way of the
Guard.
     As the Cold War polarized the international community,
it became apparent that the Security Council, plagued by
veto conventions, could not direct a UN army even if it had
one.  In the late 1950's and early 1960's, both the U.S. and
USSR independently proposed their own global disarmament
plans.   These schemes called for the establishment of UN
supervisory forces
     to  ensure  that  during  and after  implementation  of
     general and complete disarmament,  states also would
     support  and  provide  agreed manpower  for  a  United
     Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of
     armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations
     can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of
     arms.15
     In reality,  the proposals achieved little consensus
amongst the Security Council and were cynically dismissed as
superpower propaganda.
     In 1957, William Frye16 published a comprehensive study
of the  relevance of a UN Peace  Force  to  international
security.   Witnessing the success of the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East,7 Frye proposed
the possibility of establishing a small permanent UN Peace
Force of approximately 7,000 personnel.  Interested members
would contribute troops for periods of six months to two
years.  In that time they would train at a UN base or would
participate in peacekeeping operations.  Using a rotational
scheme, all states would have the opportunity to contribute
to the Peace Force.   Frye estimated that a suitable base
with barracks, airfield, logistics and training facilities,
and associated "quality of life" facilities, would cost $65
million to establish and then require a further $1 million
to maintain.   He hoped that original contributors would
shoulder the cost of initially equipping the 7,000 troops
with their arms,  uniforms,  vehicles,  and other necessary
equipment.18
     The role of the Peace Force would be to guard borders
of nations struggling to reach peace resolutions against
terrorists  and irregular  forces  causing destabilization.
The Peace Force would also supervise demilitarized zones and
reassure  belligerents  to  reduce  tension;  enforce  arms
embargoes, and other miscellaneous duties.   Significantly,
it  would  also  act  to  block  infiltration  or  invasion
approaches.  Frye proposed that an aggressor's attack on the
UN Peace  Force would automatically  invite  international
retribution, and therefore, the Force could be an effective
deterrent.19    Using  the  example  of  UNEF's  operational
history,  Frye demonstrated the benefits to international
security that his Peace Force would bring.20  However, his
proposal did not adequately resolve the unavoidable problems
of  base  location,   homogeneity  of  the  Peace  Force,
discipline, and recruitment.  More importantly, the member
nations saw the issue of command and control of the Peace
Force as an insurmountable obstacle. This is understandable
considering their continual reluctance to bestow sovereignty
to the UN and to give the Secretary-General an army.
     However,   Frye  did  raise  some  issues  which  had
considerable utility at the time and are also applicable to
current discussions on UN forces.  He argued for a military
logistics planning cell in UN Headquarters.   This cell's
role would be to act as an operations quantity surveyor and
maintain a logistical data base for all classes of military
supplies.21   This "horn of plenty" would be beneficial in
allowing mission planners to quickly build a comprehensive
logistics structure from member assets, more likely to suit
the mission conditions than the existing ad hoc method.  He
also briefly explored the development of a UN intelligence
organization tailored to meet the operational needs of the
Peace Force and a tactical planning cell.   Frye viewed a
rapidly deployable mission headquarters as being useful and
cited the efficacy of a group of ten officers in being able
to  reduce  the  tension  in  Port  Said  during  UNEF's
operations.22  He even foresaw the need for the planning of
UN  recreation as  a part  of ongoing mission planning.23
Ultimately,   Frye  designed  his  UN  Peace  Force  for
peacekeeping using UNEF as a model.  He did not configure it
for peace-enforcement.
     In 1964, Lincoln Bloomfield24 analyzed a group proposal
to establish a permanent UN force of 25,000 troops recruited
by the UN, based in a neutral country (at the time India),
and trained over five years in readiness for UN peacekeeping
operations.   He estimated that the force would cost $10
million  annually.25    Again,  discussions on   this proposal
highlighted   problems  such  as  command and   control,  base
location, and cost.
     Debate on the establishment of UN forces in the 1970's
and 1980's centered on efforts to empower the MSC to develop
the agreements suggested in Article 43 of the UN Charter.26
Certain countries promised forces on an earmarked basis, but
they were wholly insufficient and not immediately available.
In addition,  international insistence that host countries
have the right to disqualify any country's contingents from
entering their territory,  forced the UN to use  ad hoc
arrangements.   Fortunately,  the military benefit of this
situation was the development, notably in Canada and the
Nordic countries, of forces skilled in special requirements
and capabilities of peacekeeping.27   In times of crisis,
these particular nations have been quick to volunteer these
assets to the UN for peacekeeping.   With the utility of
these forces generally able to cope with the global security
demand, the debate on a permanent UN army was quelled.
     In the twenty years before the collapse of the USSR,
the UN matured and operated in the strangling atmosphere of
the Cold War.  Any efforts to establish either a permanent
UN army,  or an Article 43 arrangement force, met heated
opposition.  The mutual distrust on the part of the U.S. and
USSR contributed significantly to the failure to form a UN
force.  Sir Brian Urquhart, Scholar in Residence at the Ford
Foundation and former Principal Officer in the UN Office of
the Under-Secretary  for  Special  Political Affairs,  best
summarized this frustration:
     We were in the Cold War throughout the period that I
     was in the UN.   We spent our entire time and energy
     tip-toeing around the Cold War, and it was a pain in
     the neck.  The UN was seen as a sort of fighting ring
     for  the  superpowers--Henry  Cabot  Lodge  and Andrei
     Vishinski exchanging insults in the Security Council
     was not a very edifying spectacle.  It was as much as
     your life was worth to get anything sensible done.28
     In summarizing the history of UN force proposals up to
1989,  it  can be  determined  that  several  factors  posed
insurmountable problems.    The  ever-present  threat  of  a
Soviet veto,  the unwillingness of nations to accept a UN
army directed by a non-sovereign body, and the wealth of
pragmatic objections to the utility and sustainment of a
permanent force, all conspired to keep  worthwhile proposals
from being realized.  When the Berlin Wall fell, however, it
seemed that one of the main obstacles had vanished.   Soon
thereafter, the conflict against Iraq gave the impression
that the international community was capable of being united
in  defeating  aggression.    With  two  of  the  three  main
obstacles to a permanent UN army seemingly removed,  the
Secretary-General was encouraged to rekindle the debate.
                           CHAPTER 3
                     PRESENT GLOBAL TRENDS
     In   1992,   the   Secretary-General,   Mr.   Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, saw new opportunities for the UN.  He noted
that:
     the machinery of the United Nations, which had often
     been rendered inoperative by the dynamics of the Cold
     War, is suddenly at the center of international efforts
     to deal with unresolved problems of the past decades as
     well as an emerging array of present and future issues
     .... the international community and the UN Secretariat
     need to seize this extraordinary opportunity to expand,
     adapt, and reinvigorate the work of the United Nations
     so that lofty goals can begin to be realized.29
     With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  international
security environment has changed significantly and produced
a security phenomenon that surprised the Western World.  The
consequences of its ending are emerging in four trends:
     (1)  diffusion of power in world affairs;
     (2)  disintegration and failure of states;
     (3)  expansion in the meaning of international
          security;
     (4)  increasing recourse to collective security.30
     Diffusion of power in world affairs
     A complex world which has diffused power into different
groupings has replaced the bipolar world.   The USSR, its
satellites, and clients have disintegrated, leaving the U.S.
as reluctant hegemon.   The U.S.  is hesitating over the
challenge of global leadership because of the risks and
costs of doing so.   This hesitance may serve to galvanize
reform  in  the  UN.    As  Madeleine  Albright,  the  U.S.
representative to the UN, recently said in testimony before
Congress,  "The goal of the policy directive is to ensure
that we refrain from asking the UN to undertake missions it
is not equipped to do and to help the UN to succeed in
missions we would like it to."31      Conversely,  this U.S.
attitude may repel member states and promote the growth of
regional security responses to conflict resolution.
     The downsizing of the superpowers' arsenals has also
diffused military technology and capability.  This makes the
sale of existing high technology weapons more competitive.
Shifts in conventional arms markets are occurring as weapons
merchants seek new contracts.   This trend will alter the
global  security  situation.     In  the  new  century,  a
multipolarity of regional powers capable of war-fighting at
levels of intensity previously associated only with the
super-powers, or first-rank middle powers, will characterize
the  international  environment.32    States  with  evolving
ambition are anticipating new opportunities that will arise
and are reluctant to promise their military capabilities, or
financial support, to a UN army.
     State disintegration
     The passing of the Cold War has rekindled nationalist,
tribal, religious, and ethnic conflicts that the superpower
benefactors had held in check.    The  spread of liberal
democracy    has    also    fostered    the    desire    for
self-determination.      These   factors   have   caused   a
disintegration  of  the  existing  geopolitical  template
bringing a fear that some states and their offspring will be
unsustainable over the longer term.  This is a significant
problem to peace protagonists as they work to influence the
development of these strife torn nations.
     The failure of governmental systems of all types in the
Third World is also responsible for the fragmentation of
states.  This is particularly so in Africa and may be so in
Latin America in the future.   Lack of economic growth,
population expansion, debt, drought, famine, corruption, and
a lack of tradition in self-government have contributed to
the  backward  slide  in many nations'  efforts  to become
international players.3a  The recent situation in Rwanda has
graphically  demonstrated  the  unscrupulous  desire  for
sovereign territories based on tribal and ethnic groupings.
	Governments in failing states are now less able to
provide the economic and social glue to hold their countries
together.   During the Cold War, many Third World states
played East against West to maximize access to development
aid.  The Commonwealth of Independent States can no longer
provide this assistance to former client states,  and the
growing  number  of  emerging  states  now  compete  for  a
developmental  aid  pool  which  has  not  grown  in  a
complementary way.
     This trend has had the most significant impact where
there is a volatile intermixing of ethnic,  religious,  or
national groupings.  Savage conflicts have accompanied state
dissolution  in  the  Balkans,  Africa,  and  former  Soviet
states.  These wars have debilitating consequences for the
protagonists and, sometimes, for their neighbors, but do not
always threaten international peace.   Recent history has
reinforced this fact to many UN members and reduced their
ardor for global collective security measures.
     The Expanding Meaning Of International Security
     Traditionally, we have defined threats to international
security in terms of sovereignty.   However, many security
concerns are now beyond the capability of individual states
to cope with.   These concerns encompass new sources of
conflict such as water sharing, natural disaster relief, and
regional arms races.  These have potential effects for other
states with varying interests in such confrontations.  Those
nations that resist external intervention in their domestic
affairs,  and there  are  still many,  frustrate  effective
international responses to broader security issues such as
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.34
     There  is  some  consensus  that  the  international
community  should  compel  states  which  are  unwilling  to
conform to international standards of behavior to do so.
However, the tools for this enforcement have proven to be
difficult to find.   This trend has certainly endowed more
legitimacy to UN missions and allowed for brave ventures
beyond  the  traditional  peacekeeping  boundaries.     The
character of these interventions has created new definitions
for peace operations.
     Peacemaking operations  are diplomatic activities  or
anything other than military operations short of combat to
rectify a crisis situation through a peaceful process as
Chapter  VI  of  the  UN  Charter  outlines.    Peacekeeping
operations are those that help maintain or restore peace and
security  in  areas  of  conflict,  based  on  consent  and
cooperation.  They require the consent of the parties to the
dispute; do not seek to interfere with the affairs of host
nations; maintain strict impartiality; and have no right of
enforcement.     Peace-enforcement  operations  are  those
operations  that  require  the  use  of  combat  forces  as
prescribed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create a
cessation of hostilities and restore the peace.35  There is
clearly a dividing line between peacekeeping, which should
be  mandated  and  structured  to  operate  on  well-tested
principles;  and peace  enforcement,  which must have  the
capability to impose a solution.  The discouraging results
in Bosnia and Somalia have severely dampened the General
Assembly's enthusiasm for peace enforcement.  This has had
an obvious impact on the motivation to establish a UN army.
     Increasing recourse to collective security
     The last five years have seen an increasing dependence
on  multilateral  consensus  to  resolve  conflicts.    The
euphoria of the Gulf War victory prompted a new enthusiasm
for collective military action.  The UN continues to be the
international  forum  with  the  greatest  legitimacy  for
addressing issues of international security.  Moreover, the
UN  is  accepting  more  responsibilities  and  having  to
deliberate on a greater number of  security issues  than
before.  In the search for conflict resolutions, the use of
military power has enjoyed a popular resurgence.   Nearly
every plan for the resolution of contemporary conflicts
entertains  some  form of peace  operation using military
forces.36
     Most nations advocating military solutions to security
problems are eager to seek a multilateral response in order
to  share  the  economic,  political,  and  defense  burden.
However,    the   international   community   has   lacked
understanding of the finite capabilities of armed forces and
the extent of the resources that they consume in peace
operations.  Now nations are witnessing these limitations,
as  conflicts  in  Somalia  and Bosnia  continue  to  resist
resolution.
     The inability of the UN to settle these crises has
prompted many  states  to  reinforce  their  commitment  to
existing,  and  or  new,  regional  security  arrangements.37
Whilst  this  certainly contributes  to peace  efforts,  it
detracts  attention  and  resources  from  the  debate  to
establish a UN army.
     In conclusion, since the end of the Cold War, global
dynamics have continued to weaken the General Assembly's
desire  and  ability  to  address  the  issue  of  true
international security and to develop the tools that the UN
needs for peace enforcement.  UN commitment to future peace
missions will likely be subject to closer scrutiny: a goal
that Western nations hope to foster.38  After exploring the
current international environment,  it is clear that most
nations remain unready to embrace a UN army.  However, there
are still some advocates who favor such a force and claim
that it would have significant political and operational
utility.39   Nevertheless, doubt prevails that even if the
international   community  was   prepared   to   give   the
Secretary-General a standing force under his command,  it
would lack utility and longevity.40
                          CHAPTER 4
            THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF A UN ARMY
     Despite the unenthusiastic mood in the General Assembly
and Security Council with regard to the establishment of a
permanent   UN   army,   under   the   command   of   the
Secretary-General,  there are still advocates  for such a
force.   The focus of this paper is not to investigate the
establishment of Article 43 agreements to assemble standby
forces  for  peace  enforcement.     Instead,  the  concept
addressed here is a continuation of that studied in Chapter
One,  namely  a  supra-national  force  of  volunteers  for
international military service.    The UN would recruit,
train, equip,  and finance these soldiers.   They would be
subject to a UN military discipline code, and act under the
authority of  the  Secretary-General  for  legitimate peace
operations.  The popular model that most advocates support
is a brigade-sized force of approximately 6,000 troops with
organic service and combat service support and strategic
mobility assets, capable of rapid deployment to most global
crises.41
     Arguably,  the practicalities of establishing such a
force are far less insurmountable than in the 1960's.  The
Secretary-General has enacted reform to allow for better UN
military financing procedures.42  The downsizing of Western
defense  forces  has  made  training  areas,  barracks,  and
logistics facilities more readily available.
     The homogeneity issue remains a stumbling block, but
training can gradually overcome the language barrier, and
the recruiting process can address ethnic and religious
incompatibilities.   The establishment of training schools
and  a  staff  college  could  develop  military  education,
ethical  training,  and  combat  skills.    A  balance  of
deployment time, training courses and readiness exercises,
and liaison attachment to member nations' defense forces,
could  also  maintain  career  satisfaction  and  morale.
Moreover,  the  skilled personnel  necessary to  adequately
train this force are now readily available.
     The Scandinavian nations, Canada, the UK, the U.S., and
Australia have gathered a wealth of experience in conducting
all natures of peace operations.  They are major advocates
for  the  development  of  a  cohesive  UN peace  operations
doctrine.     They  have  established  their  own  schools,
specifically  to  train  their  defense  forces  for  peace
operations.43   In addition, they regularly encourage their
regional allies to participate in this training and seek to
engage new partners in these endeavors.  A good example is
Denmark's initiative to coordinate the training of a joint
UN peacekeeping battalion of 600 soldiers.  These soldiers
are not Danes; they are Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians
volunteered by their governments in an effort to rebuild
their  military  competence  and  political  worth  to  the
European security environment.   A Lithuanian platoon has
already completed its training and an operational deployment
to Croatia.  This is an encouraging example of what can be
achieved if the motivation exists.44
     Assuming that consensus for the establishment of a UN
army,  based on the brigade model is forthcoming,  member
nations can then address the problems of the provision of
support to the unit, particularly in the areas of strategic
mobility,  sustainment,  and intelligence gathering assets.
If the members cannot reach this consensus, then in both
peacekeeping   and   peace   enforcement,   the   logistical
sustainment of the brigade upon commitment presents the
greatest obstacle to its establishment.
     This brigade global reaction force must be capable of
operating in areas ranging from the Balkans to the Middle
East,  from Africa to Asia.   Terrain and climate variance
pose significant challenges.  The brigade would require the
assembly of a flexible mixture of mobility assets, ranging
from utility helicopters to snow mobiles, from heavy trucks
to light utility vehicles.   It would also have to include
engineering equipment to ensure logistical mobility.   The
expense  of  maintaining  enough  equipment  to  guarantee
sustainment within theater, let alone strategically, would
be prohibitive.
     If   such   a   brigade   was   available   to   the
Secretary-General,  its size and light capabilities would
limit its utility.  Boutros Boutros-Ghali and others see the
advantage of this force in its immediate availability.  Sir
Brian Urquhart proposes that
     a timely intervention by a relatively small but highly
     trained force, willing and authorized to take combat
     risks and representing the will of the international
     community,  could make a decisive difference  in the
     early stages of a crisis.45
   This  force could be useful  for missions of tactical
deterrence to deploy to a border area or enclave where
clashes appeared imminent.
     In the only recent example of such a need,  the UN
directed  the  United  Nations  Protection  Force--Croatia
(UNPROFOR)  to  deploy part  of  its  force  to  the  Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to monitor and report
developments  in the border areas.   This  initiative has
worked in buffering FYROM from the conflict to its north.
However,  opponents  of  a UN  rapid deployment  force  for
preventative peacekeeping claim that the responsiveness of
present UN ad hoc procedures is satisfactory.   They claim
that  the  nature  of  the  mission  and  the  preventative
intervention criteria used by the UN will either attract a
member nation to contribute forces or have an existing UN
mission slice off the necessary assets, as was the case of
UNPROFOR with the FYROM.   In this scenario, the lack of a
credible  UN  threat  to  deter  potential  aggressors  from
attacking  the  peacekeepers  is  seen  as  a  critical
vulnerability.
     The  deterrent  threat  of  U.S.  retaliation  clearly
protects UNPROFOR elements in the FYROM.  This would not be
the case with a lightly-armed UN rapid deployment brigade
inserted quickly  into  a border  area without  access  to
heavier combat support.   If the force was to encounter
trouble, member states, particularly the U.S., would then
come under pressure to act,  not simply to deal with an
evacuation,  but  to  escalate  the  situation  in  order  to
restore UN credibility.    This  would be  an  intolerable
endstate  far  from  that  initially  envisaged  for  the
commitment of the force.46
     A UN rapid deployment brigade would have significant
political deterrence, but it would not have the military
capabilities,  or  the  determined mandate,  to  resist  the
inevitable testing by the belligerents that it seeks to
separate.   Historically,  there has been little need for
rapid deployments in the area of peacekeeping.  When acting
as a symbolic deterrent, an ad hoc collective force, or a
permanent UN rapid deployment brigade, are hardly different
in  terms  of  operational  effectiveness  or  political
viability.   In past peacekeeping missions,  ad hoc force
arrangements have sufficed.  Member nations will not support
the creation of a UN brigade to meet a role for which their
own resources are adequate.41
     Obviously, it is even harder to see the utility of a
permanent, lightly-armed UN brigade for the role of peace
enforcement.    Unless  significantly reinforced by member
states  under  an  Article  42  intervention,  or  by  the
establishment of its own heavy combat and combat support
units, a UN brigade would be largely ineffective in a peace
enforcement mission such as Bosnia or Somalia.  A bellicose
environment pays scant regard to the symbolic presence of
peacemakers.     Ultimately,   the  complex  and  expensive
operational infrastructure and tools that make an impact in
peace enforcement missions would prove too costly for the UN
to acquire or sustain.  The challenge of these missions is
beyond even the most aggressive proposals for a UN military
capability.    Peace  enforcement  remains  reliant  on  the
vigorous political and military backing of powerful member
states or strong regional coalitions.
     The number of deployable sub-units in the UN brigade
would also be a significant limitation to its versatility.
There were 71,543 military and civilian police personnel
serving in UN peace operations in June 1994.48  A UN brigade
of  6,000  personnel  would  hardly  be  able  to  assume
responsibility for these missions.   Even if we were to
assume that the deployable proportion of the force is around
two  thirds  of  its  total  strength,  it  would  still  be
hard-pressed to  staff operations  in Mozambique  (current
strength of operation: 5,413), or Rwanda (current strength
of  operation:  5,500).49    There  are  currently  16,545
personnel serving in peacekeeping missions alone.50  A UN
brigade could not even take care of the majority of these
operations.  Member nations would oppose financing a force
that can only augment peace operations and not relieve them
of the major military and financial burden.51
     This analysis of the utility of a UN army, based on the
popular brigade model, has revealed several key issues.  The
training,  basing,  and recruitment of the force would be
easier than in the Cold War era.    Its cost,  if truly
independent of member nation support, would be expensive and
place a significant additional burden on the current UN
budget.    The  force's  operational  advantages  of  rapid
deployment and homogeneity are not significantly advanced
over  the  present  UN  systems  to  justify  its  cost  to
unenthusiastic member nations.   Its size and capability
would  restrict  the  force's  capabilities,  making  its
operational  versatility  questionable  in  the  expanding
spectrum of peace operations.  The popular brigade model for
a permanent UN army is unsuitable for peace operations in
the  current  international  environment.    Global  security
trends  indicate  that UN members  remain wary of  such a
force's powers and lack of capability.   They prefer to
search  for  alternative methods  for  conflict  resolution.
Ultimately, the UN remains the only organization committed
to global security and, as such, it needs to remain credible
in  the  international  forum.    It  requires  a  military
capability, but not an army, to do this.
                       CHAPTER 5
         MILITARY REFORM FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
     The lack of utility of a conventionally designed UN
army, and the general reticence of the UN member nations to
act  to  establish  such  a  force  has  compelled  the
Secretary-General, and other champions of the idea, to look
for alternative ways to provide reliable and timely military
capability to the UN.52  In particular, a UN proposal exists
to identify units from member states in order to provide a
"grab bag" of capabilities that the UN could assemble when
it authorizes a mission.  These would include the full range
of combat, combat support, and service support capabilities
to meet each specific case.   This idea has only moderate
support   amongst   the   member   nations,   although   the
Scandinavians are enthusiastic.53  However, the five major
countries,  and other global players,  are not hurrying to
promise their elite troops and strategic military assets to
a contract with unclear command and control arrangements,
cloudy doctrine for engagement,  and unresolved financial
concerns.54
    Instead, analysis in Chapter 2 revealed that the global
trend is moving toward conflict resolution through regional
partners  or  coalitions  with  common  interests.     The
advantages of this approach are many.   Regional proximity
can lessen response time, share cultural knowledge, and even
provide  economic  incentives,  all  of which can  increase
political legitimacy for intervention.  Collective will to
resolve  conflict  by  interested  partners  often  avoids
cumbersome political and military arrangements and is often
effective.   However,  it  is  generally not prone  to act
preventatively.   Conflict resolution in this manner has
always been a significant step before appealing to the UN
for assistance.
     It is encouraging that this trend is beginning to have
success in peace operations.  The Economic Community of West
African States successfully undertook--with its peacekeeping
force    (ECOMOG)    organized   by   Nigerian   President
Babangida--such actions to end the Liberian civil war over a
several-year period.55   Australia and the nations in the
South West Pacific region have also recently commenced a
peacekeeping operation in Bougainville in order to contain
and resolve that island's secessionist battle with Papua New
Guinea.   Regional organizations,  asking for authorization
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, will offer significant
choices  to  conflict  resolutions  in  the  coming  decade.
However,  to apportion this  legitimacy,  the UN must
remain  responsible  for  the  strategic  direction of  such
efforts  in order  to  deconflict  different  organizations'
plans, to monitor the motives of all parties involved, and
to  maintain  a  global  perspective.    It  is,  therefore,
imperative that the UN's ability to manage peace operations
loses no further credibility.   Reform is now necessary to
preserve the unique global security perspective that only
the UN offers.  The analysis so far has determined that a UN
army,  based  on  a  traditional  military  template,   is
inappropriate to restore this confidence.   The discussion
will now turn to the  consideration of how an expanded
permanent staff can address this concern.
     The  deficiencies  of  UN  peace  operations  are  well
documented.  The UN designed the administrative system that
supports these missions to deal with fewer and less complex
operations, and to proceed along a more leisurely pace than
has now become necessary.   The UN attempt to meet the
growing demand for peace operations has exacerbated problems
such as unclear mission guidance,  inadequate command and
control, poor intelligence, and nonexistent doctrine.56
     However,  those who criticize these deficiencies are
judging the efforts of an ill-structured and ill-resourced
organization  that  is  struggling  to  come  to  terms  with
increasing demands, for which it was neither designed nor
accustomed to cope with.   This is particularly so in the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations  (DPKO), part of the
Secretariat at UN Headquarters.   The DPKO must develop
better   capabilities   across   the   spectrum   of   peace
operations.57
     Reform in the DPKO since 1993 has been progressive and
has addressed the major deficiency of the DPKO not having UN
logistics  and  administrative  components  within   its  own
bailiwick.     Presently,  the  DPKO  consists  of  some  320
military and civilian personnel seconded from their national
governments  for  short  terms.    While  effective  in  the
reporting and monitoring functions, this staff is incapable
of playing a significant role in the preparation, conduct,
and management of UN peace operations.58
     What  the  UN  needs  are  improved  arrangements  for
planning  operations,  the  establishment  of  headquarters,
command and control,  logistics and procurement,  and the
provision of intelligence, or information,  as it is less
sensitively termed.  Also necessary for the more effective
employment  of  military  forces  are  clearer  political
mandates, the delegation of greater authority to commanders
in the field, and more effective liaison between the UN and
national governments.
     These  matters  are  normally  the  realm  of  military
professionals in the context of their own national forces.
The  challenge  to  a  permanent UN military  staff  is  to
professionalize peacekeeping at the international level.  It
is a process that tends to come naturally to the armies of
many countries who share professional values and a common
interest in seeing a job effectively and efficiently done.
There  are  evident  benefits  for  peacekeeping  in  such
hallmarks   of  professionalism  as   intensive  training,
effective discipline, high standards of personal integrity,
familiarity  with  modern  equipment  and  procedures,  and
acceptance of political authority.
     The organizational complexity and political sensitivity
of  peacekeeping  operations  often  demand  the  highest
standards of professionalism.   Yet the many differences
between   armed   forces   and   the   varying   levels   of
professionalism between personnel  from different nations
cannot be ignored.  It would be a challenging task to raise
the required standards of all those armed forces which will
be participating in UN peace operations.    This  can be
addressed through the expansion of the permanent military
staff in the DPKO.
     Moves towards professionalism will not occur without
resistance.  Governments will have to release some of their
best  military  officers  as  they  are  recruited  by  UN
Headquarters for extended careers within the DPKO.  The UN
must be prepared to offer a challenging and financially
rewarding    career   to    these    professionals.   The
Secretary-General has already noted that it is not possible
to establish permanent structures with staff on short-term
loan from member states.  Therefore, career UN soldiers in
the DPKO staff are the only realistic alternative.59
     Contributions of personnel will also be critical if the
UN  is   to  develop  effective   international   training
procedures, including a UN Staff College.  The recruitment
of  professional  military  logisticians  would  also  be  a
prerequisite for the assembly of a capable UN staff.   The
problem of information gathering must also be tackled.  It
will require states to provide information to UN forces
which they might not prefer to disclose, and to permit the
UN to gather all kinds of data about internal, as well as
international     developments.       This     process     of
professionalizing peacekeeping will have to occur against a
wider  background  of  UN  reform  in  the  context  of  the
administration and financing of peacekeeping operations.
This is a daunting problem.
     However,  military professionalism will offer certain
advantages if reformers persevere.  It can get things done.
Given political will, a clear mandate, and a free hand in
its professional sphere,  the problem solving capacity of
military professionals is significant.   Properly used,  a
military organization can be an effective instrument, even
in the most delicate of complex situations.  It is incumbent
upon UN members to explore this option.
     The  first  area  of  reform required  is  command and
control.    In considering reform of command and control
within  the  DPKO,  there  remains  some  debate  on  the
resuscitation of the defunct Military Staff Committee(MSC).
Some advocates urge that the MSC can provide direction for
UN forces, oversee their training, and secure the necessary
logistical  and  financial  support  from member  nations.60
However, the most significant problem with integrating the
MSC into peace operations is its UN Charter responsibilities
under  Article  47.     Here  the  MSC  is  charged  with
responsibility "for the strategic direction of any armed
forces" under the oversight of the Security Council.  Under
all foreseeable circumstances,  effective MSC oversight is
problematic  at  best,  particularly  in  rapidly  evolving
situations.   Even under optimum battlefield circumstances,
the MSC would be in a position to serve as little more than
a conduit for progress reports to the Security Council and
the Secretary-General.61  The MSC's composition of Chiefs of
Staff of permanent and rotating members of the Security
Council would do no more "than add an unnecessary extra
layer of bureaucracy to the UN".62   Rather than revive a
crippled mechanism, the challenge to reformers is to think
operationally and analyze the military staff requirements
within the DPKO to better prepare for and conduct peace
operations.63
     There are many areas in which positive change could
promote a more efficient and dynamic approach to peace
operations.  The Security Council must be more accountable
to the General Assembly,  but not to the extent that it
inhibits sensible military operations.64   Restructuring of
the Secretariat is required to place all elements associated
with  peace  operations  under  a  single  department  to
facilitate more timely, coordinated planning and management
of  future missions.    Civilian  control  of  the military
commitment should be exercised by a Special Representative
to  the  Secretary-General   (SRSG)   responsible  for  the
horizontal coordination of all components, both military and
civilian, authorized under the mandate.  The SRSG should be
involved in negotiations prior to the establishment of the
mission.
     A   military   planning   division   comprised   of
representatives of both Plans and Operations Office and the
Resource Office should be responsible for the following
tasks:
     a.    determine  the military objectives  required to
achieve the political objective(s);
     b.  decide the force structure required to achieve the
military objective(s) within the required time scale;
     c.  develop command structures sufficient to accomplish
the strategic direction of the force;
     d.    develop,  and  advise  on  changes  to,  rules  of
engagement;
     e.   monitor and record the status of national forces
available for assignment to UN operations;
     f.    coordinate,  process  and  disseminate  strategic
intelligence and information;
     g.    prepare and maintain contingency plans  for UN
military deployments;
     h.   develop standard operating procedures for use in
military operations;
     i.  coordinate logistic, financial, and administrative
functions in support of UN military operations;
     j.   analyze and collect UN military experience,  and
develop a core training curriculum to assist member states
to  train national  military  and civil  personnel  in  the
specialized techniques unique to UN multinational military
operations.65
     This division must be supported by a staff capable of
operating a permanent situation room to monitor all deployed
missions, act as the interface between Force Commanders and
UN Headquarters, and conduct ongoing staff preparation of
likely areas of upcoming UN engagement.   This staff could
develop  SOP,  engagement  doctrine,  and  conduct  ongoing
mission evaluation.66  It must also be capable of deploying
splinter staffs to missions in support of Force Commanders.
In this role it would complement national military staffs
and provide guidance on the application of UN doctrine and
assist  in  facilitating  an  efficient  civilian-military
interface.
     Complementing the command and control reforms would be
communications    improvements.      As    with   logistical
interoperability,  communications  standardization  is  also
important to force effectiveness within the mission.  Many
missions are plagued by communications problems caused by
unsupervised and uncoordinated set-up procedures implemented
by arriving member forces.67   Professional  signalers,  as
part of the DPKO military staff, can play a significant role
in  preventing  this  problem  by  analyzing  the  mission,
terrain,  and the force package.   The result would be a
better understanding of communication requirements prior to
mission  deployment.    This  would  save  the  purchase  of
redundant equipment or high technology gear that is not
needed.
     The  communications  division of  the  DPKO should be
capable  of  contributing  to  the  command  staff  at  UN
Headquarters  and  be  able  to  deploy  reconnaissance  and
mission personnel as part of mission staffs.  It should also
contribute  to  the  instructional  staff  of  the  UN Staff
College and deployable training teams.
     UN in-theater procurement systems should be managed by
professional military logisticians responsive to the Force
Commander rather than by a civilian Chief Administrative
Officer.  They are better able to recognize the needs of the
force, are more adaptable, and are more likely to empathize
with the blue helmets on the  line  than their civilian
counterparts.68  These logisticians should be provided from
a logistics staff component of the DPKO.  Civilians working
in the procurement system for the military component should
be under command of the Force Commander.
     A UN staff college should be established to train
officers for employment in the DPKO at UN Headquarters and
to supplement and standardize the training run by national
defense forces.
     The second area of reform required is the establishment
of better UN information gathering procedures.  A permanent
intelligence staff working within the framework of the DPKO
would include both military and civilian personnel recruited
from national organizations.  Again, this proposal will face
opposition from some members.   Intelligence preparation in
potential areas of UN engagement and in current missions
would be conducted by trained UN professionals capable of
utilizing the full spectrum of intelligence gathering and
processing assets.
     The concept of UN intelligence is anathema to many
nation's security safeguards.   The U.S.  complaint of UN
intelligence negligence in Somalia is a case in point.  In
order  to  secure  access  to member nation's  intelligence
networks, the DPKO must quickly establish credibility as a
responsible user.  Improvement would come through the long
term employment of professional intelligence analysts and
operatives rather than short term seconded personnel.  This
removes the inevitable objection that seconded personnel
would   return to their sponsor nation with information
useable for the enhancement of their national interests.
     Further improvement would come through the enhancement
and  sharing  of  human  intelligence  gathered  in  current
missions.  This information, when gathered by permanent UN
operatives on military staffs in the field would enhance
other  component  intelligence  gathering.     Trained  UN
intelligence operatives would have a greater understanding
of the types of information necessary to identify trends and
triggers  in  the  mission. This  information  would       be
pertinent to the success of the mandate's application.     It
would also analyze and monitor the belligerents' objectives
and have a better understanding of the cultural deceptions
and manipulations which plagued missions in Somalia and
Bosnia.  UN intelligence teams would play an important role
in ensuring a workable interface with the military component
and  the  inevitable  non-government  organization   (NGO)
operating in the mission area.  This is a critical link to
establish as NGO's are often good sources of information on
many subjects.69  However, more often than not, the military
NGO  interface  is  soured  early  through  mutual  lack  of
consideration  and  understanding.    Permanent  UN  staff,
trained  in  this  type  of  operational  diplomacy,  would
significantly enhance the quality of information garnered
from NGO's that have been operating in the mission area long
before the military turns up.
     The dissemination of such information throughout the UN
force conducting a mission has obvious benefits and goes
some way to address the sharing of intelligence issues.  At
first glance the deal seems decidedly tilted in the UN's
favor.  But if intelligence exchange with the UN results in
better prepared missions,  more appropriate mandates,  and
vastly improved operational and tactical information then
surely the investment is well rewarded.
     An intelligence division within the DPKO would have an
organization suited to man and operate cells to conduct
staff intelligence preparation at UN Headquarters, to deploy
mission intelligence groups to the field, to contribute to
both deployable training teams and to the instructional
staff on the UN staff college.
     The next area worthy of attention is that of logistical
staff management.  The Secretary-General suggests that
     a pre-positioned stock of basic peacekeeping equipment
     should be established, so that at least some vehicles,
     communications  equipment,  generators  etc.,  would be
     immediately available....   Alternatively,  governments
     should commit themselves to keeping certain equipment
     on standby for immediate sale, loan, or donation to the
     UN when required.70
     Should such logistics be made available by nations, the
DPKO staff should have professional logistical planners and
managers.   They must be capable of ascertaining the right
amount of UN support required to complement that brought to
the mission by supporting members.    They  must also assume
responsibility  for  contracting  for  the   maintenance  of
stockpiled  equipment--an  expensive  but   necessary  task.
Military staff officers are likely to better appreciate the
need for appropriate equipment and maintenance facilities.71
They  can  conduct  contingency  planning  and  logistics
preparation of the mission in better harmony with the main
logistical players in the mission area.
     The  logistics  staff  can  develop  urgently  needed
doctrine   and  standards   to   address   requirements   of
interoperability  of  equipment  used  by  the  DPKO  at  UN
Headquarters and in the field.   It can also teach the
comprehensive   forecasting   and   logistical   planning
considerations  for  improving  political,  economic,  and
operational  effectiveness.    Finally,  these professionals
would develop a keen sense for requesting the rejection of
member's  offers  of  forces  based  on  their  need  for
substantial  logistics  support.    This  would  lessen  the
expensive drainage on limited UN assets.
     A logistics division within the DPKO would have an
organization suited to man and operate cells to conduct
logistic  appreciation,  reconnaissance,  stockpiling,  and
maintenance both at UN Headquarters and in the field.  They
would  also  contribute  to  the UN  Staff  College  and  to
deployable training and assessment teams.
     Another significant area of reform already occurring is
that of doctrine and training.  Many middle powers, as well
as several of the major states,  have begun to establish
schools or courses of instruction designed to better prepare
their armed forces for peace operations.   In South East
Asia,  Australia has  commenced to  operate  a UN center,
designed to  teach  lessons  learned  from their UN peace
operations  experience.    In Northern Europe,  Sweden has
commenced operating a UN course of instruction to which it
invites officers from many nations.   The U.S. Army has
distributed U.S. doctrine on peace operations and begun to
teach the considerations involved in UN operations.  These
are  promising  steps  reflecting  a  growing  professional
commitment to improve.   However,  there are some concerns
that  countries  are  not  standardized  in their  doctrinal
approach, and that their cultural and political biases vary
the quality of the teaching.  Ultimately, incompatibility of
procedures  can result  in a  lack of interface,  or even
conflict,  between  staff  branches  within  a  UN  force
headquarters.72  The requirement is for a clear definition
of the staff procedures to be used and for training to be
provided to potential  staff officers.   This applies  to
administrative  and  logistics  as  well  as  to  operations
staffs.  The more thought and training given in advance to
the nature and requirements of peace operations, the less
likely mistakes will be made in the operations themselves.
Officers and contingents who do not understand the wider
political context of peacekeeping tend to develop negative
attitudes toward the very difficult tasks they are asked to
fulfill.   Those who "persist in comparing peacekeeping to
normal military service and who hanker  for the use of
conventional  force are  likely to end up frustrated and
defeatist."73   For this reason,  standardized training and
indoctrination  in  advance  of  operations  is  absolutely
essential.
     A positive step in the training direction would be the
establishment of a UN Training Center, or Staff College.
This  would enhance  unilateral  and combined training of
staffs and forces for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief
operations.  The center would likely be in the U.S., close
to UN Headquarters and take advantage of the U.S.  base
downsizing program for its  lodgings.    The bulk of the
instructional   and   administrative   staff   would   be
professionals from the DPKO.  The training offered by this
institution would be aimed at  three  levels.    First,  a
training program for  Peace  Operations  Force  Commanders,
Senior Political Advisors, and Senior Staff Officers.  The
syllabus  would cover  senior  level  instruction aimed  at
integrating UN doctrine with geo-political awareness and
strategic/operational analysis.  Second, a training program
for military and civilian professionals, aspiring to become
members of the permanent staff of the DPKO.  This would be
an extensive course covering the full spectrum of emerging
UN doctrine, staff procedures, management, and professional
integration.    Finally,  an  exportable  training  program
focusing  on  UN  doctrine,  staff  procedures,  information
gathering, and military integration at the tactical level.
The first two courses would be taught at UN Staff College
while  the  third  would  be  introduced  to  the  evolving
structure  of national  peacekeeping  schools  in order  to
standardize their instruction.
     Extracurricular  courses  in  media  management,  NGO
integration, information gathering, and military integration
would  also  be  offered  as  the  College  matures.    The
establishment of a UN Staff College would be challenging and
rewarding   career   for   many   military   and   civilian
professionals.
     However,  the building and operating of a UN Staff
College, and the expansion of the permanent military staff
of  the  UN  will  not  be  achieved  without  significant
determination.   Two primary factors will constantly dilute
efforts  to  achieve  such  reform.    First,  the  inherent
anti-militarism of the UN bureaucracy is an awesome obstacle
to overcome.   The General Assembly also, has historically
been reticent to adopt military reform.  Arguments for the
detrimental effect of an expanded military staff will be
based on the perceived threat that the military poses to UN
impartiality.    Opponents  will  draw  on  fears  that  the
military instrument will supersede the civilian control of
the organization.   They may argue  that the  "immediate"
benefits for militarizing the DPKO will result in a focusing
of power into the major five states of the Security Council.
This power will be available for the advancement of those
nation's  national  interests  and  not  for  the  general
improvement of global security.  Champions will also appear
to  insist  on  equitable  recruitment  from member nations
rather than an aptitude for the job.  This debate will be a
challenge to both sides and it remains to be seen if the
quest for UN efficiency can outmaneuver the advocates of
mediocrity.
     The second, and most important, obstacle is funding.
The financial burden of peace operations is staggering.  In
the  last  seven  years,  the UN  annual  budget  for peace
operations has risen from $230 million to approximately $3.6
billion.74  The UN is hopelessly in debt and is a constant
source of frustration to the Secretary-General,  who must
lobby for support for each operation.   While the UN and
member nations barter over funding systems, and levels of
member contributions, it is acutely obvious that a call for
significant expansion of the permanent military staff and a
new UN Staff  College  will  likely be met  with  initial
incredulity.    A  permanent  military  staff,  manned  and
equipped to achieve the capabilities described above, will
require a large amount of capital to start.  To recruit good
people  requires  an  attractive  career  package  offering
financial stability, good equipment and a challenging job.
This can not be accomplished cheaply.  The production of UN
permanent staff uniforms and the other paraphernalia that
accompanies a military organization will also need to be
purchased and managed.  Opponents to the expansion will be
able to resort to a wide range of short sighted objections.
Their challenge will pose the most significant threat to
reform of the military staff.   It will be a major task to
convince member nations that a better staff will inevitably
save money.
     The above analysis has focused on major reform and
expansion of the permanent military staff of the DPKO as a
viable   option   in   the   search   for   efficiency   and
professionalism in the UN.   This reform will occur on two
levels.  First, military and civilian professionals will be
recruited on a permanent basis to realize the potential
efficiency of an energetic military staff.  The staff will
be fully capable to conduct a wide range of planning and
forecasting duties.   It will be able to support missions
through a standardization of UN procedures and doctrine that
it  has  developed  and  tested.    It  will  also  have  the
important advantage of cohesion developed among a team of
professionals   loyal    to   the   credibility   of   their
organization.     In  addition,  it  will  operate  at  UN
Headquarters and in the field to complement national forces
recruited for missions.  Importantly, it will not usurp the
Force Commander role, but rather act as an advisor, guide,
and force multiplier.  Ultimately, the staff will become an
integral component working toward the achievement of mission
mandates wherever they may be.
     Second, the use of permanent military and civilian UN
personnel to establish a UN Staff College will complement
the first reforms.   The advantages of workable doctrine
development, the hard analysis of lessons learned, and the
standardization of peace operations training are obvious.
The need for these types of instruction is urgent as the
global  security environment  continues  to  change  from a
bipolar configuration.
     Challenges  to  this  reform  will  be  great.    The
resistance to military expansion in the UN, the initial set
up  and  maintenance  costs,   and  reticence  to  share
intelligence will all provide a fertile field for opponents.
It will be a major hurdle to convince the member nations
that investment in the intangible improvement offered by an
expanded  permanent  UN  military  staff  can  guarantee  a
significant return in achieving progress in the quest for
global security.
                        CHAPTER 6
                       CONCLUSION
     In 1948, the first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie,
proposed the establishment of a small UN Guard to be placed
at the disposal of the Security Council.  The kind of tasks
he envisaged for this force were to put an end to factional
fighting and to shore up truces decreed by the Security
Council.   He argued that the force was needed to meet
challenges to UN authority and would be a vital component of
the  organization's methods  in dealing with breaches  of
international peace and security.  He hoped that action to
create this force would avoid the paralysis of the Charter
provisions for military forces that prevailed at the time.
However, the Cold War, lack of government support, and lack
of imagination conspired to ensure that the idea would
remain unrealized.
     Nearly fifty years later, the idea again took flight as
part of a series of proposals made by Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali.   Worried by the inability of the Security
Council  to  enforce  its  decisions  in  less  conventional
military situations, he called for the establishment of a UN
rapid deployment force tied to his authority.   However,
present  global  trends  indicate  that  the  international
community is still reluctant to allow the UN to have a
permanent army.  Member nations are not convinced that a UN
army offers significant advantages over the present methods
for  conducting peace  operations.    When the  operational
utility of such a force is analyzed, it is clear that these
doubts are justified.   Advocates for a UN army are yet to
develop a model capable of winning strong political and
military support.
     It is clear that the UN must remain a crucial player in
global security.   Its credibility, weakened over the last
five years,  can be bolstered by taking advantage of the
trend towards regional collective security.   The UN must
improve  its  ability  to  provide  legitimacy  to  peace
operations.    It must  lead the world in developing and
disseminating strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine
for these operations.   It must be capable of directing
mission commanders and providing timely, useable information
to assist and guide its operatives.  These capabilities can
be developed through the adoption of a DPKO military staff
organized on functional lines and staffed by permanent UN
military and civilian professionals.  The advantages gained
for  command  and  control,  the  UN  intelligence  cycle,
logistics management,  and the standardization of training
for peace operations, are significant.  The potential gains
outweigh the objections of cost and mercenary stigma.
     In 1948, Trygve Lie remarked that the establishment of
a UN army would have required a degree of attention and
imagination on the part of men in charge of the foreign
policies of the principal member nations that they seemed
unable to give.  In 1995, that degree of enthusiasm is still
lacking.  Instead, the way ahead is to urge further reform
in the DPKO.   The improvement that a staff of permanent
military  professionals  can  provide  will  strengthen  UN
credibility.   Ultimately,  it will help restore political
confidence in the only international organization committed
to the preservation of global security.
                          NOTES
   1Boutros Boutros Ghali, "Peace Making and Peacekeeping
for the Next Century," Vital Speeches of the Day 61, no. 11
(March 15, 1995):  322.
   2William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York
City: Oceana Publications, 1957), 176.
   3Frye, 177.
   4Frye, 177.
   5William H. Lewis, "Peacekeeping: The Deepening Debate,"
Strategic Review 21, no. 3 (Summer 1993):  30.
   6Leland Goodrich, "Efforts to Establish International
Police Force Down To 1950," in A United Nations Peace Force,
ed. William R. Frye (New York City: Oceana Publications,
1957), 175-179.
   7Frye, 176.
   8Frye, 197.
   9Arthur M. Cox, Prospects For Peacekeeping (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), 76.
   10Frye, 199.
   11Frye, 200.
   12Cox, 76-77.
   13Frye, 210-212.
   14Frye, 214.
   15Cox, 74.
   16At  the  initiative  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for
International   Peace,   William  Frye,   a   respected  UN
correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, directed the
efforts of a group of diplomats, academics, and soldiers in
the study of a UN Peace Force.
   17Cox, 157.  UNEF was established by the General Assembly
to monitor a cease-fire along the Egypt-Israel border in
November 1956.  Ten countries provided up to 6,000 troops.
The first UN peace operation by comparatively large scale
military forces.
   18Cox, 74-75.
   19Frye, 91.
   20Frye, 113-118.
   21Frye, 85.
   22Frye, 86.
   23Having  spent  8  months  peacekeeping  in  the  Islamic
Republic of Iran I share this concern.  Battlefield stress
also affects peacekeepers.  My research indicates that no UN
mission has adequately addressed this problem.   Brigadier
John Wilson, a former Chief Military Observer (UNPROFOR),
has alerted the Australian Government to this deficiency.
   24Lincoln Bloomfield served in the U.S. State Department
from 1946 to 1957 as a policy planner for UN affairs.   In
1964,  as  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Editors  of  the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he edited a study of
international military forces in the role of peacekeeping.
   25Cox, 75.
   26A wholly original concept for a future global military
unit was developed by an unusual military think-tank working
for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command between 1978
and 1985.   "The First Earth Battalion" was an imaginative
concept based on the recruitment and training of a peace
force  to  combat  the  ravages  of  war  and  environmental
vandalism.  Its author is LtCol. Jim Channon.  The concept
was published as a draft operations manual  titled OM-1
Evolutionary Tactics but was considered too eccentric for
general distribution to the U.S. Army.
   27The Joint Nordic Committee for military UN matters, The
Handbook on Nordic Standby Forces in United Nations Service
(Stockholm:  UN-department,  Army Staff,  1973)  is  a  good
example of the detail that the Scandinavian countries devote
in the preparation of their military commitment to the UN.
   28Lance Morrow, "An Interview: The Man in the Middle,"
Soldiers for Peace - Supplement to MHQ: The Quarterly
Journal of Military  History  5, no. 1, (Autumn 1992):  26.
   29Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations,"
Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992/93):  89.
   30 Cathy Downes, "Challenges for Smaller Nations in the
New Era of UN and Multinational Operations in Peacekeeping,"
in Peacekeeping, Challenges for the Future, ed. Hugh Smith
(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 13-14.
   31Fred Barnes, "Low Priority for UN Peace Operations,"
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 21, no. 2/3 (August/September
1994):  29.
   32Richard Shultz, "Compellance and Escalation Control:
The Value of Visible Forward Deployed Forces," Perspectives
on Warfighting 2, no. 2 (1992):  8-12.
   33Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic
Monthly, (February, 1994):  49-54.
   34Shultz, 8-10.
   35Joint Publication 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping
Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June
1991).
   36Downes, 16.
   37David Miller, "Anywhere, anytime: rapid-deployment
forces and their future," International Defense Review
Special Report, (October 1994):  3.
   38Barnes, 28-29.
   39Richard N. Haass, "Military Force: A User's Guide,"
Foreign Policy, no. 96 (Fall 1994):  34-35.
   40John F. Hillen, III, "Policing The New World Order:
The Operational Utility Of A Permanent UN Army," Strategic
Review 22, no. 2 (Spring 1994):  54-62.
   41 Lukas Haynes and Timothy Stanley, "To Create a United
Nations Fire Brigade," Comparative Strategy 14, no. 1
(January-March 1995):  11-15.  Authors propose a typical
model based on a brigade sized rapid deployment force in
this article.
   42Edward C. Luck, "Making Peace," Foreign Policy, no. 89
(Winter 1992-93):  151.
   43 Senator Robert Ray, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking - The
Challege for the Future," Peacekeeping Challenges for the
Future, ed. Hugh Smith (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies
Centre, 1993), 175.
   44Hans Haekkerup, "Peacekeeping: a Danish perspective,"
International Defense Review - Defense `95, (1995):
103-106.
   45Hillen, 60.
   46Haass, 35.
   47Hillen, 62.
   48Mark Stenhouse, ed., "United Nations peacekeeping
operations history, resources, missions, and components,"
International Defense Review - Defense`95, (1995):  119.
   49Stenhouse, 124-125.
   50Stenhouse, 121-125.
   51The issue becomes a "Catch 22" when the UN spends more
to enlarge the force thus enabling members to justify their
requests for services based on their increased financial
contributions.
   52Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Sir Brian Urquhart have both
revised their concepts of UN permanent forces since 1992,
acknowledging the lack of interest for a UN Army in the
General Assembly.
   53Haekkerup, 104-106.
   54Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," 93.
   55David Arnold and Albert Mitchum, "A Note On The United
Nations' Best Laid Plans: Now What?" Defense and Foreign
Affairs Strategic Policy 22, no. 11-12 (Nov.- December
1994):  10.
   56Hugh Smith, "Challenge of Peacekeeping," Peacekeeping -
Challenges for the Future (Canberra: Australian Defence
Studies Centre, 1993), 190.
   57David Ramsbotham, "UN Operations: The Art Of The
Possible," The RUSI Journal, (December 1993):  26.
  58LtCol R. Roan, Military Advisor to the U.S. Mission to
the UN Headquarters, New York, briefing on DPKO reform to
the International Military Students USMC C&GSC,  11 April
1995.
   59Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: One Year
Later", Orbis 37, no. 3 (Summer 1993).
   60Lewis, 28.
   61Lewis, 31.
   62Ramsbotham, 26.
   63Ramsbotham, 26.
   64R.M. Connaughton, "Peacekeeping and Military
Intervention," Strategic and Combat Studies Institute
Occasional Paper No 3, (1992).
   65Admiral Sir James Eberle, "Agenda for Peace: Military
Issues," The Naval Review 8, no. 1 (January 1993):  6.
   66Robert T. Grey, "Strengthening the United Nations to
Implement The `Agenda For Peace'," Strategic Review 21, no.
3 (Summer 1993):  22.
   67The UN mission to Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG), set up in 1988,
is a good example.  One of the first components into Iran
was a Canadian signals unit.  On its own initiative, due to
poor UN HQ direction, and with meager equipment, it set up
an insecure and flawed communications net.  Once the net was
established,  the unit left the country - its obligation
fulfilled.  UN Headquarters and the observers were left with
a system that never worked capably and was plagued by
maintenance  difficulties.     Author's  experience  as  an
observer March 1989 to October 1989.
   68Robert L. Ord, "The US Army Approach To Peacekeeping
Support Operations," in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the
Future, ed. Hugh Smith (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies
Centre, 1993), 143.
   69Peter Kieseker, "Relationships Between Non-Government
Organizations and Multinational Forces in the Field," in
Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future, ed. Hugh Smith
(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 72-73.
   70C.W. Hoffman, Jr., "UN Peackeeping Proposals," in
Essays On Strategy II, ed. John N. Petrie (Washington D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1994), 65.
   71Hoffman, 67.
   72J.D. Murray, "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping:
Problems and Recommendations," in Peacekeeping - Appraisals
and Proposals, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press,
1983), 185.
   73Brian Urquhart, "A View From The Operational Center,"
in Peacekeeping - Appraisals and Proposals, ed. Henry
Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 173.
   74Boutros Ghali, "Peace Making and Peacekeeping for the
Next Century,"  322.
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