The Utility Of Expanding The United Nations Permanent Military Force CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE MASTERS PAPER THE UTILITY OF EXPANDING THE UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT MILITARY FORCE by MAJOR A.W. GUNDER AUSTRALIAN ARMY 18 APRIL 1995 COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE QUANTICO, VA. 22134 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Utility Of Expanding The United Nations Permanent Military Force Author: Major A. W. Gunder, Australian Army Thesis: The United Nations (UN) permanent military capability requires reform to meet the new challenges in the global security environment. Is the establishment of a standing UN army appropriate? If not, what reform is suitable to improve the UN's credibility in peace operations? Discussion: Since the inception of the United Nations, debate has surrounded the limitations to its power. A number of Secretary-Generals, academics, and military professionals have advocated the establishment of a permanent UN army. During the Cold War, this concept did not materialize due to the paralysis of the Security Council, the unwillingness of member nations to expand the Secretary-General's power, and the pragmatic objections to the utility of a UN army. Since the Cold War, the concept has been advanced on the basis that the obstacles to its establishment have been removed. However, an analysis of both the present global trends and the current operational utility of a UN army indicates that significant challenges remain to be overcome. Currently, the international community lacks sufficient enthusiasm and imagination for the task. Important reform is achievable within the UN Secretariat. The establishment of a permanent military staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would greatly improve UN performance in peace operations. This reform poses challenges and faces determined opposition. The reward for its adoption would be a robust UN capability to prepare and manage peace operations that would be respected by the international community and help to restore UN credibility. Conclusion: The enlargement of the DPKO permanent military staff should proceed in the areas of command and control, training and doctrine, logistics management, communications, and information management. CONTENTS Chapter Page 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. HISTORY OF THE UN ARMY DEBATE 3 3. PRESENT GLOBAL TRENDS 15 4. THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF A UN ARMY 23 5. MILITARY REFORM FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 31 6. CONCLUSION 52 Notes 55 Bibliography 61 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION This is a time when the world community is working to decide the future role of its UN instrument. The global security environment, once threatened by nuclear holocaust, is now faced with threats of unknown quantity and nature. It has witnessed a dramatic increase in UN peace and security activities. The quantitative change has been enormous over the last seven years: - UN involvement in preventative diplomacy or peacemaking has grown from eleven disputes to thirty. - the number of new UN peace operations deployed has more than tripled to sixteen. The number of military personnel deployed has risen from 9,570 to 62,333 and the number of civilian police has jumped from 35 to 1169. - the number of member nations contributing military and police personnel has risen from 26 to 74 and the annual budget for UN peace operations has increased twelve-fold to $3.6 billion.1 Beyond quantitative change, there have been qualitative changes of even greater significance. Most of today's conflict takes place within states. Demands for UN intervention go well beyond traditional peacekeeping. Many member nations now consider Operations Other Than War (OOTW) to be an important part of their security strategies. Frustratingly, the impact of these new conflicts on the global security environment remains unclear. What is clear is that the UN is still the only world organization with the legitimacy to tackle these dilemmas. There are many diplomats, academics, and politicians who advocate increasing the UN's military options in order to deal with these problems. This concept has frequently offered unique but untested methods to resolve conflict in the international arena. The purpose of this analysis is to explore the utility of expanding the UN's military capability. It will analyze the proposal to establish a permanent UN army, how this proposal fared in the past, and its applicability to the current global situation. It will also investigate the expansion of the permanent UN military staff, and explore the advantages and disadvantages of such a reform. The analysis combines a rich history with a number of controversial ideas. It challenges the well meaning arguments of UN army adherents but also offers an alternative approach for improving the UN's ability to manage UN peace operations. CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF THE UN ARMY DEBATE Article 43 of the UN Charter describes the collective responsibility to provide military muscle to the UN: All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement, or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rites of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Under Article 47, the establishment of a Military Staff Committee (MSC), consisting of the Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives, from the five permanent members of the Security Council provides the international mechanism meant to facilitate this commitment. The MSC is responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The intent of these provisions, deliberated at the end of World War II, was to create for the UN continued access to the enormous Allied forces. Although this concept was noble in vision, it was soon apparent that the global political trend after World War II would cause significant difficulties in realizing the agreements necessary to assemble a coalition when required. The Secretary-General started the debate for the creation of a permanent UN force to overcome this uncooperative attitude. This chapter reviews previous proposals for a permanent UN army and examines the obstructions that they faced in the Cold War. The five permanent members of the Security Council had differing views on the nature of a UN army from the start. The U.S., confident of its primacy in future UN affairs, advocated that the UN needed "a mobile force able to strike quickly at long range and bring to bear, upon any given point in the world where trouble may occur, the maximum armed force in the minimum time."2 The U.S. predicated its model on strike weapons delivered by strong air and naval forces. The model's strength rested on a force of 3,500 combat aircraft and two hundred capital warships, half of which were submarines.3 The USSR, on the other hand, unwilling to support a force which could complicate its hegemonic plans, advocated an organization roughly half the size of the U.S. model.4 The UK, China, and France also favored a smaller force to preserve the influence of their own contributions.5 In the period preceding the Korean War, it became obvious that negotiations conducted by the MSC would not result in the ratification of the agreements specified in Article 43. Moreover, failure of the Security Council to agree on principles governing the conclusion of agreements under Article 43 made it impossible for the MSC to make any progress toward establishing levels of strength of the national contingents to be made available to the Council. Disagreements over member force contributions, force roles and missions, command and control arrangements, and criteria for disengagement produced a stalemate.6 Thus, the Security Council had no armed forces that would enable it to exercise power under Chapter VII of the Charter, and a central part of the peace-enforcement system failed to become operative. In 1948, in an effort to circumvent the impasse surrounding the Article 43 negotiations, the Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie, proposed a plan for a UN Guard. Mr. Lie described this as a force, internationally recruited by the Secretary-General, under his immediate direction, and at the disposal of the Security Council. It would have truce and plebiscite functions, be lightly armed, and equipped with organic transport and communications. In addition it would afford: security to a field mission's members, secretariat, premises, archives, and other property; furnish such transportation, communication, and supply as might be necessary to supplement services available to a mission in the field; maintain order during hearings and investigations of United Nations missions; patrol points or guard objectives neutralized under truce or cease-fire orders of the United Nations; and exercise supervisory and observation functions at polling points during the conduct of referendums conducted under UN auspices. The Secretary-General argued that the Guard did not constitute an international army, and that its constitutional authority existed in Articles 97 and 98 of the Charter, provided that the General Assembly gave budgetary approval. He contended that under his own authority he could recruit the force and, pursuant to Articles 97, 98, 100, and 101, that he could deploy the Guard to fulfill the needs of United Nations' field missions.8 He politically downplayed the nature, functions, and organization of the Guard by emphasizing that it would be `entirely non-military' in character, have only light small arms, some transport and communications, and be organizationally incapable of aggression. The Guard's powers did not include powers of arrest, quelling of insurrections, or functions implying the use of force for other than personal protective reasons. The Secretary-General estimated that an 800-man Guard, composed of both active and reserve components, would cost $4 million dollars per year.9 Even the proposed establishment of this meager bodyguard met with strong opposition. The Soviet Union, suspicious of Western motives, argued against the Guard on the grounds that the Secretary-General could not legally recruit it, or control it. The Soviets also claimed that the force was military in character and capable of expansion into the Article 43 army that they already opposed.10 Other nations challenged the cost of the Guard and forecast that its establishment would exceed the UN budget. France, China, and the UK all raised objections doubting the practicality of the Guard. They claimed that it was incapable of achieving even a protective role.11 The recruitment of the force faced obstacles in language, religion, and training, and morale problems were considered likely. Overall, most nations shared the concern that the force had a high probability of acquiring a paramilitary nature as it matured, leading to a tendency for non-conventional expansion, and a corresponding burgeoning budget. Although the General Assembly voted to study the Guard concept further, the Secretary-General resolved to explore other avenues through which to bolster his powers. He stripped the Guard of its truce and plebiscite functions, reduced its arms and numbers, and renamed it the Field Service. The Secretary-General managed to have the international community adopt the Field Service in 1949.12 This Field Service of some 300 uniformed men became part of the Secretariat and provided transport and communications for missions. It also guarded UN premises, and maintained order during meetings, hearings, and investigations. Except in isolated circumstances, the Service was unarmed. The UN Field Service gradually became an integral part of the Secretariat and its powers remained strictly limited. The collective response to the Korean War encouraged the Secretary-General to advocate the establishment of a UN instrument of coercive policing. In 1952, he proposed that member nations not only quickly establish the special agreements required for Article 43 forces but also accept the establishment of a UN Legion. The Legion was to consist of volunteers drawn mostly from countries unable to contribute to the Article 43 forces. Again, the Legion was to be at the disposal of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Under the Legion proposal, the UN would recruit some 60,000 volunteers through the existing national military establishments of the participating states. The proposal asked these states to meet the costs of recruiting, equipping, and training UN volunteer reservists as part of their advance contribution to collective security under the UN. In return, the UN would "elastically" arrange command and control of the force to preserve its international flavor.13 Not surprisingly, debate in the General Assembly was very negative. The Secretary-General concluded that: the creation of any supra-national self-contained standing force, internationally recruited for a fixed period of full-time service and subject, not to the control of any national government, but to a self-contained United Nations command, was administratively, financially, and militarily impractical at the present time.14 Ultimately, the Secretary-General's pessimism and the lack of interest of both the General Assembly and the Security Council doomed the Legion to go the way of the Guard. As the Cold War polarized the international community, it became apparent that the Security Council, plagued by veto conventions, could not direct a UN army even if it had one. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, both the U.S. and USSR independently proposed their own global disarmament plans. These schemes called for the establishment of UN supervisory forces to ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.15 In reality, the proposals achieved little consensus amongst the Security Council and were cynically dismissed as superpower propaganda. In 1957, William Frye16 published a comprehensive study of the relevance of a UN Peace Force to international security. Witnessing the success of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East,7 Frye proposed the possibility of establishing a small permanent UN Peace Force of approximately 7,000 personnel. Interested members would contribute troops for periods of six months to two years. In that time they would train at a UN base or would participate in peacekeeping operations. Using a rotational scheme, all states would have the opportunity to contribute to the Peace Force. Frye estimated that a suitable base with barracks, airfield, logistics and training facilities, and associated "quality of life" facilities, would cost $65 million to establish and then require a further $1 million to maintain. He hoped that original contributors would shoulder the cost of initially equipping the 7,000 troops with their arms, uniforms, vehicles, and other necessary equipment.18 The role of the Peace Force would be to guard borders of nations struggling to reach peace resolutions against terrorists and irregular forces causing destabilization. The Peace Force would also supervise demilitarized zones and reassure belligerents to reduce tension; enforce arms embargoes, and other miscellaneous duties. Significantly, it would also act to block infiltration or invasion approaches. Frye proposed that an aggressor's attack on the UN Peace Force would automatically invite international retribution, and therefore, the Force could be an effective deterrent.19 Using the example of UNEF's operational history, Frye demonstrated the benefits to international security that his Peace Force would bring.20 However, his proposal did not adequately resolve the unavoidable problems of base location, homogeneity of the Peace Force, discipline, and recruitment. More importantly, the member nations saw the issue of command and control of the Peace Force as an insurmountable obstacle. This is understandable considering their continual reluctance to bestow sovereignty to the UN and to give the Secretary-General an army. However, Frye did raise some issues which had considerable utility at the time and are also applicable to current discussions on UN forces. He argued for a military logistics planning cell in UN Headquarters. This cell's role would be to act as an operations quantity surveyor and maintain a logistical data base for all classes of military supplies.21 This "horn of plenty" would be beneficial in allowing mission planners to quickly build a comprehensive logistics structure from member assets, more likely to suit the mission conditions than the existing ad hoc method. He also briefly explored the development of a UN intelligence organization tailored to meet the operational needs of the Peace Force and a tactical planning cell. Frye viewed a rapidly deployable mission headquarters as being useful and cited the efficacy of a group of ten officers in being able to reduce the tension in Port Said during UNEF's operations.22 He even foresaw the need for the planning of UN recreation as a part of ongoing mission planning.23 Ultimately, Frye designed his UN Peace Force for peacekeeping using UNEF as a model. He did not configure it for peace-enforcement. In 1964, Lincoln Bloomfield24 analyzed a group proposal to establish a permanent UN force of 25,000 troops recruited by the UN, based in a neutral country (at the time India), and trained over five years in readiness for UN peacekeeping operations. He estimated that the force would cost $10 million annually.25 Again, discussions on this proposal highlighted problems such as command and control, base location, and cost. Debate on the establishment of UN forces in the 1970's and 1980's centered on efforts to empower the MSC to develop the agreements suggested in Article 43 of the UN Charter.26 Certain countries promised forces on an earmarked basis, but they were wholly insufficient and not immediately available. In addition, international insistence that host countries have the right to disqualify any country's contingents from entering their territory, forced the UN to use ad hoc arrangements. Fortunately, the military benefit of this situation was the development, notably in Canada and the Nordic countries, of forces skilled in special requirements and capabilities of peacekeeping.27 In times of crisis, these particular nations have been quick to volunteer these assets to the UN for peacekeeping. With the utility of these forces generally able to cope with the global security demand, the debate on a permanent UN army was quelled. In the twenty years before the collapse of the USSR, the UN matured and operated in the strangling atmosphere of the Cold War. Any efforts to establish either a permanent UN army, or an Article 43 arrangement force, met heated opposition. The mutual distrust on the part of the U.S. and USSR contributed significantly to the failure to form a UN force. Sir Brian Urquhart, Scholar in Residence at the Ford Foundation and former Principal Officer in the UN Office of the Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, best summarized this frustration: We were in the Cold War throughout the period that I was in the UN. We spent our entire time and energy tip-toeing around the Cold War, and it was a pain in the neck. The UN was seen as a sort of fighting ring for the superpowers--Henry Cabot Lodge and Andrei Vishinski exchanging insults in the Security Council was not a very edifying spectacle. It was as much as your life was worth to get anything sensible done.28 In summarizing the history of UN force proposals up to 1989, it can be determined that several factors posed insurmountable problems. The ever-present threat of a Soviet veto, the unwillingness of nations to accept a UN army directed by a non-sovereign body, and the wealth of pragmatic objections to the utility and sustainment of a permanent force, all conspired to keep worthwhile proposals from being realized. When the Berlin Wall fell, however, it seemed that one of the main obstacles had vanished. Soon thereafter, the conflict against Iraq gave the impression that the international community was capable of being united in defeating aggression. With two of the three main obstacles to a permanent UN army seemingly removed, the Secretary-General was encouraged to rekindle the debate. CHAPTER 3 PRESENT GLOBAL TRENDS In 1992, the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, saw new opportunities for the UN. He noted that: the machinery of the United Nations, which had often been rendered inoperative by the dynamics of the Cold War, is suddenly at the center of international efforts to deal with unresolved problems of the past decades as well as an emerging array of present and future issues .... the international community and the UN Secretariat need to seize this extraordinary opportunity to expand, adapt, and reinvigorate the work of the United Nations so that lofty goals can begin to be realized.29 With the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has changed significantly and produced a security phenomenon that surprised the Western World. The consequences of its ending are emerging in four trends: (1) diffusion of power in world affairs; (2) disintegration and failure of states; (3) expansion in the meaning of international security; (4) increasing recourse to collective security.30 Diffusion of power in world affairs A complex world which has diffused power into different groupings has replaced the bipolar world. The USSR, its satellites, and clients have disintegrated, leaving the U.S. as reluctant hegemon. The U.S. is hesitating over the challenge of global leadership because of the risks and costs of doing so. This hesitance may serve to galvanize reform in the UN. As Madeleine Albright, the U.S. representative to the UN, recently said in testimony before Congress, "The goal of the policy directive is to ensure that we refrain from asking the UN to undertake missions it is not equipped to do and to help the UN to succeed in missions we would like it to."31 Conversely, this U.S. attitude may repel member states and promote the growth of regional security responses to conflict resolution. The downsizing of the superpowers' arsenals has also diffused military technology and capability. This makes the sale of existing high technology weapons more competitive. Shifts in conventional arms markets are occurring as weapons merchants seek new contracts. This trend will alter the global security situation. In the new century, a multipolarity of regional powers capable of war-fighting at levels of intensity previously associated only with the super-powers, or first-rank middle powers, will characterize the international environment.32 States with evolving ambition are anticipating new opportunities that will arise and are reluctant to promise their military capabilities, or financial support, to a UN army. State disintegration The passing of the Cold War has rekindled nationalist, tribal, religious, and ethnic conflicts that the superpower benefactors had held in check. The spread of liberal democracy has also fostered the desire for self-determination. These factors have caused a disintegration of the existing geopolitical template bringing a fear that some states and their offspring will be unsustainable over the longer term. This is a significant problem to peace protagonists as they work to influence the development of these strife torn nations. The failure of governmental systems of all types in the Third World is also responsible for the fragmentation of states. This is particularly so in Africa and may be so in Latin America in the future. Lack of economic growth, population expansion, debt, drought, famine, corruption, and a lack of tradition in self-government have contributed to the backward slide in many nations' efforts to become international players.3a The recent situation in Rwanda has graphically demonstrated the unscrupulous desire for sovereign territories based on tribal and ethnic groupings. Governments in failing states are now less able to provide the economic and social glue to hold their countries together. During the Cold War, many Third World states played East against West to maximize access to development aid. The Commonwealth of Independent States can no longer provide this assistance to former client states, and the growing number of emerging states now compete for a developmental aid pool which has not grown in a complementary way. This trend has had the most significant impact where there is a volatile intermixing of ethnic, religious, or national groupings. Savage conflicts have accompanied state dissolution in the Balkans, Africa, and former Soviet states. These wars have debilitating consequences for the protagonists and, sometimes, for their neighbors, but do not always threaten international peace. Recent history has reinforced this fact to many UN members and reduced their ardor for global collective security measures. The Expanding Meaning Of International Security Traditionally, we have defined threats to international security in terms of sovereignty. However, many security concerns are now beyond the capability of individual states to cope with. These concerns encompass new sources of conflict such as water sharing, natural disaster relief, and regional arms races. These have potential effects for other states with varying interests in such confrontations. Those nations that resist external intervention in their domestic affairs, and there are still many, frustrate effective international responses to broader security issues such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.34 There is some consensus that the international community should compel states which are unwilling to conform to international standards of behavior to do so. However, the tools for this enforcement have proven to be difficult to find. This trend has certainly endowed more legitimacy to UN missions and allowed for brave ventures beyond the traditional peacekeeping boundaries. The character of these interventions has created new definitions for peace operations. Peacemaking operations are diplomatic activities or anything other than military operations short of combat to rectify a crisis situation through a peaceful process as Chapter VI of the UN Charter outlines. Peacekeeping operations are those that help maintain or restore peace and security in areas of conflict, based on consent and cooperation. They require the consent of the parties to the dispute; do not seek to interfere with the affairs of host nations; maintain strict impartiality; and have no right of enforcement. Peace-enforcement operations are those operations that require the use of combat forces as prescribed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create a cessation of hostilities and restore the peace.35 There is clearly a dividing line between peacekeeping, which should be mandated and structured to operate on well-tested principles; and peace enforcement, which must have the capability to impose a solution. The discouraging results in Bosnia and Somalia have severely dampened the General Assembly's enthusiasm for peace enforcement. This has had an obvious impact on the motivation to establish a UN army. Increasing recourse to collective security The last five years have seen an increasing dependence on multilateral consensus to resolve conflicts. The euphoria of the Gulf War victory prompted a new enthusiasm for collective military action. The UN continues to be the international forum with the greatest legitimacy for addressing issues of international security. Moreover, the UN is accepting more responsibilities and having to deliberate on a greater number of security issues than before. In the search for conflict resolutions, the use of military power has enjoyed a popular resurgence. Nearly every plan for the resolution of contemporary conflicts entertains some form of peace operation using military forces.36 Most nations advocating military solutions to security problems are eager to seek a multilateral response in order to share the economic, political, and defense burden. However, the international community has lacked understanding of the finite capabilities of armed forces and the extent of the resources that they consume in peace operations. Now nations are witnessing these limitations, as conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia continue to resist resolution. The inability of the UN to settle these crises has prompted many states to reinforce their commitment to existing, and or new, regional security arrangements.37 Whilst this certainly contributes to peace efforts, it detracts attention and resources from the debate to establish a UN army. In conclusion, since the end of the Cold War, global dynamics have continued to weaken the General Assembly's desire and ability to address the issue of true international security and to develop the tools that the UN needs for peace enforcement. UN commitment to future peace missions will likely be subject to closer scrutiny: a goal that Western nations hope to foster.38 After exploring the current international environment, it is clear that most nations remain unready to embrace a UN army. However, there are still some advocates who favor such a force and claim that it would have significant political and operational utility.39 Nevertheless, doubt prevails that even if the international community was prepared to give the Secretary-General a standing force under his command, it would lack utility and longevity.40 CHAPTER 4 THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF A UN ARMY Despite the unenthusiastic mood in the General Assembly and Security Council with regard to the establishment of a permanent UN army, under the command of the Secretary-General, there are still advocates for such a force. The focus of this paper is not to investigate the establishment of Article 43 agreements to assemble standby forces for peace enforcement. Instead, the concept addressed here is a continuation of that studied in Chapter One, namely a supra-national force of volunteers for international military service. The UN would recruit, train, equip, and finance these soldiers. They would be subject to a UN military discipline code, and act under the authority of the Secretary-General for legitimate peace operations. The popular model that most advocates support is a brigade-sized force of approximately 6,000 troops with organic service and combat service support and strategic mobility assets, capable of rapid deployment to most global crises.41 Arguably, the practicalities of establishing such a force are far less insurmountable than in the 1960's. The Secretary-General has enacted reform to allow for better UN military financing procedures.42 The downsizing of Western defense forces has made training areas, barracks, and logistics facilities more readily available. The homogeneity issue remains a stumbling block, but training can gradually overcome the language barrier, and the recruiting process can address ethnic and religious incompatibilities. The establishment of training schools and a staff college could develop military education, ethical training, and combat skills. A balance of deployment time, training courses and readiness exercises, and liaison attachment to member nations' defense forces, could also maintain career satisfaction and morale. Moreover, the skilled personnel necessary to adequately train this force are now readily available. The Scandinavian nations, Canada, the UK, the U.S., and Australia have gathered a wealth of experience in conducting all natures of peace operations. They are major advocates for the development of a cohesive UN peace operations doctrine. They have established their own schools, specifically to train their defense forces for peace operations.43 In addition, they regularly encourage their regional allies to participate in this training and seek to engage new partners in these endeavors. A good example is Denmark's initiative to coordinate the training of a joint UN peacekeeping battalion of 600 soldiers. These soldiers are not Danes; they are Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians volunteered by their governments in an effort to rebuild their military competence and political worth to the European security environment. A Lithuanian platoon has already completed its training and an operational deployment to Croatia. This is an encouraging example of what can be achieved if the motivation exists.44 Assuming that consensus for the establishment of a UN army, based on the brigade model is forthcoming, member nations can then address the problems of the provision of support to the unit, particularly in the areas of strategic mobility, sustainment, and intelligence gathering assets. If the members cannot reach this consensus, then in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the logistical sustainment of the brigade upon commitment presents the greatest obstacle to its establishment. This brigade global reaction force must be capable of operating in areas ranging from the Balkans to the Middle East, from Africa to Asia. Terrain and climate variance pose significant challenges. The brigade would require the assembly of a flexible mixture of mobility assets, ranging from utility helicopters to snow mobiles, from heavy trucks to light utility vehicles. It would also have to include engineering equipment to ensure logistical mobility. The expense of maintaining enough equipment to guarantee sustainment within theater, let alone strategically, would be prohibitive. If such a brigade was available to the Secretary-General, its size and light capabilities would limit its utility. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and others see the advantage of this force in its immediate availability. Sir Brian Urquhart proposes that a timely intervention by a relatively small but highly trained force, willing and authorized to take combat risks and representing the will of the international community, could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a crisis.45 This force could be useful for missions of tactical deterrence to deploy to a border area or enclave where clashes appeared imminent. In the only recent example of such a need, the UN directed the United Nations Protection Force--Croatia (UNPROFOR) to deploy part of its force to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to monitor and report developments in the border areas. This initiative has worked in buffering FYROM from the conflict to its north. However, opponents of a UN rapid deployment force for preventative peacekeeping claim that the responsiveness of present UN ad hoc procedures is satisfactory. They claim that the nature of the mission and the preventative intervention criteria used by the UN will either attract a member nation to contribute forces or have an existing UN mission slice off the necessary assets, as was the case of UNPROFOR with the FYROM. In this scenario, the lack of a credible UN threat to deter potential aggressors from attacking the peacekeepers is seen as a critical vulnerability. The deterrent threat of U.S. retaliation clearly protects UNPROFOR elements in the FYROM. This would not be the case with a lightly-armed UN rapid deployment brigade inserted quickly into a border area without access to heavier combat support. If the force was to encounter trouble, member states, particularly the U.S., would then come under pressure to act, not simply to deal with an evacuation, but to escalate the situation in order to restore UN credibility. This would be an intolerable endstate far from that initially envisaged for the commitment of the force.46 A UN rapid deployment brigade would have significant political deterrence, but it would not have the military capabilities, or the determined mandate, to resist the inevitable testing by the belligerents that it seeks to separate. Historically, there has been little need for rapid deployments in the area of peacekeeping. When acting as a symbolic deterrent, an ad hoc collective force, or a permanent UN rapid deployment brigade, are hardly different in terms of operational effectiveness or political viability. In past peacekeeping missions, ad hoc force arrangements have sufficed. Member nations will not support the creation of a UN brigade to meet a role for which their own resources are adequate.41 Obviously, it is even harder to see the utility of a permanent, lightly-armed UN brigade for the role of peace enforcement. Unless significantly reinforced by member states under an Article 42 intervention, or by the establishment of its own heavy combat and combat support units, a UN brigade would be largely ineffective in a peace enforcement mission such as Bosnia or Somalia. A bellicose environment pays scant regard to the symbolic presence of peacemakers. Ultimately, the complex and expensive operational infrastructure and tools that make an impact in peace enforcement missions would prove too costly for the UN to acquire or sustain. The challenge of these missions is beyond even the most aggressive proposals for a UN military capability. Peace enforcement remains reliant on the vigorous political and military backing of powerful member states or strong regional coalitions. The number of deployable sub-units in the UN brigade would also be a significant limitation to its versatility. There were 71,543 military and civilian police personnel serving in UN peace operations in June 1994.48 A UN brigade of 6,000 personnel would hardly be able to assume responsibility for these missions. Even if we were to assume that the deployable proportion of the force is around two thirds of its total strength, it would still be hard-pressed to staff operations in Mozambique (current strength of operation: 5,413), or Rwanda (current strength of operation: 5,500).49 There are currently 16,545 personnel serving in peacekeeping missions alone.50 A UN brigade could not even take care of the majority of these operations. Member nations would oppose financing a force that can only augment peace operations and not relieve them of the major military and financial burden.51 This analysis of the utility of a UN army, based on the popular brigade model, has revealed several key issues. The training, basing, and recruitment of the force would be easier than in the Cold War era. Its cost, if truly independent of member nation support, would be expensive and place a significant additional burden on the current UN budget. The force's operational advantages of rapid deployment and homogeneity are not significantly advanced over the present UN systems to justify its cost to unenthusiastic member nations. Its size and capability would restrict the force's capabilities, making its operational versatility questionable in the expanding spectrum of peace operations. The popular brigade model for a permanent UN army is unsuitable for peace operations in the current international environment. Global security trends indicate that UN members remain wary of such a force's powers and lack of capability. They prefer to search for alternative methods for conflict resolution. Ultimately, the UN remains the only organization committed to global security and, as such, it needs to remain credible in the international forum. It requires a military capability, but not an army, to do this. CHAPTER 5 MILITARY REFORM FOR THE UNITED NATIONS The lack of utility of a conventionally designed UN army, and the general reticence of the UN member nations to act to establish such a force has compelled the Secretary-General, and other champions of the idea, to look for alternative ways to provide reliable and timely military capability to the UN.52 In particular, a UN proposal exists to identify units from member states in order to provide a "grab bag" of capabilities that the UN could assemble when it authorizes a mission. These would include the full range of combat, combat support, and service support capabilities to meet each specific case. This idea has only moderate support amongst the member nations, although the Scandinavians are enthusiastic.53 However, the five major countries, and other global players, are not hurrying to promise their elite troops and strategic military assets to a contract with unclear command and control arrangements, cloudy doctrine for engagement, and unresolved financial concerns.54 Instead, analysis in Chapter 2 revealed that the global trend is moving toward conflict resolution through regional partners or coalitions with common interests. The advantages of this approach are many. Regional proximity can lessen response time, share cultural knowledge, and even provide economic incentives, all of which can increase political legitimacy for intervention. Collective will to resolve conflict by interested partners often avoids cumbersome political and military arrangements and is often effective. However, it is generally not prone to act preventatively. Conflict resolution in this manner has always been a significant step before appealing to the UN for assistance. It is encouraging that this trend is beginning to have success in peace operations. The Economic Community of West African States successfully undertook--with its peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) organized by Nigerian President Babangida--such actions to end the Liberian civil war over a several-year period.55 Australia and the nations in the South West Pacific region have also recently commenced a peacekeeping operation in Bougainville in order to contain and resolve that island's secessionist battle with Papua New Guinea. Regional organizations, asking for authorization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, will offer significant choices to conflict resolutions in the coming decade. However, to apportion this legitimacy, the UN must remain responsible for the strategic direction of such efforts in order to deconflict different organizations' plans, to monitor the motives of all parties involved, and to maintain a global perspective. It is, therefore, imperative that the UN's ability to manage peace operations loses no further credibility. Reform is now necessary to preserve the unique global security perspective that only the UN offers. The analysis so far has determined that a UN army, based on a traditional military template, is inappropriate to restore this confidence. The discussion will now turn to the consideration of how an expanded permanent staff can address this concern. The deficiencies of UN peace operations are well documented. The UN designed the administrative system that supports these missions to deal with fewer and less complex operations, and to proceed along a more leisurely pace than has now become necessary. The UN attempt to meet the growing demand for peace operations has exacerbated problems such as unclear mission guidance, inadequate command and control, poor intelligence, and nonexistent doctrine.56 However, those who criticize these deficiencies are judging the efforts of an ill-structured and ill-resourced organization that is struggling to come to terms with increasing demands, for which it was neither designed nor accustomed to cope with. This is particularly so in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), part of the Secretariat at UN Headquarters. The DPKO must develop better capabilities across the spectrum of peace operations.57 Reform in the DPKO since 1993 has been progressive and has addressed the major deficiency of the DPKO not having UN logistics and administrative components within its own bailiwick. Presently, the DPKO consists of some 320 military and civilian personnel seconded from their national governments for short terms. While effective in the reporting and monitoring functions, this staff is incapable of playing a significant role in the preparation, conduct, and management of UN peace operations.58 What the UN needs are improved arrangements for planning operations, the establishment of headquarters, command and control, logistics and procurement, and the provision of intelligence, or information, as it is less sensitively termed. Also necessary for the more effective employment of military forces are clearer political mandates, the delegation of greater authority to commanders in the field, and more effective liaison between the UN and national governments. These matters are normally the realm of military professionals in the context of their own national forces. The challenge to a permanent UN military staff is to professionalize peacekeeping at the international level. It is a process that tends to come naturally to the armies of many countries who share professional values and a common interest in seeing a job effectively and efficiently done. There are evident benefits for peacekeeping in such hallmarks of professionalism as intensive training, effective discipline, high standards of personal integrity, familiarity with modern equipment and procedures, and acceptance of political authority. The organizational complexity and political sensitivity of peacekeeping operations often demand the highest standards of professionalism. Yet the many differences between armed forces and the varying levels of professionalism between personnel from different nations cannot be ignored. It would be a challenging task to raise the required standards of all those armed forces which will be participating in UN peace operations. This can be addressed through the expansion of the permanent military staff in the DPKO. Moves towards professionalism will not occur without resistance. Governments will have to release some of their best military officers as they are recruited by UN Headquarters for extended careers within the DPKO. The UN must be prepared to offer a challenging and financially rewarding career to these professionals. The Secretary-General has already noted that it is not possible to establish permanent structures with staff on short-term loan from member states. Therefore, career UN soldiers in the DPKO staff are the only realistic alternative.59 Contributions of personnel will also be critical if the UN is to develop effective international training procedures, including a UN Staff College. The recruitment of professional military logisticians would also be a prerequisite for the assembly of a capable UN staff. The problem of information gathering must also be tackled. It will require states to provide information to UN forces which they might not prefer to disclose, and to permit the UN to gather all kinds of data about internal, as well as international developments. This process of professionalizing peacekeeping will have to occur against a wider background of UN reform in the context of the administration and financing of peacekeeping operations. This is a daunting problem. However, military professionalism will offer certain advantages if reformers persevere. It can get things done. Given political will, a clear mandate, and a free hand in its professional sphere, the problem solving capacity of military professionals is significant. Properly used, a military organization can be an effective instrument, even in the most delicate of complex situations. It is incumbent upon UN members to explore this option. The first area of reform required is command and control. In considering reform of command and control within the DPKO, there remains some debate on the resuscitation of the defunct Military Staff Committee(MSC). Some advocates urge that the MSC can provide direction for UN forces, oversee their training, and secure the necessary logistical and financial support from member nations.60 However, the most significant problem with integrating the MSC into peace operations is its UN Charter responsibilities under Article 47. Here the MSC is charged with responsibility "for the strategic direction of any armed forces" under the oversight of the Security Council. Under all foreseeable circumstances, effective MSC oversight is problematic at best, particularly in rapidly evolving situations. Even under optimum battlefield circumstances, the MSC would be in a position to serve as little more than a conduit for progress reports to the Security Council and the Secretary-General.61 The MSC's composition of Chiefs of Staff of permanent and rotating members of the Security Council would do no more "than add an unnecessary extra layer of bureaucracy to the UN".62 Rather than revive a crippled mechanism, the challenge to reformers is to think operationally and analyze the military staff requirements within the DPKO to better prepare for and conduct peace operations.63 There are many areas in which positive change could promote a more efficient and dynamic approach to peace operations. The Security Council must be more accountable to the General Assembly, but not to the extent that it inhibits sensible military operations.64 Restructuring of the Secretariat is required to place all elements associated with peace operations under a single department to facilitate more timely, coordinated planning and management of future missions. Civilian control of the military commitment should be exercised by a Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) responsible for the horizontal coordination of all components, both military and civilian, authorized under the mandate. The SRSG should be involved in negotiations prior to the establishment of the mission. A military planning division comprised of representatives of both Plans and Operations Office and the Resource Office should be responsible for the following tasks: a. determine the military objectives required to achieve the political objective(s); b. decide the force structure required to achieve the military objective(s) within the required time scale; c. develop command structures sufficient to accomplish the strategic direction of the force; d. develop, and advise on changes to, rules of engagement; e. monitor and record the status of national forces available for assignment to UN operations; f. coordinate, process and disseminate strategic intelligence and information; g. prepare and maintain contingency plans for UN military deployments; h. develop standard operating procedures for use in military operations; i. coordinate logistic, financial, and administrative functions in support of UN military operations; j. analyze and collect UN military experience, and develop a core training curriculum to assist member states to train national military and civil personnel in the specialized techniques unique to UN multinational military operations.65 This division must be supported by a staff capable of operating a permanent situation room to monitor all deployed missions, act as the interface between Force Commanders and UN Headquarters, and conduct ongoing staff preparation of likely areas of upcoming UN engagement. This staff could develop SOP, engagement doctrine, and conduct ongoing mission evaluation.66 It must also be capable of deploying splinter staffs to missions in support of Force Commanders. In this role it would complement national military staffs and provide guidance on the application of UN doctrine and assist in facilitating an efficient civilian-military interface. Complementing the command and control reforms would be communications improvements. As with logistical interoperability, communications standardization is also important to force effectiveness within the mission. Many missions are plagued by communications problems caused by unsupervised and uncoordinated set-up procedures implemented by arriving member forces.67 Professional signalers, as part of the DPKO military staff, can play a significant role in preventing this problem by analyzing the mission, terrain, and the force package. The result would be a better understanding of communication requirements prior to mission deployment. This would save the purchase of redundant equipment or high technology gear that is not needed. The communications division of the DPKO should be capable of contributing to the command staff at UN Headquarters and be able to deploy reconnaissance and mission personnel as part of mission staffs. It should also contribute to the instructional staff of the UN Staff College and deployable training teams. UN in-theater procurement systems should be managed by professional military logisticians responsive to the Force Commander rather than by a civilian Chief Administrative Officer. They are better able to recognize the needs of the force, are more adaptable, and are more likely to empathize with the blue helmets on the line than their civilian counterparts.68 These logisticians should be provided from a logistics staff component of the DPKO. Civilians working in the procurement system for the military component should be under command of the Force Commander. A UN staff college should be established to train officers for employment in the DPKO at UN Headquarters and to supplement and standardize the training run by national defense forces. The second area of reform required is the establishment of better UN information gathering procedures. A permanent intelligence staff working within the framework of the DPKO would include both military and civilian personnel recruited from national organizations. Again, this proposal will face opposition from some members. Intelligence preparation in potential areas of UN engagement and in current missions would be conducted by trained UN professionals capable of utilizing the full spectrum of intelligence gathering and processing assets. The concept of UN intelligence is anathema to many nation's security safeguards. The U.S. complaint of UN intelligence negligence in Somalia is a case in point. In order to secure access to member nation's intelligence networks, the DPKO must quickly establish credibility as a responsible user. Improvement would come through the long term employment of professional intelligence analysts and operatives rather than short term seconded personnel. This removes the inevitable objection that seconded personnel would return to their sponsor nation with information useable for the enhancement of their national interests. Further improvement would come through the enhancement and sharing of human intelligence gathered in current missions. This information, when gathered by permanent UN operatives on military staffs in the field would enhance other component intelligence gathering. Trained UN intelligence operatives would have a greater understanding of the types of information necessary to identify trends and triggers in the mission. This information would be pertinent to the success of the mandate's application. It would also analyze and monitor the belligerents' objectives and have a better understanding of the cultural deceptions and manipulations which plagued missions in Somalia and Bosnia. UN intelligence teams would play an important role in ensuring a workable interface with the military component and the inevitable non-government organization (NGO) operating in the mission area. This is a critical link to establish as NGO's are often good sources of information on many subjects.69 However, more often than not, the military NGO interface is soured early through mutual lack of consideration and understanding. Permanent UN staff, trained in this type of operational diplomacy, would significantly enhance the quality of information garnered from NGO's that have been operating in the mission area long before the military turns up. The dissemination of such information throughout the UN force conducting a mission has obvious benefits and goes some way to address the sharing of intelligence issues. At first glance the deal seems decidedly tilted in the UN's favor. But if intelligence exchange with the UN results in better prepared missions, more appropriate mandates, and vastly improved operational and tactical information then surely the investment is well rewarded. An intelligence division within the DPKO would have an organization suited to man and operate cells to conduct staff intelligence preparation at UN Headquarters, to deploy mission intelligence groups to the field, to contribute to both deployable training teams and to the instructional staff on the UN staff college. The next area worthy of attention is that of logistical staff management. The Secretary-General suggests that a pre-positioned stock of basic peacekeeping equipment should be established, so that at least some vehicles, communications equipment, generators etc., would be immediately available.... Alternatively, governments should commit themselves to keeping certain equipment on standby for immediate sale, loan, or donation to the UN when required.70 Should such logistics be made available by nations, the DPKO staff should have professional logistical planners and managers. They must be capable of ascertaining the right amount of UN support required to complement that brought to the mission by supporting members. They must also assume responsibility for contracting for the maintenance of stockpiled equipment--an expensive but necessary task. Military staff officers are likely to better appreciate the need for appropriate equipment and maintenance facilities.71 They can conduct contingency planning and logistics preparation of the mission in better harmony with the main logistical players in the mission area. The logistics staff can develop urgently needed doctrine and standards to address requirements of interoperability of equipment used by the DPKO at UN Headquarters and in the field. It can also teach the comprehensive forecasting and logistical planning considerations for improving political, economic, and operational effectiveness. Finally, these professionals would develop a keen sense for requesting the rejection of member's offers of forces based on their need for substantial logistics support. This would lessen the expensive drainage on limited UN assets. A logistics division within the DPKO would have an organization suited to man and operate cells to conduct logistic appreciation, reconnaissance, stockpiling, and maintenance both at UN Headquarters and in the field. They would also contribute to the UN Staff College and to deployable training and assessment teams. Another significant area of reform already occurring is that of doctrine and training. Many middle powers, as well as several of the major states, have begun to establish schools or courses of instruction designed to better prepare their armed forces for peace operations. In South East Asia, Australia has commenced to operate a UN center, designed to teach lessons learned from their UN peace operations experience. In Northern Europe, Sweden has commenced operating a UN course of instruction to which it invites officers from many nations. The U.S. Army has distributed U.S. doctrine on peace operations and begun to teach the considerations involved in UN operations. These are promising steps reflecting a growing professional commitment to improve. However, there are some concerns that countries are not standardized in their doctrinal approach, and that their cultural and political biases vary the quality of the teaching. Ultimately, incompatibility of procedures can result in a lack of interface, or even conflict, between staff branches within a UN force headquarters.72 The requirement is for a clear definition of the staff procedures to be used and for training to be provided to potential staff officers. This applies to administrative and logistics as well as to operations staffs. The more thought and training given in advance to the nature and requirements of peace operations, the less likely mistakes will be made in the operations themselves. Officers and contingents who do not understand the wider political context of peacekeeping tend to develop negative attitudes toward the very difficult tasks they are asked to fulfill. Those who "persist in comparing peacekeeping to normal military service and who hanker for the use of conventional force are likely to end up frustrated and defeatist."73 For this reason, standardized training and indoctrination in advance of operations is absolutely essential. A positive step in the training direction would be the establishment of a UN Training Center, or Staff College. This would enhance unilateral and combined training of staffs and forces for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. The center would likely be in the U.S., close to UN Headquarters and take advantage of the U.S. base downsizing program for its lodgings. The bulk of the instructional and administrative staff would be professionals from the DPKO. The training offered by this institution would be aimed at three levels. First, a training program for Peace Operations Force Commanders, Senior Political Advisors, and Senior Staff Officers. The syllabus would cover senior level instruction aimed at integrating UN doctrine with geo-political awareness and strategic/operational analysis. Second, a training program for military and civilian professionals, aspiring to become members of the permanent staff of the DPKO. This would be an extensive course covering the full spectrum of emerging UN doctrine, staff procedures, management, and professional integration. Finally, an exportable training program focusing on UN doctrine, staff procedures, information gathering, and military integration at the tactical level. The first two courses would be taught at UN Staff College while the third would be introduced to the evolving structure of national peacekeeping schools in order to standardize their instruction. Extracurricular courses in media management, NGO integration, information gathering, and military integration would also be offered as the College matures. The establishment of a UN Staff College would be challenging and rewarding career for many military and civilian professionals. However, the building and operating of a UN Staff College, and the expansion of the permanent military staff of the UN will not be achieved without significant determination. Two primary factors will constantly dilute efforts to achieve such reform. First, the inherent anti-militarism of the UN bureaucracy is an awesome obstacle to overcome. The General Assembly also, has historically been reticent to adopt military reform. Arguments for the detrimental effect of an expanded military staff will be based on the perceived threat that the military poses to UN impartiality. Opponents will draw on fears that the military instrument will supersede the civilian control of the organization. They may argue that the "immediate" benefits for militarizing the DPKO will result in a focusing of power into the major five states of the Security Council. This power will be available for the advancement of those nation's national interests and not for the general improvement of global security. Champions will also appear to insist on equitable recruitment from member nations rather than an aptitude for the job. This debate will be a challenge to both sides and it remains to be seen if the quest for UN efficiency can outmaneuver the advocates of mediocrity. The second, and most important, obstacle is funding. The financial burden of peace operations is staggering. In the last seven years, the UN annual budget for peace operations has risen from $230 million to approximately $3.6 billion.74 The UN is hopelessly in debt and is a constant source of frustration to the Secretary-General, who must lobby for support for each operation. While the UN and member nations barter over funding systems, and levels of member contributions, it is acutely obvious that a call for significant expansion of the permanent military staff and a new UN Staff College will likely be met with initial incredulity. A permanent military staff, manned and equipped to achieve the capabilities described above, will require a large amount of capital to start. To recruit good people requires an attractive career package offering financial stability, good equipment and a challenging job. This can not be accomplished cheaply. The production of UN permanent staff uniforms and the other paraphernalia that accompanies a military organization will also need to be purchased and managed. Opponents to the expansion will be able to resort to a wide range of short sighted objections. Their challenge will pose the most significant threat to reform of the military staff. It will be a major task to convince member nations that a better staff will inevitably save money. The above analysis has focused on major reform and expansion of the permanent military staff of the DPKO as a viable option in the search for efficiency and professionalism in the UN. This reform will occur on two levels. First, military and civilian professionals will be recruited on a permanent basis to realize the potential efficiency of an energetic military staff. The staff will be fully capable to conduct a wide range of planning and forecasting duties. It will be able to support missions through a standardization of UN procedures and doctrine that it has developed and tested. It will also have the important advantage of cohesion developed among a team of professionals loyal to the credibility of their organization. In addition, it will operate at UN Headquarters and in the field to complement national forces recruited for missions. Importantly, it will not usurp the Force Commander role, but rather act as an advisor, guide, and force multiplier. Ultimately, the staff will become an integral component working toward the achievement of mission mandates wherever they may be. Second, the use of permanent military and civilian UN personnel to establish a UN Staff College will complement the first reforms. The advantages of workable doctrine development, the hard analysis of lessons learned, and the standardization of peace operations training are obvious. The need for these types of instruction is urgent as the global security environment continues to change from a bipolar configuration. Challenges to this reform will be great. The resistance to military expansion in the UN, the initial set up and maintenance costs, and reticence to share intelligence will all provide a fertile field for opponents. It will be a major hurdle to convince the member nations that investment in the intangible improvement offered by an expanded permanent UN military staff can guarantee a significant return in achieving progress in the quest for global security. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION In 1948, the first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, proposed the establishment of a small UN Guard to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The kind of tasks he envisaged for this force were to put an end to factional fighting and to shore up truces decreed by the Security Council. He argued that the force was needed to meet challenges to UN authority and would be a vital component of the organization's methods in dealing with breaches of international peace and security. He hoped that action to create this force would avoid the paralysis of the Charter provisions for military forces that prevailed at the time. However, the Cold War, lack of government support, and lack of imagination conspired to ensure that the idea would remain unrealized. Nearly fifty years later, the idea again took flight as part of a series of proposals made by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. Worried by the inability of the Security Council to enforce its decisions in less conventional military situations, he called for the establishment of a UN rapid deployment force tied to his authority. However, present global trends indicate that the international community is still reluctant to allow the UN to have a permanent army. Member nations are not convinced that a UN army offers significant advantages over the present methods for conducting peace operations. When the operational utility of such a force is analyzed, it is clear that these doubts are justified. Advocates for a UN army are yet to develop a model capable of winning strong political and military support. It is clear that the UN must remain a crucial player in global security. Its credibility, weakened over the last five years, can be bolstered by taking advantage of the trend towards regional collective security. The UN must improve its ability to provide legitimacy to peace operations. It must lead the world in developing and disseminating strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine for these operations. It must be capable of directing mission commanders and providing timely, useable information to assist and guide its operatives. These capabilities can be developed through the adoption of a DPKO military staff organized on functional lines and staffed by permanent UN military and civilian professionals. The advantages gained for command and control, the UN intelligence cycle, logistics management, and the standardization of training for peace operations, are significant. The potential gains outweigh the objections of cost and mercenary stigma. In 1948, Trygve Lie remarked that the establishment of a UN army would have required a degree of attention and imagination on the part of men in charge of the foreign policies of the principal member nations that they seemed unable to give. In 1995, that degree of enthusiasm is still lacking. Instead, the way ahead is to urge further reform in the DPKO. The improvement that a staff of permanent military professionals can provide will strengthen UN credibility. Ultimately, it will help restore political confidence in the only international organization committed to the preservation of global security. NOTES 1Boutros Boutros Ghali, "Peace Making and Peacekeeping for the Next Century," Vital Speeches of the Day 61, no. 11 (March 15, 1995): 322. 2William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York City: Oceana Publications, 1957), 176. 3Frye, 177. 4Frye, 177. 5William H. Lewis, "Peacekeeping: The Deepening Debate," Strategic Review 21, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 30. 6Leland Goodrich, "Efforts to Establish International Police Force Down To 1950," in A United Nations Peace Force, ed. William R. Frye (New York City: Oceana Publications, 1957), 175-179. 7Frye, 176. 8Frye, 197. 9Arthur M. Cox, Prospects For Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), 76. 10Frye, 199. 11Frye, 200. 12Cox, 76-77. 13Frye, 210-212. 14Frye, 214. 15Cox, 74. 16At the initiative of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, William Frye, a respected UN correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, directed the efforts of a group of diplomats, academics, and soldiers in the study of a UN Peace Force. 17Cox, 157. UNEF was established by the General Assembly to monitor a cease-fire along the Egypt-Israel border in November 1956. Ten countries provided up to 6,000 troops. The first UN peace operation by comparatively large scale military forces. 18Cox, 74-75. 19Frye, 91. 20Frye, 113-118. 21Frye, 85. 22Frye, 86. 23Having spent 8 months peacekeeping in the Islamic Republic of Iran I share this concern. Battlefield stress also affects peacekeepers. My research indicates that no UN mission has adequately addressed this problem. Brigadier John Wilson, a former Chief Military Observer (UNPROFOR), has alerted the Australian Government to this deficiency. 24Lincoln Bloomfield served in the U.S. State Department from 1946 to 1957 as a policy planner for UN affairs. In 1964, as a member of the Board of Editors of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he edited a study of international military forces in the role of peacekeeping. 25Cox, 75. 26A wholly original concept for a future global military unit was developed by an unusual military think-tank working for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command between 1978 and 1985. "The First Earth Battalion" was an imaginative concept based on the recruitment and training of a peace force to combat the ravages of war and environmental vandalism. Its author is LtCol. Jim Channon. The concept was published as a draft operations manual titled OM-1 Evolutionary Tactics but was considered too eccentric for general distribution to the U.S. Army. 27The Joint Nordic Committee for military UN matters, The Handbook on Nordic Standby Forces in United Nations Service (Stockholm: UN-department, Army Staff, 1973) is a good example of the detail that the Scandinavian countries devote in the preparation of their military commitment to the UN. 28Lance Morrow, "An Interview: The Man in the Middle," Soldiers for Peace - Supplement to MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 5, no. 1, (Autumn 1992): 26. 29Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992/93): 89. 30 Cathy Downes, "Challenges for Smaller Nations in the New Era of UN and Multinational Operations in Peacekeeping," in Peacekeeping, Challenges for the Future, ed. Hugh Smith (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 13-14. 31Fred Barnes, "Low Priority for UN Peace Operations," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 21, no. 2/3 (August/September 1994): 29. 32Richard Shultz, "Compellance and Escalation Control: The Value of Visible Forward Deployed Forces," Perspectives on Warfighting 2, no. 2 (1992): 8-12. 33Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, (February, 1994): 49-54. 34Shultz, 8-10. 35Joint Publication 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1991). 36Downes, 16. 37David Miller, "Anywhere, anytime: rapid-deployment forces and their future," International Defense Review Special Report, (October 1994): 3. 38Barnes, 28-29. 39Richard N. Haass, "Military Force: A User's Guide," Foreign Policy, no. 96 (Fall 1994): 34-35. 40John F. Hillen, III, "Policing The New World Order: The Operational Utility Of A Permanent UN Army," Strategic Review 22, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 54-62. 41 Lukas Haynes and Timothy Stanley, "To Create a United Nations Fire Brigade," Comparative Strategy 14, no. 1 (January-March 1995): 11-15. Authors propose a typical model based on a brigade sized rapid deployment force in this article. 42Edward C. Luck, "Making Peace," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (Winter 1992-93): 151. 43 Senator Robert Ray, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking - The Challege for the Future," Peacekeeping Challenges for the Future, ed. Hugh Smith (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 175. 44Hans Haekkerup, "Peacekeeping: a Danish perspective," International Defense Review - Defense `95, (1995): 103-106. 45Hillen, 60. 46Haass, 35. 47Hillen, 62. 48Mark Stenhouse, ed., "United Nations peacekeeping operations history, resources, missions, and components," International Defense Review - Defense`95, (1995): 119. 49Stenhouse, 124-125. 50Stenhouse, 121-125. 51The issue becomes a "Catch 22" when the UN spends more to enlarge the force thus enabling members to justify their requests for services based on their increased financial contributions. 52Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Sir Brian Urquhart have both revised their concepts of UN permanent forces since 1992, acknowledging the lack of interest for a UN Army in the General Assembly. 53Haekkerup, 104-106. 54Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," 93. 55David Arnold and Albert Mitchum, "A Note On The United Nations' Best Laid Plans: Now What?" Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 22, no. 11-12 (Nov.- December 1994): 10. 56Hugh Smith, "Challenge of Peacekeeping," Peacekeeping - Challenges for the Future (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 190. 57David Ramsbotham, "UN Operations: The Art Of The Possible," The RUSI Journal, (December 1993): 26. 58LtCol R. Roan, Military Advisor to the U.S. Mission to the UN Headquarters, New York, briefing on DPKO reform to the International Military Students USMC C&GSC, 11 April 1995. 59Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later", Orbis 37, no. 3 (Summer 1993). 60Lewis, 28. 61Lewis, 31. 62Ramsbotham, 26. 63Ramsbotham, 26. 64R.M. Connaughton, "Peacekeeping and Military Intervention," Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper No 3, (1992). 65Admiral Sir James Eberle, "Agenda for Peace: Military Issues," The Naval Review 8, no. 1 (January 1993): 6. 66Robert T. Grey, "Strengthening the United Nations to Implement The `Agenda For Peace'," Strategic Review 21, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22. 67The UN mission to Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG), set up in 1988, is a good example. One of the first components into Iran was a Canadian signals unit. On its own initiative, due to poor UN HQ direction, and with meager equipment, it set up an insecure and flawed communications net. Once the net was established, the unit left the country - its obligation fulfilled. UN Headquarters and the observers were left with a system that never worked capably and was plagued by maintenance difficulties. Author's experience as an observer March 1989 to October 1989. 68Robert L. Ord, "The US Army Approach To Peacekeeping Support Operations," in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future, ed. Hugh Smith (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 143. 69Peter Kieseker, "Relationships Between Non-Government Organizations and Multinational Forces in the Field," in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future, ed. Hugh Smith (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 72-73. 70C.W. Hoffman, Jr., "UN Peackeeping Proposals," in Essays On Strategy II, ed. John N. Petrie (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 65. 71Hoffman, 67. 72J.D. Murray, "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping: Problems and Recommendations," in Peacekeeping - Appraisals and Proposals, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 185. 73Brian Urquhart, "A View From The Operational Center," in Peacekeeping - Appraisals and Proposals, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 173. 74Boutros Ghali, "Peace Making and Peacekeeping for the Next Century," 322. BIBLIOGRAPHY Arnold, David, and Albert Mitchum. "A Note On The United Nations' Best Laid Plans: Now What?" 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