Reserve Support Of Operations Other Than War CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Manpower CONTENTS Executive Summary i Introduction 1 Bottom Up Review 2 Peacetime Operational Missions 5 Peace Operations 8 Composition of Marine Corps Reserve 9 Access 13 Personnel Tempo 19 Annual Training Period 21 Finite Resource 25 Involuntary Mobilization 29 Mobilization Legislation 31 Marine Corps Input 32 Limitations 36 Funding 38 Conclusion 41 Endnotes 45 Bibliography 51 FIGURES Figure 1. Components of the Marine Corps Reserve 10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Reserve support for Operations Other Than War Author: Major Tom Duhs, United States Marine Corps Reserve Research Question: Within the framework of todays Defense budget, there is a disparity between continuing security requirements and available resources. The United States Defense Department continues to maintain a strategy of forward deployed naval forces. This strategy impacts the peacetime personnel tempo, which has been increased due to the downsizing of the Marine Corps force structure. In order for the Marine Corps to maximize the use of all of its resources, the Marine Corps Reserve can be employed to a greater extent, which includes missions not traditionally assigned to Reservists. The Marine Corps Reserve, included as part of the Total Force in Operations Other Than War, can decrease personnel tempo pressure on the Active Component. The Marine Corps Reserve as part of the Total Force can make significant contributions to any Marine Air Ground Task force to which they may be assigned. Discussion: One of the objectives of the Bottom Up Review was for the services to examine ways in which the Reserve forces could contribute to Operations Other Than War and thus reduce personnel tempo (perstempo). For its part, the Marine Corps Reserve offers three ways in which it supports the Active Component and meets these requirements. The first way is to use individual volunteers for various operations, exercises or special projects and pay them with special funds. The second way, is for the Reserve to augment the Active Component with specialized units trained to accomplish specific tasks and missions over their two week annual training period or weekend drill periods. Finally, Reservists could be "mobilized" or "activated" by the President and Congress for a specific amount of time for a specific task which could include Operations Other Than War or other situations where Reserves could be employed. In each of the ways, there are limitations, risks, and costs involved. For example, Reserve volunteers are limited by law to the amount of time in which they can serve on active duty. Additionally, the amount of funding dollars available is "finite" and that limits the number of individuals the Corps is able to pay to serve as volunteers. One solution is to use Reservists for operational commitments, rather than allowing them time to conduct their annual training periods. For a Reservist, time is a crucial factor when considering which option to choose. Specific units trained for specific tasks are usually available for only the two week period. This limit makes it an option of limited utility. Real world crises or operations generally require more than a two week commitment. Another option which maximizes the time available to use the Reserves, is the "mobilization" or "activation" option. The mobilization option carries the political cost which must be shouldered by the president and Congress. Legislation currently exists that allows for adequate time to make the transition from "part-time" to "full-time" status. The Commanding General of the Marine Forces Reserve has offered several suggestions, using both options, regarding possible missions that the Reserve may be able to take over or at least contribute to. In either case consideration of increasing the use of Reservists requires additional funding. Conclusion: The Marine Corps Reserve is capable and should conduct Operations Other Than War as part of larger Marine Air Ground Task Forces. Operations Other Than War are appropriate missions for the Reserve and as part of the Total Force their contribution is essential. Various references agree that the Reserve should be included in Operations Other Than War. Funding considerations will be a side issue when deciding future use of the Reserve for Operations Other Than War. If the decision is made to task the Reserve with Operations Other Than War, funding must be provided. Missions currently executed by the Active Component, such as Great Lakes and UNITAS cruises are examples of assignments which could be transferred completely to the Reserve. However, if the Reserve is assigned additional missions which were previously executed by the Active Component, funding must be commensurate with those new taskings. Nevertheless, the Reserve Component is the key part of the Total Force, especially in Operations Other Than War, to bridge the gap between continuing security requirements and limited resources. By using the Reserves, the Marine Corps can decrease the perstempo of the Active Force. Introduction. Conflicts around the globe continue to involve the Marine Corps in Operations Other Than War. A busy 1994 was an indication of what may be expected in the future. We can surmise that participation in Operations Other Than War will continue as a major source of activity for the Naval forces. The personnel tempo (perstempo) of the Active Component has remained constant and shows no indication of decreasing commitments. The Marine Corps Reserve, included as part of the Total Force in Operations Other Than War, can decrease personnel tempo pressure on the Active Component. Greater reliance upon the Reserve continues to be more prevalent since the Active Component end strength was reduced. Operations Other Than War are viable missions for the Marine Corps Reserve and as such they will be employed as part of a larger Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The current proposal toward increasing the use of the Reserve Component poses both interesting opportunities and serious concerns for the Marine Corps. The Bottom-up Review, and subsequent policy guidance from the Secretary of Defense, recommended Active duty forces transfer completely some missions to the Reserve Components.1 This thesis will examine a few of the current issues that must be considered prior to committing the Marine Corps Reserve to Operations Other Than War, or use as a means of reducing the perstempo of the Active Component. Views from the current and former Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD RA), Ms. Debbie Lee and Mr. Stephen M. Duncan respectively, will be presented to discuss compensating leverage, peacetime operational missions, domestic social problems, limitations and expectations. The Marine Corps position, and various options for increasing the use of the Reserve in order to reduce perstempo will be presented. Finally, existing legislation governing the call-up of Reservists and the composition of the Reserve manpower pool available to carry out additional missions will be discussed. The concluding remarks will show that the Marine Corps Reserve should be included as part of Total Force Operations Other Than War thus decreasing perstempo. BOTTOM-UP REVIEW. Now that the Cold War is over and the threat of global war more remote, the Department of Defense (DoD) through the Bottom-Up Review attempted to determine the following: How do we structure the armed forces of the United States for the future; and, how much defense is enough in the post-Cold War era?2 The review assessed what each of the services brought to the table in terms of capabilities. The forces were then sized based on their capabilities. The size of the active force has been reduced in the "drawdown". Never-the-less, in order to maintain a robust military capability, a new operational concept must be developed. During a time of rancorous debate regarding roles and missions, as well as tighter defense dollars, the Marine Corps must find ways to continue to serve the nation efficiently using all of its available resources. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deborah R. Lee, the concept of "compensating leverage" should signal a greater relative importance for the Reserve Components compared to the past: The Bottom-Up Review was a watershed document for the Reserves that determined that we could and should -- rely more on the Reserves in the future. As a member of the Bottom-Up Review team, I advocate a new strategy for the new era -- a strategy I call "compensating leverage". Compensating leverage means that, instead of reducing the Reserve Components in the same direct proportion as the Active Components, we should look for smart, mission effective ways to use the Reserves to control our peacetime costs and to minimize the risks associated with the active draw down. It also means assigning to the Reserves missions that properly employ their strengths and providing them with sufficient resources so that they can be ready when they are needed. The compensating leverage strategy was accepted under the Bottom-Up Review. The result: we will look even more to the Reserves in the future to help us produce the win/win strategy we envision in the case of two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.3 In the political environment existing today, budgets are austere, the structure of all services has been reduced, programs are being cut, and further changes for the military are in progress. The shrinking defense budget has been a powerful catalyst for Congress and the military to take a close look at the possible savings that may be achieved through increased use of the Reserve Component. The possibility of increased reliance on the Reserve may be unpopular with some in the Active duty military.4 However, there is no disagreement with this concept within the Marine Corps. Increasing the use of the Reserve for operations is completely consistent with Marine Corps philosophy. The Clinton Administration supports a policy of increasing the use of Reservists for peacetime operations. These operations do not demand mobilization for war or national emergency; however, use of the Reserves may be required for unforeseen contingencies. Because of the reductions in the size of the force, the Reserves may be called upon to perform a number of tasks which have previously not been considered within their purview. The Bottom Up Review required the services to examine ways in which Reserves may contribute to Operations Other Than War and to reducing perstempo.5 Congress directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to increase the opportunities for Reservists to serve on Active duty in positions traditionally filled by Active Component personnel. The SECDEF was required to: Review the opportunities for Reservists to serve during peacetime in positions traditionally filled by Active duty personnel and to remove any impediments to this happening. SECDEF was also required to report to the Congressional Armed Services Committees on his plan to increase the use of Reservists in peacetime and on any legislation necessary to increase such opportunities.6 PEACETIME OPERATIONAL MISSIONS. Peacetime operational missions fall under the umbrella of Operations Other Than War, in that they require time, resources, and possibly Reserve personnel to execute. The Department of Defense has been looking for ways to assign reservists to a wide range of "peacetime operational missions and domestic social problems"7. Ms. Deborah R. Lee, commented on her vision of Civil/Military Cooperation for the Reserves. In response to section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-93, pilot programs have been established at sites around the country. We are initially concentrating on three focus areas for potential Civil-Military pilot projects: (1) Education/Job training, (2) Health and Medical Services, (3) Engineering/ Infrastructure,-- programs drawing on the extensive peacetime resources of Reserve members for educational programs for at-risk youth and medical programs for individuals in medically under served areas, as well as providing stewardship for the national infrastructure assets. The idea here has been to leverage our defense resources-- facilities, equipment and personnel-- to address critical needs here at home. And to do so in ways that are fully compatible with wartime readiness. Limited Office of the Secretary of Defense-Reserve Affairs (OSD-RA) funding support is designed to cover incremental costs involved in the planning, coordination and initiation of the pilot projects. The results of these pilot programs are beginning to show and it is indeed gratifying to see how Defense resources can effectively be leveraged to address critical needs here at home. We anticipate that in addition to the existing pilot projects we will have new pilots in fiscal year 1995. At the end of the fiscal year 1994 pilot cycle, we will complete a comprehensive report suggesting how the department should proceed with civil/military cooperation programs for the future.8 Reserves have been called on to be actively involved in efforts to stop "low literacy levels, high unemployment rates, the high numbers of high school dropouts, unavailability of health care, rising crime and drug abuse".9 Although it is unclear as to how the Reserve Component will "stop" these negative tendencies within our society, those deficiencies have been identified as a priority for action under the terms of the Bottom Up Review. Fortunately, the Army and Air National Guard forces will continue as the first line of defense for domestic emergencies.10 As the Marine Corps Reserve gets marginally involved with these problems, training time, which would otherwise be spent on preparation for the conventional warfighting mission, is lost. Efforts, to include Reservists for activities not involving important national security interests, deviate from an important premise upon which the "Total Force" concept was originally based. Former Army Chief of Staff, Creighton Abrams intentionally integrated Reservist into the modern Army's force structure for one reason: To make it very difficult, politically, for a President to use significant military force without calling up the Reserves.11 The question of why we use the military at all in a particular situation should dominate any consideration of the use of Reservists. If the American people have not been persuaded to pay for an active force structure large enough to carry out the number of Operations Other Than War desired by the administration, the solution should not be automatic and frequent activations of Reservists. Activation, movement, billeting and processing of the Reserves costs as much as using the Active forces, whatever the requirement. Rather, what is offered as a peacetime strategy for Reserve employment should be revisited. More courageous and effective political advocacy should be undertaken to persuade the nation at large, including Reservists, their employers and families, that military operations are worth the price paid for them.12 Army and Air National Guard forces are positioned more favorably than others to take advantage of the Civil/Military projects. In order to be competitive for Federal dollars, Reserve Components from all services are attempting to participate in Civil/Military projects. In order for the Marine Corps Reserve to participate in Operations Other Than War or any type of Civil/Military exercise or operation, it must choose between three options or methods. The first is to use individual volunteers from the Reserve. The second is to use Inactive Duty for Training (drill time) or the two week annual training period and third, and least probable, is to mobilize Reservists in order to carry out a specific peacetime task or mission.13 Each choice comes with a price, either fiscal, in readiness, or political. PEACE OPERATIONS. Some examples of how the Guard and Reserve have supported Active forces in executing a broad range of peace operations include the following: While on active duty for training, Reserve units have supplemented Active forces assigned to the Unified Combatant Commands; e.g. medical and engineering assistance in USSOUTHCOM, and USEUCOM's operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Reservists made critical contributions in post-hostility operations in Panama and Kuwait, disaster relief in Bangladesh, assisting displaced Haitians, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and in humanitarian relief efforts in the Cameroon epidemic.14 Units and individual members of the Guard and Reserve have also supported DoD's Military-to-Military Contact programs by providing members to Liaison Teams stationed in Eastern Europe and with contact teams to meet requests of foreign nations.15 Other Guard and Reserve Components have performed contributory support operations joining with the Active Component under the umbrella of the Total Force Policy. The objective of the Total Force Policy is to integrate the capabilities and strengths of Active and Reserve forces in the most cost effective manner possible, and to maintain as small an Active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy and overseas commitments permit. Required military forces are maintained in that component of the Total Force--Active or Reserve-- in which-they can most effectively and most economically accomplish required objectives at an acceptable level of risk.16 Contributory support may be provided as an enhancement of Reserve Component training, (weekend or annual) or as additional voluntary support by Reservist's while on Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW). Reserves are paid only by Reserve dollars unless there is a Presidential call-up. Current examples of Reserve volunteers serving on ADSW include; Marine Reserves serving on a humanitarian mission to Cuba,17 Guardsmen supplementing USAREUR's maintenance force, augmenting Air Mobility Command flight and mainten- ance crews, and providing CONUS air movements for the Navy. Linguistic specialist are frequently used by the Active forces and paid with ADSW funds. Excellent language skills and intelligence resources are part of the valuable expertise residing in the Reserve Component. Individual Reservists routinely contribute to Operations Other Than War as part of Total Force on a daily basis.18 Contributions, such as those mentioned above, show that Reserve participation in Peace Operations are reducing perstempo for the Active Force. COMPOSITION OF MARINE CORPS RESERVE. In order to provide legitimacy to the Total Force premiss, a basic understanding of what and who makes up the Marine Corps Reserve is in order.19 The Ready Reserve is Click here to view image the major source of manpower augmentation for the Active force. The Ready Reserve is the manpower pool which will relieve perstempo and join Active units for Operations Other Than War. It includes Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units, Individual Ready Reserve and Mobilization Training Units. SMCR units are organized, equipped and trained to perform a wartime mission. Members of these units train throughout the year and participate annually in active duty training. Pre-trained individual Reservists include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA's) and members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR generally consists of Marines who have served recently in the Active Component or SMCR and have some period of obligated service remaining on their contract. The majority of the members in the IRR do not participate in Reserve training. The Standby Reserve generally consists of members who have completed their statutory eight-year military obligation and have chosen to remain in the Standby Reserve. Members of the Standby Reserve do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They may be mobilized by authority of Congress.21 Although the majority of the volunteers who augment the Active Component come from the SMCR, many also come from the IRR. SMCR personnel fill a Table of Organization (T.O.) billet within the Marine Reserve Component. These Marines conduct monthly drills and participate in a two week annual training duty once per calendar year. The Individual Mobilization Augmentee is a category within the SMCR program that is currently in place and can serve to fulfill some of the goals of expanding the use of the Marine Corps Reserve, especially war-time expansion. An IMA is an officer or staff non-commissioned officer that, as a Reservist, trains with an Active Component staff during peacetime and fills those same "Battle Staff" functions during war. This program is worthwhile because IMA's are required upon mobilization to augment or backfill when a member of the Active duty staff leaves. These Marines serve on an existing staff, for example; the Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) staff. When a contingency arises the workload increases, consequently, the existing staff incurs additional requirements. The IMA program provides a competent and trained individual which is functional when the need arises, and more importantly, requires no further training. The IMA fills a legitimate role, they train to be functional upon mobilization. The Active Component staff has confidence in the individual because of the long time association that has been built during the Reservists service on the staff. Sometimes the Reservist may be drilling with the staff for two or three years. The continuity that the IMA's bring to the staff is valuable because the Active Component personnel seldom remain in the same position for long, uninterrupted periods of time.22 Although the IMA is not required for the day to day work of the Active staff, he is a trained individual that can be used during crisis times as needed.23 Throughout the Reserve establishment there are many individual Marine Reservists who are counted upon to serve when the Active Component needs additional assistance. These personnel contribute to relieving some of the stress of perstempo. Within the SMCR, there are many outstanding Marines who are called to serve on Active duty, as individuals, when crisis situations require additional manpower. Because individual Reservists are recognized as a valuable resource, they are often asked to serve on Active duty for more than just their required drill and annual training periods. In many instances, Reservists are asked to "volunteer" to work on Active duty and help Active Component staffs when additional manpower is required. DoD policy authorizes the use of IMA volunteers to support contingency operations; however, DoD does not provide additional funding; Individual Reserve volunteers are, and will continue to be heavily relied upon to meet specific requirements. In any case, the method of obtaining the services of Reservist's for missions and tasks such as; Operations Other Than War involve the question of "access". ACCESS. In order to have Reservists participate in Operations Other Than War and decrease perstempo, the question of "How do you get them?" must be addressed. The Marine Corps uses three methods in which it is able access the Reserve; annual training, volunteers, or mobilization. In September 1993, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the "Senior Level Working Group on Accessibility" to identify major issues in accessing Reserve Components.24 Of particular interest are the provisions of law governing access to the Reserve Component. Accessibility is an important variable in planning the Total Force. Access, as it pertains to the length of time Reservists will be available to the Active Component, is important to both the President and to the Active Component Commanders. The President must be concerned about the political ramifications involved in calling up the Reserves while Active Component Commanders are concerned about how soon can they acquire the Reserves and how long can they use them. As DoD prepares to shift peacetime missions of Operations Other Than War to the Reserve, certainty of access must be assured. Access also effects the Active Component as they plan to use Reserve personnel and units for contingencies and other requirements. The assurance of Reserve participation is a major planning factor which will reduce perstempo for the Active Component. Current force structure requires some form of premobilization recall to Active duty of specific units which are critical to deploying the forces. Early access to Reserve "enabling" forces has been raised as a significant issue in every major war game during the last several years. In some cases, it has been "the overarching issue".25 Enabling forces are considered those forces which are resident in the Reserve that the Active Component must have in order to meet its wartime requirements. For example, all of the Civil Affairs Groups and much of the sustainment capability of the combat service support units are resident in the Marine Corps Reserve. Depending on the scenario, a Reserve Component member or unit must be accessible for call to Active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to meet operational requirements. Forward deployed Task Forces, such as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), are not conducive to the employment of voluntary Reservists. Current regulations allow a Reservist to serve on a volunteer basis for 179 days. At the 180 day mark those volunteers count against the total end strength of the Marine Corps. So, peacetime Reserve capabilities can be accessed by either the first or second method.26 (1) The first method is through training periods (drills and annual training). A drill is any continuous four hour period, of which the SMCR/IMA Reservist gets 48 per year. A reservist may accumulate not more than sixty drill periods per year. CMC approval is required for waivers which allow an individual to accumulate over sixty drills in a anniversary year.27 The annual training (AT) duration for SMCR units in MARFORRES is a minimum of 14 days, excluding travel. The Maximum number of days is 19 (excluding travel). Any requests to exceed this limitation must be forwarded via the chain of command to the CMC (RA). In no case will the AT period exceed 30 days.28 Members of the SMCR are required to serve at least one AT each year. Although, the goal of the AT period is to enhance the Reservist's mobilization potential vice serving an Active Component requirement, any employment is permitted as long as it does not exceed the 19 day limit.29 (2) The second method is voluntary, through periods of Active duty other than for training. This voluntary program is commonly known as, [Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) in support of the Active Component (Category IV Program) or CAT IV]. By DoD policy, ADSW tours are normally limited to an aggregate of 139 days or less in any one fiscal year.30 The major issue of concern regarding this option is the inadequacy of funding. Selected Reserve units cannot be counted upon as a source of volunteers. Volunteers can be collected from the Reserve Component and formed into units on an ad hoc basis but, a hodgepodge collection of individual volunteers is not an efficient or logical method of doing business.31 Bringing a Reservist to serve with the Active Component can be done with base support units or combat service support units over a weekend drill period or even a two week annual training duty period. A Marine Corps Reserve infantry unit can make little or no contribution to the Active Component over a weekend. Reserve volunteers could make a contribution but the problem would be to get a Reserve unit to volunteer to serve with the Active duty unit for any period, short of mobilization, longer than the required 15 days for annual training duty. Ad hoc volunteers could be obtained to serve up to the 179 day mark but for missions that require a team approach, a disparate group of volunteers is not the answer. For the Marine Corps, there is a reluctance to depend on a voluntary system, preferring instead the certainty afforded by an involuntary recall of numerous critical Reserve units.32 (3) The third method of accessing the Reserve is by use of mobilization. This method is not for peacetime access. Early in 1994 the DoD proposed a plan to Congress which would expand Reserve Component access in major conflicts and peace operations. Specifically, the DoD sought to provide the Secretary of Defense with, call-up authority which would provide early access to 25,000 Selected Reservists. This plan would have provided access to some Selected Reserve capability early in a crisis.33 However, the recommendation failed to gain Congressional approval. Congress has improved the involuntary call up authority, however, by increasing the time of the call up to 270 days. Increasing the time available for call up will provide sufficient time for Reservists to gear up, train, and participate in a crisis. By increasing the call up time limit, DoD is hopeful the recent change will provide greater Presidential "access" to the Reserves. The conferees, noting the length of time required to train and certify some types of Reserve Component units after mobilization, increased the call-up period and effectively removed one objection to the use of the Reserve in a national emergency.34 This recent legislation passed at the end of the term of the 103rd Congress. Never-the-less, the OASD RA believes Reservists can be used on a voluntary basis to relieve some of the pressure of operational commitments and reduce high personnel tempo within the Active Component. If the services do not come up with plausible methods to increase the use of Reservists, there is always the possibility Congress will make this directive.35 Because of the brisk pace of operational commitments, the Active Component must obtain augmentation from the Reserve Component. Augmentation is defined as "trained and equipped Reserve units, detachments of those units, and/or qualified individual Reservists assigned to Active force commands to bring those commands to the manning required within existing force structure for an operational mission, national emergency, or in time of war".36 The shrinking end strength of the Active Component places the Reserves in the position of being required to take on existing and future commitments. A great deal of attention has focused on the widening gap between the requirements of the Active Component and the resources available to meet ongoing commitments. Stephen M. Duncan, former OASD RA (1987-1993), was critical of several recent proposals by the Clinton Administration. One of the points Mr. Duncan raises is that while the drawdown has significantly reduced manpower, the operational commitments have continued at the same pace as before the Cold War ended. Excessive perstempo, if continued un-abated, could have an adverse effect on the morale of the active forces. As the Reserve contributes to the Total Force and undertakes Operations Other Than War issues such as; funding, methods of access, availability of units, and volunteers must be addressed. Mobilization promises to be the surest method of obtaining Reserve participation for Operations Other Than War. All three methods used to access the Reserves provide the means by which perstempo will be reduced. PERSONNEL TEMPO. Recently, Marines have experienced first hand how stressful the perstempo can be. The amount of deployed time for Marines is at a high level. Record amounts of time away from the family causes morale problems and could eventually drive people out of the service. An example of the rigorous schedule performed by Marines is provided by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The 24th MEU conducted a Mediterranean deployment, or had been at sea in a support role, in Somalia and in Bosnia. They recently came home after six months at sea. The typical procedure would have been for the unit to receive a ten-day stand down period. In essence, they would be given a break, time to spend with their families. After a ten day stand down, the unit would spend time at their home base working and training and going through the post deployment activities which accompany any six month deployment. Halfway through the first ten days home, the units were re-assigned to ships and sent to Haiti because there was an insufficient number of Marines to cover contingencies abroad.37 The example of 24th MEU is becoming more common for Fleet Marines. For first term Active Component Marines, there isn't much time spent at home. The stress of perstempo is real. During the first four years of obligated service, the average Marine will be deployed 45% of the time during the first year. He will be deployed 27% of the time the second year, 20% during the third year and during the fourth year he will be deployed 22% of the time. In September 1994, the Marine Corps had 25% of the operating forces deployed worldwide. For example; 28,928 Marines, 10 of 24 Infantry Battalions, 10 of 30 Helo Squadrons, 6 of 23 Fixed Wing Squadrons were deployed.38 With deployments at such a high rate, the Marine Corps Reserve must contribute in a manner which will decrease the perstempo of the Active forces. Use of individual volunteers is one option. Another option is to use Reservists during their two week annual training period for operational missions. The two week annual training periods are planned in advance and require no additional outlay of funds. This option is cost effective and if planned with sufficient lead time could produce excellent results. Although this option is not illegal, it is not what the training period was designed to accomplish. When this option has been used it was criticized. The former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Mr. Duncan, was critical of using the two week annual training time for anything other than Reserve training. ANNUAL TRAINING PERIOD. Mr. Duncan raises a counter argument to using, method one, the Reserves annual training periods. He makes the point in his opposition to Pentagon plans which use limited Reserve training funds and training time for "contributory" peacetime operational missions. He was opposed to using the Reservist's two week annual training period to conduct peacetime operations.39 The reason for Mr. Duncan's criticism, had to do with how the Reserves received funding for Peacetime operations. Peacetime operations conducted by Active forces, are funded from Active Component funds. Peacetime operations conducted by Reservist's, even though they are receiving training, should be funded from the Reserve Component. Active Component funds can cover operations and maintenance type expenditures; however, pay and allowances still must come from Reserve Component funds. Reserve funding for pay and allowances is not available for additional operations outside of scheduled training periods. Reserve annual training can support Operations Other than War when the mission assigned to the Reserve unit is consistent with its warfighting mission. In order to integrate with the Active forces quickly and effectively, the Reserve unit's training must be as realistic as possible. Training must support unit mission requirements. Appropriate use of Reservist's training period, as a peacetime operational mission, might be the assignment of military police units to provide external security such as for Cuban and Haitian migrant camps at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Conducting military occupational skill (MOS) specific kinds of missions, for a special type unit, would serve the dual purpose of training the Reservists and at the same time provide some relief to Active Component perstempo. The use of organizations entirely unsuited for a particular assignment, yet filling in during their annual training period, may raise some opposition. Members of units performing assignments inconsistent with their warfighting mission would be most opposed to using the two week annual training duty period for Operations Other Than War assignments. In the view of some, this practice could degrade readiness. Some might argue, using the Reservists annual training time for the performance of peacetime operations contradicts the purpose of conducting annual training. Annual training is a time for the unit to practice for the wartime mission as a "team". Additionally, the annual training period can be used to obtain Military Occupational Skill (MOS) training and qualification. The annual training period is the unit's most important evolution of the year. Annual training is the culmination and focus of the previous twelve months of drill periods. The monthly drill periods are used for planning, practice, coordination, and training which reaches the decisive point during the two week annual training period. If, for example, an infantry unit substitutes something else for combat training, essential combat training will be postponed for a full year during which readiness will decline without an opportunity to recover. The notion that training for important combat missions can be universally accomplished merely by performing other operational activities is overly optimistic. Sending Reservists to Haiti to "enhance democracy" or for "nation- building" is fine for members of Civil Affairs Groups, or Civil Engineers or similar units. But, nation-building is not the same as training for a Desert Storm type of "come- as-you-are" major regional conflict. Specific units are staffed, equipped and manned for a given function and mission. If an opportunity to participate in an Operation Other Than War presented itself and the training, person- nel, and capability of a Reserve unit fit the requirement, then including the Reserves should be considered. Expanding the use of Reserves is the requirement and desired goal. Normally, the two week training period should be used preparing for the missions the unit was designed to perform. However, all Reserve units must be readily adaptable to new roles and missions which they may be assigned in todays new Total Force environment. With adequate lead time, planning, and scheduling Reservists could be assigned with Active Component units to Operations Other Than War. Reservists could be part of a Marine Air Ground Task Force during their two week annual training period. If this kind of scheduling were to take place the Active Component would obtain relief from perstempo and the Reserve could be committed to Operations Other Than War. Units with missions similar to the task assigned would be able to provide the most qualified personnel. Under the Total Force concept, the Reserve should participate alongside the Active Forces and this arrangement would benefit both Components. FINITE RESOURCE. Under the Total Force Concept, equal partnership includes investing the time and commitment to the Marine Corps as the Reserve participates in Operations Other Than War. As planners consider expanding the use of the Reserve, consideration must be given to consequences that may come about because of increased taskings. Reservists are citizen soldiers, that is they are primarily citizens. They have career, education, and family demands as well as military demands. Marine Corps Reservists serve with pride and their record during Desert Shield/Storm was a huge success. However, that was a national emergency where the Reserve served in the specific capacity for which they were trained. Operations Other Than War represent something short of mobilization for a major conflict. Participating in Operations Other Than War, where practicing and preparing for the warfighting mission is not accomplished, causes some Reservists to think twice before leaving their homes and businesses. When dubious military commitments intrude into the private lives of Reservists, the outgrowth can be increased friction in families and resentment among civilian employers. The Chief of the Air Force Reserve has speculated that the problem is driving their people to the "breaking point".40 The consequence of increasingly frequent intrusions into the lives of the Reservist must be considered. The Reserve is a "finite" resource that cannot be abused without some expectation of adverse effect. The policies suggested by DoD as a means of increasing the use of Reserves to reduce perstempo and conducting Operations Other Than War must be weighed and carefully planned out. The consequence of using method number three, the mobilization option, may be that some Reservists just call it quits and retire, drop out of the IRR, or not re-enlist. If the individual perceives that his or her service is not valued or is misused, chances are they will leave the Reserve. In today's environment of the Total Force, the Reserves may now be used in roles and missions that were never before contemplated. The most recent example of new roles and missions for the Reserves, involves their use in Haiti. In September 1994, President Clinton signed an Executive Order authorizing the "involuntary" activation of as many as 1,600 Reservists for nation building efforts in Haiti. "Civilian officials deny that the military is being turned into a social-welfare agency, but they have also proudly announced plans to have Reservists repair housing, restore the environment, build a pier for fishing vessels in an economically depressed fishing community, dig wells, and survey the safety of dams and airport runways".41 Conducting Operations Other Than War is a shift away from the traditional way in which the military has been employed during the past fifty years. Shifting emphasis from preparing for warfighting to peacekeeping operations requires a change in priorities. In Mr. Duncan's opinion, the proper use of the Reserves includes the following three examples:42 a. Serious crisis. Mobilization when serious crisis threaten the nations security. Under the Total Force concept, the Reserve Component provides a framework in which each Reserve unit maintains its capability to make that short-notice transition to mobilization status, to deploy, and to meet operational challenges across the potential spectrum of conflict. b. Volunteers with special skills. Increased reliance even in peacetime on "selected Reservists" who have special skills and volunteer for additional assignments. All services are attempting to develop some shift of responsibility from Active to Reserve individual volunteers. In situations where Reserve volunteers could fulfill known requirements, there still exists detrimental built-in delays. For example, time delays include; the mandatory advertising process for volunteers, (This process requires message traffic from higher headquarters, which notifies commands of the opportunities for Reserve volunteers to participate in operations and exercises.) Reservist's responses to the solicitations, command selection of best qualified applicants, administrative issuance and transmittal of orders and delays in reporting. If these encumbrances are not considered serious and the gaining command is willing to wait the three to twelve days for the volunteer, the use of volunteers has merit. However, there are few critical requirements that allow for time delays. Basic to any use of Reserve capability is the ability to compensate Reservists who perform Active duty beyond normal drill and annual training. In as much as a Reservist performing Active duty cannot generate civilian income, volunteers are available only to the extent that funding is available to provide an off-set (if often at a reduced rate) income.43 c. Collateral Missions. Where Reservists can be effectively trained for their combat missions by activities that have collateral benefits. For example; an infantry unit fighting forest fires can be used as a time to build teamwork, cohesion, and esprit. Although conducting these types of operations may be useful for some types of units, it might be a stretch to consider it beneficial for all. Although the Reserve is a finite resource they are part of the Total Force. Mr. Duncan's counter argument limits the circumstances by which Reservists may be used. Since Operations Other Than War are legitimate missions the Reserve should participate. The following are examples of where Reserve participation helped to relieve perstempo; Artillery units have been used recently to guard refugees in Cuba. Military Police units assigned in Haiti is another good example where Reservists have contributed directly to the mission and derived maximum training benefits at the same time. INVOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION. The last and least probable means of obtaining Reservists to serve in Operations Other Than War is by the use of involuntary mobilization, method number three. Since its inception, the Marine Corps Reserve has been mobilized four times for the major conflicts of this century. They include:44 (1) World War II, 68 percent of the Marine Corps' total strength was Reserve. Almost all of the 10,000 Marine Aviators who served were Reservists. (2) Korea, Over 85,000 Reservists were called to Active duty. (3) Vietnam, Although no national mobilization took place, several USMCR elements were involuntarily mobilized to Southeast Asia and served with distinction. (4) Persian Gulf War, 31,172 Reservists were mobilized. The future range of situations in which the Reserve Components may be required include: Wars and contingency operations.45 In the case of unambiguous threat to vital U.S. interests, there is little question that Reserve units and individuals would be ordered to active duty without their consent. The only problem in accessing Reserve Components in these situations would be early in a crisis, when the full nature of the threat could be ambiguous yet some Reserve augmentation would still be needed. Domestic emergencies. The Army and Air National Guard in each state can be ordered into service for state missions by the Governor. The issue of employing Federal resources in a domestic emergency, and access to Reserve Components other than the Guard for these missions, is relevant only if the available Guard capabilities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance is requested. Peace operations. The situation in which Reservists are activated for peace operations will depend on a variety of considerations such as; the nature of the operations, Reserve capabilities required, or other military operations underway. The major issue for consideration will be, "is it politically advisable to order Reservists to Active duty without their consent in order to carry out a peace operation?" The Marine Corps Reserve exists to augment, reinforce,and reconstitute the Active Component. It is unlikely that Marine Reserves will be used separately from the Active duty Marine Corps. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Marine Corps Reserve will be used for domestic emergencies, or peace operations unless they are part of a larger, Marine Air Ground Task Force. MOBILIZATION LEGISLATION. Serious discussion of using the Reserve for Operations Other Than War must include the legal authority which would require their services if activated. Previously, the Reserve role was to mobilize both support and combat forces, and to deploy them quickly. As a result, Congress expanded the authority given to the President to order Reserve units to active duty without their consent by the passage of Title 10 USC 673b in 1976, and amendments in 1980 and 1986. During this period, the major role of the Reserve Component in lesser contingencies was in airlift, refueling, and air defense. There was little doubt about access to the Reserve Component following enactment of Section 673b. In the event that the armed forces would require access to the Reserve Component, provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code provide the legislative authority.46 The call-up authority accomplishes two things. It provides required forces and signals our intent and national will. Under Base Force end-strengths, the deployment of significant portions of the Active Component will create a requirement for individual fillers that exist due to the fact that the deployment took place. Specific units required by the Active Force will be called up early in a mobilization. Other Reservists are required early in the mobilization process to set up receiving stations. The scope of this will vary with the individual services and how much dependence they have placed on the supporting establishment and the individual Reservists to meet the wartime requirements of the operating forces. The forces (i.e. the "mix" of units and individuals) needed are determined by the events taking place. Deploying contingency forces creates a need for units (CSS units needed for sustainability) and individuals (the supporting establishment having been depleted of individuals to make up operating force manning shortfalls).47 Some of the Reserve Components mobilize their forces by echelon. The Marine Corps policy differs, in that all Reserve units are ready to mobilize immediately, whereas other Reserve Components are given a period of time to prepare for mobilization. MARINE CORPS INPUT. In order to provide input to the SECDEF and to comply with the spirit and intent of the DoD guidance, the Marine Corps has an obligation to provide innovative solutions for the requirements described in the Bottom Up Review. With the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) shrinking from 123,000 during the Persian Gulf War to 107,000 in FY 1995, the Marine Corps is searching for ways to use the Reserves more than had previously been required. The "need" is probably more than can be realistically met by the Reserve. The net loss of 16,000 Marines represents a loss that cannot be made up in total by Reserves. The manpower loss is the equivalent to 5,840,000 mandays of Reserve service per year. However, Marine Forces Reserve can make a significant contribution. They are able to augment and reinforce the Active Component across the spectrum, from Operations Other Than War to major conflict. The Marine Reserve will be part of a Marine Air Ground Task Force participating in joint operations. When a requirement arises for the nation to call on the Marine Corps all contact between the Reserve Component and warfighting Commander-in-Chief (CINC) is through the Service Component Commander. In other words, if a CINC required a force of Marines, he would receive a MAGTF, most likely a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) which will be part of a larger joint and/or combined force. Our current strategy and warfighting doctrine prefers that all future U.S. military operations will be joint efforts. The Marine Force provided will be integrated with Active and Reserve Component forces, not separate Reserve Component forces. The Commandant of the Marine Corps will provide a total force to meet the CINC requirement through the Service Component Commander.48 This concept is absolutely consistent with the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve. "The Mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to provide trained and qualified units and individuals to be available for active duty in time of war, national emergency and at such other time as the national security may require."49 The Commanding General of the Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) Major General James E. Livingston offered several solutions which focus on relieving some of the stress of high perstempo. Major General Livingston's suggestions offer solutions as to how the SMCR may be involved with Operations Other Than War by augmenting Active Marine Forces. Any augmentation of the Active Force will help to reduce perstempo. In order to participate there will be major challenges for the Marine Corps Reserve of the future. The first challenge will be to weave SMCR units more seamlessly into the fabric of the Total Force. In order for the Active Component to have confidence in the Reserve force, they must cross-train together as much as possible. Working together, in order to "seamlessly integrate" an effective team, is relevant and appropriate use of the Marine Corps Reserve Component.50 The second challenge, for the Marine Corps Reserve, will be to concentrate on augmentation and reinforcement of active MEF's for the future. This goal can be accomplished through coordination and planning. One way Reserves have moved toward increased integration is by progressively expanding the scope of participation in MAGTF exercises. In order for the Marine Corps to implement this policy, the Commanding General, MARFORRES Major General Livingston suggests the Reserve can relieve Active Component exercise perstempo with longer range planning (12-18 month lead) and provision of JCS overseas travel funds. He believes the Reserve is a willing player if the exercise training is meaningful and maintains combat readiness. Major General Livingston further suggests, as an example, that the Reserve Force Service Support Group (FSSG) can augment, reinforce or take the lead in some operations such as; Maritime Pre- positioned Force (MPF) offload operations. Reserve aviation squadrons could serve 30 day tours relieving the Aviano (Bosnian deployment), and our ground, and Combat Service Support (CSS) could perform a significant portion of our yearly requirement for the Great Lakes and UNITAS cruises. Individual Reserve personnel could fill Joint, MARFOR, and MAGTF staff assignments. In the supporting establishment, the Reserves could provide structure and manning for classroom instructors, flight instructors, maintenance personnel and Base/Station staff. Reserve aviators could be assigned to Active squadrons as the Navy and Air Force have. Reserve aviators could substantially man our overall Marine Corps support aircraft requirement (C-9's, C-12's, C-20's, etc.).51 Because all of these operations have attendant costs, a decision would have to be made as to where the additional Reserve funding would come from. The effect of Major General Livingston's suggestion was that the Active Marine Forces would explore possible areas where Reserve force units could be properly integrated. The ultimate goal of the "Total Force" concept included the "seamless integration" of the Reserve Component with the Active Component. In order to accomplish Major General Livingston's goals and carry out additional assignments, the Reserve Component is finding the most appropriate opportunities in which the spirit and intent of the new guidance may be accomplished. Certainly, the drawdown of the Active Component has had a significant influence on the expanded use of the Reserves. In addition to using the SMCR units as proposed by Major General Livingston, implementation of the new policy guidance may be accomplished by the expanded use of some other Marine Corps programs as well. The structure of the Marine Corps Reserve, represents the "Reserve of the Force- in-Readiness", an entity which serves to reinforce, augment or reconstitute the "Force-in-Readiness". Under the umbrella of the "Total Force" the role of the Marine Corps Reserve will continue to serve a reinforcement, augmentation, reconstitution role 52 LIMITATIONS. Policy makers who put forward suggestions which call for Reserve volunteers to take on expanded roles and missions must consider other key factors such as; funding limitations and regulatory restraints. The Marine Force Reserve welcomes and supports additional funding and increased use of the Reserve Component. Additional funding authorized by Congress for Reserve Component ADSW would increase access to the Reserve by the Active Component. Additional funding should come under the condition that these monies are additive to Marine Corps Total Obligational Authority (TOA).53 It may be questionable as to whether or not Reserves cost less money than the Active Component. When funds are taken away from the Active Component and given to the Reserve Component in order to reduce perstempo, there is little savings.54 At the beginning of the drawdown, policy makers believed that by cutting Active forces, monetary savings could be obtained by placing a greater reliance on the Reserves. However, more reliance on the Reserves has come with additional costs. In addition to the normal pay and allowances, additive monetary costs include; travel costs, training, medical costs, as well as dependent care. When the costs are tallied up the amount of savings accrued by enlisting the services of the Reserves is insignificant.55 An additional impediment to expanded use of Reserves has been the regulatory restraints imposed by various policies, orders and instructions. These often place limits such as; 139 day limit at which time a Reservist rates Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and 179 day limit at which time a Reservist counts against Active Component end strength.56 In order to stay within the law, which requires remaining under the authorized end strength of the Marine Corps, Reservist may not serve more than 179 days on active duty in a given year. The question for Marine Corps planners is, how to most efficiently use the funding allotted? The choices are; Active Component Forces with a higher perstempo, or using Reserves on a continual basis to fill in on exercises and Operations Other Than War. DoD guidance seems to indicate that the Reserves will be used to a greater extent than ever before. The Marine Forces Reserve does not support unnecessary involuntary activation of the Reserve Component in peacetime, except for National or Civil emergency. The potential hardship to Reservists and the resulting negative impact could cause the loss of valuable manpower necessary for the primary wartime mission. The exceptions should be only if that capability exists exclusively within the Reserve, and at the onset the Reserve member fully understands the possibility of mobilization and extended periods of service on Active duty. (i.e. CAGs)57 Regardless of cost efficiency, decisions have been made that force the services to place more commitments with the Reserve Components. FUNDING. If Congress determines more use of the Reserve is required, funding will be provided. However, at this time, DoD initiatives to increase employment of Reserves for peacetime requirements are inadequately funded. The Marine Corps cannot afford to internally increase ADSW funding at the expense of other appropriations; Therefore, in order to support new requirements, the Marine Corps requires funding beyond the Marine Corps Total Obligation Authority. From FY 1992 through FY 1994, the Marine Corps has consistently overexecuted its ADSW program. Most recently, FY 1994 was budgeted at $0.8M, and executed at $1.8M. The aggressive execution of this program has been consistently constrained by prevailing fiscal realities.58 One example of how the ADSW program is aggressively executed is through the use of IMA's for contingencies. Current Marine Corps policy provides that IMAs may be used to support contingency operations. This policy allows for funds to return IMAs to voluntary Active duty in connection with their IMA billet responsibilities.59 When circumstances are such that require the services of individual volunteers, Force commanders have a ready pool to call on. Force commanders manage their own separate, discretionary ADSW accounts and have additional funds available from Headquarters Marine Corps, Reserve Affairs. The Reserves can contribute to Active Component perstempo reduction; however, even with unlimited funding the Reserves are no panacea to high levels of Active Component perstempo resulting from cuts in Active Forces with no corresponding decrease in operational and training commitments.60 Prior to receipt of Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) or Partial Mobilization authority, Reserve volunteers on Active Duty Special Work orders are the only alternative to meet augmentation requirements. DoD policy authorizes the use of IMA volunteers to support contingency operations, however, funding is not provided. There is no money to pay for Reserve volunteers before PSRC is authorized. Therefore, all pay and allowances will be borne by existing Reserve Military Personnel Marine Corps (RMPMC) and Reserve Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps (RO&MMC) funds. Absorbing costs associated with Reserve volunteers may require fiscal programming at the expense of existing validated programs. While the notion of expanding the use of the Reserves has great merit, costs associated with doing so are presently prohibitive. The Marine Corps cannot support any position that advocates funding such an endeavor through offsets to existing manpower programs.61 The Marine Corps has little fiscal flexibility. Sixty- Nine per cent of the TOA pays for manpower entitlement. Therefore, the Total Force Marine Corps cannot afford to internally increase ADSW funding at the expense of other appropriations. Additive funding would further enhance ADSW support, but in this era of dramatically reduced fiscal options and tough resource decisions we must live with less.62 CONCLUSION. The Marine Corps Reserve is capable and should conduct Operations Other Than War as part of larger Marine Air Ground Task Forces. Operations Other Than War are appropriate missions because the Marine Corps Reserve is part of the Total Force and their contribution is essential. Prudence would dictate that training for Operations Other Than War makes sense from a practical point of view because the likelihood for future employment in this arena is high. Certainly, there are many skills that are interchangeable between traditional warfighting and executing Operations Other Than War. Units such as; CAG's, Engineer's, CSS and Air units can make a contribution and are available for service with the Active Component. These types of units, with special qualifications, can easily assimilate with Active Component forces for Operations Other Than War. Regardless of whether the missions or skills are interchangeable or not, the Reserves must expand into new roles. The Reserve is able and willing to augment, reinforce, and contribute as an equal partner of the Total Force. In order to be an equal partner Reserves must practice and train so that they can effectively meet the requirements of all assigned missions across the spectrum of conflict. The purpose of the practice and training is to accomplish the "seamless integration" with the Total Force and to build a capable, competent, and credible Reserve. Seamless integration means the transition of an individual Reservist or unit (of whatever size) into the Active Component, with no discernable difference in capability or performance between the individual or unit and regular counterparts. If a national emergency is such that Reserve augmentation is required, then the SMCR individuals and units must be able to execute missions regardless of type. Relieving the stress of high perstempo for the Active forces is another assignment that the reserves must embrace, as a new role. The Active and Reserve Component should be integrated for the major exercises around the globe. Long lead times and meaningful realistic assignments for the Reserves would help accomplish the "seamless integration" concept that is desired today. A close working relationship between the Active and Reserve Components can only build trust and confidence between the two forces. Additionally, Headquarters Marine Corps should assign specific exercises to the Reserve Component. When decisions are made that transfer completely some missions to the Reserve Component, funding must be provided over and above the Marine Corps TOA. The decision to use Reservists for Active Component missions will have to be paid for somehow. That funding should not come out of Active Component allocation but rather should be budgeted for during the POM and apportioned to the Reserve. Funding considerations will be a side issue for any decision regarding future use of the Reserve. The bottom line is: If Congress decides more use of the Reserve is required, funding must be provided. Future planners considering the use of the Reserve should conduct a follow-up investigation that allows for adequate funding and increased use of the Reserve Component. Undoubtedly, the Marine Corps of the future will place heavier reliance on the Reserve. Reduced force structure will require increased use of the Reserve for contingencies, especially Operations Other Than War, even though those contingencies are perceived to be less than a national emergency. Follow-up research might center around frequent activations or mobilizations. What would be the impact on the Reserve Component if the President activated units such as, a battalion or squadron for one year at a time? Because the force has been downsized and commitments remain constant, the President may have no choice but to mobilize units for extended periods. If funding limitations continue into the next century, the Reserve Components will have to be used with greater frequency and differently than they are now. It might be interesting to forecast public reaction to frequent Reserve call-ups. How would mainstream America react to frequent intrusions into the lives of Reservists? How would the Reserve Component react? Perhaps, if the Reservist's were to be on Active duty for one year at a time, the entire ethos of the Reserve Component might change. Research into such a topic might indicate what changes may come about in the future. Regardless of what the forecast for the future may be, there will be interesting opportunities and innovative solutions advocated by both the Active and Reserve Components of the U. S. Marine Corps. ENDNOTES 1. Deborah R. Lee, Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces in the Post-Cold War World, DRAFT, Department of Defense, 19 October 1993. 2. Ibid. 3. Colonel Eric L. Chase and Lt. Col. Douglas Stone, The Next Generation: Marine Corps Reserve Vision 2000., "Reserve Concepts and Issues." 21. 4. Terrance O'Connell, "Looking for more Action," Navy Times, 19 Dec. 1994. Focus on the Reserve; 5. CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP-O// TO ALMAR 161/94. (UNCLAS) subject: "Readiness Terminology" 271100Z May 94. Ms. Lee, Congressman Talent, and others have used the terms "Operational Tempo and Personnel Tempo" interchangeably in their writings. I have used the definitions provided in ALMAR 161/94 as the standard throughout the thesis. The following definitions provided in the ALMAR are germane. A. OPTEMPO: Level of Operations and Training over time. Common measurements include Flight hours, Track hours, Ship steaming days, Rounds of ammunition etc. B. DEPTEMPO: Percentage of time in a given annual period that a unit, or element of a unit, supports operations or training away from its home base, or station for a period greater than (10) consecutive days. C. PERSTEMPO: Percentage of time in a given annual period, that an individual supports operations and training away from his barracks, home base or station for a period of time greater than twenty-four (24) hours; To include unaccompanied FMF duty assignments and TAD. 6. Lt. Col. Stephen P. Anderson, AUS (Ret.), The Officer, Legislative Update, September 1994. 7. Deborah R. Lee, Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces, Department of Defense, 18 April 1994, 5. 8. Deborah R. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services Force Requirements and Personnel Subcommittee in connection with National Guard and Reserve Programs. "oral version", 23 March 1994. 7. 9. Ibid. 10. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, June 1994. 2. 11. Stephen M. Duncan, "A Reservists training isn't for social welfare," Navy Times, 26 Dec. 1994. Focus on the Reserve. 20. 12. Ibid. 13. RAP-24 Headquarters Marine Corps, Information Paper, 941026, "Employing Reserves for Peacetime Active Component Requirements". 14. MSgt. L.P. Cabal, "Understanding the Cubans", Continental Marine, Jan-Feb 1995/Vol. 18,No.7; 12-13. 15. RAC-7 Headquarters Marine Corps, Trip Report, 940919, "Joint Contact Team, Transition Coordination Conference", Stuttgart, Germany, 14-15 Sept. 94. 16. The Reserve Components of The United States Armed Forces, 9. 17. MSgt. Cabal, 12-13. 18. Deborah R. Lee, Accessibility, 7-9. 19. See, Figure 1. for a wire diagram of the Ready Reserve. 20. Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual (MCRAMM), MCO P1001R.1G. Department of the Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps. 1 May 92. 21.Marines, Almanac 95, January 1995, Special Edition. 21. 22. Maj. C.W. Murphy, Reserve Affairs Policy Branch, interview by author 9 Dec 1994. 23. Author unknown, "Positive Deployment 95" Position Paper, undated. Potential supporting establishment augmentation requirements are identified in the 130 "Wartime Tables of Organizations" ("W" T/O's). These T/O's currently authorize 2784 IMA's 6711 pre-assigned IRR's and 2026 pre-assigned retirees to enhance the supporting establishment's ability to support the warfighting needs of deploying Marine Expeditionary Forces. 24. Lee, "Accessibility", i. 25. Capt. John M Kirby USN "Reserve Accessibility" working notes to the Reserve Affairs Policy Section at Headquarters Marine Corps. 1. 26. RAP-24, "Employing Reserves for Peacetime Active Component Requirements", Information Paper, 26 Oct 1994. 27. MCO P1001R.1G. (MCRAMM), 4-17. 28. Ibid. 29. OSDA/RA Meeting on 20 May 94. RAP OIC, Lt. Col. Heidenthal attended and provided this note to BGeneral Berkheiser and Col Sexton. "Section 672b; DoD's General counsel has interpreted 672b as providing authority for use of the Reserve Component on operational missions as well as for Active Duty for training. However the 15 day limit clearly still applies." 30. MPP-63 Headquarters Marine Corps, Point Paper. 940803 "Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) in support of the Active Component" (Category IV Program.) p.1-2. The ADSW (CAT IV) Program is funded through the Military Personnel Marine Corps (MPMC) appropriation for pay and allowances, and the Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps (O&MMC) short tour appropriation for travel and per diem. The Policy during Peacetime is as follows; (1) Reserve personnel must provide a unique talent or expertise that is not readily available in the inventory of active duty Marines, by Government Service employees, or when civilian contractor service is considered to be cost prohibitive, not cost effective, and/or untimely. (2) The ADSW (CAT IV) Program may not be used to. alleviate manpower shortfalls, augment active duty staffs, create a position which duties are those required to enable or enhance day-to day operations, or to improve manning of a table of organization (T/O) by filling a vacant billet (e.g., billets left vacant due to a permanent change of station, temporary active duty, or a result of military or civilian judiciary actions. (3) By DoD policy, ADSW tours are normally limited to an aggregate of 139 days or less in any one fiscal year (because of the PCS vice TAD rule). Exceptions may be granted by CMC. Short breaks in tours (30 days or less) to circumvent this requirement are not authorized. Although there are four additional paragraphs to the Peacetime policy regulations these three are the most important for this narrative. The Policy for Operations Short of Mobilization or PSRC are as follows; (1) New DoD policy provides for the use of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) to support contingency operations. ADSW may be used to return IMAs to voluntary active duty in connection with their IMA billet responsibilities. (2) CMC (MP) may, upon receipt of PSRC or partial mobilization authority, modify ADSW orders to reflect involuntary recall. The CAT IV program allows the Marine Corps to tap into a pool of individuals who have special skills or experience and who are available to meet short-fuzed requirements. In addition, it is the only means available to the CMC to bring Reservists on active duty to meet operational requirements short of mobilization or PSRC. 31. Lt. Col. Heidenthal, D.P., Reserve Affairs- Policy (RAP) "Increased use of the Reserve Components in total force missions." Talking points. 29 Sept 1994. 32. Kirby, "Reserve Accessibility". 33. Lt. Col. Stephen P. Anderson, AUS (RET). 7. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Roles of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve., Mobilization Summary, Volume II (MPLAN). Paragraph 1401.A. 37. Congressman James M. Talent (R-MO.) "Hollowing Out American Armed Forces", The Officer, Sept. 1994, 31-32. 38. General C.E. Mundy, "Marine Corps Presentation on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces", Briefing to Marine Corps University Students, Quantico, VA. 26 Oct 1994. 39. Stephen M. Duncan, 20. 40. James M. Talent, 31-32. 41. Stephen M. Duncan, 20. 42. Ibid. 43. Lt. Col. S.F. Tremel, "Talking Points", 4 Aug 1994. 44. The Reserve Components of The United States Armed Forces, 33. 45. Title 10 USC 101 (a) (13) defines a contingency operation as "a military operation that (A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or (B) results in the call or order to, or retention on Active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 672(a), 673, 673(b), 673(c), 688, 3500, or 8500 of title 10 USC, or any other provision of law or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress." 46. Naval Reserve Project, Naval War College, The Presidential Reserve Call-up: A Treatise for Military Commanders, Naval Reserve Paper No.2 Advanced Concepts Department, 1990. 1-20. 47. RAC-7, Headquarters Marine Corps, "The Call-Up Authorities and the Base Force" Point Paper, Undated. 48. Col. N.E. Williams, Marine Corps Service Planner, Memorandum for the Director, J-3 The Joint Staff "Assignment of Reserve Component (RC) Forces (J-3A 00175- 94), 7 Feb. 1994. This position is reinforced by the Assistant Secretary of Defense's (RA) opinion that all Navy and Marine Reserves should remain under peacetime control of the Secretary of the Navy, who will continue to provide units to the CINCs as required. The Current DoD Directive 5100.1 enumerates all functions of the Department of Defense and its major components. It certifies, that the function of the Military Department is to "... maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency." The Services remain in the best position to train and administer their Reserve Components. All Marine Corps units are trained against common standards to ensure their readiness is maintained across the spectrum of assigned missions. 49. FMFM 1-2 "The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense" (Washington, DC: United states Marine Corps. 1991), 3-7. 50. MGen. James E. Livingston and Col. Eric Chase, "Marine Reserve Force: Critical Back-Up Muscle for America's Post- Cold War Force-In-Readiness", Marine Corps Gazette, March 1994, 14-17. 51. Ibid. 52. Chase and Stone, 5. 53. Col. J.M. Maloney, "Peacetime Access to Reserve Component Capability" memorandum for CG MARRESFOR, 22 Jul. 1994. 54. Maj. C.W. Murphy, interview of 9 Dec 1994. 55. Ibid. 56. Tremel, Talking Points. 57. Col. J.M. Maloney, CG MARRESFOR Comments on ltr 1001, RAC-01 dtd 21 Jul 94 "Peacetime Access to Reserve Component Capability" 22 July 1994. 58. Department of the Navy Program Budget Decision, (PBD) "Reserve Initiatives", Reclama, PBD No: 718, undated. 59. Maj. C.W. Murphy, "Use of IMA's for contingency operations." Memorandum, 3 Aug 1994. 60. Unknown Author, "Peacetime Access to Reserve Component Capability", Point Paper, 26 Jul 1994. 61. Unknown Author, "Positive Deployment 95", Position Paper undated. 62. BGen. R.G. Richard, "Memorandum For the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs" 12 Oct 1994. BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Stephen P. Lt Col AUS (Ret). "Legislative Update." The Officer. September 1994: 7. Cabal, L.P. MSgt. "Understanding the Cubans" Continental Marine, Jan-Feb 1995/Vol. 18, No. 7; 12-13. Chase, Eric L. Col. and Stone, Douglas Lt Col. "The Next Generation: Marine Corps Vision 2000." Reserve Concepts and Issues Paper. 1994: 21. Commandant Marine Corps. UNCLAS Message to ALMAR 161/94 Subject: "Readiness Terminology" 271100Z May 94. Duncan, Stephen M. "A reservist's training isn't for social welfare." The Navy Times. 26 Dec 1994: 20. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2. "The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense." 21 Jun 1991: 3-7. Heidenthal, D.P. Lt Col. "Increased use of Reserve components in total force missions." 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