Joint Fires And Fire Support: Do We Have The Vision?
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Joint Fires and Fire Support: Do we have the
Vision?
Author: Major Michael J. Dean, United States Marine Corps.
Thesis: The Marine Corps must change the way it views fire
support in order to fully apply the concepts and meet the
goals outlined in "Forward From the Sea."
Background: Marines take pride in the combat power we are
able to generate through the synchronization of supporting
arms inherent in Naval Expeditionary Forces. However, this
view is an inward focus that does not display the vision
necessary for us to win on future battlefields or survive as
a Corps. We are entering into an entirely new era of
warfare. Future military success will depend on our ability
to fight with a joint perspective. We can not let
parochialism stand in our way.
Recommendations:
A number of recommendations are made throughout this
paper. These include such concepts as standardizing joint
fire support language; developing an awareness of joint
problems; understanding Marine Corps doctrine and using
common sense. Specific recommendations include enhancing
the Marine Corps liaison capabilities, improving our
Professional Military Education and changing the way our
Corps views joint duty.
However, the most critical recommendation is to make
changes to the way we think in order to respond to this
challenge. We must develop an awareness and understanding
of our sister services' systems and procedures in order to
remain a viable force and effectively use all assets that
are available in the joint environment.
JOINT FIRES AND FIRE SUPPORT: DO WE HAVE THE VISION?
Marines take pride in the combat power we are able to
generate through the synchronization and integration of
supporting arms inherent in Naval Expeditionary Forces.
However, we must become capable of drawing upon all the
unique assets and strengths that each service brings to a
conflict.
The Navy's strategic concept "Forward From the Sea"
emphasizes this fact. The Marine Corps, as part of the
Naval service must "...operate jointly to ensure that we can
operate successfully in all warfare areas..."1 The
coordination of those assets that contribute to operational
fires and tactical fire support is one part of this
requirement.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the way the
Marine Corps views fire support to determine if we have the
vision to fully apply the concepts and meet the goals
outlined in "Forward From the Sea." In organization, this
paper will follow the basic structure of our fire support
system. This system consists of three key elements:
Command, Control and Communication (C3), Weapons and
Ammunition and Target Acquisition.2
COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION
The requirements for joint warfare clearly indicate
that each service must be both interoperable and
complementary. To achieve this goal, it is imperative that
the services be flexible, versatile and have a common
understanding of doctrinal matters. In the area of fire
support, this includes knowledge of C3 systems and
procedures. Language is one element of these systems.
Unfortunately, language can become the barrier that we
must penetrate in order to be successful. While it can be a
facilitator, it can also become a stumbling block. As an
example, each service has an organization and/or an
individual who plans for the use of air power, controls the
function of air defense, coordinates air-to-ground support
operations, and coordinates ground fires.
Each performs similar, if not identical, functions.
However, depending on the branch of the service, each
organization or individual has a different title as
illustrated in the following table:
Table 1.
FUNCTION Marines Army/Air Force Navy
Air Planning TACC AOC TACC
Air Defense TAOC CRC AAWC
Air to Ground DASC ASOC ASCS
Fire Support FSCC FSE SACC
The problem is obvious, and it appears that education
could be a solution. However, communication between
services is even more critical. It is easy to envision a
breakdown simply because an individual or organization is
not aware of the other services' language. A better
solution lies in the establishment of and adherence to joint
doctrine, forcing the services to rid themselves of
parochial languages.
As Joint Pub 1-01.1 illustrates, the Department of
Defense has begun this process.3 However, we are not moving
fast enough. Recent events illustrate this point. In 1991
the United States (U.S.) military began to reduce its
footprint in Europe from approximately 336,000 to 100,000
active duty soldiers.4
However, as a result of international factors, the U.S.
military in Europe is now performing more missions, which
are more varied in nature. To achieve success, the services
must now rely upon each other for critical support.
Unfortunately, they are accomplishing all this well before
the "joint doctrine" is complete and the mechanisms are in
place to facilitate the actions.
Simple solutions are the best. In this respect, the
establishment of a common "joint language," or at least the
elimination of some parochial hold-outs, would make sense
and facilitate the synchronization of separate service
assets. In the area of fire support the standardization of
doctrinal language across all services would be a small
step. See the example below. These terms could describe
the same functions listed in Table 1.
Table 2.
FUNCTION STANDARD TERMS/LANGUAGE
Air Planning Air Coordination Center (ACC)
Air Defense Air Defense Center (ADC)
Air to Ground Air-Ground Coordination Center (AGCC)
Fire Support Fire Support Center (FSC)
Standardization and interoperability are the keys.
From Marine Corps perspective, we should take the lead and
immediately make the necessary changes to our doctrine and
training syllabi to cement joint language into our culture.
We do not need to hold on to the past terminology simply
because it is Marine. Only in those uniquely Marine areas
do we need our own language.
Another example of doctrinal problems is the discussion
over fire support coordination measures. The one item that
seems to cause the greatest concern is the definition and
placement of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).
Concerning this, common sense needs to be a common virtue.
In regards to the FSCL, Joint Publication 1-02 and
current Marine Corps publications amazingly provide the same
definition "...the FSCL is established by the appropriate
ground commander to ensure coordination of fire not under
his control, but which may affect current tactical
operations."5 The key is that this is the guidance provided
by both Marine Corps and joint doctrine.
A number of issues have risen about the use of the
FSCL. The most controversial being, how can we attack
targets beyond the FSCL without prior coordination?
However, by definition, "...this fire support coordination
measure permits the attack of targets forward of the FSCL
without prior coordination with the ground force
commander."6
For the Marines operating in a Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF), the commander of the Ground Combat Element
(GCE) would designate and coordinate the location of this
fire support coordination measure to support his plans. Any
strikes beyond the FSCL are the responsibility of the higher
headquarters.
When focusing on the MAGTF and the limited range of GCE
assets, parochialism permits us to believe that no real
coordination is necessary. However, in this case the
Command Element of the MAGTF would plan and control strikes
beyond the FSCL to influence the deep battle.
When Marines enter into the joint arena, they may no
longer be the only ground or air force. Depending on who
owns the airspace, as well as what boundaries are given to
the Marines, for the MAGTF to employ fire support assets
beyond the FSCL, the commander may have to coordinate with a
higher or other affected headquarters.
Not only does this reflect a common sense approach to
problems, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
clarified the issue in a memorandum.
...a fire support coordination line (FSCL) will be
designated by the land or amphibious force commander
and coordinated with the JFACC and other supporting
elements. It is a permissive fire support coordination
measure used to expedite fires.7
Therefore, control of all fires short of the FSCL,
including air interdiction, is the responsibility of the
appropriate ground force commander. Fires beyond the FSCL
are not subject to his approval or review. However, common
sense dictates that forces planning to attack targets or
operate beyond the FSCL must inform affected commanders.
This allows sufficient time to avoid friendly casualties as
well as providing for more efficient use of assets.
According to Marine Corps and joint doctrine, control
and coordination of all fires is a requirement. In any
situation involving deep fires beyond FSCL, if the Joint
Force Commander (JFC) designates a Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC), it is the ground forces' responsibility
to inform that organization of these strikes. Concerning
the Marine Corps, if it assigns a MAGTF to a Joint Task
Force (JTF), the MAGTF commander would have this
responsibility.
In its most simplistic form, an awareness of this
"jointness issue" and some basic common sense is what we
need. Our Corps should not view this as a limit on Marine
Corps' flexibility. We must view it as efficient usage of
assets and flexibility for the entire JTF.
Concerning this and the previous C3 issues, the bottom
line is for Marines to understand their own doctrine and use
common sense. We cannot afford to remain a prisoner of our
own culture. Otherwise, our parochialism may no longer be
only a critical vulnerability; it may become a center of
gravity.
Another key to any successful joint operation is
effective liaison at all levels between elements of the
various forces. This facilitates unity of purpose, intent
and standard procedures. As a testimony to this issues'
impact, some units that routinely operate in the joint
environment devote an entire staff section to this
requirement.
Concerning fire support, the best method is to
establish and train liaison teams that have their own
organic communications and a sufficient number of personnel
to operate continuously.8 The Marine Corps' air and naval
gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICO) are perfect for this
mission. Units such as these can turn this potential
critical vulnerability into a combat multiplier.
According to our doctrine, ANGLICO units provide
expertise in naval air and naval surface fire support to the
joint and combined arena.9 In this role, they also have
utility far beyond this task. The use of this resource as a
communication and connectivity link between forces is a
clear example.
However, besides training to accomplish these missions,
there is another significant hurdle to overcome: manpower.
There are never enough personnel or assets to accomplish
this liaison task. There are only four ANGLICO companies in
the Marine Corps; of these, only two are active. In
addition, as with most Marine Corps organizations, personnel
shortages are a matter of routine. In this case, the
shortage is critical.
Ideally, ANGLICO provides liaison teams for a U.S. or
Allied division and three of its brigades. Each brigade
team provides support for two battalions and two companies
within each battalion. However, due to a number of factors
ranging from operational tempo to unit strength, very few
teams are available to support missions other than those
which occur on a regular basis.
The primary reasons for this shortage is a decision
made by the Marine Corps in 1986 to provide a task organized
control and liaison team from ANGLICO to each Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU). As a result, three teams
simultaneously support three MEUs on each coast. Therefore,
approximately 1/3 of ANGLICO's combat strength is
unavailable to fulfill the unit's primary mission.
Additionally, real world contingencies in locations
such as Haiti and Bosnia also put a strain this unit.
Without augmentation from the Marine Corps Reserve, some
innovative staffing or "global sourcing" (which can
breakdown the cohesive fabric of any combat unit), this unit
is not be capable of meeting its primary task.10
With the increasing importance and evolving nature of
joint operations, these liaison functions are becoming more
critical and essential to success. As the Marine Corps
continues to "right size," it should give consideration to
enhancing this organization. It would be worthwhile to
increase this unit's Table of Organization by at least the
same number of personnel supporting the MEUs.
Another recommendation would be to increase the size of
this organization from two active duty companies to four or
at least double the number of operators assigned to 1st and
2nd ANGLICO. In terms of manpower, this equates to 18
Officers and 108 enlisted Marines for each company. Lending
greater flexibility to any MAGTF or JTF, the benefit to both
the Marine Corps and the nation would far outweigh this
relatively small manpower cost.
As discussed earlier, clear doctrine, communication
systems and the liaison functions are keys to success in
this environment. However, just admitting that there may be
a problem is the first step the Marine Corps needs to take
to improve in the joint fire support arena. The area of
weapons and ammunition will follow.
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
By virtue of the Marine Corps force structure and
heritage, fighting as a combined arms team is "...second
nature to Marine Corps units."11 While we profess great
capability in the employment of Marine systems, as a direct
result of our organization's culture, we give little
consideration to the integration of other component assets.
For example, how many Marine Fire Support Coordinators
(FSC) understand the capabilities and limitations of
conventional Air Force aircraft, Army attack helicopters,
A-TACMS or the Navy's Tomahawk missiles. Concerning the
nonlethal area, what about the capabilities and limitations
of assets from those services that support the pillars of
Command and Control Warfare (C2W) such as electronic
warfare, deception and PSYOPS?12
Not only are we, as an organization, deficient in the
understanding of these resources, but we are grossly unaware
of the new systems and capabilities that are under
development. Marines must be aware that each service has
programs that imagine "...a world of enhanced battlefield
intelligence, enlarged communications networks, space-based
weaponry and sensor to shooter technologies."13
Any Marine with interests in fire support should remain
cognizant of these issues. As a member of the naval
service, we should also have an awareness of such items as
the Navy's research and development efforts into a self
escorting, stealth type aircraft. In addition, we should
acknowledge their emphasis on using technology to enhance
surface fire capability. For example, by placing an MLRS
type missile aboard ship, as well as using liquid or
electrothermal propellants, we may once again have a
credible naval surface fire support platform.14
To be true experts in this arena, Marines must think
beyond service boundaries. This requires a complete
knowledge of the current and future capabilities that each
service can bring to the battlefield. However, this is not
merely a question of awareness of the weapon systems, but we
must expand this knowledge to include our sister services'
culture, tactics, doctrine, command, control, communication
and intelligence systems.
We can achieve success in this area and cover our
cultural and doctrinal flanks through education. However,
the process must begin early in a Marine's career. As an
example, it is amazing that a group of our brightest company
grade officers attending the Amphibious Warfare School were
unaware that the Air Force conducts Close Air Support (CAS)
missions.15
As professionals and as an institution, we must take a
wider view of this process to become truly joint. The most
likely locations to begin to infuse this information would
be in our career-level schools and non-resident courses.
However, our Professional Military Education (PME) system
currently does not provide an adequate understanding of our
sister services' systems or approach to warfare. We need an
aggressive program to make us aware of these resources.
This is a critical failure of our academic institutions: the
Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps Institute.
Taking a more pragmatic approach, in addition to
education, joint training can also be the "...steel that
welds."16 our services together. In this respect, joint
duty assignments for officers, external assignments for
enlisted Marines and joint training exercises can provide
invaluable experiences. The Marine Corps is slowly moving
in that direction. However, we also need a shock to this
system.
Concerning joint duty, in an era of increasing
"jointness" it seems that the options are too far and too
few between. Because of manpower constraints, these
assignments are only available to a few officers. In fact,
as a result of "right sizing," there is a conscious effort
to reduce this total even further. In regards to enlisted
Marines and what the Marine Corps calls an external
assignment, the same applies.
Additionally, within our Corps and our culture, we view
this duty as marking time, "skate duty" or a necessary evil.
In the officer's case, we often refer to this as the "Texaco
Syndrome." The duty that he or she needs to "stay in the
game" and remain promotable.17
As a Corps, we need to alter the way we think. We can
not wait for another promotion list to be in question for us
to accept the value of this duty. One way to demonstrate
the importance of this duty would be to increase not
decrease the number of joint billets available to Marines.
In support of this we could establish joint billets at each
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
The Navy is already present in our expeditionary forces
and will probably increase its presence in the near
future.18 Concerning fires and fire support, we could
easily incorporate other services by designating billets in
our Force Fires Center as joint. Our deploying units would
benefit from our sister service expertise and this would
also support the MEF's efforts to be true purple
organization.
Of course, we would pay a price. The current manpower
system would require us to offer up Marine Corps personnel
to perform similar functions in Army and Air Force
organizations. However, this is not a direct cost to our
manpower system. It is simply a one for one replacement.
While there are other hidden costs, designation of
joint billets at the MEF Force Fires Center would obviously
provide more options for joint duty. To this end, it would
improve our Corps' ability to function in that arena,
benefiting both the Marine Corps and the nation. Hence, the
price would be worth the investment.
Approaching this issue from another aspect, while joint<